Ms K O’Sullivan v Guys and St Thomas’ NHS Trust and Others: 2302288/2022 and Others

EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS

Case No 2302288/2022

Between

Ms K O’SullivanClaimant

Guys and St Thomas’ NHS Trust and OthersRespondent

Before

Employment Judge Morton

No appearance for claimant

Mr P Sangha (instructed by Counsel) for respondent

Date 23 July 2026

JUDGMENT

[1]The claimant’s applications for strike out of the response are refused;

[2]The respondent’s application for strike out of the claim is not granted at this point, but the claim will be struck out without any further hearing if the claimant does not comply with the order made at paragraph 48 of the reasons below within seven days of this judgment being sent to the parties.

REASONS

[1]This case has a somewhat complex procedural history. The claimant initially brought three claims that were consolidated. The first was presented on 9 July 2022. Following the termination of her employment in January 2024 she brought an unsuccessful application for interim relief and submitted a number of further claims against the first respondent, Capita PLC, Central London Community Healthcare NHS Trust and several individual respondents, Ian Abbs, Jennie Mien, Elizabeth Kock, Matthew Rowe and Fiona Williams. A total of seven claims proceeded and a decision was made to consolidate all seven claims. The claims against Capita PLC, Central London Community Healthcare NHS Trust, Ian Abbs, Jennie Mien and Elizabeth Kock have at various times and on various grounds been struck out.

[2]For ease of reference and unless stated otherwise, when I refer to the ’respondent’ in these reasons I mean all of the respondents against whom claims are still continuing, namely Guys & St Thomas’ NHS Trust, Matthew Rowe and Fiona Williams.

[3]The claimant’s claims as originally pleaded were exceptionally prolix and difficult to follow. This is a characteristic of many of the claimant’s communications with the Tribunal and the respondent. A total of nine preliminary hearings over 13 days has taken place in order to establish which claims the employment tribunal has jurisdiction to hear, what legal issues arise in those claims and make orders management of the case and preparation for a final hearing. That hearing is due to take place over 4 weeks in June and July 2027.

[4]The purpose of this hearing was to deal with strike out applications by both parties which I deal with in turn below. I will first address the fact that the claimant did not attend the hearing and my decision to proceed with it despite her absence. Claimant’s non-appearance at the hearing

[5]The hearing was listed as an in person hearing. The claimant has expressly requested that hearings are held in person because of her disabilities. The parties were notified of the hearing in correspondence by letter and separately by means of a notice of hearing. The hearing was originally listed for 9 July 2026, but was relisted for 15 July 2026 due to the unavailability of the respondent’s counsel. The parties were notified in writing of this change.

[6]The claimant was not present at the Tribunal at the start of the hearing and I asked the clerk to contact her by phone. After a number of attempts contact was made with her and she said she did not know about the hearing. She then said that she would like to attend and could be there in two hours. I asked that it be suggested to her that it would save time for her to attend by CVP if she would prefer that option. She then asked to be able to present her own strike out application in private without counsel for the respondent present. I refused this request which would have required a written application and could only have been granted on very exceptional grounds, if at all. I also made it clear via the clerk that the applications from both parties would be dealt with whether or not the claimant decided to attend the hearing. The claimant then confirmed that she had changed her mind and would not now be attending the hearing.

[7]At 11.23 am the claimant wrote to the clerk: I am confirming that I am not attending today’s preliminary hearing on the case 2302288/2022 due to witness and claimant intimidation by the respondent and their legal team.

[8]A further email followed at 11.54 in which the claimant said: IN addition, I wish to add the following: 1. I am NOT abandoning the claim 2. There has been severe procedural err in law in the list of issues process with extreme bias - Moustache v Westminister and Chelsea NHS Trust as one amongst many case precedents. The justices at EAT confirmed that the list of issues never act to substitute what is on the ET1 in any case. Again, it is true that not ALL claims on an ET1 HAS to be accepted or heard by the Tribunal. However, where the ET1 has made out claims and where there is intentional and bias differences from the ET1 and the List of Issues, or the list of issues is from one party or based on the one parties tampered with list of claims, leaving out claims they do not want to answer, this would be a clear err in law. 3. Again, I am intimidated and the manner in which my claim has been administered by the clerical office and the way my emails and applications have been ignored has not been fair. At this stage, a fair trial is not possible with such pervasive evidence tampering and overt sustained bullying by the Respondents and their legal counsel. I am intimidated and the actions of the Respondents has crossed the bar to warrant strike out. Forgive me, but my personal thoughts are that this now is falling on deaf ears and sits with EAT should I be lucky enough to pass the sift.

