Mr S Hasan and Others v University of West London: 2200732/2024 and Others
EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS
Case No 2200732/2024
Between
(1) Mr S Hasan (2) Mr L Reid (3) Mr S SoboyeClaimantUniversity of West LondonRespondent
Before
Tribunal Judge Jack, acting as an Employment JudgeDate 4 January 2026
JUDGMENT
[1]The first claimant was an employee of the respondent and had been employed by the respondent for at least two years when their employment ended.[2]The first claimant’s claim of unfair dismissal was not presented within the applicable time limit. It was reasonably practicable to do so. The claim is therefore dismissed.[3]The second claimant was an employee of the respondent and had been employed by the respondent for at least two years when their employment ended.[4]The second claimant’s claims of unfair dismissal and unauthorised deductions were not presented within the applicable time limits. It was reasonably practicable to do so. The claim is therefore dismissed.[5]The third claimant was not an employee of the respondent at the relevant time. The third claimant’s claim of unfair dismissal is therefore dismissed because the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to determine it.
REASONS
[1]The purpose of the hearing was to determine: 1.1. Whether the claimants were employees of the respondent within the meaning of section 230 of the Employment Rights Act 1996. 1.1. Whether the claimants meet the two-years continuous service requirement in section 108(1) of the Employment Rights Act 1996. 1.2. Whether the unfair dismissal and unlawful deduction claims were made within the time limits in the Employment Rights Act 1996? The Tribunal will decide: 1.2.1. For each claimant, what was the effective date of termination? 1.2.2. Was the claim made to the Tribunal within three months (plus early conciliation extension) of the effective date of termination? 1.2.3. If not, was it reasonably practicable for the claim to be made to the Tribunal within the time limit? 1.2.4. If it was not reasonably practicable for the claim to be made to the Tribunal within the time limit, was it made within a reasonable period?[2]There were witness statements from: 2.1. Claimant 1, two statements dated 29 June 2025 and 25 November 2025; 2.2. Claimant 2, two statements dated 26 June 2025 and 26 November 2025; 2.3. Claimant 3, an undated statement; 2.4. Mrs Hannah Chapman, senior HR Partner at the respondent, a statement dated 20 November 2025.[3]All of these witnesses gave oral evidence.[4]There was a bundle of 924 pages plus inserts.[5]All of the parties made oral closing submissions.
Findings of Fact
[6]The respondent’s academic year is split into two semesters. Semester 1 runs from October to January. Semester 2 runs from February to June. The First Claimant[7]The first claimant (Mr Hasan) worked as a lecturer for the respondent. I make findings below about the contractual documents he received in respect of modules that he taught. He did not receive the document for Hourly Paid Lecturers headed “Statement of Main Terms and Conditions of Employment”. Nor did he receive a copy of the Guidance for Hourly Paid Lecturers. This states that the hourly rate for teaching includes an amount for preparation of teaching materials, assessments including resit papers and attendance at all meetings associated directly with the delivery of the modules.[8]He was sent a letter on 29 October 2019 which recorded what was said to be a fixed term contract as an Hourly Paid Lecturer in respect of a module on Visual Communication, with a start date of 1 October 2019 and an end date of 31 January 2020.[9]He was sent a letter on 25 February 2020 confirming the details of a contract with a start date of 27 January 2020 and an end date of 18 May 2020.[10]He was sent four letters on 18 September 2020 about different modules, all confirming details of a contract, each contract having a start date of 7 September 2020 and an end date of 22 January 2021. Two of these contracts were amended in December 2020: his hours under the original documentation for these modules were retrospectively increased to reflect the fact that he had taught the modules more than once.[11]He was sent three letters on 8 February 2021, each about what was said to be a fixed term contract as an Hourly Paid Lecturer for a different module, each of which specify a teaching start date and a teaching end date. The specified period runs from 8 February 2021 to 11 June 2021.[12]He was sent five letters on 13 October 2021, each about what was said to be a temporary fixed term contract as an Hourly Paid Lecturer for a different module, each of which specify a fixed term contract start date and a fixed term contract end date. The specified period runs from 4 October 2021 to 28 January 2022.