Mr J Johnson v Capital City College Group and Others: 2219438/2024 and Others
EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS
Case No 2219438/2024
Between
Mr J JohnsonClaimantCapital City College Group and OthersRespondent
Before
Employment Judge Norris, sitting alone (via CVP)Date 10 November 2025
REASONS
Introduction
[1]The Claimant was employed by the First Respondent, a group of further education colleges, as a Mixed Martial Arts (MMA) instructor, from 27 November 2023 until 10 July 2024.[2]There are nine further named respondents:• Mr R Murphy (Second Respondent) is Sports Development Manager at the First Respondent.• Mr J Silman (Third Respondent) is Head of School for Sports at the First Respondent.• Mr R Hindley (Fourth Respondent) is the Vice Principal at Haringey, Enfield and North East London for the First Respondent.• Ms T Hartley (Fifth Respondent) is Chief People Officer for the First Respondent.• Mr G Mitchell (Sixth Respondent) is an external investigator, appointed by the First Respondent but not an employee of the First Respondent.• Ms A Joyce (Seventh Respondent) is Chief Executive Officer of the First Respondent.• Mr P Hodgson (Eighth Respondent) is Interim Head of School for Sports for the First Respondent.• Mr H Sokhi (Ninth Respondent) is an HR Manager for the First Respondent.• Mr A Da Costa (Tenth Respondent) is the former Chair of Governors.[3]Following his dismissal, the Claimant presented five claims, contending in summary that he was subjected to direct discrimination because of race, race-related harassment and victimisation. The Claimant puts his claim thus (I have substituted numbers for the names of the Respondents): “R2 and R3 subjected me to a campaign of racial discrimination for which I put forward an official grievance. R5 ignored the grievance then lied to ACAS about ignoring the grievance. R5 then appointed R6 to coverup the campaign of discrimination brought against me, under the guise of him carrying out an investigation. R6, along with R8, and R4, began to harass and victimise me. I informed R7 who ignored the evidence I presented to her, and willingly joined the campaign of racial discrimination brought against me”. There is an additional claim for unpaid wages against the First Respondent only.[4]In August 2024, EJ Glennie indicated that he was considering consolidating all five claims and extending a preliminary hearing (case management) (PHCM) that had been listed for 29 October 2024 from two to three hours, to deal additionally with the Respondent’s application to list the matter for a further preliminary hearing (PH) for consideration of strike out/the making of a deposit order, or more than one, based on the prospects of the case. There was no objection to that course of action from the parties.[5]At the PHCM on 29 October, EJ Davidson listed a full merits Hearing for ten days, starting on 29 September 2025. She also listed the case for a oneday PH in public on 23 January 2025 to consider the Respondents’ application for strike out/deposit orders, following which the list of issues to proceed to the full Hearing would be drawn up and case management directions given.[6]The hearing on 23 January 2025 went ahead, but it appears it was quickly converted to one of case management after Employment Judge Boyle had refused the Respondents’ application to strike out the claim on the basis of the Claimant’s non-compliance with EJ Davidson’s orders. The final Hearing dates were maintained and directions given to progress to that trial. A list of issues was drawn up. Nonetheless, the Respondents reserved the right to renew an application for strike out/deposit orders on prospects once they had served revised responses to the claim as it was then understood.[7]The application was indeed renewed in writing on 20 February 2025. In broad summary, the Respondents argued that the Claimant had failed to show a prima facie case of discrimination and that accordingly his claims were either vexatious and/or stood no reasonable prospect of success and/or that his claims against some of the named Respondents (specifically Rs4-7, 9 and 10) were vexatious. The Claimant responded with a four-page “claim summary” and 178 pages of emails (“email bundle”) with a covering email that said this was his response to the strike-out application. On 7 May 2025, the Tribunal listed the case for the one-day PH that came before me on 18 July 2025. Preliminary Hearing 18 July 2025[8]At the PH, which was conducted by CVP, the Claimant represented himself and the Respondents were represented by Mr Johnston, Counsel, with a representative from Shakespeare Martineau. The Fifth and Ninth Respondents were also present and there were three observers who were not connected with the case. All three observers said they were unable to enable their cameras, but the Claimant and Mr Johnston had no objection to them remaining on the call.[9]I received the Respondent’s 667-page bundle, and two documents from the Claimant, shortly before 10.00 and had only had the opportunity for a skim through what I had received before I joined the call at 10.10. Once we started the PH and following introductions, I therefore indicated that I would require time for reading. It was clear that I would have to consider a large number of allegations, all but one of which are put under different legal heads and many of which are brought against more than one Respondent; we only had a day for the PH and the final Hearing is in two months. The bundle was in a most unhelpful state; the internal pagination did not match the pdf numbering, and the Respondents’ application referred to page numbers in the Claimant’s email bundle which appeared at pages 484 to 661. There were no written submissions, and the Respondents had not provided a Skeleton Argument or any authorities to the Claimant in advance. Therefore, I asked Mr Johnston to direct me to what the Respondents say is the essential reading to support their application, and he gave the page numbers in the bundle accordingly.[10]Fortunately, the two documents supplied by the Claimant were his email bundle and four-page claim summary. I therefore had the hearing bundle and, separately, the Claimant’s email bundle and claim summary open on my screen. The Claimant agreed that the documents to which Mr Johnston had referred were the ones I should read, though adding that his four-page summary was enough. He suggested that everything I might need was in that document.[11]I explained that I could not exclusively read the Claimant’s summary (which I had had the opportunity to consider only very briefly up to that point), because I was hearing the Respondents’ application to strike out. I did note however that during the adjournment and while I was reading in, which I anticipated would take around an hour, the Claimant might want to think about the causal link between race and the conduct complained of. I explained that there needs to be a connection between the protected characteristic (race) and the conduct.[12]The Claimant expressed concern that I was raising this. Since I had not read far into the documents, I asked Mr Johnston whether the Respondents were aware of the link relied on. He said, while acknowledging that the Tribunal must take the Claimant’s case at its highest, that they were not aware of it.[13]The Claimant refuted that. I explained however that it is insufficient to show that there is a difference in status (i.e. in this case race) and a difference in treatment1. I looked by way of example only at the first two issues on the Claimant’s claim summary, sharing my screen as I did so: 1. “1 December 2023 [R2] creating incoherent work environment by not providing MMA equipment to deliver MMA project (see page 4, 5, 6 and 7 emails dated 1st December 2023 from me and [R2]) because I am a black man …direct discrimination; 2. [R3] threatened me with dismissal because I was ensuring I had all the resources required to deliver MMA sessions, because I am a black man (see pages 5, 6 and 7 emails dated 1st December 2023)……direct discrimination and harassment”.[14]Taking the first allegation, I asked the Claimant to think about why he was saying the reason R2 had allegedly created an “incoherent work environment” was race. I asked him to think about what “more” there was to that argument, explaining that on the face of it, I could not see it. I acknowledged that I had not read all the documents yet and said that it might be that once I had done so, it would be sufficiently clear that I would not have to ask the Claimant to clarify further. However, if it was still not yet 1 See for example Igen v Wong 2005 ICR 931, in which the Court of Appeal cautioned tribunals at [51] “against too readily inferring unlawful discrimination on a prohibited ground merely from unreasonable conduct where there is no evidence of other discriminatory behaviour on such ground” and Madarassy v Nomura International PLC [2007] ICR 867 in which Mummery LJ stated at [58] that: “The bare facts of a difference in status and a difference in treatment only indicate a possibility of discrimination. They are not, without more, sufficient material from which a tribunal “could conclude” that, on the balance of probabilities, the Respondent had committed an unlawful act of discrimination”. clear, after the adjournment I would first ask the Claimant to clarify, then ask Mr Johnston to make his application for the Respondents, then come back to the Claimant again for any response to that application.[15]The Claimant then asserted that I was biased against him and towards the Respondent. I endeavoured to explain that it was very important I was given a full explanation for why he claimed the alleged conduct was “because of” race (or amounted to race-related harassment), as this PH had been listed to determine whether there were reasonable prospects of success in each of his complaints. If there were little prospects of success, he could be required to pay a deposit, or more than one. If there were no reasonable prospects of success, his complaint(s) – and potentially the entire claim - could be struck out. I also explained that if a deposit order is made, a party may not only lose their deposit if the complaint to which it attaches is unsuccessful, they may also be at risk more widely on costs, while making it clear that this is not usually a jurisdiction in which the loser is ordered to pay the winner’s costs; nonetheless, that may be the case where a claim is lost on the same basis that a deposit was ordered.[16]The Claimant expressed the view that his position was very clear and that there had been previous hearings during which he had completely explained it. I noted however that a Judge had listed this hearing to consider the Respondents’ strike out application, which I considered would not have been done if the Judge had considered that that application was entirely without merit. It might therefore be necessary for me to clarify what the Claimant was saying was the causal link, if it had not already become clear in the course of my reading. The Claimant strenuously disagreed with this.