[9]I decided to proceed with the hearing notwithstanding the claimant’s absence as I was satisfied that she had in fact been properly notified of it by reason of the Tribunal’s notifications and by reason of the respondent having prepared a bundle for the hearing. I did not specifically check that this had been sent to the claimant as well as the Tribunal, but I considered it highly unlikely that the respondent would not have taken that step. It would not have been in accordance with the overriding objective or fair to the respondent to adjourn the hearing and given the nature of the claimant’s correspondence about her non-attendance I was not in any event confident that she would attend any adjourned hearing. The law – strike out of claims and responses

[10]The power for a Tribunal to strike out a claim or response is set out in Rule 38 of the Employment Tribunal Rules 2024. Rule 38 provides as follows: 38.—(1) The Tribunal may, on its own initiative or on the application of a party, strike out all or part of a claim, response or reply on any of the following grounds—(a) that it is scandalous or vexatious or has no reasonable prospect of success;

(b) that the manner in which the proceedings have been conducted by or on behalf of the claimant or the respondent (as the case may be) has been scandalous, unreasonable or vexatious;

(d) that it has not been actively pursued;

(e) that the Tribunal considers that it is no longer possible to have a fair hearing in respect of the claim, response or reply (or the part to be struck out). (2) A claim, response or reply may not be struck out unless the party advancing it has been given a reasonable opportunity to make representations, either in writing or, if requested by the party, at a hearing.

[11]There is a two stage test, involving firstly a finding that there has been conduct falling within the rule that would enable the power to be exercised and secondly a decision that it would be appropriate in all the circumstances to exercise the discretion to deploy that power.

[12]Any discretionary power must be exercised fairly and justly. Dealing with cases fairly and justly is the overriding objective of the Employment Tribunal Rules. The overriding objective is set out in Rule 3 which provides: 3.—(1) The overriding objective of these Rules is to enable the Tribunal to deal with cases fairly and justly. (2) Dealing with a case fairly and justly includes, so far as practicable—(a) ensuring that the parties are on an equal footing,

(b) dealing with cases in ways which are proportionate to the complexity and importance of the issues,

(d) avoiding delay, so far as compatible with proper consideration of the issues, and

(e) saving expense. (3) The Tribunal must seek to give effect to the overriding objective when it— (a) exercises any power under these Rules, or (b) interprets any rule or practice direction. (4) The parties and their representatives must— (a) assist the Tribunal to further the overriding objective, and (b) co-operate generally with each other and with the Tribunal.

[13]Striking out is a step that should be taken only in exceptional circumstances where the Tribunal is clear that not only has the threshold of unreasonable conduct been met, but that it is appropriate to exercise the discretion to strike out and doing so would be a proportionate step (Blockbuster Entertainment Ltd v James

[2006] IRLR 630

). I return to that case and the further authorities cited in it later in these reasons.

[14]In this case the overriding objective also requires the Tribunal to take into consideration the relevant parts of the Equal Treatment Bench Book (‘ETBB’), this being a case in which the claimant has asserted that she has multiple disabilities that affect the manner in which she communicates and engages with the litigation process, the respondent and its representatives and the Tribunal itself. The claimant’s asserted disabilities, according to a disability impact statement she signed on 15 June 2025, are panic disorder/anxiety disorder, dyslexia, Irlen syndrome, essential tremor, ADHD, dyspraxia and depression. of these dyslexia, Irlen syndrome, essential tremor and ADHD are conceded by the respondent. The relevant sections of the ETBB are those dealing with mental disability, set out in Chapter 4, which addresses the difficulties the court process may pose, and adjustments that may be necessary in case preparation and at hearings.

[15]The Tribunal has striven to take the claimant’s difficulties into consideration when managing this case. It has noted the requests that the claimant has made for adjustments to enable her to participate effectively in hearings, as recorded in the case management orders that have been made to date. These have included providing her with a quiet room away from the main claimants’ waiting room, making sure the hearing room is on the quiet side of the building, that the lighting in the room is not too bright, and ordering the hearing bundles to be printed on a specific shade of peach paper that will enable her to read them. The large number of case management hearings in the case has to a significant extent resulted from the need for the claimant to have more time than a claimant without disabilities to explain her claims and the issues arising from them. The Tribunal has noted that the claimant has at times expressed uncertainty about what is required of her and it has therefore taken time at hearings to try to ensure that the claimant has identified the legal claims arising from her employment that the Tribunal has jurisdiction to deal with. This has been a difficult process. The claimant has a very detailed and forensic approach, is inclined to be argumentative and finds it difficult to let points go. Given that this may arise from conditions that are disabilities the Tribunal has striven to accommodate and make allowances for it. Both the Tribunal and the respondent have accordingly made allowance for the fact that the claimant has difficulty expressing herself in a straightforward way and writes long and complex communications that do not focus on the issues in hand. The final hearing has been listed over 20 days in 2027, with rest days interspersed between sitting days to enable the claimant to take part as effectively as possible. At an early stage consideration was given to whether it would be appropriate to appoint an intermediary, but the claimant objected to this and the suggestion was not pursued.

