Ms S Walters v Croydon Health Services NHS Trust: 2302757/2024

EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS

Case No 2302757/2024

Between

Ms S WaltersClaimant

Croydon Health Services NHS TrustRespondent

Before

Employment Judge Ramsden

Date 11 November 2025

JUDGMENT

[1]The Claimant has no reasonable prospect of persuading the Tribunal at the Final Hearing that it has jurisdiction to determine her Claim, given she did not comply with the ACAS Early Conciliation requirements in section 18A of the Employment Tribunals Act 1996 before presenting her Claim on 8 March 2024. The Claim is struck out pursuant to Rule 38(1)(a) of the Employment Tribunal Procedure Rules 2024 (the ET Rules).

[2]The Respondent indicated an intention to make an application for costs, and it must make any such application within 14 days of the date of this judgment, by way of variation to Rule 75(1) of the ET Rules, pursuant to Rule 5(7), given the time given over to that possible costs application in today’s hearing.

REASONS

17. The Claimant’s application for reconsideration is rejected, because none of the grounds for reconsideration raised by the Claimant provide any reasonable prospect of the strike out decision reached on 11 November 2025 being varied or revoked.

18. Ground 1: This ground is without merit. There was no private discussion between the Employment Judge and the Respondent’s representative.

19. Ground 2: The Employment Judge stated in the hearing that the Tribunal records showed that the Orders of EJ Ord had been sent to the Claimant’s representative’s email address, which is the Claimant’s preferred method of contact on file, and is the email address from which the Claimant’s mother has emailed the Tribunal on the Claimant’s representative throughout this Claim. As it turned out, whether or not those Orders were read by the Claimant or her representative made no difference to the outcome of the case, as the Employment Judge determined to strike out the Claim for want of jurisdiction pursuant to the decision in Reynolds v Abel Estates Ltd and others [2025] EWCA Case Number: 2302757/2024 5 of 5 Civ 1357 that a failure to comply with section 18A of the Employment Tribunals Act 1996 is something that goes to the Tribunal’s jurisdiction (or competence) to hear the Claim. That decision had not been published by the date of EJ Ord’s Orders. Whether or not the Claimant had received or read EJ Ord’s Orders ahead of the hearing on 11 November 2025 made no difference to the outcome of that hearing.

20. Ground 3: The Claimant is incorrect: EJ Beck did not accept the Claimant’s amendment applications, but Ordered that any amendment applications made by the Claimant were to be determined at the Public Preliminary Hearing EJ Beck listed (paragraph 4(b) of EJ Beck’s Orders), and the Claimant was obliged to set out clear details of any amendment sought (paragraph 9 of those Orders). EJ Beck’s Orders say nothing about the Claimant’s compliance with ACAS Early Conciliation. In any event, clarification of the fact that a failure to comply with ACAS Early Conciliation goes to the Tribunal’s jurisdiction only emerged from the Court of Appeal’s decision in the Reynolds case after the hearing before EJ Beck. Any decision by EJ Beck would, in any event, be ‘trumped’ by the precedent set by the Court of Appeal which is binding on the Employment Tribunal.

21. Ground 4: EJ Ramsden considers the strike-out to not only be justified, but to be required, by the doctrine of precedent: the Employment Tribunal is bound to apply the law as interpreted by the Court of Appeal in the Reynolds case where the Employment Judge considers it to be directly applicable, which was (and remains) the case here. This was explained by her several times in the oral hearing on 11 November 2025, in what EJ Ramsden considers to be an oral judgment which complied with the requirement of Rule 60(7) and the decision in Meek, and this has in any event since been set down in written reasons sent to the Parties which EJ Ramsden again considers to comply with Rule 60(7) and the decision in Meek. DECISION

22. For the reasons set out above, the Claimant’s application for reconsideration fails and that decision is confirmed. Employment Judge Ramsden Date: 01 December 2025 Case Number: 2302757/2024 1 of 14 EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS Claimant: Miss S Walters Respondent: Croydon Health Services NHS Trust COSTS JUDGMENT (Determined on the papers)

Background

[1]This matter arises from a Claim that was struck out by the Tribunal on 11 November 2025 for want of jurisdiction - the Tribunal concluded that the Claimant had not complied with section 18A of the Employment Tribunals Act 1996 to have obtained an ACAS Early Conciliation certificate before presenting an application to institute relevant proceedings before the Employment Tribunal.