[17]As the Claimant was raising his voice to the point of shouting, and was not listening to me, I warned him that I would have to mute him if he continued in this manner. He did not stop, and I did mute him. He could be seen on screen still speaking and then he left the virtual hearing room. I adjourned as I had previously indicated I would, and the Court Clerk emailed him to say that we would reconvene at 11.45.[18]By the time we reconvened (at 11.53), the Claimant had emailed the Court Clerk to say that he wished to make a formal complaint against me because I had chaired the PH in an “unfair manner” because he is a black man. In the circumstances and although the Claimant had not asked me to do so, of my own motion, I considered whether to recuse myself. My reasons for not doing so are: a) I had not read the evidence beforehand and had proposed adjourning to do so, for an adequate period and with the agreement of the parties as to the relevant documents; b) I had not said before reading that the Claimant’s case lacked merit. I had explained the law on shifting burdens of proof in the context of a PH listed to determine a strike out application on prospects of success. I had said that I proposed to adjourn to read the papers to which the parties had directed me. I had invited the Claimant to consider his argument on causation during the adjournment so that - if necessary - I could ask him to set that out when we reconvened. At that stage, the nexus between the allegations and race was unclear. I was mindful that the Claimant was representing himself and is not a lawyer and I wanted to give him plenty of time to give the point consideration if it remained so after reading. In Cox v Adecco Group UK & Ireland & Others2, the EAT (Tayler J) noted that a claim brought by a litigant in person should not be ascertained only by requiring the Claimant to explain it orally while under the stresses of a hearing. It said (at [10]), “Things often go wrong at preliminary hearings when considering strike out, or deposit orders, where there has been insufficient consideration of the issues. In this case, a good starting point would have been to identify with care the protected disclosures asserted, and the basis upon which they were contended to be qualifying and protected”. By the same token, I considered it was incumbent on me in this case to identify with care the basis upon which the Respondents’ conduct was said to amount to race discrimination, i.e. probing (if necessary) the reason why the Claimant believed it was. The EAT in Cox gave the following general propositions (to which I had endeavoured to give effect), noting that some are generally wellunderstood while others are not: “(1) No one gains by truly hopeless cases being pursued to a hearing. (2) Strike out is not prohibited in discrimination or whistleblowing cases; but especial care must be taken in such cases as it is very rarely appropriate. (3) If the question of whether a claim has reasonable prospects of success turns on factual issues that are disputed, it is highly unlikely that strike out will be appropriate. (4) The Claimant's case must ordinarily be taken at its highest. (5) It is necessary to consider, in reasonable detail, what the claims and issues are. Put bluntly, you can’t decide whether a claim has reasonable prospects of success if you don’t know what it is. (6) This does not necessarily require the agreement of a formal list of issues, although that may assist greatly, but does require a fair assessment of the claims and issues on the basis of the pleadings and any other documents in which the Claimant seeks to set out the claim. (7) In the case of a litigant in person, the claim should not be ascertained only by requiring the Claimant to explain it while under the stresses of a hearing; reasonable care must be taken to read the pleadings (including additional information) and any key documents in which the Claimant sets out the case. When pushed by a judge to explain the claim, a litigant in person may become like a rabbit in the headlights and fail to explain the case they have set out in writing. (8) Respondents, particularly if legally represented, in accordance with their duties to assist the tribunal to comply with the overriding 2 [2021] I.C.R. 1307 objective and not to take procedural advantage of litigants in person, should assist the tribunal to identify the documents in which the claim is set out, even if it may not be explicitly pleaded in a manner that would be expected of a lawyer. (9) If the claim would have reasonable prospects of success had it been properly pleaded, consideration should be given to the possibility of an amendment, subject to the usual test of balancing the justice of permitting or refusing the amendment, taking account of the relevant circumstances.” c) I had not said the Claimant had to give his argument first. On the contrary, I specifically explained that it is the Respondents’ application, to which the Claimant would be given the chance to respond. However, I was mindful that the authorities confirm it is impossible to give judgment on an issue without knowing what the issue is (“It is an essential tenet of a fair process that the parties should know what those issues are and have had adequate notice of them so as to be able to fairly and properly address them and their implications for the claims before the tribunal”3 and see Cox above). In similar vein, I could see it might be difficult to determine prospects (or possibly even for the Respondents to be able to make coherent arguments) if the Claimant’s underlying case remained unclear. In this instance, the issues were set out and agreed between the parties, but on the brief reading I had already carried out, I considered it was possible that even having read everything to which the Claimant directed me, the underlying reason for his complaints might not be obvious and I wanted him to be aware of the potential significance of that for his claim; d) I muted the Claimant because he was shouting, having warned him first that I proposed to do so if he continued.[19]During the adjournment, I had considered the two previous claims of race discrimination (first instance decisions) to which the Claimant specifically refers in his claim summary, which he said had been brought against the First Respondent in this claim showing a “pattern of behaviour”. I return to these below.[20]I considered whether, in the circumstances, a fair-minded and informed observer, having considered the facts, would conclude that there was a real possibility of bias against the Claimant and/or in favour of the Respondents and concluded that they would not. I decided to proceed in the Claimant’s absence in line with Rule 47. Cases cited by the Claimant[21]On reconvening, before we proceeded, I explained the above in brief summary and reminded Mr Johnston of his obligations to the Tribunal in the 3 Kolev v Middlesex University [2023] EAT 173 Claimant’s absence. Before I heard the Respondents’ submissions, we looked at the outcomes of the two previous claims to which the Claimant had referred in his claim summary document: a) Mr P Sogbodjor v WKCIC T/a Capital City College Group: 2202583/2023; and b) Mrs S Abed v Capital City College Group: 2203468/2021. While neither case is binding on this Tribunal, I considered that any adverse findings in those decisions against the Respondents (or any of them) in the case before me might be relevant, in that they could have given the Claimant grounds to believe that one or more of the Respondents was prone to discriminatory conduct (the “pattern of behaviour” referred to in his document), and thus potentially form the basis of the causal link as discussed. 22. 2202583/2023 - Mr Johnston had also represented the First Respondent (which was the only respondent in that case) while Mr Sogbodjor was also represented by Counsel. Thirteen complaints of direct race discrimination and nine of victimisation were found by the Tribunal, following a six-day Hearing, to be out of time and time was not extended. The remaining direct race and victimisation complaints were not well-founded and were dismissed.[23]I note that the Fifth Respondent in this case, Ms Hartley (then Head of Human Resources), was a witness in Mr Sogbodjor’s case. I also note that at [49] of the written reasons, the Tribunal made this finding: “Ms Hartley was overseeing the process from the HR perspective. She was the one who responded to the claimant’s appeal against the stage 1 outcome. We, however, accept her evidence that that she did not put any pressure on Mrs Merdjan. We also do not find that she shared into the alleged negative view/assumptions about the claimant because of his race or protected acts. There is no proper evidential basis from which we could possibly draw such an inference.” 24. 2203468/2021 - In this case, both parties were represented by Counsel (neither of whom was Mr Johnston). Again, the claim was brought against the First Respondent only. The Hearing was four days long, plus a day for deliberation before the Tribunal delivered its judgment with reasons. As Mr Johnston noted, the first point of differentiation is that the claimant in that case was not a black man; at [8] it is noted “The Claimant has Israeli citizenship. She describes herself as of Palestinian and/or Middle Eastern ethnicity”.[25]Further, Mrs Abed’s claim was for unfair and wrongful dismissal as well as direct race discrimination and harassment. Only her claim of unfair dismissal succeeded (with 100% reduction in remedy for culpable conduct). Her discrimination claims were not well-founded and were dismissed. None of the named Respondents in the present claim is mentioned in the decision in Mrs Abed’s claim.[26]Consequently, I was unable to identify any finding in either of the cases cited by the Claimant that would go to a pattern of behaviour such as he asserts. On the contrary, since both claims were dismissed (and the Fifth Respondent’s evidence accepted by the Tribunal that she did not have a negative view or assumption about Mr Sogbodjor because of race or protected acts), they are of no help to him at all.[27]I heard the application on behalf of the Respondents and reserved my decision. I noted that if the complaints, or any of them, proceeded, the directions given by EJ Boyle would need to be varied, as I had been told that the parties had completed their disclosure but there is as yet no bundle (due to be agreed by 15 April 2025) or witness statements (due to be exchanged on 17 July 2025). In light of my conclusions below, I deal with these directions in a separate case management summary.