[16]Against that background I now turn to the substantive applications that were to be dealt with on 15 July 2026. Claimant’s applications

[17]The claimant pursues strike out of the respondent’s response on two grounds. I have considered her written applications and the respondent’s written responses. I was unable to access the video footage the claimant provided with her application. In any event I did not consider it necessary or proportionate to do so.

[18]The first concerns a matter that has already been dealt with by me in correspondence, albeit briefly. The claimant alleges that the respondent has acted improperly by asserting that the claimant had accused the respondent’s legal representatives of rape. Having reviewed the background and related correspondence and considered all the circumstances I dismissed this strike out application as not showing behaviour by the respondent that reached the threshold for a strike out. Although that matter has therefore been dealt with, since the claimant has persisted with it and presented it again in advance of this hearing, I will amplify my reasons for refusing to strike out the response on these grounds.

[19]As I said in my letter to the parties of 19 March 2026, this matter appears to me to be primarily one of miscommunication, and it involves only a minor error on the part of the respondent. The appendix to the respondent’s letter of 12 January 2026 seeking a strike out warning was originally created on 1 May 2025, in support of a strike out application that was not pursued at the time. In the original appendix the respondent alluded to the fact that the claimant had accused the respondent’s legal representatives of “rape” (the respondent used quotation marks). The claimant wrote to the respondent about this after a preliminary hearing on 12 May 2025 and complained that the phrase she had used when complaining about the respondent’s legal representatives’ conduct was “behaviour akin to rape”. The respondent sent a note of correction to the Tribunal and the claimant on 23 May 2025. The appendix to the letter of 12 January 2026, as corrected, now refers instead to “behaviour akin to rape” which I accept more accurately reflects the language that the claimant has used in her correspondence to the respondent.

[20]Pausing there it is I think it is appropriate to note that the metaphor of “rape” was originally used by the claimant herself in correspondence to the respondent as she explains at some length in her strike out application of 4 May 2026. The use of the word “rape” or the phrase “behaviour akin to rape” might both be regarded by any reasonable person as an unusually strong description of the conduct of the respondents during the course of the claimant’s employment and the litigation. In her correspondence the claimant has not referred to any actual words or conduct on the respondent’s part that could justify the use of such a term. Clearly the claimant finds the process of litigation itself a difficult and emotionally challenging one but it might be said that this is the nature disputes of this kind. The respondent, correctly in my view, openly acknowledged that it had used the wrong expression in the appendix and promptly issued a corrected version. Matters should have rested there. However, the claimant at the time, namely in May 2025, blew the issue up out of all proportion by making a crime report to the Metropolitan Police seemingly out of concern that she had been or was going to be accused of making false rape allegations. Whilst I acknowledge that the claimant might have felt aggrieved by having an accusation misattributed to her the respondent acted promptly to rectify the position and accepted its own error. There was no need in my view for the claimant to do anything further than accept that correction. Her response and her escalation of the matter to the police was disproportionate, inappropriate and wasteful of time and costs. This is also a matter that arose almost a year before the strike out application of 4 May 2026 that she is now asking me to deal with. There are simply no grounds arising from this situation that would come anywhere close to the threshold of unreasonable conduct of the defence of the claim that would justify striking out the respondent’s response.

[21]I also note that the claimant asserts that this matter amounted to intimidation by the respondents. I have tried hard to understand how the respondent’s error could reasonably be regarded as intimidation but have concluded that the claimant’s perception that the respondent was intimidating her was not a reasonable perception. I return to my point that the decision to use such a strong metaphor originated with the claimant herself. The claimant has relied on this assertion that she is being intimidated to explain her non-appearance at the hearing on 15 July 2026. As she was prepared to attend a hearing in December 2025, and the incident she refers to occurred in May 2025, I find it difficult to understand her position.

[22]I also consider that the way in which the claimant reacted to this incident is relevant to the factual matrix which I must consider in dealing with the respondent’s application to strike out the claim. The claimant has demonstrated a propensity to react very strongly to events and place the worst possible interpretation on the motives and actions of others, including those representing the respondent and even the members of the judiciary who have been dealing with this case. I will return to that point later in this decision. I think it fair to say that the correspondence generated by the claimant in this case is replete with farfetched allegations against professional representatives and others who have striven to keep the case moving towards a trial.

