Employment Judge E SearleyJeremy Raizon (instructed by Counsel) for claimantDate 1 July 2025
JUDGMENT
The claimant was not an employee or worker of the respondent at the relevant time. The claims are therefore dismissed in their entirety because the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to determine them.
REASONS
[1]By a claim form presented on 3 May 2024, the Claimant brought a claim against the Respondent for unfair dismissal, unauthorised deductions from wages, and failure to provide an itemised pay statement. Early conciliation via ACAS began on 2 April, and a certificate was issued by ACAS on 4 April.[2]Between March 2020 and February 2024, the Claimant and the Respondent were in a personal relationship during which they became engaged. They moved in together in December 2021, buying a home together, and lived there together until the relationship broke down in early 2024. The Respondent’s business was run from the home address.[3]The Claimant asserts that she was employed by the Respondent between 1 October 2021 and 7 January 2024 when she was summarily dismissed. The Claimant’s case is that she was the office manager for the Respondent’s business which performed diagnostic and repair services for home appliances and electronics, and that she performed that role under a contract of employment on a full-time basis. The Respondent’s case is that he never employed the Claimant. He asserts that she assisted him with the operational running of the business because she was in a relationship with him, but she never held a formal status within his business. The role was not a full-time role, but amounted to ad-hoc assistance and it was not performed under any contract of employment.[4]Oral Judgment was provided at the hearing on 5 March 2025, and a request for written reasons was received on 13 March 2025, prior to the written Judgment being provided to the parties.
Issues
[5]The preliminary issue is the Claimant’s status. Specifically, the question of whether the Claimant was an employee or worker within the meaning of s.230 ERA 1996.[6]Such a status is a pre-requisite to the Claimant’s ability to bring these claims. Unless she is an employee, the tribunal has no jurisdiction to hear her claim of unfair dismissal, and unless she is an employee or a worker, the tribunal has no jurisdiction to hear her claim of unauthorised deductions from wages and failure to provide an itemised pay statement.
The hearing
[7]The matter was listed for final hearing before me on 4 and 5 March 2025. At the outset of the hearing, and following discussion with the parties, the final hearing was converted to a public preliminary hearing to deal with the issue of the Claimant’s status.[8]During the preliminary hearing, I heard evidence from the Claimant and the Respondent, and a witness – Mr Laszlo Gulyas – who gave evidence on behalf of the Claimant via an interpreter. To determine the preliminary issue, I only heard evidence as to the Claimant’s employment status. I read and considered the evidence before me in the bundle prepared for the hearing, including the supplemental bundle and documents produced during the hearing. I have not considered the evidence of a Mr Eghed, who provided a witness statement on behalf of the Respondent but did not attend to give evidence.
Findings of fact
[9]The relevant facts are as follows. Where I have had to resolve any conflict of evidence, I will explain how I have done so. References to page numbers are to the agreed Bundle of documents.[10]In March 2020, the Claimant met the Respondent, and they began a relationship. At that time, she was employed in a primary school and remained there until she left that role on 31 August 2021 (that is her leaving date, as recorded on the P45 in the bundle (at page 48)). The Respondent was an appliance engineer and operated a small business repairing home appliances and electronics. He has been in business for 13 years and was running that business when he met and began his relationship with the Claimant.[11]On 12 February 2021, the Respondent engaged the services of Croner to provide employment services to his business (see the additional document provided during the hearing on 4 March 2025). The document describes those services as being “preparation and updating of employment documentation and 24/7 telephone advice on employment law, HR and payroll matters and access to BrightHR Online portal”. He paid a monthly fee of £181 for that service. The document describes the Respondent’s “Company name” as “NonStopDiag”. Croner handled his employment matters thereafter.[12]On 6 April 2021, the Respondent employed a second engineer for his business – Mr Eghed. The contract (pg. 225) states that Mr Eghed’s employment was to be with “Mr Zortmund Horvath trading as NonStopDiag.com.”