[2]The decision to strike out the Claim was taken and delivered orally at a hearing on 11 November 2025. (The Claimant has subsequently applied for reconsideration of that decision, and so written reasons have since been sent to the Parties for the strike out, and the reconsideration application refused.)

[3]At the 11 November 2025 hearing, the Respondent started to make an application for an award of costs.

[4]Noting that, according to the Employment Tribunal files, the Claimant remained employed by the Respondent, the Employment Judge asked the Respondent to consider whether it wished to pursue a Costs application at that time. Some breaks were then taken for consideration to be given to the matter.

[5]Ultimately, the Respondent took the view that it was not ready to pursue its Costs application at the hearing, and so the summary judgment of the Tribunal from 11 November 2025 gave the Respondent 14 days from that date within which to make any Costs application it wished to make.

[6]This judgment concerns the written Costs application then made by the Respondent within that 14-day period. Case Number: 2302757/2024 2 of 14

Facts

[7]The Claimant commenced employment with for the Respondent on 31 March 2023.

[8]On 15 January 2024, the Claimant commenced a period of long-term sick leave.

[9]The Claimant presented a Claim Form to the Tribunal on 8 March 2024 in the name of a named individual – that of the Matron of the Respondent’s Acute Medical Unit, who is the Claimant’s line manager, “NC”.

[10]Early Conciliation in respect of the Respondent commenced on 11 March 2024 and concluded on 15 March 2024.

[11]The Claimant’s Claim Form was vetted by the Employment Tribunal on 21 March 2024, and the Claim was accepted on 22 March 2024 and served on NC on the same date.

[12]The Respondent sent a costs warning to the Claimant on 12 December 2024.

[13]The Respondent made an offer to settle the Claim on a ‘without prejudice save as to costs’ basis on 17 December 2024 for a payment of £14,913.15. This was not accepted by the Claimant.

[14]The Respondent sent a second costs warning to the Claimant on 18 December 2024.

[15]The Respondent made a second offer to settle the Claim on a ‘without prejudice save as to costs’ basis on 20 December 2024 on the same terms as the First Settlement Offer, which was not accepted by the Claimant.

[16]The Respondent repeated its settlement offers, again on a ‘without prejudice save as to costs’ basis on 23 December 2024, but again this was not accepted by the Claimant.

[17]The Respondent applied to strike out the Claimant’s Claim, or for Deposit Orders to be made in respect of it, on 31 January 2025. That application was made on two bases:a. That the Claimant’s complaints had no reasonable prospect of success; and

b. That the Claimant and/or her representative had acted unreasonably in the proceedings.

[18]The first Preliminary Hearing for Case Management in this matter was held on 26 February 2025 before EJ Beck. EJ Beck could not, in a private hearing, determine the Respondent’s strike-out application, but in any event that hearing was largely ineffective, as it was conducted via CVP and the Claimant could not both access the hearing and view the electronic documents sent to her. EJ Beck’s written Orders noted that the Respondent had applied to strike out the Claimant’s Claim, Case Number: 2302757/2024 3 of 14 and Ordered that any response to that application from the Claimant should be received by 19 March 2025.

[19]The Claimant made representations against the Respondent’s Strike-Out application on 6 March 2025.

[20]The Claimant applied to amend the Claim on a number of occasions, but the outstanding applications are those dated 7 and 17 March 2025.