[23]The second matter on which the claimant relies in seeking a strike out of the respondent’s response to her claims concerns an allegation that the respondent has ‘tampered with evidence’ by manipulating a screenshot. The respondent says that there has been no impropriety and it firmly denies the allegations of evidence tampering and perjury against the respondent and its representatives, all of whom are members of regulated professions.

[24]The claimant’s allegation is made in a protracted and detailed document containing what she describes as ‘evidence’ that a screenshot that has been put in evidence by the respondent in support of an application for a deposit, has been manipulated in some way. I have read the document and considered the argument the claimant has put forward. This involves a very detailed and technical analysis of specific details of the document and why these details suggest that the image has been changed. It is not within the competence of the Tribunal to assess the validity of allegations of this nature but looking at them objectively I agree with the respondent that they consist largely of opinion and speculation by the claimant. Furthermore, the allegation itself is inherently improbable considering the nature of the respondent and the representatives involved – it seems to me little more than a conspiracy theory. The matter could only be fully resolved by engaging forensic experts to provide an independent opinion, the cost and disruption of which would be completely disproportionate in the circumstances. This is not the first time that the claimant has put forward arguments about ‘evidence tampering’ which I dismissed earlier in the proceedings for the same reasons. I agree with the respondent that the document and video footage provided by the claimant with the application consists of the claimant's subjective thoughts, opinions, and suppositions and conduct that meets the threshold for a potential strike out is not established by any objective evidence. But even if I take the allegation at its highest, and even if it was the case that a piece of evidence had been manipulated in some way by the respondent or its representatives, which I consider to be very unlikely, striking out the entirety of the respondent’s response would not be a proportionate response. If the claimant is making a more limited application it is not clear what this is.

[25]The claimant’s strike out application is refused on both grounds. Respondent’s application

[26]I have considered very carefully the correct approach to the respondent’s application to strike out the claimant’s claim in its entirety. I had the benefit of helpful submissions from Mr Sangha.

[27]The respondent’s strike out application is set out in its letter of 20 May 2026 and refers to its application for a strike out warning made on 12 January 2026, the terms of the strike out warning I issued in response to that application, the nature of the claimant’s applications to strike out the response, which I have dealt with above and the ongoing tone and content of the claimant’s correspondence, which it justifiably describes as hostile and combative. Whilst acknowledging the claimant’s disabilities and health issues, it points to the fact that the claimant is still contesting the list of issues that was supposedly finalised at the hearing on 15 December 2025, but rather than focusing on specifying her concerns she is putting her energy, not for the first time, into farfetched allegations against the respondents and their representatives. There is now real prejudice to the respondent in the form of the significant costs of the proceedings to date, before any trial has taken place and the difficulties it is facing in preparing for a hearing when the claimant is still disputing the issues that are to be determined. All these points are justified observations.

[28]As noted, the claims the claimant wishes to bring have been exhaustively discussed with her at a series of case management hearings. It was agreed prior to the preliminary hearing in May 2025 that the tribunal would take charge of the list of issues as it was not proving possible to achieve a resolution of the list through correspondence between the parties. A prolonged discussion of the list took place at a case management hearing on 12 May 2025 and following that hearing, on 25 September 2025 a revised list of issues reflecting the discussion that had taken place, was sent to the parties, the delay being attributable to me and other pressures of work that I was dealing with at the time. A further hearing took place on 15 December 2025 at which there was yet again a further discussion of the list. I recorded the following in my case management orders: Discussion of the list of issues 4. The initial part of the hearing was taken up by a discussion of the list of issues. As part of this discussion the claimant said that she wished to withdraw her claim against Ian Abbs. I asked her whether that that was really her intention and she confirmed that it was. A judgment will therefore be issued dismissing the claims against Mr Abbs. 5. There were two parts to this discussion of the list itself. Firstly, the current draft contains missing information that the claimant will need to provide to the Tribunal. The Judge showed the claimant where the gaps were in the list of allegations and asked her to provide the missing information by including it in tracked changes in a copy of the draft list of issues. This is reflected in the orders below. 6. Secondly, the claimant is unhappy with the process by which the list of issues has been created as it was based on a list of allegations initially prepared by the respondent’s representatives. The claimant considers that this is unfair, but I reiterate here that it is normal practice for a respondent to draft a list of issues in a claim, drawing on the pleaded claims, and it is not the case that a claimant must always have the right to assert their own list, provided that the claimant has been given a reasonable opportunity to explain the claims. There is no doubt that the claimant has been given that opportunity over several days of case management hearing, where great pains have been taken to understand the legal claims the claimant wishes to advance. 7. It is also within the case management powers of the employment tribunal to assume responsibility for drafting or completing a list of issues if it appears to be in accordance with the overriding objective for it to do so, which it has done in this case. The Tribunal has taken charge of the list because the history of the claim made this the most sensible course and the Tribunal has acted within its powers in assuming this task. It has given the claimant a great deal of time in which to explain and clarify her claims. The manner in which they have been put forward has been exceptionally complex and difficult to follow. 8. The process of identifying the issues has therefore been very protracted. The respondent’s need for certainty about the issues must also be taken into account and the respondent was very keen that the list that was sent to the parties by the Tribunal on 24 September 2025 should be treated as the definitive list. The claimant however was adamant that there were parts of her pleaded claim that had been left out. I agreed to give reasonable consideration to the claimant’s argument in this regard and considered that the overriding objective, the case law (Moustache v Chelsea and Westminster NHS Trust) and the interests of justice, would likely require me to include any a claim that had clearly been pleaded from the outset but overlooked. 9. I also note from the file that the claimant did write to the Tribunal after receiving the draft list of issues stating that the following matters had been excluded (email of 18 October 2025):9.1 A claim under s21 Equality Act 2010 based on failure to make reasonable adjustments as well as a failure to provide auxiliary aides;