[13]On 17 June 2021, the Respondent made an offer of employment to Mr Gulyas, whose evidence was that, at that time, the Respondent’s business consisted of Mr Eghed, Mr Horvath and a woman called Laura who managed the office.[14]Around September 2021, the Claimant moved in with the Respondent at his home at Notley Road in Essex. In December 2021, the Claimant and the Respondent bought a home together in Trinity Road in Halstead, and thereafter the Respondent carried on his business from that address.[15]The mortgage was taken out in joint names, and the Claimant’s prior employment enabled the couple to purchase a larger home than the Respondent could have purchased alone. The Respondent states that he paid the mortgage, by putting funds into a joint account from which the mortgage payments were taken. The Claimant states that the Respondent deducted her share of the mortgage payments from the salary that was due to her as an employee.[16]The Claimant gave evidence that she began employment with the Respondent on 1 October 2021 as an Office Manager. Mr Gulyas’s evidence was that Laura left the Respondent’s business in October and her role was taken over by the Claimant. The Claimant said that she was provided with a contract of employment by the Respondent. She gave no other evidence about any discussion with the Respondent as to how her employment might work (for example a discussion about terms and conditions).[17]The Claimant described her role as being answering the calls from clients (both private and corporate clients such as Howdens), documenting the requests for repair, and inputting them into a google calendar. She would then arrange with the engineer and see if parts needed to be ordered and make herself available to deal with any deliveries. She would call customers to confirm the repairs. She had to put the Howdens requests into a separate system, and it was not possible to access that remotely, but otherwise she could deal with client calls remotely. I therefore find it was possible for the Claimant to perform the majority of these tasks away from the home. The Claimant stated that she would talk to the Respondent if she was poorly or needed to leave early. She would ask his permission to go and do something and the Respondent would look after matters in her absence.[18]The Respondent agrees that the Claimant did perform tasks of that type, but she did it because she had offered to help him not because she was an employee. He explained that prior to the Claimant providing that help he had used someone called Laura to do it, but she had left in August or September 2021. The Respondent said that, when he had enough engineers to cover the repair work, then he was able to perform the office management tasks himself, and that he would also do that whenever the Claimant was not available to help. He stated that the Claimant did not need the Respondent’s permission to not provide that help. She was free to do what she wanted. In essence, his evidence was that there was no obligation on the Claimant to help, but that she did help him.[19]The Respondent had hired a second engineer (Mr Eghed) in April 2021 and taken Mr Gulyas on in June 2021. I find the Respondent therefore did have more time available to him for admin work as a result. Mr Gulyas’ evidence was that by December 2021, it was mainly him and Mr Eghed performing the engineer work, as the Respondent was taken up with working on the house he had bought with the Claimant. Mr Gulyas stated that the Claimant was still working for the Respondent at that time. Mr Gulyas resigned in March 2022.[20]There are two documents which the Claimant says evidence her employment. The first is the document at page 40 of the bundle entitled statement of main terms of employment (the “main terms” document).[21]The main terms document appears to be an agreement between the Claimant and a company called “NonStopDiag”. There was some confusion in the evidence as to whether the Respondent traded under the name “NonStopDiag” or “NonStopDiag.com”, however it was not in dispute that those names referred to the Respondent’s company, and therefore this is not an issue I need to resolve.[22]The main terms document is signed by the Claimant only, and not by any person on behalf of NonStopDiag. It is dated 1 October 2021 and states that it sets out the particulars of main terms of employment under which NonStopDiag would employ the Claimant. It does not include the Respondent’s personal name (i.e. Zotmund Horvath) at all. The role described is office manager, the working hours are 40 hours a week (Monday to Sunday including evening and weekend working) and the salary was described as being £22k per annum paid monthly by bank transfer in arrears on the last working day of the month.