[21]On 23 June 2025, EJ Sudra wrote to the Parties noting that “there has been a slew of correspondence from the Claimant (and/or her representative)”. EJ Sudra noted that it was, at times, difficult to discern from that correspondence what the Claimant was seeking. EJ Sudra rejected the Respondent’s application to prohibit email correspondence from the Claimant (confining correspondence to be by post only) in the following terms: “I decline to make such an Order, at this time, as it is hoped the Claimant will acquiesce to my following observation: Lengthy, unnecessary, and brusque correspondence is seldom justified and almost never helpful. The Claimant is reminded of the Overriding Objective and the parties’ duty to deal with the matter proportionately, save expense, and cooperate with one another and the Tribunal. Persistent verbose missives breach each of the elements of the Overriding Objective I have referred to in the preceding sentence (supra). The Claimant should only correspond with [the Respondent’s solicitor] and desist from copying in any other person or organisation unless it is absolutely necessary to do so. The Claimant’s communications should be concise, respectful and have a genuine purpose. If the Claimant continues to inundate the Respondent with excessive correspondence, the Respondent may renew its application to restrict the volume and method of the Claimant’s communications. … The Claimant has also sent to the Tribunal correspondence relating to settlement between the parties. This is wholly inappropriate and matters relating to settlement must be kept between the parties and not divulged to the Tribunal.”

[22]A further Preliminary Hearing took place before EJ Ord on 2 July 2025. At that hearing, EJ Order reiterated the contents of EJ Sudra’s letter. EJ Ord’s written Case Management Orders record that “Employment Judge Ord took some time to explain what was expected of the claimant and what was not”.

[23]At the hearing in this matter to determine the Respondent’s strike-out application, EJ Ramsden proactively raised a concern about the Claimant’s compliance with section 18A of the Employment Tribunals Act 1996, and the sought submissions from the Parties on the ramifications for this Claim of the Court of Appeal’s decision in Reynolds v Abel Estates Ltd and others

[2025] EWCA Civ 1357

. At the conclusion of that hearing, the Claimant’s Claim was struck-out on the basis of that the Reynolds decision made it clear that the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction Case Number: 2302757/2024 4 of 14 (or competence) to consider the Claimant’s Claim. EJ Ramsden also made some observations about the volume and content of the Claimant’s correspondence, noting in particular that it was highly inappropriate for the Claimant to repeatedly write to the Tribunal and thereby show to it copies of ‘without prejudice’ correspondence between her and the Respondent. This was noted to have been emphasised by EJ Sudra in correspondence, and EJ Ord in the Preliminary Hearing before her on 2 July 2025.

[24]The Respondent made a Costs application on 25 November 2025. On the same date the Claimant made representations resisting the Respondent’s application. The Respondent’s application and the Claimant’s response to it

[25]The Respondent applied, on 25 November 2025, for the Tribunal to make a Costs Order against the Claimant “to the extent that the Tribunal considers it is reasonable for her to do so”. The Respondent noted that its costs have reached £29,281.40, including Counsel’s costs for attendance at the 11 November 2025 hearing of £1,719 plus VAT.

[26]The Respondent’s application of 25 November 2025 is made on the bases that throughout the proceedings, including following the hearing on 11 November 2025, the Claimant and/or her representative have acted unreasonably as follows:a. The Claimant’s representative sent an excessive number of lengthy and inappropriate emails to both the Respondent, the Respondent’s employees and the Tribunal, which: i. Contained no meaningful submissions in support of the Claim; ii. Were inappropriate in tone and nature; iii. Caused unnecessary administrative work for the Tribunal; and iv. Unnecessarily increased costs for the Respondent in having to review and respond to such correspondence;

b. The Claimant was advised by both the Tribunal and the Respondent to seek legal advice on the merits of the Claim, however it appears she did not do so;

c. The Claimant rejected generous settlement offers from the Respondent; and

d. The Claimant’s representative made references to settlement discussions in correspondence with the Tribunal, which is inappropriate and contrary to the principles of without prejudice privilege.

[27]The Claimant has objected to the Costs application, on the basis that:a. She says it was not open to the Respondent to make such an application before the 14 day period stipulated in the judgment of 11 November 2025 Case Number: 2302757/2024 5 of 14 had passed. This is evidently a misunderstanding of the terms of the judgment1;

b. The Claimant is a litigant-in-person; and

c. The Respondent has shown a pattern of behaviour of failing to comply with Directions, attempting to lodge defective applications, and withholding access to documents (namely, a draft settlement agreement, for which the Claimant says the passcode to access the document has not been provided to her). Law Without prejudice privilege

Law

[28]The ‘without prejudice’ principle will generally prevent the admission of statements (written and oral) into evidence made in a genuine attempt to settle an existing dispute from being put before a court or tribunal as evidence of admissions against the interest of the party that made them. The rationale for this has been stated in many cases, but it is effectively that:a. There is a public policy in favour of encouraging the settlement of disputes; and/or

b. An implied contract between parties to a dispute genuinely trying to settle that dispute, which prevents admission statements or offers made in the course of negotiations for settlement being brought before the court of trial as admissions on the question of liability or of costs (Walker v Wilsher

(1889) 23 QBD 335

, Cutts v Head [1983] EWCA Civ 8).