9.2 A claim of less favourable treatment because of perceived disability/perceived autism. 10. I also note having reviewed the claim form for claim 7, that claim 7 arguably contained a claim that Fiona Williamson was liable for detriment under s47B Employment Rights Act 1996 as a result of her involvement in the claimant’s dismissal. I discuss that further in relation to the respondent’s strike out application below. 11. I agreed that I would consider the claimant’s request that missing matters be inserted into the list of issues. In doing so I would also consider her document of 12 December 2025 and whether this made any other submission about missing matters that were clear and coherent and that it would be in the interests of justice to include, taking into account both the claimant’s entitlement to have her claims heard and the respondent’s entitlement to have those claims finally identified. 12. After reading the 12 December 2025 document, revisiting the pleadings in the case and weighing up what both parties said at the hearing I have decided that the only amendments that should be made to the list of issues are:

12.1 the correction of the PCP at paragraph 14 of the list of allegations attached to the list of issues to read ‘being required to read documents on a mobile phone that have been photographed’;

12.2 the incorporation of the claimant’s claims that she was discriminated against because of ‘perceived disability’, which she has clearly pleaded, but which is not reflected in the list. The claimant will have to explain where in the list of issues the question of perceived disability arises. This is reflected in the orders below; and

12.3 the removal of the references to Ian Abbs, against whom the claimant withdrew her claim during the course of the hearing;

12.4 to add a claim under s47B ERA 1996 against Fiona Williams in relation to the Claimant’s dismissal;

12.5 any amendments that result from my decision about the applications referred to in paragraphs 26-29 of Mr Cordery’s submissions, which will follow after 12 January. 13. The claimant’s document of 12 December 2025 did not clearly identify any other matters that were missing from the list of issues. As the claimant had had the list since 24 September, this document was her opportunity to set out her concerns. Other than those listed above, I could not discern any others that were clear and coherent or justified an amendment to the list. Some assertions in the document were incorrect, such as (these are examples only):

13.1 the assertion that Matthew Rowe has been removed from the list of issues – he has not;

13.2 the assertion that the list of issues limits the reasonable adjustments claim to a lack of auxiliary aids. That is not the case – there are a number of references to claims relying on a provision, criterion or practice that the claimant says has put her at a substantial disadvantage and that required reasonable adjustments;

13.3 the claimant says that her claim that her dismissal was discriminatory is missing from the list - it is not;

13.4 she says that the claims against Capita are missing, but that is because they have all been struck out. 14. The claimant also said that the list of issues is missing her claim about not being provided with employment particulars by Pia Larsen when Pia Larsen attempted to extend her contract. This seems to me to be part of the claimant’s complaint that she did not want to agree to a contract extension without understanding the terms of it. Whilst that is understandable, I do not see this as a separate head of claim. It is part of the factual matrix surrounding the termination of the claimant’s employment and the question of whether she was dismissed or resigned. 15. I wish to note at this point that it has been a feature of this case that has caused considerable difficulty that the claimant wishes to treat very many aspects of the facts as separate heads of claim, usually under more than one statutory provision. This has introduced disproportionate complexity into the case. It is simply not feasible for the Tribunal to address every layer of complexity identified by the claimant and doing so is not in my judgment necessary to achieve a just result. In fact, it is likely to impede the achievement of an outcome. With the additions identified above the list of issues now represents a fair and reasonable summary of the claims advanced by the claimant. It will therefore be regarded as final once the amendments referred to in these orders have been made.