[23]Contrary to the claimant’s evidence I find that the claimant was not given this document by the Respondent for the following reasons:a. The document is unsigned. If, as the Claimant contends, it was always the Respondent’s intention to enter into a contract of employment with her, there is no plausible reason for the Respondent not to have signed the document. I do not accept Mr Raizen’s submission that the Respondent did not sign it to protect himself from some hypothetical future employment tribunal claim.b. The document is different from all the other employment contracts between the Respondent and his other employees provided in the bundle, most particularly in the way that the name of the employer is described. All the other employment contracts the Respondent entered into are made between “Zotmund Horvath trading as NonstopDIAG.com” and the relevant employee. Given the Respondent was a sole trader, trading as Nonstopdiag.com, there is no plausible reason why the parties in the main terms document are not Mr Horvath and the Claimant.c. There was no need for the Claimant to be able to drive to perform her role, and no basis for the contract to be conditional on whether she could, particularly given her evidence was that she could and did perform her role remotely.d. All the other employment contracts have a consistency of structure and font and are signed, as to be expected, by both parties to the agreement. The Respondent had engaged the services of Croner to perform the service of the preparation of employment contracts for him and he paid a monthly fee for that service. I infer that all of the other employment contracts, which are consistent, were drawn up by Croner as part of that service. There is no plausible reason for the Respondent not to have used that same service to prepare a contract of employment for the Claimant in the same way.e. The evidence shows that the Respondent’s business, at the time of the Claimant’s employment, consisted of two engineers (one of whom was the Respondent). It is inherently implausible that the Respondent needed a 40 hour a week office manager to manage that volume of work and to justify a contract of that type with the Claimant.f. The Claimant’s explanation for why the main terms document was unsigned was not a compelling one. As someone who had been employed before, it was not unreasonable for her to know that an employer should sign a contract of employment.[24]Accordingly, I do not accept that the main terms document is evidence of a contract of employment between the Claimant and the Respondent.[25]The second piece of documentary evidence is the new employee form at page 39 of the bundle. Contrary to the claimant’s evidence I find that the new employee form was not completed by her in September 2021 for the following reasons:a. The Claimant’s new employee form is dated 7 September 2021, and notes that it attaches a copy of the P45 from her previous employer. The P45 at page 48 of the bundle shows that the Claimant’s P45 was only dated 4 October 2021. The Claimant therefore did not have a P45 to attach at that time.b. There is no evidence from anyone other than the Claimant that the Respondent used these forms. On balance, I prefer the Respondent’s evidence that he would use the service provided by Croner for recording this information, given he paid a monthly fee for that service. That is also consistent with the fact that there are no forms of this type for Ms Boston and Ms Furness.c. It is inherently unlikely that the Respondent would issue and ask the Claimant to complete a new employee form in September 2021 in advance of the contract being agreed between them (which on her own evidence occurred in October 2021).[26]Accordingly, I do not accept that the Claimant’s new starter form was provided to her by the Respondent in September 2021 and does not evidence an intention to enter into an employment contract with her. Having reached this conclusion, I do not consider it necessary to reach a view on whether Mr Eghed and Mr Gulyas’s new starter forms were used by the Respondent or not as they do not provide any evidence of the agreement in place between the Respondent and the Claimant.[27]The Respondent states that there was no obligation on the Claimant to perform the role, and that he performed the role himself whenever she was unavailable. She did not need his permission to not perform the role. I accept that evidence. The nature of the role and the size of the business, at least at the time the Claimant began giving assistance, are not consistent with a 40 hour a week administrative role. I find it is more likely than not that the Claimant helped out when she could on an ad-hoc basis but was not obliged to do so when she could not.[28]Between October 2021 and April 2022, a company called “Repairmygoods” was set up in the Claimant’s name with the Claimant operating as a sole trader. I do not consider that the facts relating to this business help me in determining the Claimant’s employment status for the purposes of this claim.