[29]This principle applies to proceedings before the Employment Tribunal as well as to those before a court (Independent Research Services Ltd v Catterall

[1993] ICR 1

[30]Statements that are made ‘without prejudice save as to costs’ are admissible on the question of costs (Calderbank v Calderbank

[1975] All ER 333

[31]Whether a communication is ‘without prejudice’ is answered objectively, taking account all the facts of the case (Pearson Education Ltd v Prentice Hall of India 1 Which included: “The Respondent indicated an intention to make an application for costs, and it must make any such application within 14 days of the date of this judgment, by way of variation to Rule 75(1) of the ET Rules, pursuant to Rule 5(7), given the time given over to that possible costs application in today’s hearing”. Case Number: 2302757/2024 6 of 14 Private Ltd

[2005] EWHC 636 (QB)

). The communications must be in the context of:a. An existing dispute; and

b. A genuine attempt to settle that existing dispute.

[32]In Ogiehor v Belinfantie

[2018] EWCA Civ 2423

(not an employment case) the litigant-in-person claimant shared the contents of without prejudice correspondence in the course of the trial, which resulted in the hearing being ineffective. The dispute needed to be relisted and the hearing re-started. The claimant had been warned, both by the defendant and by the trial judge, that it was inappropriate to discuss the contents of without prejudice correspondence in the hearing, but he did so nonetheless. Upon appeal against a resultant costs order, the Court of Appeal acknowledged that the inadmissibility of without prejudice material “may not be immediately accessible to a lay person”, but found that in this case, where the claimant had been warned at the outset of the hearing not to reveal without prejudice communications in court, and as he started to do so the judge tried to stop him but he ploughed on heedlessly, he must have known he was doing something he should not do. The costs order was upheld. Costs

[33]Unlike in the civil courts, costs do not ‘follow the event’ in the Employment Tribunal, and an award of costs remains the exception rather than the rule (Yerrakalva v Barnsley Metropolitan Borough Council

[2012] ICR 420

). This does not mean, however, that in order for a costs application to succeed the facts of the case have to be exceptional – all that is needed is for the relevant test to be satisfied (Power v Panasonic (UK) Ltd

UKEAT/0439/04

[34]The Tribunal’s power to order costs is set out in Rule 74 of the ET Rules: “(1) The Tribunal may make a costs order or a preparation time order (as appropriate) on its own initiative or on the application of a party or, in respect of a costs order under rule 73(1)(b), a witness who has attended or has been ordered to attend to give oral evidence at a hearing. (2) The Tribunal must consider making a costs order or a preparation time order where it considers that—(a) a party (or that party's representative) has acted vexatiously, abusively, disruptively or otherwise unreasonably in either the bringing of the proceedings, or part of it, or the way that the proceedings, or part of it, have been conducted,

(b) any claim, response or reply had no reasonable prospect of success, or …”.

[35]As described in the case of Daly v Newcastle Upon Tune Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust

EAT/0107/18

, there are three stages to a Tribunal considering a costs application: Case Number: 2302757/2024 7 of 14a. Does it have jurisdiction to award costs?

b. If the Tribunal does have discretion to award costs, should it do so?

c. If the answer to the previous question is ‘yes’, what is the appropriate amount? (i) Does the Tribunal have jurisdiction to award costs?

[36]The burden of establishing that the tribunal has jurisdiction to make an award of costs sits with the applicant (Haydar v Pennine Acute NHS Trust

EAT/0141/17

[37]The Tribunal may not make an award of costs unless the paying party “has had a reasonable opportunity to make representations (in writing or at a hearing, as the Tribunal may order)” (Rule 75(2)).