Law
[28]I was not addressed specifically on the law by either party. I confine myself to noting the following: Strike out/deposit orders a) At Rule 38(1)(a) of The Employment Tribunal Procedure Rules 2024 (“Rules”), the Tribunal may, on its own initiative or on the application of a party, strike out all or part of a claim, response or reply on … the following grounds: that it is scandalous or vexatious or has no reasonable prospect of success”. According to Rule 40(1), if the Tribunal considers that any specific allegation or argument in a claim, response or reply has little reasonable prospect of success, it may make an order requiring a party to pay a deposit not exceeding £1,000 as a condition of continuing to advance that allegation or argument (“deposit order”). b) The threshold for striking out a claim or response for having no reasonable prospect of success is a high one:(1) In Ezsias v North Glamorgan NHS Trust4, the Court of Appeal (Maurice Kay LJ) held that where there are facts in dispute, it would only be “very exceptionally” that the ET should strike out a case without the evidence being tested and upheld the EAT's decision that tribunals should not be overzealous in striking out a case as having no reasonable prospect of success, unless the facts as alleged by the Claimant disclose no arguable case in law;(2) In Romanowska v Aspirations Care Limited5, the EAT (Langstaff, P) held that “sometimes it may be obvious that, taking the facts at their highest in favour of the Claimant, as they would have to be if no evidence were to be heard, the claim simply could not succeed on the legal basis on which it has been put forward. Where, however, 4 [2007] EWCA Civ 330 5 [2014] 6 WLUK 763 there is a dispute of fact, then unless there are good reasons, indeed powerful ones, for supposing that the Claimant's view of the facts is simply unsustainable, it is difficult to see how justice can be done between the parties without hearing the evidence in order to resolve the conflict of fact which has arisen”. Direct discrimination (c) By virtue of section 13 Equality Act 2010 (EqA), direct discrimination occurs when an employer treats an employee less favourably than they treat or would treat others because of a protected characteristic (in this case, race). There must be facts from which the Tribunal could conclude that discrimination occurred, so that the burden of proof shifts to the Respondent to provide an adequate non-discriminatory explanation for its actions. (d) Section 26 EqA 2010 provides: “(1) A person (A) harasses another (B) if – (a) A engages in unwanted conduct related to a relevant characteristic, and (b) the conduct has the purpose or effect of – (i) violating B’s dignity, or – (ii) creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment for B … (4) In deciding whether conduct has the purpose or effect referred to in subsection (1)(b), each of the following must be taken into account – (a) the perception of B; (b) the other circumstances of the case; (c) whether it is reasonable for the conduct to have that effect.” (e) Underhill LJ said in UNITE the Union v Nailard6: “… The necessary relationship between the conduct complained of and the claimant’s gender was not created simply by the fact that the complaints with which they failed to deal were complaints about sexual harassment…”. The Tribunal must focus on the conduct of the individuals concerned and ask whether their conduct is related to the protected characteristic. (f) Section 27 EqA sets out the test as follows: (1) A person (A) victimises another person (B) if A subjects B to a detriment because— (a) B does a protected act, or (b) A believes that B has done, or may do, a protected act. 6 [2019] ICR 28 (2) Each of the following is a protected act— (a) bringing proceedings under this Act; (b) giving evidence or information in connection with proceedings under this Act; (c) doing any other thing for the purposes of or in connection with this Act; (d) making an allegation (whether or not express) that A or another person has contravened this Act. General (g) Section 212(1) EqA states that “detriment” does not include conduct which amounts to harassment. Thus, allegations of conduct on the same facts cannot amount to both direct discrimination and harassment, or both victimisation and harassment. Findings on the Respondents’ application[29]There are 33 factual allegations against the ten Respondents in this case; some of them are put in more than one way as allegations of direct discrimination, harassment and/or victimisation. I am mindful that I did not hear evidence from any of the parties concerned and that the Claimant is, and has been throughout, acting as a litigant in person. In light of my findings and conclusions I have not considered any jurisdictional point on time (it was identified in EJ Boyle’s summary that complaints of conduct occurring before 3 February 2024 may not have been brought within the statutory time limits).[30]I make the following general findings that are relevant to the preliminary issues: a) The Claimant’s stance, both internally in the grievance process and before the Tribunal, has been to asset that all relevant evidence to support his allegations is contained in his email bundle. The bundles for the grievance and the hearing may not be identical, but I am satisfied that everything on which the Claimant relied in the grievance process was also before me in this PH and that, as he himself said, that was the entirety of the material on which he wishes to rely. He has had multiple opportunities to set out further material or further argument, including before me, but as I have noted above, flatly refused to engage in any further discussion with me at the PH. As I note below, this reflects his approach to the internal grievance as well; b) Notwithstanding two previous preliminary hearings and the associated directions made by the two Employment Judges involved, the basis for the Claimant saying that the conduct alleged amounts to direct race discrimination, harassment or victimisation still remains unclear, even where the conduct alleged could be found to have occurred.[31]I take the allegations in turn, broadly in the order in which Mr Johnston addressed me on them in his submissions (i.e. by reference to the Respondent in each allegation), rather than the order in which they appear in the list of issues. However, I have also included a table at Annex 1 to this decision, summarising the allegations in numerical order, and a further table at Annex 2 showing which Respondents remain parties to the proceedings and in relation to which allegation. a) Tenth Respondent The only allegation against R10 is number 33: that he was informed on 12 July 2024 of the matters of which the Claimant complains7 and took no action, in retaliation for putting forward a grievance about them. (said to be direct discrimination, victimisation, and harassment). I accept the submission on behalf of the Tenth Respondent that as the (now ex-) Chair of Governors, even if he was notified on 12 July 2024 about the Claimant’s complaints (of which there is no evidence before me), it was not incumbent on him to do anything about them. There is no evidence adduced that the Tenth Respondent took no action because of race, or because the Claimant had raised a grievance. There is no evidence adduced that the Tenth Respondent’s lack of action was related to race. Allegation 33 accordingly stands no reasonable prospect of success and is struck out. The claim is struck out against the Tenth Respondent. b) Seventh Respondent The allegations against R7 are numbers 29 and 32: that she ignored the Claimant’s grievance and supporting evidence against on 28 April 2024 and dismissed him on 10 July 2024 because the Claimant is a black man, and in retaliation for him putting forward a grievance (said to be direct discrimination, victimisation, and harassment). As to allegation 29, I accept the submissions on behalf of the Seventh Respondent that as the CEO, she had no involvement with the engagement, management or dismissal of the Claimant. The evidence before the Tribunal is that the Claimant notified the Seventh Respondent of his grievances and sent his documents to her at 13.23 on 28 April 2024; she responded at 17.31 on 29 April (i.e. the following day) saying, “Thank you for bringing this to my attention. The grievances and claims you have made are currently under investigation. We will contact you to share the outcome and any next steps as soon as the investigation is concluded”. Thus, the allegation that R7 “ignored” the grievance is bound to fail, on the Claimant’s own evidence and it is simply unsustainable. There is also no evidential basis for contending that anything in R7’s response was less favourable treatment or a detriment either because of race or because the Claimant had submitted a grievance or that it was related to race (save to the extent that it acknowledged he had raised a grievance). Allegation 29 stands no reasonable prospect of success and is struck out. 7 The Claimant refers in the complaint summary to informing R10 of “the above”, which I have taken at its highest to encompass all the preceding allegations rather than solely the preceding paragraph As to allegation 32, the Seventh Respondent has not signed the letter of dismissal and there is no evidence to suggest that she saw it or had any input into it, or the decision behind it. I return to this allegation below in the context of the Eighth (and First) Respondents. The claim is struck out against the Seventh Respondent. c) Ninth Respondent The allegation against R9 (31) is that he refused to process the Claimant’s appeal for no valid reason and in retaliation for putting forward a grievance (said to be direct discrimination, victimisation, and harassment). I accept the submission that the Claimant stands no reasonable prospect of success of showing that R9 committed the conduct alleged. The exchange in the Claimant’s email bundle (which is the only material on which the Claimant seeks to rely in this regard) shows that R9 received the Claimant’s appeal at 12.22 on 20 June 2024 and replied a week later as follows: “I have reviewed your points in the email below, but they differ from the ones in your grievance. The report and outcome letter specifically address the points raised in your grievance submission. If you wish to appeal, you need to focus on the points in the report and outcome letter that you believe have not been satisfactorily resolved. Please provide your reasons for this. With that information, your appeal will be considered [emphasis added].” It is accordingly clear