[29]In October 2023, the Respondent obtained a contract with Domestic and General, and expected it to increase trade significantly. That same month, the Claimant engaged a Melinda Szabo as an administration contractor. There are no documents relating to her employment in the bundle. It is not in dispute that the Claimant sought to help show Melinda Szabo how to deal with calls and bookings, but ultimately the Respondent travelled to Hungary to train her personally.[30]On 1 January 2024, the Respondent employed Zoe Boston as a part time office administrator, working 20 hours per week. It is not in dispute that the appointment of Ms Boston was a source of contention between the Claimant and the Respondent.[31]The Claimant states that on 7 January 2024 the Respondent summarily dismissed her. The Respondent says he did not dismiss her because he never employed her.[32]On 22 February 2024, Mark Young from Howdens provided the Claimant, at her request, with a reference. In the course of the correspondence, he asked her “don’t you work for Nonstopdiag anymore” (see page 60 of the bundle). She also asked Mr Eghed if he would provide her with a reference and he also agreed (see page 75 of the bundle).[33]On 3 March, the Claimant wrote to the Respondent (see page 62) complaining about the Respondent’s treatment of her. She asked the Respondent for £35,000 to settle matters between them and allow the Respondent to keep the house. The Respondent replied the same day stating that he could not obtain £35,000 in such a short period of time.[34]On 15 April 2024, the Claimant emailed the Respondent asking him to provide a reference for her. She wrote out what she wished the reference to say and asked the Respondent to put it on headed paper. The Respondent accepts he provided the Claimant with a reference of this type. He provided it because he had reached an agreement with the claimant in relation to their house by then. He accepted what was written in the letter was not true.[35]There are bank statements in the bundle which show the payment of regular funds from the Respondent to the Claimant. The first payment is dated 13 October 2021. Amounts are paid until 14 February 2024. The amounts paid are not described consistently nor are they paid in a pattern. For example, in the month of January 2023, the Respondent paid the Claimant a total of £1430 and in the month of March 2023, he paid £900. There are no payslips for the entire period the Claimant states she was employed.[36]I accept, and indeed the Respondent does not dispute, that the facts show that the Claimant was performing a role for the business. It appears that at certain points in time, that role was quite a busy one, and likely did take up a portion of the Claimant’s time. I also accept that to those outside of the business, the role performed by the Claimant gave the impression that she was working for the Respondent in some capacity (in particular to Howdens and Mr Gulyas).
Relevant law
[37]The statutory definitions of employee and worker are contained in s.230 ERA 1996 which, so far as relevant, provides:(1) In this Act “employee” means an individual who has entered into or works under (or, where the employment has ceased, worked under) a contract of employment.(2) In this Act “contract of employment” means a contract of service or apprenticeship, whether express or implied, and (if it is express) whether oral or in writing.(3) In this Act “worker” (except in the phrases “shop worker” and “betting worker”) means an individual who has entered into or works under (or, where the employment has ceased, worked under) – (a) a contract of employment, or (b) any other contract, whether express or implied and (if it is express) whether oral or in writing, whereby the individual undertakes to do or perform personally any work or services for another party to the contract whose status is not by virtue of the contract that of a client or customer of any profession or business undertaking carried on by the individual; and any reference to a worker's contract shall be construed accordingly.[38]Reg 2(1) WTR 1998 adopts the same definition of worker as the ERA.[39]The protection from unfair dismissal is a right which is only afforded to employees as defined by s.230(1). Whereas certain provisions of the ERA, such as the protection against unlawful deductions from wages and the right to an itemised pay statement, extend to workers as defined by s.230(3).[40]Therefore, the employment status of the Claimant will determine what protections, if any, are afforded under the Employment Rights Act and accordingly what claims, if any, might be pursued before the Employment Tribunal. An employment contract[41]In determining whether a claimant has employment status of one kind or another, a tribunal must first be satisfied that there is some form of contract between the individual and the putative employer. In the absence of a contract, whether express or implied, and whether made orally or in writing, there can be no employment relationship (IDS Handbook, Volume 6, 2.22).