[29]I also made the following further orders for the management of the case. Information missing from the list of issues 16. The claimant must complete the list of issues with the missing information about the disabilities she is relying on (and any other information that is missing). The gaps are clearly indicated on the draft list. 17. The claimant should:17.1 Save a copy of the document;

17.2 Add the missing information using ‘tracked changes’;

17.3 Show on the list of issues where she considers that she has been discriminated against because of perceived disability;

17.4 Send the amended document back to the respondent and the tribunal. 18. She must do this by 12 January 2026. 19. Any matter on which information remains missing or cannot reasonably be understood, may be struck out.

[30]The claimant did not comply with the case management orders made that day and the respondent wrote to the Tribunal on 12 January 2026, raising concerns about the claimant’s lack of communication and the potential impact on the case preparation timetable. The respondent sought a strike out warning against the claimant on a number of grounds, including the claimant’s conduct of the case to date. The grounds were set out in a letter which included an Appendix describing some of the conduct the respondent regarded as unreasonable.

[31]I therefore sent a letter to the parties on 19 March, which included a strike out warning as follows: ‘That if the Claimant continues to conduct the claim in the unreasonable manner in which she has on occasion conducted it to date, and as illustrated by the examples set out in the Appendix to the Respondent's application to this Tribunal on 12 January 2025 (and appended with this Strike Out Warning), either on the Tribunal's own volition or on the application of the Respondent, an Open Preliminary Hearing may be listed to consider striking out the Claimant's claims.’

[32]The claimant was required to acknowledge that she had seen and understood the strike out warning. The claimant did not do this. In fact nothing was heard from the claimant at all by the respondent or the tribunal until 21 April 2026 at which point she wrote to the respondent as follows: ‘can Judge Morton strike out. She has erred in law, and this was recorded as being suggested and encouraged by Mr Ohringer. London South can not strike out! It highlights how in err they are, and they are trying to coerce me to accept a list of issues I SIMPLY WILL NOT AND COERCE ACCEPTANCE BY A COERCIVE TRIBUNAL ORDER BY A JUDGE THAT SHOULD KNOW BETTER. I feel a familiar feeling where I have the courage to point out mistakes by Senior people who laugh at me and dismiss me for being utterly stupid. but rules are rules. I want to got to EAT if I have to force it. I made clear I was not accepting of the list of issues at all. claims have been missed off and the list of issues process has been completely abused to sabotage the claim. she can not strike out and when and if she does, I have an EAT application already written out.’

[33]The claimant wrote further on 23 April: Your list of issues is not the claim to be heard. It isnt the claim brought. but the NHS has form for trying these things on!

[34]On 4 May, in the context of her application to have the response struck out, the claimant wrote to the Tribunal: ‘If you decide to Strike out the Respondents, I will immediately get to work to progress the claim and finalise the List of Issues. But I should have a fair chance to submit my own draft of the list of issues - as I said it before and I will say it again, this is being managed with procedural perverseness. I will wait two decades if I have to. I am not abandoning the claim. But it must have the fair procedures with respect to the list of issues applied to it. I intend to apply to EAT if not. The claims in Anna Martins drafts are misworded and she has changed the allegations and sometimes dates. I can easily get the missing claims that have not yet been struck out and the minor missing details such as the final details needed. Then it is a simple case of disclosure of integral untampered with evidence for the court to go through the hearing process and make their decision.’

[35]On 8 June she wrote ‘The list of issues I am being instructed to 'complete' and thereby coerce consent by the claimant is simply not fair. It is not my claim. I do not consent to the list of issues, nor the way it has been coerced by Judge Morton….’.

[36]I set out this background because the respondents’ submission at the hearing was that the lack of agreement about the list of issues at this stage of the proceedings, is not only jeopardising the case management timetable, but also putting in danger the possibility of a fair trial of the claims in June and July 2027. Whilst in theory, Mr Sangha submitted, there is still time to prepare the case, the very clear indication by the claimant that she does not regard the list of issues as legitimate, let alone settled, presents a real problem for the management of the case at the next stage.