[38]The Respondent has alleged that the Claimant and her representative have acted unreasonably. The word “unreasonable” has its ordinary English meaning, and is not to be interpreted as if it means something similar to vexatious (Dyer v Secretary of State for Employment [1983] 10 WLUK 154).

[39]The unreasonable conduct alleged is not the bringing of the claim, or pursuing it, but rather (among other things) continuing to pursue it in light of the Respondent’s settlement offers. The case law indicates that the tribunal should consider:a. Whether, objectively, when the claim was presented or the response submitted (as appropriate), did it have no reasonable prospect of success, or did that become the case at a later stage when more evidence was available?

b. At the stage that the claim or response had no reasonable prospect of success, did the relevant party know that was the case?

c. If the relevant party did not know that the claim or response had no reasonable prospect of success, should they have known? This assessment is likely to be more rigorous where the party is legally-represented (Opalkova v Acquire Care Ltd EA-2020-000345-RN). (ii) Should the Tribunal exercise its discretion to make an award for costs?

[40]There is no obligation on a Tribunal to make a costs award when the jurisdiction to do so is engaged (save in the circumstances described in Rule 74(4), which do not apply here) – it remains a matter of discretion as to whether to do so – but it is obliged to consider whether to do so.

[41]The Claimant’s means are not usually a relevant consideration to this second question (Mardner v Gardner

UKEAT/0483/13

[42]The tribunal should adopt a broad-brush approach to identifying the conduct which engages the costs jurisdiction and its effect (Sud v Ealing London Borough Council [2013] ICR D39. Case Number: 2302757/2024 8 of 14

[43]The principle of relevance means that the Tribunal must have regard to the nature, gravity and effect of the unreasonable conduct (or other matter which gives rise to the costs jurisdiction) when considering whether to exercise the discretion to make an award of costs (McPherson v BNP Paribas

[2004] EWCA Civ 569

). The purpose of an award of costs is to compensate, not to punish.

[44]The nature of the conduct of the party in question involves considering, at the stage that it took place:a. Whether the relevant party knew that it was unreasonable, vexatious, had no reasonable prospect of success (etc. – did they appreciate the matter that forms the jurisdictional basis for the costs award); and

b. If not, whether they should have known (Opalkova).

[45]The Supreme Court in Barton v Wright Hassall

[2018] 1 WLR 1119

UKSC observed that: “[A litigant in person’s] lack of representation will often justify making allowances in making case management decisions and in conducting hearings. But it will not usually justify applying to litigants in person a lower standard of compliance with rules or orders of the court... The rules do not in any relevant respect distinguish between represented and unrepresented parties… The rules provide a framework within which to balance the interest of both sides. That balance is inevitably disturbed if an unrepresented litigant is entitled to greater indulgence in complying with them than his represented opponent… Unless the rules and practice directions are particularly inaccessible or obscure, it is reasonable to expect a litigant in person to familiarise himself with the rules which apply to any step which he is about to take.”

[46]As regards “effect”, as per Yerrakalva, any causal link between the jurisdictional basis for the award of costs and the costs incurred by the applicant is a relevant, though not a constricting factor, to considering whether a costs award should be made.

[47]While individual considerations are important (such as, for example, whether a party was dishonest), it is also vital to look at the whole picture, and not to lose sight of the totality of the circumstances (Yerrakalva). This will include consideration of the conduct of the applicant, and the likely effect of the applicant’s conduct on the costs incurred. Costs warnings – or their absence

[48]One aspect of the applicant’s conduct that may be relevant is whether they warned the paying party of the risk of a costs award, and if so, how that was communicated: for example, if it was done in a threatening manner, if it explained the weakness of the other side’s position in a straightforward manner case, if it Case Number: 2302757/2024 9 of 14 quantified the costs it would or may seek (Rogers v Dorothy Barley School

UKEAT/0013/12

[49]There is no general principle that there should be a costs warning letter in advance of a costs application (Vaughan v London Borough of Lewisham

UKEAT/0533/12

), but a failure to engage with arguments in the costs warning letter can be a factor to weigh in the balance as to whether an award of costs should be made (Peat and others v Birmingham City Council

UKEAT/0503/11

). The costs warning letter in that case had enhanced the prospects of an award of costs being made.