[42]The essence of the employment relationship is therefore a contractual one, overlaid with certain statutory rights and protections. For a contract to exist, several conditions must be satisfied. Firstly, there must be an agreement which usually takes the form of an offer of employment which is accepted. Secondly, the agreement must be made with the intention of creating legal relations, and thirdly, the agreement must be supported by consideration – something of benefit must pass from one party to the contract to the other. In employment contracts this usually takes the form of a service performed in return for the payment of wages (IDS Handbook, Volume 3, 1.1-1.2). (i) The offer[43]The test to be applied in determining whether an offer has been made is an objective one, but, per the decision in Blue v Ashley 2017 EWHC 1928 (Comm), QBD, at paragraph 64, where the Tribunal is dealing with an oral agreement: “evidence of the subjective understanding of the parties is admissible in so far as it tends to show whether, objectively, an agreement was reached, and if so, what its terms were and whether it was intended to be legally binding. Evidence of subsequent conduct is admissible on the same basis”.[44]An apparent intention to be bound by the offer may be considered sufficient if a reasonable person would believe that, as a result of the offeror's words or actions, they intended to be bound. In cases of conflicting evidence, the court or employment tribunal will determine, based on its findings of fact, whether an offer was made (IDS Handbook, Volume 3, 1.3). (ii) Intention to create legal relations: presumption in relation to family members[45]This must be considered objectively, (see RTS Flexible Systems Ltd v Molkerei Alois Müller GmbH and Co KG 2010 1 WLR 753, SC). However, again, evidence showing the subjective intentions of the parties, and of their subsequent conduct, is admissible where it sheds light on whether, objectively, there was an intention to create legal relations (see Blue v Ashley 2017 EWHC 1928 (Comm), QBD) (IDS Handbook, Volume 3, 1.9).[46]The context in which any agreement is being reached will be relevant to whether or not there was an intention to create legally binding relations. In Blakely v On-Site Recruitment Solutions Ltd and Anor EAT 0134/17, the EAT overturned an Employment Tribunal Decision which found that the putative employer (ORS Ltd) did not intend to create legal relations with the putative employee (B), noting at paragraph 37 that: “the context was clearly a commercial one of an individual seeking work for which he would expect to be paid. This is not a family or domestic arrangement where there might be some presumption against there being any intention to create legal relations. The Claimant would expect that if he was not paid for work done, there would be some legal recourse.”[47]The relevant law in relation to that presumption is neatly summarised in the case of Barry & Anor v Barry [2024] EWHC 1661 (KB) at paragraph 1: “For a contract to be legally binding, there must be an intention to create legal relations…Often whether the contract is intended by the parties to be legally enforceable is not in doubt, certainly not in most commercial settings, where there is a presumption, often said to be a strong or "heavy" one, that such an intention is built into the situation (Edwards v Skyways [1964] 1 WLR 349, 355). In other words, a commercial relationship creates a strong presumption of an intention to be legally binding…given that matters within a family are often sorted out without an intention of strict enforcement through the courts, the legal presumption operates in the opposite direction: it is presumed that there is no intention to create legal relations (Jones v Padavatton (1969) 1 WLR 328, 331, per Salmon LJ). However, that presumption can be rebutted by evidence of contrary intention (ibid. at 332-33). This is because contract law retains a flexibility to reflect the true intentions of the parties and the seriousness of the situation.” (iii) Consideration[48]In Ready Mixed Concrete (South East) Ltd v Minister of Pensions and National Insurance 1968 1 All ER 433, QBD, Mr Justice Mackenna stated that: “in order for a contract of employment to exist there must be a wage or other remuneration. Otherwise there will be no consideration, and without consideration no contract of any kind”.[49]Consideration can exist in the form of notional, rather than received, pay (Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills v Knight 2014 IRLR 605, EAT).