from the Claimant’s own evidence that R9 did not “refuse to process” the appeal; rather, he asked the Claimant to clarify his grounds for making it solely by reference to the grievance report and outcome letter. The Claimant’s allegation is simply unsustainable. Even if that were not so, I accept the submission that there is no evidential basis on which a Tribunal could conclude that the reason R9 responded as he did was race, or because the Claimant had raised the grievance in the first place; R9’s email is not race-related. This allegation stands no reasonable prospect of success and is struck out. The claim is struck out against the Ninth Respondent. d) Fourth Respondent The allegations against R4 are numbers 19, 25 and 28: that he supported R8 in taking specific actions (said to be direct discrimination, victimisation, and harassment). R4 is the line manager of the Claimant’s own line manager’s line manager, i.e. several organisational levels above those who would be making the decisions about the Claimant’s employment. I accept the submissions on behalf of R4 that there is no evidence that R4 “supported” R8 in taking any decisions, Further, even if he did, there is no basis on which the Employment Tribunal could properly conclude any action taken by R4 was for any other reason than that he agreed with what R8 was saying or doing, i.e. the Tribunal could not properly conclude that it was because of race or because the Claimant had raised a grievance. There is also no basis for claiming that any support R4 gave to R8 was “related to” race. struck out. The claim is struck out against the Fourth Respondent. e) Sixth Respondent The allegations against R6 are numbers 23, 24 and 27: that he “actively tried to get the identity of a scared employee” (I infer this employee was the Claimant’s potential companion in the grievance process); that he “actively ignored evidence” that the Claimant handed into him so as to cover up racism committed by R2, 3 and 8; and that he “actively harassed” the Claimant on 19 April 2024 by contacting the Claimant directly after the Claimant had told him not to. These allegations are said to amount to direct discrimination, victimisation and harassment. I accept the submission that R6 is not an employee of the Respondent, but an external investigator appointed by R1 through R5 to deal with the Claimant’s grievance. It is clearly arguable that the First Respondent might be vicariously liable for any proven discriminatory conduct committed by R6; but the question of where such liability should fall is immaterial since, for the reasons set out below, the allegations against R6 are struck out. Allegation 23:(i) In email exchanges lasting a little over two hours, R6 contacted the Claimant on 22 March 2024 to say that he had been appointed to investigate the Claimant’s grievance. He invited the Claimant to a meeting to discuss it on 27 March. The Claimant said that the unnamed “member of staff” he had asked to accompany him was available on 25 March or 8 April. R6 chose the latter. The Claimant then replied saying that the member of staff was afraid if he accompanied the Claimant, he too would be subjected to persecution at work by Rs2, 3 and 8. The Claimant said this “only reinforces the racist work culture I have already highlighted” and that he was not happy meeting with R6 alone, so he sent the grievance and supporting evidence in writing to R6 and invited him to email any questions he might have.(ii) On 25 March 2024, R6 emailed the Claimant again, saying: “Thanks for your email. It is concerning that your workplace colleague feels the way they do. Please reassure them that their name will not be mentioned in any documentation that I produce. I need to know their name in advance of our meeting of course, as I first need to ensure that they work for the College. However, apart from that, you can give them my assurance that they will not be named. My strong preference is to meet you with and go through your grievances as I have also been asked by [R5] to investigate your grievance against [R8].”(iii) The Claimant replied by email later that day repeating that R6 should deal with the grievance without a meeting and could send by email any questions he might have. He said he would pass on R6’s comments to his companion, to which R6 said he looked forward to receiving any feedback they may have, and R6 followed this up on 2 April: “I was wondering whether you have had a response from your colleague. I always feel that a meeting with the person raising a grievance is better than holding an interview through an exchange of emails.” The Claimant merely repeated his request for R6 to deal with the grievance, in terms, on the papers (i.e. without an in-person hearing).(iv) On 15 April 2024, R6 asked, “Have you had a response from your colleague yet? Do please reassure them that their contribution will be entirely anonymous.” The Claimant replied, “My colleague doesn't feel comfortable revealing his identity, because since I have handed in my grievance: 1. The campaign of racial discrimination brought against me has worsened. 2. More members of staff have joined above campaign. Once again, as it stands I am not comfortable meeting with you by myself, so please go through grievance, and supporting evidence sent in previous correspondence.”(v) R6 replied, “It is unfortunate that your colleague does not feel comfortable accompanying you to a meeting with me and therefore revealing his identity even though I have given assurances that I would not divulge his name to the College. It is also regrettable that you are unwilling to meet me on your own, and therefore, I have attached a number of questions for you to answer.”(vi) After the Claimant had responded, on 16 April 2024, R6 wrote to him asking him to re-send a number of emails on which the date of sending was not visible. I cannot see any mention of the Claimant’s companion after 15 April 2024. I find the Claimant has no reasonable prospect of showing R6 (improperly) actively tried to get his companion’s identity as alleged. I find no Tribunal could properly conclude that R6 was doing anything other than seeking to offer reassurance to the Claimant’s companion, via the Claimant, that once his name was known in order to confirm he met the parameters within the Employment Relations Act 1999 (i.e. he was an employee of the First Respondent) it would not be further revealed. Save for that email on 24 March 2024, R6 was not, on the evidence, trying to obtain the name at all. Further, the Claimant appears to be saying that it is the unnamed companion who suffered a detriment by R6’s attempts to identify him, “so he will be subjected to retribution for highlighting work environment as toxic and racist”. I find that no Tribunal could properly find that this amounted to less favourable treatment of the Claimant, or that it was “race-related”. As noted in Nailard (above), the necessary relationship between the conduct complained of and the Claimant’s race is not created simply by the fact that the complaints which R6 was investigating were complaints about race discrimination/harassment. Allegation 24: (i) I have noted above that R6 asked the Claimant some questions (at his express invitation) in order to deal with the grievance “on the papers”. There were 48 questions, to eight (or arguably nine) of which the Claimant replied substantively. To the remaining questions, the Claimant replied repeatedly and simply, “(see supported evidence submitted to you)”. (ii) It is clear that R6 faced a problem in understanding how the Claimant puts his case. He asked, for instance, “Subjecting you to an incoherent work environment where you are left in the lurch without vital tasks/problems being resolved: I assume you are referring to undertaking teaching where issues had not been resolved. If I have that wrong, then please correct me. Please let me have, or point me to, the evidence that demonstrates this.” In response to both, the Claimant’s answer was “(see supported evidence submitted to you)”. R6 also asked, again by way of example, “Please provide details of when you were threatened with dismissal. I need to know who said it; what they said; when and where it was said and the names of any witnesses.” The Claimant’s response was the same. (iii) I find that no Tribunal could properly find that this amounts to R6 “actively ignoring” evidence presented to him by the Claimant. On the contrary, it is clear that R6 had read through the Claimant’s complaints and was seeking to confirm and develop his understanding thereof. However, in similar vein to his behaviour before me, when pressed for specifics in relation to his complaints, the Claimant reacted by saying that R6 already had everything he needed and, in terms, that his failure to recognise that amounted to racist behaviour on R6’s part. I find that there is no evidence that R6 behaved as he did because of race. Again, to the extent that his questions were “related to” race, that was because he was asking the Claimant for details of a grievance that raised complaints of race discrimination and harassment. The Claimant’s allegation is simply unsustainable, and he stands no reasonable prospect of showing that R6’s conduct amounted to a detriment for having raised the grievance. It therefore cannot amount to victimisation. Allegation 27 (i) This allegation is that R6 “actively harassed” the Claimant by contacting him on 19 April after the Claimant had made it clear that he was not to do so. The background to this allegation is that on 15 April, the Claimant emailed R5 saying that he was putting forward an official grievance against R6 for “for joining the campaign of racial discrimination brought against me”. He did not copy in R6, and on 16 April, R6 emailed the Claimant as I have noted above, asking him to re-send a number of emails of which the “sent” dates were unclear. Later that afternoon, the Claimant emailed R5 again, saying, “Please tell [R6], who I have copied in this email, not to contact me directly moving forward, as I have submitted an official complaint about him. I have handed in ample information, and supporting evidence, for a fair investigation to be carried out. Moving forward please ensure all information regarding this matter is relayed through yourself.” R5 replied on 17 April noting that R6 had been appointed to investigate the Claimant’s complaints and that he would continue to do so (this email chain forms the basis of part of the Claimant’s allegations against R5 herself to which I return below). On 19 April, R6 chased the Claimant for the emails he had requested. The Claimant replied, “If you