[37]The claimant is of course entitled to have her say on the list of issues, to comment on it, correct it and, if she considers that the tribunal has erred in law, appeal to the EAT. However I make the following points:a. The claimant has not complied with case management orders giving her the opportunity to comment on the list;

b. Instead she has made generalised assertions about the inadequacy and unfairness of the list of issues but has failed either to provide a detailed criticism or to take the opportunity to insert information that only she can provide but is missing from the list;

c. She has not provided an alternative list that she says better represents the claims she wants to make or provided detailed comments on the list produced by the tribunal after discussion with her, thereby pointing out in concrete terms where she considers the tribunal has missed important aspects of her claim rather than making generalised assertions;

d. The claimant has shown herself capable of making detailed structured arguments, for example when drafting her own strike out applications. I do not therefore consider that the claimant has failed to engage with the list of issues through a lack of understanding of what is required of her;

e. The claimant’s recent applications for strike out did not have any reasonable basis but were still costly and time-consuming for the respondent and the Tribunal to deal with and contain far-fetched allegations about matters such as evidence tampering. The claimants spent time preparing these at a time when she should have been complying with the orders made by the Tribunal in December in relation to the list of issues and acknowledging the Tribunal’s strike out warning;

f. Her assertions about the origin of the list are not accurate. I note at this point that in fact the claimant did in fact produce a schedule of the issues in her first three claims that formed the starting point for the list of issues that has now been arrived at. Paragraph 19 of the case management orders made on 4 June 2024 states as follows: There then followed a detailed discussion of the issues in the case, focusing on the later claims, in respect of which there has been no case management hearing so far and therefore no opportunity to consider the issues that arise and how these supplement the issues in the earlier claims. It was very helpful to have access to the spreadsheet the Claimant had prepared setting out her complaints, which was the principal document from which the issues were identified;

g. Some of the claimant’s assertions are incorrect, for example as noted in paragraph 13 of the case management orders of 15 December 2025 cited above.

[38]The claimant has therefore not played her part in moving her own case forward and has instead disrupted and make even more difficult the painstaking process of trying to establish what she wishes to bring her claims about. That is before any other steps have been taken to prepare the case for trial, and in particular disclosure of documents, agreement about which documents are needed for the final hearing and preparation of witness statements. The respondent is very understandably concerned about this state of affairs.

[39]In addition to these matters of concern are the matters listed in the appendix to the respondent’s application for a strike out warning of 12 January 2026, which I need not replicate in full here but can be summarised as:a. Her disruptive and discourteous conduct at the hearing on 15 December 2025;

b. Failure to comply with case management orders, or being selective and inconsistent in the way that she complies with them causing delay and disruption to the process;

c. Failure on a number of occasions to collect or to collect expeditiously, bundles of documents prepared specifically to accommodate her disabilities incurring wasted costs and the postponement of at least one hearing in November 2024. There was then further disruption to the postponed hearing in February 2025 because of the claimant’s unexplained failure to engage with the process of producing the bundle for that hearing;

d. Repeated unsubstantiated allegations against legal professionals and judges and the use of insensitive, inflammatory language in her communications;

e. Making a report to the Metropolitan Police in May 2025 about the respondent’s erroneous use of the word “rape” when it should have said “behaviour akin to rape” when this was clearly not a proper basis for a report to the police.

[40]These are powerful points. But the critical questions at this point in my decision are:a. Is this conduct by the claimant that meets the threshold for striking out the claim?

b. Should I exercise my discretion to strike out? Would some lesser sanction be sufficient?

c. Is a fair trial still possible?

d. Would striking out the claim at this point be proportionate?

[41]I have found this a difficult decision. The expense, disruption, inconvenience to the respondent of the claimant’s manner of conducting these proceedings is very clear. The respondent is evidently prejudiced and the respondent’s representatives have had to tolerate a great deal of hostile and sometimes offensive correspondence and unwarranted accusations of professional misconduct.

[42]I do not however accept the respondent’s concern that there is still no viable list of issues. I think that there is a viable list, albeit that the claimant has still not clarified some matters. But on that, it was made very clear to the claimant that if she did not provide that clarification within the timescales set at the hearing on 15 December 2025, those parts of the list would be removed. Hence if matters do move forward, it will be with this shorter list. The problem, as I have already noted, is that the claimant is rejecting the list altogether and refusing to accept the authority of the Tribunal to order the list of issues that should stand as the list of issues to be determined in the final hearing. The respondent justifiably submits that this state of affairs is casting serious doubt on the ability of the claimant to focus on the issues in the case and get down to the business of preparing for the trial.

[43]I have considered the authorities on strike out and set out here three passages that seem to me relevant to this decision. In Blockbuster Entertainment Ltd v James

[2006] IRLR 630

Lord Justice Sedley said the following: This power, as the employment tribunal reminded itself, is a draconic power, not to be readily exercised. It comes into being if, as in the judgment of the tribunal had happened here, a party has been conducting its side of the proceedings unreasonably. The two cardinal conditions for its exercise are either that the unreasonable conduct has taken the form of deliberate and persistent disregard of required procedural steps, or that it has made a fair trial impossible. If these conditions are fulfilled, it becomes necessary to consider whether, even so, striking out is a proportionate response. The principles are more fully spelt out in the decisions of this court in Arrow Nominees v Blackledge