[50]The tribunal may also have regard to the paying party’s ability to pay (Rule 82 of the ET Rules) (as Mr Recorder Luba QC put it in Mirike v Wilson & Co Solicitors

UKEAT/0025/11

, the discretion to take account of the paying party’s means or not is a “discretion within a discretion”). This does not mean that “poor litigants may misbehave with impunity and without fearing that any significant costs order will be made against them, whereas wealthy ones must behave themselves because otherwise an order will be made” (Kovacs v Queen Mary and Westfield College

[2002] EWCA Civ 352

[51]Any assessment as to means must be based on evidence.

[52]Where the tribunal is asked to take this into account, it should state both whether it has done so, and if it has, how that has been done (Jilley v Birmingham and Solihull Mental Health NHS Trust [2007] 11 WLUK 517). The EAT in Jilley also acknowledged that: “there may be cases where for good reason ability to pay should not be taken into account: for example, if the paying party has not attended or has given unsatisfactory evidence about means”.

[53]The weight to be given to a relevant consideration is a matter for the tribunal, unless it amounts to an error of law (Mirikwe).

[54]Considering ability to pay involves consideration of both income and capital and savings (Shields Automotive ltd v Grieg

UKEAT/0024/10

), and can involve consideration of the party’s spouse or partner’s means (Abaya v Leeds Teaching Hospital NHS Trust

EAT/0258/16

). (iii) What is the appropriate value for the costs order?

[55]Cost awards are compensatory, not punitive (e.g., Lodwick v Southwark London Borough Council

[2004] ICR 884

[56]Any award of costs should be limited to costs reasonably and necessarily incurred, but it is not necessary to establish a precise causal link between the costs incurred and the basis for the jurisdiction (e.g., unreasonable conduct) (Yerrakalva). However, that does not mean that where, for example, there has been some unreasonable conduct, it is necessarily appropriate to make an award for the other party’s costs for the whole of the proceedings (McPherson). Case Number: 2302757/2024 10 of 14

[57]The tribunal may take into account the paying party’s ability to pay when assessing the value of the award, but it is not obliged to do so. The tribunal should say if it has, and if so, how (Jilley).

[58]The tribunal is not required to confine the sum of an award of costs to an amount that the paying party can pay (Arrowsmith

[2011] EWCA Civ 797

[59]“The vital point in exercising the discretion to order costs is to look at the whole picture of what has happened” (Yerrakalva).

[60]Pursuant to Rule 76(1), the Tribunal may order the paying party to pay an amount of costs not exceeding £20,000 by way of unassessed costs. Detailed assessment is required for any Costs Order exceeding £20,000. Application to the complaints here (i) Does the Tribunal have jurisdiction to award costs?

[61]It is evident that the conduct of the Claimant, and of the Claimant’s representative, has fallen below the standard that should be expected of litigants before the Employment Tribunal in two respects:a. The Claimant’s representative has sent an excessive number of lengthy emails (often several on a single day), the point of which are often difficult to understand; and

b. The Claimant’s representative has made references to settlement discussions which were expressly stated to be “without prejudice save as to costs”, and that some of this occurred after: i. Warnings from the Respondent (a and b); ii. Written warnings from EJ Sudra (a and b); iii. Oral warnings from EJ Ord2 (b); and iv. Oral warnings from EJ Ramsden on 11 November 2025 (b).

[62]In particular, the Tribunal finds that:a. The volume and lack of clarity in the Claimant’s representative’s correspondence; and

b. The fact that the Claimant’s representative brought to the Tribunal’s attention the content of without prejudice communications (these clearly 2 These warnings were also written from EJ Ord, but the Claimant appears not to have received or read those Orders. Case Number: 2302757/2024 11 of 14 were ‘without prejudice’ communications, as they set out terms upon which settlement of the Claim was offered by the Respondent), are both matters which could result in an award of costs, as they meet the standard of unreasonable conduct in Rule 74(2)(a).