[50]An absence of an agreement on the amount of salary or wages to be paid will normally indicate that a contract of employment has not been formed yet. However, a contract — whether of service or for services — can in principle exist even if the parties have not agreed the amount of remuneration (see Stack v Ajar-Tec Ltd 2012 EWCA Civ 543, CA) Employee Status[51]Returning to the definitions in the ERA, assuming a contract exists, the next question is whether such a contract amounts to a contract of service. There is no statutory definition of a contract of service, as described in s.230(2).[52]Per the IDS Handbook, Volume 6, 2.23 the approach to identifying a contract of service is “to apply a multifactorial test focusing on three factors, all of which are essential but none of which is determinative in itself — namely, mutuality of obligation, personal service and the exercise of control”.[53]In Ready Mixed Concrete (South East) Ltd v Minister of Pensions and National Insurance [1968] 2QB 497 at 515, MacKenna J. said: “A contract of service exists if these three conditions are fulfilled.(i) The servant agrees that, in consideration of a wage or other remuneration, he will provide his own work and skill in the performance of some service for his master.(ii) He agrees, expressly or impliedly, that in the performance of that service he will be subject to the other's control in a sufficient degree to make that other master.(iii) The other provisions of the contract are consistent with its being a contract of service.”[54]The authorities establish that there is an irreducible minimum threshold to establish a contract of service, consisting of mutuality of obligation, personal performance, and control.[55]Carmichael v National Power plc [1999] ICR 1226 (at 1230) is authority for the proposition that if there were no obligation on the employer to provide work, and none on the putative employee to undertake it, there would be “an absence of that irreducible minimum of mutual obligation necessary to create a contract of service.”[56]In Cotswold Developments Construction Ltd v Williams [2006] IRLR 181 Langstaff J concluded that: “It cannot simply be control that determines whether a contract is a contract of employment or not. The contract must also necessarily relate to mutual obligations to work, and to pay for (or provide) it: to what is known in labour economics as the “wage-work bargain”… Regard must be had to the nature of the obligations mutually entered into to determine whether a contract formed by the exchange of those obligations is one of employment, or should be categorised differently.”[57]An agreement under which there was never an obligation on a worker to do work, or on the company to provide work could not be a contract of service (see Nethermere (St Neots) Ltd v Taverna [1984] ICR 612). The employee must be subject to an obligation to accept and perform some minimum, or at least reasonable, amount of work for the alleged employer. A mere expectation that an individual will undertake a certain amount of work is not the same as an obligation to do so (see Hafal Ltd v Lane-Angell, UKEAT/0107/17).[58]Assuming mutuality of obligation exists, the next question is that of control. The question is not whether the employer controls the way the putative employee does the work, rather whether the employer can, under the terms of the contract, direct her/him in what s/he did (Wright v Aegis Defence Services (BVI) Ltd, UKEAT/0173/17/DM at [35]).[59]Lastly, in relation to the third element of the test – whether the other provisions of the contract are consistent with its being a contract of service – it will be necessary to consider many different aspects of the person's work activity, and that is not a mechanistic or tick box exercise. Not all details are of equal weight or importance in any given situation (see Hall (Inspector of Taxes) v Lorimer [1994] ICR 218). Worker status[60]Anyone who meets the definition of an employee will meet the definition of worker. However, the ERA also recognises what has been described as an “intermediate class” falling between employees and self-employed independent contractors (see Bates van Winkelhof v Clyde and Co LLP and Anor (Public Concern at Work intervening) 2014 ICR 730, SC).[61]In Sejpal v Rodericks Dental Ltd 2022 ICR 1339, EAT, HHJ Tayler set out the following approach to the determination of worker status:a. The starting point must be the words of the statute.b. Focus on the statutory language means there must be a contract between the worker and the putative employer.c. The true nature of the agreement must be ascertained, and contractual wording must not be allowed to detract from the statutory test and purpose.d. A realistic and worldly-wise determination of the true nature of the agreement between the parties must be undertaken with a focus on the statutory provision.e. The concept of mutuality of obligation goes principally to the issue of whether there is a relevant agreement, or agreements. There must be mutuality of obligation for there to be a contract at all.