contact me directly again for any reason, I will report you to the police for harassment.” (ii) I find that no Tribunal could properly find that this amounts to R6 actively harassing the Claimant as alleged, or to discrimination because of race, or to victimisation. I accept the submission made on his behalf that it was patently R6 doing his best to ensure the material that he had been asked to consider was before him and that he had fully understood the Claimant’s grievance. struck out. The claim is struck out against the Sixth Respondent. f) Fifth Respondent As I have noted above, R5 became involved in exchanges regarding R6’s investigation of the Claimant’s grievance. The allegations against her are 17, 21, 22, 24, 26 and 27: that on 6 March 2024 she ignored the Claimant’s grievance against R2 and R3 because he had submitted a grievance; that on 20 March 2024 she ignored the grievance against R8 in retaliation for putting in a grievance against R88; that on 22 March 2024 she “lied about ignoring the grievances submitted to her” in retaliation for the Claimant putting forward a grievance; and that on 17 April 2024, R5 threatened the Claimant because he handed in a grievance against R6 for actively ignoring evidence the Claimant had handed in; and that she supported R5 in first ignoring the Claimant’s evidence on 15 April and then in actively harassing the Claimant on 19 April 2024. All are said to amount to direct discrimination, victimisation and harassment. The background is as follows: (i) The Claimant sent his grievance about R2 and R3 at 19.44 (i.e. after close of business) on 6 March 2024, from his private email account to R5’s work account. R5 replied at 09.48 the following morning acknowledging receipt and indicating that once an investigating manager had been appointed, the Claimant would be informed and an interview scheduled. She wrote again at 17.39 on 8 March 2024 8 The reference here is to “him”, which therefore cannot be R5, who is a woman. I have inferred it is to R8. to say that R6 had been appointed to investigate the grievance. (ii) At 15.46 on 20 March 2024, the Claimant sent R5 his grievance about R8. On 22 March 2024 at 14.40, R5 replied acknowledging the grievance and indicating that it would be added to the open investigation into his other claims. I accept the submission made on behalf of R5 that the evidence demonstrates she did not ignore the grievances and that accordingly allegations 17 and 21 cannot succeed. In relation to allegation 22, it appeared to me that the Claimant was complaining R5 had “lied” to ACAS, in light of the introductory paragraph in the claim summary: “R5 ignored the grievance then lied to ACAS about ignoring the grievance.” I accept the submissions on behalf of R5 that, first, communications between the parties and ACAS should not be before the Tribunal; but in any event, if, as I have found, R5 did not ignore the Claimant’s grievances, she cannot have lied to ACAS if she said she did not. Allegation 22 cannot succeed. In relation to allegation 27, I have noted above that on 17 April 2024, R5 emailed the Claimant saying that R6 would continue to carry out his investigation into the Claimant’s grievance, as he had been appointed for that task. She added: “If you choose to not participate in the investigation into your complaint, please be aware that this could lead [to] decisions which may not benefit you. This is your decision to make. As you have raised issues of racial complaint [sic], we will investigate these, regardless of whether you participate fully or choose not to.” I accept the submission that this cannot reasonably be interpreted as a “threat” to the Claimant, though there was nothing else which the Claimant had identified as such and I infer that it was to this paragraph that he was referring. It is a factual – and objectively truthful - statement that if the Claimant did not participate in the grievance process (something which was entirely his choice), adverse decisions might be made. I also accept that no Tribunal could properly infer R6 was motivated in making this statement by the Claimant’s race or by the fact that he had raised grievances alleging discrimination. It is only related to race by virtue of the fact that the Claimant’s grievance is about race discrimination. As I have found that the Claimant stands no reasonable prospect of succeeding in allegations 24 and 27 against R6, it follows that he similarly stands no reasonable prospect of success against R5 when the allegation is that she “supported” R6 in discriminatory conduct. struck out. The claim is struck out against the Fifth Respondent. g) Second and Third Respondents The allegations against R2 are that he: (i) created an “incoherent work environment by not providing MMA equipment to deliver MMA project” (allegation 1); (ii) (with R3) in December 2023, ignored or did not make full use of the information provided by the Claimant (allegation 3); (iii) requested information again (allegation 4); (iv) left the Claimant “in the lurch” on 15 December 2023 (allegation 5); (v) (with R3) did not pay the Claimant his November/December 2023 wages by January 2024 and did not pay him anything until the end of February 2024 (allegation 6); (vi) further ignored the Claimant and failed to make use of information the Claimant gave him in January 2024 (allegation 7);(vii) (with R3) refused to provide coherent means of accessing funding assigned to the MMA program (allegation 8);(viii) further ignored the Claimant and failed to make use of information the Claimant gave him in February and March 2024 (allegations 10, 14 and 16);(ix) did not stick to the agreement of volunteers setting up the mats and then blamed the Claimant for the outcome (allegation 11);(x) (with R3) refused to pay the Claimant for hours he worked on 4 March 2024 (allegation 15); and(xi) sabotaged the Claimant’s ability to market the MMA project by falsely telling him that a colleague could put videos on the First Respondent’s Instagram account (allegation 18); The allegations against R3 are that he: (i) threatened the Claimant with dismissal because the Claimant was ensuring he had all the resources required to deliver MMA sessions (allegation 2); (ii) (with R2) in December 2023, ignored or did not make full use of the information provided by the Claimant (allegation 3); (iii) (with R2) did not pay the Claimant his November/December 2023 wages by January 2024 and did not pay him anything until the end of February 2024 (allegation 6); (iv) (with R2) refused to provide coherent means of accessing funding assigned to the MMA program (allegation 8); (v) actively disregarded the issues the Claimant highlighted to the extent he said the Claimant should not keep him informed on 6 February 2024 (allegation 9); (vi) blocked a major way of marketing the MMA program, devalued the project with false presentation of given statistics, then demanded that the Claimant increase attendance, creating an incoherent work environment (allegation 12); (vii) created a work environment where the Claimant had to work more than his allocated work hours, then refused to pay him for the time he had worked (allegation 13); and (viii) (with R2) refused to pay the Claimant for hours he worked on 4 March 2024 (allegation 15). Allegation 1 is said to be direct discrimination, allegations 2-16 direct discrimination and harassment and allegation 18 direct discrimination, victimisation and harassment. I take the Claimant’s claim at its highest in each of the above allegations despite the vagueness of some of them (I also note that in allegation 5 for instance, R2 told the Claimant by email on 15 December 2023 “Please note that today is the last day I will be in the office until the 8th of January” and directed him to speak to R8 about matters in his absence). I assume for these purposes that at a full Hearing he would be able to show the facts relied on (for instance that there was an “incoherent” work environment, that notwithstanding the above, that R2 “left him in the lurch”, that R3 “threatened him with dismissal” and that Rs 2 and/or 3 ignored or did not make full use of information the Claimant provided etc). What the Claimant has not done however is to raise a prima facie case that any of that alleged conduct (or any omission) was done because of race, or because the Claimant had raised a grievance, or was related to race. There is nothing more than a bare assertion in each case. I accept the Respondents’ submission that on every occasion where the Claimant was unhappy with something he was told by the Respondent(s) or at conduct he perceived they have committed, he has ascribed their answer or their conduct to his race. However I accept the submission that there is no hint from anything in the email bundle on which the Claimant relies that either of these Respondents is adversely pre-disposed towards the Claimant because of race, or, in the case of allegation 18, because he has raised a grievance. None of the conduct (or failure to act) alleged is race-related. Allegations 1-16 and 18 are accordingly struck out. The Claimant stands no reasonable prospect of success in any of his complaints against the Second and/or Third Respondents and the claim is struck out against them both. h) Eighth Respondent Allegations 19, 20, 25, 28, 30 and 32 are brought against R8. Allegation 19 is that R8 (who became the Claimant’s line manager on or around 12 March 2024) ignored the Claimant and failed to make use of information the Claimant gave him in March and April 2024. Allegation 20 is that R8 refused to pay the Claimant for hours he had worked on 19 and 20 March 2024; Allegation 25 is that R8 refused to pay the Claimant for hours he worked between March and May 2024 and failed to make use of the information the Claimant submitted to him; Allegation 28 is that R8 removed a martial arts video from the First Respondent’s Instagram account on 22 April 2024 in an attempt to sabotage the Claimant’s work; and Allegation 30 is that on 17 and 18 June 2024, R8 actively refused to pay the Claimant money that was owed to him. All allegations against R8 are said to amount to direct race discrimination, victimisation and harassment. Again, I have taken the Claimant’s case at its highest save where there is incontrovertible evidence to the contrary: (i) The manner in which R8 is said to have “ignored” the Claimant (allegation 19) is unclear; however, the evidence shows that when R8 asked the Claimant for information on 19 March 2024, the Claimant replied on the same day. While the timings are not shown in the email bundle, R8 then messaged the Claimant again on 19 March with responses