[63]In this regard, the Tribunal notes that the word “unreasonable” should be given its ordinary English meaning (Dyer).a. While litigants-in-person, and non-professional representatives, may reasonably not be expected to communicate with the brevity and directness of legal professionals, the Claimant’s representative failed to heed the clear warning of EJ Sudra on 23 June 2025. Even if it was not clear up until that point that Ms Reddy’s approach to correspondence was unreasonable, it was made abundantly clear in that letter – and yet the volume and style of the correspondence continued unabated (e.g., three emails on the same day as EJ Sudra’s letter, another two days later, another five days after that), which prompted EJ Ord to reiterate orally in the hearing in strong terms what EJ Sudra had written in the hearing of 2 July 2025.

b. In addition, the clear direction from EJs Sudra, Ord and Ramsden not to copy the Tribunal in to without prejudice communications was totally ignored by Ms Reddy, who has continued to copy the Tribunal on those communications, including after the 11 November 2025 hearing - twice on 17 November 2025, again on 18 November 2025, and again on 25 November 2025.

[64]The Tribunal does not consider the following matters relied upon by the Respondent to provide a basis for an award of costs in this case:a. The fact that the Claimant did not seek legal advice. This is not something that should engage the Tribunal’s power to award costs, given this is a jurisdiction where parties can (and frequently do) represent themselves.

b. The rejection of the Respondent’s settlement offers. i. Most of those rejections must be seen in the context of the Claim being struck out based on a decision of the Court of Appeal which was handed down on 27 October 2025, i.e., two weeks before the Claimant’s Claim was struck-out for want of jurisdiction. The Claimant did not turn down those settlement offers that pre-dated the 11 November 2025 hearing when apprised of the fact that the Tribunal lacks jurisdiction to hear her Claim. ii. Moreover, even if the Claimant had looked into the law in this area, she could well have taken the view (at least up until 26 October 2025) that the fact that the Tribunal had accepted her Claim after vetting it meant that her claim could not be retrospectively rejected, which is one reading of the preceding case of Sainsbury’s Case Number: 2302757/2024 12 of 14 Supermarkets Ltd v Clark

[2023] EWCA Civ 386

. (Albeit that the Court of Appeal in Reynolds drew a distinction between the evidential non-compliance in Clark – where ACAS Early Conciliation had been complied with but the evidence not provided with the Claim Form - and the substantive non-compliance - the failure to comply with the Early Conciliation requirements - on the facts of Reynolds.)

[65]To summarise: the answer to the first question is that the Tribunal finds that it does have the power to award costs for the Claimant’s representative’s unreasonable conduct in(a) sending excessive and difficult-to-understand correspondence to the Respondent and the Tribunal, and

(b) sending ‘without prejudice save as to costs’ correspondence to the Tribunal. (ii) Should the Tribunal exercise its discretion to make an award for costs?

[66]The Tribunal is to look at the conduct, as well as its gravity and effect when deciding whether to exercise its discretion to make an award of costs (Sud, Yerrakalva).

[67]Here, the Tribunal considers that:a. It is reasonable to find that the volume and lack of clarity in the correspondence from the Claimant’s representative would have resulted in additional costs for the Respondent, as more correspondence means more billed time, and difficult-to-understand correspondence would have added to the time spent. The Respondent is a public body, and the Claimant’s representative went to the trouble to copy in numerous employees of the Respondent as well as the Respondent’s on-the-record representatives, evidently so as to embroil those individuals in that correspondence and the detail of the litigation as well. This was clearly designed to absorb their time as well as that of the Respondent’s representatives. The Claimant’s representative was told this was inappropriate by the Respondent’s representative, but carried on doing so. The nature, gravity and effect of this conduct is serious and marked, and points to it being appropriate to make an award of costs; and

b. The sharing, by Ms Reddy, of without prejudice correspondence would not have added to the Respondent’s costs. It was entirely inappropriate to do so, but its effect was not to add any meaningful time to the time that was already been spent by the Respondent on this litigation. At most, it contributed to (but was not the main bulk of) the Respondent’s strike-out application which was to be heard at the 11 November 2025 hearing. The absence of a link between this conduct and the Respondent’s costs is a relevant, but not constricting factor, to the Tribunal’s decision as to whether to award costs (Yerralkalva). Case Number: 2302757/2024 13 of 14