Conclusions
[62]Whilst my factual findings show that the Claimant was performing some sort of role for the business, and that others outside of the business believed she was working for the Respondent in some capacity, those facts do not, without more, establish on what legal basis the Claimant was performing that role. They are equally as consistent with the Claimant helping the Respondent out as they are with her being an employee.[63]I have explained in my findings of fact that I do not accept that there was a written contract of employment between the Claimant and the Respondent.[64]Therefore, I have considered whether there is other evidence of an oral contract between the Claimant and the Respondent. Applying the legal principles:a. Absent the main terms document and the new starter form, which I do not accept, there was no evidence before me that an offer of employment was made to the Claimant. I conclude that the evidence of the subjective understanding of the parties, and their subsequent conduct, shows that it is more likely than not that an informal agreement was reached between the Claimant and the Respondent that she would help him out with the business as needed because she was not working in another role. Such a role is consistent with a business the size of the Respondent’s business, and also consistent with the fact that when the Respondent anticipated further growth in his business, he sought to engage formal administrative support by contracting with individuals other than the Claimant. The fact that Mr Gulyas and Howdens saw her as an employee is not inconsistent with the Claimant performing a role as helper rather than employee.b. The legal presumption in a case of family arrangements is that there is no intention to create legal relations. Absent the main terms document and the new starter form, which I do not accept, there was no evidence before me that the Respondent intended to create legal relations with the Claimant in an employment context. The evidence of the subjective understanding of the parties, and their subsequent conduct, shows that the Claimant offered to help the Respondent and support him as his partner. It does appear that, through the Claimant’s assistance, the Respondent’s business grew and succeeded, and I understand why the Claimant might feel aggrieved following the breakdown of the relationship that she deserved recognition for the support she had given. However, the law is concerned with what the intention of the parties was at the time of the agreement, and I do not consider that there was an intention to create legal relations. If there was, there would be no reason for the Respondent not to have provided the Claimant with a signed contract of employment as he did for all his other employees.c. I have considered whether there was consideration, taking account of the fact that a contract for services can exist even if the parties have not agreed on remuneration, and whether the pay is notional rather than received pay. There is no doubt that the Respondent supported the Claimant financially during the period. However, there is no evidence that these sums of money were paid as consideration for her assistance with the business. The amounts are random and inconsistently described. They were not paid in regular amounts or described as a salary at any point. The Claimant, despite having been employed previously, never queried the failure to provide a payslip. It is implausible that she did not seek to somehow regularise this, had she genuinely believed that she was performing work under a contract of employment. The payments made are consistent with a couple living together, and one partner providing financial support to another.d. I have also considered whether there was any obligation on her to provide the services she performed. My findings of fact show that there was not. The fact that she could do most of the tasks remotely means, in my judgment, that it was easy for her to offer the help without curtailing her own ability to live her life. The fact that she may, with the benefit of hindsight, have offered the Respondent far more help than she now wishes she had done, does not mean she was under an obligation at the time to do so.e. I have considered the fact that the Respondent wrote a reference for the Claimant describing her as having been employed by him. I note that, on his account, this was an untrue statement. However, I do not consider that to be evidence of a legally binding contract existing between the Claimant and the Respondent. It is consistent with the Respondent seeking to bring matters to a conclusion with the Claimant following the breakdown of their relationship. I do not consider that it materially impacts on the Respondent’s credibility, as his explanation that he wanted matters resolved is a plausible one.[65]It follows that I do not consider that there was a contract between the Claimant and the Respondent. Accordingly, the claimant cannot satisfy the definition in s.230, either as an employee or a worker.[66]In any event, my findings on the evidence show that I do not accept there was mutuality of obligation – either for the Claimant to perform the work or the Respondent to pay her to do so. Accordingly, even if there was some sort of oral or implied agreement between the Claimant and the Respondent the irreducible minimum necessary to establish a contract of service (and therefore a contract of employment) for the purposes of s.230 is not established on the facts.[67]When considering her status as a worker, focus on the statutory language requires a contract between the worker and the putative employer. I have found that no such written contract existed. In relation to an oral or implied agreement, there must still be mutuality of obligation for there to be a contract at all (and therefore a relevant agreement under the statute). My findings on the evidence show that there was no such mutuality of obligation, and therefore no relevant agreement under the statute.[68]The Claimant was not an employee or worker of the Respondent at the relevant time. The claims are therefore dismissed because the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to determine them. Approved by