and follow-up questions. The Claimant replied again later that evening and R8 emailed him the following morning (20 March); it was that afternoon that the Claimant submitted his grievance against R8. A Tribunal could not find, in the circumstances, that R8 “ignored” the Claimant. The allegation is simply unsustainable. (ii) Allegation 20 is also factually unsustainable on the Claimant’s own evidence. The Claimant’s entitlement to pay is a running theme in the email bundle. The evidence shows that when the Claimant joined the Respondent, he was to provide three two-hour sessions per week. It was then agreed that he would be paid for three hours per session, to include setting up and packing away. On or around 26 January 2024, the Claimant asked for an update (from R2) regarding, among other points, “Changing MMA sessions from 2hours to 3hour taking into account setting up and packing up”. He repeated this on or around 29 January 2024. On 8 February 2024, however, the Claimant wrote: “You have extended my hours from 2 to 3hours to allow for set up and pack up of mats, but it takes me an hour to set up the mats. So please either adhere to what was agreed, which was volunteer students set up and pack away the mats or allocate 4 hours per session, which will allow an hour to set up and an hour to pack up the mats”. On 4 March 2024, R3 wrote to the Claimant, copying in R2, as follows: “Unfortunately I will not be able to pay for any additional hours outside the timetabled MMA slots as there is a process for hour allocation to each academy budget. If there are hours in which you believe are vital to be added beyond the timetabled hours then please seek clearance from [R2] (line manager) who will then need to put a case forward to myself, who will then need to get finance approval to raise the budget.” The Claimant replied, “Moving forward I should be paid 5 hours for each session”. R2 replied on 5 March 2024, “Unfortunately, that is not possible. I went to great length to reorganise payments from 2 hours per session to 3 hours per session to the 4 hours it currently is. This is the maximum we can pay for sessions. We don’t have any more budget that can be assigned to this on a weekly basis.” R2 repeated on 6 March that there was no budget with which to pay the Claimant for five hours per session. On 20 March 2024, R8 wrote to the Claimant: “In regards to the additional admin hour, the HPL hourly rate is inclusive of admin time. This can be for tasks such as planning, completing reports or creating social media content. Currently the agreed hours are 3hrs per session, which includes 2hr delivery and 30 mins each side of the session to put the mats out and pack away. I am aware there has been a short term amendment to the 3hrs (due to exams/sports tournaments etc) however long term, 3hrs is what will be approved. Finally, trial days and directed meetings (if outside of the 3hrs) are paid at an admin rate in addition to the 3 hours. I have confirmed with VT2000 that the 4hrs for the meeting stated below will be paid in this months payroll, however moving forward any meetings or additional hours worked need to be agreed prior to completion. They will not be paid unless approved prior.” I consider that a Tribunal could not find in the circumstances that R8 had “refused to pay” the Claimant for hours he had worked on 19 and 20 March. The evidence shows the opposite is true. In any event, what the Claimant has not shown is any reason at all for a Tribunal to find that such conduct or failure to act was because of race or because the Claimant had raised a grievance. None of the conduct alleged is race-related. (iii) Allegations 19, 20, 25, 28 and 30 are struck out as standing no reasonable prospect of success. (iv) Allegation 32 is that the Claimant was dismissed because of race and/or as an act of harassment and/or in retaliation for the Claimant’s submission of grievances. R8’s letter of termination to the Claimant dated 10 July 2024 says as follows: “I am writing to advise you that we will not be requiring your services as hourly paid support delivering Mixed Martial Arts coaching going forward as we have made the strategic decision not to run Mixed Martial Arts academy in the next academic year. We made this decision because Mixed Martial Arts (MMA) is not a recognised sport by the Association of Colleges (AOC). Therefore, it does not align with our long-term goal of becoming the top AOC sports college in London. Consequently, we have decided to concentrate on enhancing our performance in our recognised sports. This letter will serve as giving you two weeks’ notice with your end date being 24th of July 2024.” I bear in mind the authorities and in particular, Ezsias and Romanowska. There remains no arguable basis that the Claimant’s dismissal is race-related or that it is “because of” race. Taking his claim at its highest, the Claimant has not put forward any evidence that could support those bare assertions of direct discrimination and/or harassment. Taking the complaint at its highest however, I consider the Claimant should be given the opportunity to argue that his dismissal is because he had raised grievances and/or submitted a Tribunal claim (or more than one). Nonetheless, if the First and Eighth Respondents are able to evidence the facts as set out in the termination letter in relation to the decision to discontinue the provision of MMA, I consider the Claimant is highly likely to fail to show that his dismissal was because he had done a protected act or acts. Accordingly, I am ordering him to pay a deposit as a condition of pursuing that complaint, which is dealt with in a separate order.[32]Finally, I note that at the January PHCM, EJ Boyle identified a wages claim for £575 relating to what the Claimant says is 23 hours of work that remain unpaid. I do not have the breakdown of when those hours were said to have been worked. However, I have referred above to the exchanges of messages about the Claimant’s working time. The Claimant made clear his intention to claim for additional hours above what had been expressly agreed by the First Respondent through its various managers, despite, as noted, being told that there was no budget available for him to do so. Whether this claim represents such additional hours that may not have been authorised by the Claimant’s managers is unclear. For that reason, I have made a case management order under separate cover requiring the Claimant to provide further details of this complaint.[33]Therefore, in conclusion: a) All the discrimination complaints save allegation 32 are struck out in their entirety as they have no reasonable prospect of success. b) Allegation 32 proceeds as a complaint of victimisation against the First and Eighth Respondents only (subject to the payment of a deposit, set out in an order under separate cover) and is otherwise struck out as having no reasonable prospect of success. c) The complaint of unpaid wages proceeds subject to the Claimant providing the details of the manner in which he has calculated the amount allegedly owing. The Hearing is reduced to two days. A case management order varying EJ Boyle’s directions is also issued under separate cover.[1]This claim came before me for determination of the remaining claims. - 1 -[2]The claimant issued five claims: 2219438/2024, 2219440/2024, 6004695/2024, 6005600/2024, and 6006063/2024.[3]At a preliminary hearing conducted by EJ Norris on 18 July 2025, the vast majority of the claims were dismissed. There remained two claims for potential determination. The first claim, 2219438/2024, was issued on 2 May 2024. There remained a claim of unlawful deduction from wages. I will refer to this as the ‘wages’ claim. The third claim, 6005600/2024, was issued on 11 July 2024. There remained a claim that the dismissal was an act of victimisation. I will refer to this as the ‘victimisation,‘ claim. All remaining allegations in the five claims have previously been dismissed. The case management orders[4]On 18 July 2025, EJ Norris gave case management orders for the management of the remaining claims. The claimant was to provide particulars of the alleged deduction from wages by no later than 4 August 2025. The respondents were to produce a bundle of documents by 26 August 2025. Witness statements would be exchanged by 17 September 2025. The hearing 9 October 2025 The claimant failed to attend the hearing.[6]At the hearing, I consider with the respondent those matters which needed to be decided. We agreed that I should consider the following matters –a. Having noted that EJ Khan had refused to convert this hearing to a CVP case management, was there any renewed application? If so, should this hearing be converted? If so, could it proceed or should it be relisted for a hearing, potentially by CVP?b. What are the remaining live claims to be determined?c. Did the claimant comply with the deposit order made by EJ Norris on 18 July 2025, and if not have any or all claims been struck out?d. If the matter is not to be adjourned, should the tribunal determine any claims?e. Should the tribunal determine the respondent’s application, of 7 August 2025 to dismiss the wages claim. The claimant’s failure to attend[7]The claimant applied on 29 September 2025 to attend the hearing on 9 and 10 October 2025 by video link. He stated, “Because of health concerns I am only to attend 9th and 10th October 2025 hearing via video link.” He gave no further information and did not provide further details or supporting evidence.[8]The respondent objected on 1 October 2025; the respondent stated: - 2 - The claimant has not provided any medical evidence relating to his health concerns. Further, following the claimant’s conduct in the last hearing in which he became irritated and left the video hearing never to return, the respondent is concerned that the claimant may do this again, which will prevent a meaningful hearing from being undertaken. The Tribunal should also note that the claimant has failed to comply with the Tribunal’s directions following the last hearing and as a result, this has caused the respondent tremendous difficulty in being able to prepare for the final[9]That application was dealt with by EJ Khan on 2 October 2025. He responded as follows: The claimant’s application to convert the final hearing on 9-10 October 2025 from an in person hearing to one conducted remotely by video has been referred to Employment Tribunal Judge Khan who has decided to refuse it because the claimant has not provided any details of the health concerns he relies on. Should the claimant renew his application. However, unless he provides an explanation of what his health concerns are and why they prevent him from attending the Tribunal in person, and provides any supporting documents which substantiate this, any further application is likely to be refused.