[2000] 2 BCLC 167

and of the EAT in De Keyser v Wilson

[2001] IRLR 324

, Bolch v Chipman

[2004] IRLR 140

and Weir Valves v Armitage

[2004] ICR 371

… The first object of any system of justice is to get triable cases tried. There can be no doubt that among the allegations made by Mr James are things which, if true, merit concern and adjudication. There can be no doubt, either, that Mr James has been difficult, querulous and uncooperative in many respects. Some of this may be attributable to the heavy artillery that has been deployed against him - though I hope that for the future he will be able to show the moderation and respect for others which he displayed in his oral submissions to this court. But the courts and tribunals of this country are open to the difficult as well as to the compliant, so long as they do not conduct their case unreasonably….. The particular question in a case such as the present is whether there is a less drastic means to the end for which the strike-out power exists. The answer has to take into account the fact – if it is a fact – that the tribunal is ready to try the claims; or – as the case may be – that there is still time in which orderly preparation can be made. It must not, of course, ignore either the duration or the character of the unreasonable conduct without which the question of proportionality would not have arisen; but it must even so keep in mind the purpose for which it and its procedures exist.

[44]In Emuemukoro v Croma Vigilant (Scotland) Ltd

[2022] ICR 327

the EAT held that a fair trial is not one which is possible "if enough time and resources are thrown at it" but one which is conducted without undue expenditure of time and money and with proper regard to the demands of other litigants and the finite resources of the court.

[45]In Rolls Royce v Riddle

UKEAT/0044/07

, Lady Smith said "...it is quite wrong for a claimant, notwithstanding that he has, by instituting a claim, started a process which he should realise affects the employment tribunal and the use of its resources, and affects the respondent, to fail to take reasonable steps to progress his claim in a manner that shows he has disrespect or contempt for the tribunal and/or its procedures."

[46]All of these passages are relevant to the question of whether it is appropriate to strike out the claimant’s claims at this point. The well-known passage from James provides the Tribunal with clear guidance that it needs to be convinced either that there has been deliberate and persistent disregard of required procedural steps, or that a fair trial is impossible. It seems to me that I am obliged to take into account when considering whether the first condition is met, that the claimant’s disabilities make it difficult for her to conduct litigation in the way that other litigants in person might do so. I have made and continue to make allowance for the fact that at least some of her very difficult behaviour may not be deliberate. I make the same assessment in relation to the passage from Rolls Royce v Riddle. The clamant is on the face of it showing disrespect and even contempt for the Tribunal and its procedures, but I am not convinced that that is deliberate. I therefore do not consider that I can reliably conclude that the first condition is met at this point.

[47]As for whether a fair trial is possible, it seems to me that it still is, but only on condition that the claimant can now accept that enough time has been spent on the list of issues and the case must now move forward with the amended and reduced list that resulted from the case management hearing on 15 December 2026 and its aftermath. Here the passage from Emuemukoro is relevant. The claimant has had a very generous allocation of the resources of the Tribunal and no more can feasibly be offered in relation to this aspect of the case.

[48]Having weighed matters up I have decided that I will not order strike out of the claimant’s claims at this point, but I will issue the claimant with a second very clear warning in the following terms: The claimant must, within seven days of this judgment being sent to the parties write to the Tribunal and the respondent confirming: 1. that she accepts and will not further dispute the list of issues as amended after the discussion at the hearing on 15 December 2025; 2. that she accepts that any claims where she has still not provided the details ordered at that hearing will be deleted from the list; 3. that she accepts that this will be the list of issues to be used at the final hearing in June and July 2027.

[49]An email from the claimant confirming that she accepts these terms will be sufficient.

[50]If the claimant does not do this, the Tribunal will strike out her claim without any further hearing on the basis that the claimant has unreasonably refused to accept a list of issues that has been carefully created in consultation with her. As a consequence of that it seems to me clear that a fair trial of her claims will not be possible. Having certainty about the issues to be dealt with at a hearing to which 20 days of Tribunal time have been allocated is a fundamental part of case preparation. All other steps in case preparation depend on it.

[51]The other case management orders made on 15 December 2025 will remain suspended for the period given to the claimant to give this confirmation. If the claimant gives the confirmation the respondent should write to the Tribunal suggesting a revised timetable for preparation.

[52]I wish also to make it clear to the claimant that the Tribunal will expect her to be co-operative throughout the period of case preparation and to focus on the process to the best of her ability. If, for example, she continues to make farfetched allegations about the validity of documents, preparation of the case will quickly become derailed and fair trial will again be put in jeopardy. In other words, this will not be the only occasion on which the claimant is in danger of her claims being struck out if she fails to co-operate with the process of case preparation going forward. Approved by