[68]The Claimant has emphasised in her resistance of the Respondent’s costs application that she is a litigant-in-person (but more accurately, she is represented by a lay person – her mother), effectively pleading that indulgence should be given for her representative’s behaviour. However, as the Supreme Court has stated plainly in the Barton case, litigants-in-person are still held to the same rules as other litigants. The Tribunal considers this case analogous to the Court of Appeal decision in Ogiehor, where additional costs were incurred by a litigant-in-person despite that person being warned several times beforehand not to behave as they proceeded to. As the Court said in Ogiehor: “…he must have known that he was doing something that he should not do”, and “Judges will show common sense and often flexibility, but in the end must enforce the Rules, and have a proper eye to the legitimate interests of the other parties to litigation, including as to costs. That is a fundamental obligation, as the overriding objective makes clear”.

[69]This is entirely analogous with the situation here.

[70]The overriding objective in Ogiehor was derived from the Civil Procedure Rules, but the Employment Tribunal Procedure Rules 2024 contain a similarly-worded objective.

[71]Ogiehor, unlike the Claim here, was brought a case in a jurisdiction where costs-followed-the-event – but in the Tribunal’s view, that is not the pertinent point. The most relevant point is that it was plain to the Claimant and her representative that their approach to correspondence was inappropriate from, at the very latest, EJ Sudra’s letter of 23 June 2025. The Tribunal finds that they knew, or should have known, that they were behaving unreasonably from that time onwards.

[72]While the Respondent did send the Claimant costs warnings, it is not clear that those warnings were reiterated after EJ Sudra’s letter of 23 June 2025, and so those earlier warnings have not been taken into account when deciding whether to exercise the discretion to make a costs award here.

[73]The answer to the second question is, therefore, that these considerations weighed together – particularly the continuation of the conduct by the Claimant’s representative after very clear judicial warning - make it appropriate for the Tribunal to exercise its discretion to award costs in respect of the Claimant’s representative’s volume and difficult-to-understand correspondence.

[74]However, the Tribunal finds that the lack of causative link between the Claimant’s representative’s sharing of ‘without prejudice’ communications with the Tribunal and the costs the Respondent incurred means that any costs awarded on that basis would not be compensatory, and would rather be punitive, and so the discretion should not be exercised in respect of that second category of unreasonable conduct. Case Number: 2302757/2024 14 of 14 (iii) What is the appropriate value for the costs order?

[75]The Respondent says that it has incurred around £30,000 of costs in defending the Claim. Much of that would have been incurred by it in any event, regardless of the Claimant’s behaviour, because the Claimant’s failure to comply with section 18A of the Employment Tribunals Act 1996 was not appreciated by the Tribunal at the outset of the litigation, and nor was its significance after the Claim had been accepted - until the Court of Appeal decision in Reynolds.

[76]EJ Sudra’s letter of 23 June 2025 was the first time the Tribunal, as opposed to the Respondent, told the Claimant and her representative that their correspondence was inappropriate. It is not unreasonable that the Claimant, as litigant with a lay representative, did not believe the Respondent (as the opposing party) when the Respondent told her at an earlier point in time that the correspondence was inappropriate.

[77]The Tribunal has heard no evidence whatsoever of the Claimant’s means, but the Respondent accepts that they are limited. In any event, the costs award that will be made will be limited also, given that the Tribunal considers it appropriate to exercise the discretion only in respect of the email volumes and lack of clarity after EJ Sudra’s warning in June 2025. The Claimant’s means therefore have been considered (given the Respondent does not dispute that they are limited), but a more in-depth consideration of what exactly the Claimant’s means are is not proportionate given the size of the award to be made.

[78]Consequently, the Tribunal considers it appropriate to make an award of costs in the sum of £1,000.

Conclusions

[79]For all of the above reasons, the Claimant is Ordered to pay to the Respondent £1,000 by way of costs. The time by which the Claimant is Ordered to pay this is within 60 days of the date of this judgment (by way of variation from the usual period of 14 days set out in Rule 64).