[10]It follows that the initial application was refused. The claimant was invited to provide a further explanation, together with supporting documentation, should he wish to renew the application.[11]The claimant renewed the application at 13:54, approximately five minutes after the letter was sent to him. He submitted a doctor’s fit note. In his email he gave a further explanation as follows: Details of my health issues is highlighted on attached document, which I have sent to the tribunal on multiple occasions.[12]The fit note gave limited detail. It was dated 11 June 2025 and was for the period from 4 June 2025 to 1 December 2025. It stated the claimant was not fit for work. The explanation was, “Anxiety and depression – not to attend any meeting/tribunal hearings in person.”[13]No further explanation was given either by the claimant or by his GP.[14]It appeared that the document had not been referred to a judge and I treated it as a renewed application. It was unclear in the renewed application whether the claimant was seeking to convert the hearing to case management hearing, adjourn generally, or attend the final hearing by CVP. His renewed application lacked detail.[15]I had regard to all correspondence from the claimant concerning his nonattendance. On the day of the hearing, I asked my clerk to contact the claimant to confirm if the deposit order had been paid. I have had regard to the emails sent by the claimant on the day of the hearing. - 3 -[16]The tribunal sent the following email: Please include the other parties in all correspondence with the tribunal, I see EJ Khan refused this request, however the Judge will discuss it in the I see that there was a deposit order, has this been paid? And can you forward me the receipt; this is for the Judge.[17]On 9 October 2025, at 09:40 the claimant sent the following email: If my request has been refused this is the first I'm hearing of it. Plus there should be no reason to refuse as I provided evidence of my condition. The only explanation is he has actively joined the gang of employment Judges that are currently sabotaging my case. Details of which can be found in the multiple complaints I have handed in regarding this case. As well as my EAT applications The corruption and racism Employment Judges have shown with this case has been blatant. It's like the entire tribunal service has been bribed or paid off in some way.[18]The case management order of 18 July 2025 stated the hearing will proceed in person. There is no record of any application to proceed as a video hearing, this despite the fact the fit certificate had already been obtained.[19]At the hearing on 18 July 2025, there is no record of the claimant making an application, by reason of disability or otherwise, for any reasonable adjustment in respect of the conduct of the hearing. It is apparent the claimant attended at the hearing by video, at least initially.[20]Since the hearing on 18 July, the claimant has failed to comply with EJ Norris’s orders to provide particulars of his wages claim by 4 August 2025. He has still not provided any particulars.[21]The claimant has not cooperated with the respondent in production of the bundle. A bundle has been produced by the respondent and sent to the claimant.[22]The respondent has made numerous attempts to secure exchange of witness statements. The claimant has failed to exchange statements either on 17 September 2025, as ordered, all at all.[23]The claimant has not complied with the deposit order.[24]The claimant has not taken any steps in relation to victimisation claim. - 4 -[25]It follows that the claimant has failed to take any active steps in this claim, other than to seek conversion to CVP hearing.[26]The claimant’s request can be interpreted in two ways. First, he wishes to proceed with the liability hearing, but wishes to convert this to CVP hearing. If that is the position, it is unclear why the claimant has taken no active steps in these proceedings to clarify the wages claim, or to provide relevant witness evidence. Second, he may wish to adjourn the matter generally.[27]There is no automatic right to adjourn a final hearing. There is no automatic right to choose whether a claim proceeds in person or online.[28]I have regard to the ET Presidential guidance issued in 2013 concerning seeking a postponement. This provides general guidance on the use of medical evidence. All medical certificates and supporting medical evidence should be provided. In addition, there should be an explanation as to the nature of the health condition concerned. Where opinions are expressed by a medical practitioner, there should be some explanation for why the person is unfit to attend, consideration of the prognosis, and an indication when the state of affairs may cease.[29]It may be necessary for the tribunal to consider whether further evidence should be obtained.[30]There may be occasions when it is necessary to consider making reasonable adjustments. However, there should be an explanation for why the adjustment is necessary. A bare assertion of need may not be sufficient.[31]It is appropriate to take into account all the relevant circumstances.[32]I considered whether it was appropriate to proceed by CVP, and to adjourn this hearing in order to facilitate it.[33]The claimant had an opportunity to request a CVP hearing, and explain why it was necessary, at the previous hearing. There is no record that he did so, albeit I do not discount the possibility that it may have been raised in an agenda or in correspondence. When he did make the application, he failed to provide appropriate detail. He failed to send the fit note, although it is clear it had been obtained.[34]EJ Khan refused the application and identified the failure to provide that detail and wrote to the claimant explaining the need for it and gave him an opportunity to present it. The detail presented was poor and unclear for the reasons I have outlined above. The evidence did not support the contention that he could not attend the hearing at all. It provided some support for the proposition that he may need to attend by CVP, but the explanation was inadequate; the failure to give any prognosis, or estimate as to when he may be able to attend an in-person hearing, was unhelpful - 5 - and failed to establish any sufficient reason. The evidence did not establish that any depression or anxiety prevented participation or was of a nature which prevented attendance. It may be the claimant preferred to attend by CVP, but that in itself is not a sufficient reason when the case had been listed for an in-person hearing and the evidence that he could not attend was unsatisfactory.[35]I took into account the full circumstances. The claimant had taken no active steps to prepare for the hearing. This was inconsistent with a conclusion that he was actively pursuing this claim. The claimant had taken no active steps to clarify the wages claim or to provide any evidence. The claimant has not produced any statement, whether relating to wages or his claim of victimisation. There is no explanation for that failure. There is no explanation for his failure to cooperate with the respondent. Further, the claimant did not explain why he left the last hearing, or why it should be assumed that he would proceed with the final[36]The claimant’s cumulative failure to engage, or to provide any adequate explanation for his leaving the last hearing, or failing to engage with the directions in this case, indicated a failure to actively pursue the claim, and was unsupportive of any conclusion that he genuinely seeks to participate in the hearing, but is inhibited from doing so by the hearing being in person.[37]Having weighed all these matters in the balance, I concluded that I should not grant the claimant’s application to proceed by CVP. The remaining claims to be determined[38]As noted above there is a wages claim and a victimisation claim.[39]The wages claim is contained in 2219438/2024, issued on 2 May 2024. This was the first claim. I considered that claim. It is arguable that no wages claim is brought at all. In the ET1, the claimant has ticked the boxes referring to “arrears of pay” and “other payments.” In addition, at paragraph 8.2 he wrote the following: Robert Murphy and Jonathan Silman subjected me to a campaign of racial discrimination for which I put forward an official grievance. Trovene Hartley ignored the grievance then lied to ACAS about ignoring the grievance. Trovene Hartley the appointed Geoff Mitchell to coverup the campaign of discrimination brought against me, under the guise of him carrying out an investigation. Geof Mitchell, along with Philip Hodgson, and Robin Hindley, began to harass and victimise me. Informed Angela Joyce who ignored the evidence I presented to her, and willingly joined the campaign of racial discrimination brought against me.[40]This narrative does not refer to any wages claim. The wages claim is not clarified. It is arguable that simply ticking the box is insufficient to bring the claim. I observe tribunals, faced with unclear claims, frequently take a - 6 - generous view and order particularisation, without the need for amendment.[41]Attempts have made to clarify the claim of failure to pay wages. On 29 October 2024, EJ Davidson directed the respondents should write to the claimant by 12 November 2024 setting out the information required. The respondents produced an extensive request for further and better particulars, including clarification of the wages claim, which was sent to the claimant on 12 November 2024. The claimant did not clarify the wages claim. Ultimately, this led to the order by EJ Norris, on 18 July 2025.[42]The claimant failed to comply with EJ Norris’s order to clarify the wages claim. On 7 August 2025, the respondent applied to strike out the wages claim. The application explained the claimant was contacted on 5 August and asked to provide information by 8 August 2025, but the claimant responded on 5 August as follows: This information has been in your possession for quite a while now. And was in the possession of the Judge. The Judges order suggesting otherwise is why I have put forward an official complaint against her.[43]It is the respondent’s contention that this is insufficient to comply with the order and demonstrates the claimant does not intend to provide proper details.[44]The respondent contends that the wages claim should be struck out as it has no reasonable prospects of success, in any event. It alleges failure to comply with the judge’s directions is blameworthy, and the failure to comply with the order demonstrates the claimant is either acting unreasonably or is not actively pursuing the claim. Further it relies on the failure to comply with the judge’s orders.[45]The reality is that there is no pleaded wages claim. The claimant does not set out the contractual term relied on, or give details of what sums were due, or when they were not paid.[46]It is possible for the respondent to consider the correspondence and to speculate about what was intended by the claimant. However, claims do not, and should not, proceed on the basis of speculation by respondents. They proceed on the basis of pleaded cases. The claimant has not pleaded his case. He has been given an opportunity to do so. The judges who gave directions sought particularisation without requiring amendment to the pleading, but the claimant has failed to take advantage of that generous approach. His conduct makes it plain that he will not comply with the tribunal’s orders, or provide the information required.[47]The tribunal may strike out claims, either of its own volition, or on application. Law - 7 -[48]Employment Tribunal Procedure Rules 2024 rule 38 provides - 38.—(1) The Tribunal may, on its own initiative or on the application of a party, strike out all or part of a claim, response or reply on any of the following grounds—(a) that it is scandalous or vexatious or has no reasonable prospect of success;(b) that the manner in which the proceedings have been conducted by or on behalf of the claimant or the respondent (as the case may be) has been scandalous, unreasonable or vexatious;(c) for non-compliance with any of these Rules or with an order of the Tribunal;(d) that it has not been actively pursued;(e) that the Tribunal considers that it is no longer possible to have a fair hearing in respect of the claim, response or reply (or the part to be struck out). (2) A claim, response or reply may not be struck out unless the party advancing it has been given a reasonable opportunity to make representations, either in writing or, if requested by the party, at a hearing. (3) …[49]As a general rule, cases should not be struck out on the ground of no reasonable prospect of success when the central facts are in dispute (see North Glamorgan NHS trust v Ezsias 2007 IRLR 603). This is authority for the proposition that it would only be in exceptional cases that it would be appropriate to strike out when the central facts are in dispute. Such situations would include situations where the facts sought to be established by the claimant were "totally and inexplicably inconsistent with the undisputed contemporaneous documentation."[50]As a general principle, discrimination cases should not be struck out except in clear circumstances. For instance in Anyanwu v South Bank Students Union 2001 IRLR 305; Lord Steyn put it as follows: For my part such vagaries in discrimination jurisprudence underline the importance of not striking out such claims as an abuse of the process except in the most obvious and plainest cases. Discrimination cases are generally fact-sensitive, and their proper determination is always vital in our pluralistic society. In this field perhaps more than any other the bias in favour of a claim being examined on the merits or demerits of its particular facts is a matter of high public interest.[51]This does not place a fetter on the tribunal's discretion. Nevertheless, it indicates that the power to strike out in discrimination cases should be exercised with greater caution than in other, less fact sensitive, types of case.[52]Where the threshold ground for striking out proceedings has been made out, the tribunal should still consider alternatives where appropriate this may include ordering further particulars (see Lambrou v Cyprus Airways Ltd EAT 0417/05) - 8 -[53]Whilst this is not a fetter on the tribunal's discretion, but the power to strike out in discrimination cases should be exercised with great caution.[54]A tribunal should not take the view that Anyanwu creates some form of public policy that prevents claims being struck out. The test is whether there is no reasonable prospect of success, as is made clear by Lord Hope at paragraph 39 of Anyanwu itself. Nevertheless, I would have held that the claim should be struck out if I had been persuaded that it had no reasonable prospect of succeeding at trial. The time and resources of the employment tribunals ought not to [sic] taken up by having to hear evidence in cases that are bound to fail.[55]The Court of Appeal in Ahir v British Airways Ltd [2017] EWCA Civ 1392 made it clear there is no general proposition that where there is a potential dispute of fact a claim must proceed. It is necessary to look carefully at the facts and to consider the nature of the dispute. Underhill LJ put it as follows: 16 … Employment tribunals should not be deterred from striking out claims, including discrimination claims, which involve a dispute of fact if they are satisfied that there is indeed no reasonable prospect of the facts necessary to liability being established, and also provided they are keenly aware of the danger of reaching such a conclusion in circumstances where the full evidence has not been heard and explored, perhaps particularly in a discrimination context. Whether the necessary test is met in a particular case depends on an exercise of judgment, and I am not sure that that exercise is assisted by attempting to gloss the well understood language of the rule by reference to other phrases or adjectives or by debating the difference in the abstract between ‘exceptional’ and ‘most exceptional’ circumstances or other such phrases as may be found in the authorities. Nevertheless, it remains the case that the hurdle is high, and specifically that it is higher than the test for the making of a deposit order, which is that there should be ‘little reasonable prospect of success.’[56]It can be seen from Ahir that it is not enough for a claimant to assert there is a dispute of facts, and that, therefore, the tribunal is compelled to find there is a prospect of success. First, the claim must be clear. Second, the facts alleged and relied on should be clear. Third, resolution of those facts should be capable of demonstrating discrimination whether directly or by way of inference. Fourth, the respondent's explanation should be considered. Fifth, if the explanation is disputed, there should be some plausible explanation for this from the claimant.[57]There is nothing in Ahir which conflicts with the general proposition that the claimant's case should be taken at its highest on the pleadings see, e.g., Ukegheson v London Borough of Haringey 2015 ICR 1285.[58]Ahir is authority for the proposition that the tribunal should treat with caution references to "exceptional" circumstances (see paragraphs 13, 14 and 16 of Ahir). A tribunal should be cautious not to be distracted by the application of adjectives that are a gloss on the plain wording of the rules. - 9 -
Discussion
[59]I am satisfied the claimant has been given a reasonable opportunity to deal with the application to strike out.[60]When considering striking out a claim, the starting position is to consider the pleading and take at its height, which means presuming that those factual matters relied on can be proven. In this case, the claimant has pleaded no facts in support. Absent a pleaded claim a claim cannot succeed. It is no answer to say that he could particularise it if he chose to. That may be a reason to delay a decision and to give a claimant a chance to provide particulars or to seek amendment. He has been given opportunity to do so and has failed to comply. This demonstrates either unreasonable conduct of the proceedings or failure to actively pursue the claim in any event. It is unreasonable because the respondent is entitled to know the case it is to answer and should not be put to the expense of dealing with wholly unparticularised claims. The unreasonableness of conduct is compounded by the failure to deal with the reasonable requests for, or to comply with the directions for, clarification.[61]The wage claim should be struck out. In summary: it is not pleaded adequately; it has no prospect of success; the claimant has been given ample opportunity to rectify the deficiency of pleading; and his conduct of the proceedings is unreasonable. For the reasons I have given, I strike out the wages claim.[62]Lest I be wrong in striking the claim out, I should consider the merits. I heard evidence from the Mr Philip Hodgson, curriculum manager. He gave evidence concerning the claimant’s contract, the variations of his contract, and the payments made. He confirmed that all payments had been made in accordance with the contract and no wages were outstanding.[63]I considered whether there was any evidence from the claimant. The claimant failed to provide any witness evidence. He failed to explain the claim. It is for the claimant to prove his claim. He has failed to do so. The respondent has given clear evidence that all relevant sums have been paid. I dismiss the claim on its merits. The victimisation claim[64]The victimisation claim is brought against the respondent company and Mr Philip Hodgson. All claims against any remaining respondents had been dismissed.[65]The victimisation claim was subject to a deposit order. EJ Norris ordered that the claimant must pay a deposit of £100 by 18 August 2025 failing which the victimisation claim would be dismissed without further explanation or order. - 10 -[66]At the commence of this hearing, I made enquiries as to whether the deposit had been paid. I was unable to obtain any response. I also directed that my clerk ask the claimant whether it had been paid, but his response was equivocal and unsatisfactory.[67]In the circumstances, I proceeded as if the deposit order had been paid and heard evidence from the respondent. I was not able to ascertain the position on payment until after I had heard the evidence and undertook my deliberations on the merits of the claim. As it is now clear that the deposit order was not paid, I do not need to set out my alternative finding on the evidence. I do not need to consider any alternative arguments about strike out. If, contrary to my understanding, the claimant did pay the deposit, I should make it clear I have reached a decision on the merits which can be set out if needed.[68]The claimant failed to pay his deposit. As consequence of not paying the deposit, I declare that claim was struck out on 18 August 2025 and has been dismissed.