[13]On 16 February 2022 he was sent five letters, each about a “Temporary Fixed Term Hourly Paid Lecturer Contract” for a different module, and each of which specified what was said to be a fixed term contract start date of 14 February 2022 and a fixed term contract end date of 10 June 2022. On 20 May 2022 he was sent two further letters retrospectively formalising the position in respect of two other modules which he also taught during this period.[14]He was offered some additional marking on 28 June 2022 by Dorota Watson (who was head of subject), at a lower rate of pay than teaching, which was in the event allocated to others.[15]He provided Showcase Support in July 2022, receiving on 19 August 2022 a letter regarding a contract covering the period 11 July 2022 to 17 July 2022.[16]On 17 October 2022 he was sent five letters in respect of different modules, each concerning what was said to be a “temporary fixed term contract” running from 3 October 2022 to 4 February 2023.[17]On 21 February 2023 he was sent five letters about five “Temporary Fixed Term Hourly Paid Lecturer Contract[s]”, each of which specified a teaching start date of 13 February 2023 and a teaching end date of 6 June 2023.[18]However the first claimant worked after 6 June 2023, doing marking in respect of the modules that he had taught in the previous semester. He submitted grades for students with extensions on 15 July 2023 (as Mrs Chapman accepts in her witness statement). On 17 July 2023 a student emailed him regarding assignment resits, and he forwarded this email to Mr Varsamis (who was course leader). That was administration regarding the assessment of work done by a student in respect of a module he had taught.[19]Some contractual documentation was provided to the first claimant very late. For example, on 20 April 2022 he received a letter said to be an offer of a temporary fixed term contract in respect of a module on Fashion Digital Skills for the period 4 October 2021 to 28 January 2022. This “offer” was in respect of work that he had already done, plainly as a result of an earlier agreement between the first claimant and the respondent that he should teach this module in return for payment.[20]In the intervals between the periods specified in these documents, the first claimant was expected to work e.g. admin, preparation and marking. At the end of September 2022 he asked Dorota Watson if there were any admin hours available for reviewing learning materials prior to his contract start dates. She replied that preparation, admin and marking were included in the Hourly Paid Lecturer hourly rate. I accept the first claimant’s oral evidence that he was told by Dorota Watson and Sotirios Varsamis, in meetings, that he was expected to work after the end dates specified in the written contractual documentation.[21]On 6 September 2023, Dorota Watson offered the claimant teaching in the next academic year. He was offered significantly less than in previous years.[22]On 19 September 2023, he was emailed by a student welfare adviser about the academic support that a tutee of his might require.[23]Dorota Watson emailed the first claimant on 26 September 2023 and told him that if he accepted the offer of work in the next semester he would have completed four years continuous service with effect from 1 October 2023.[24]The first claimant did not accept the offer of work in the next semester. He did not work for the respondent at all in the academic year 2023/2024.[25]Early conciliation took place from 23 November 2023 to 19 December 2023.[26]The first claimant presented his claim on 19 January 2024. His complaints included unfair dismissal.[27]The first claimant received a P45 in March 2024, which stated that his leaving date was 30 June 2023.[28]The first claimant was line managed by Ms Watson and Mr Varsamis.[29]His remuneration was pensionable and his payslips show that he paid contributions to the Teacher’s Pension Scheme 2015.[30]When working as an Hourly Paid Lecturer he was not able to subcontract, but needed to provide the services required of him personally. The Second Claimant[31]The second claimant (Mr Reid) worked as a lecturer for the respondent. He wrote the content for a new BA in Interior Design which started in September 2019. He provided all of its content. He later designed and authored a new MA course. He subsequently took on responsibilities for supervising a PhD student.[32]The second claimant was provided with a copy of the Hourly Paid Lecturers Induction Pack on 20 August 2019. He was not provided with a copy of the Guidance for Hourly Paid Lecturers, or of the Statement of Main Terms and Conditions of Employment for Hourly Paid Lecturers.[33]On 20 September 2019 the second claimant was sent a letter recording “a fixed term contract as an Hourly Paid Lecturer … subject to the original terms and conditions issued to you”. No such terms and conditions had been issued to him. The letter specified the module (Interior Design), the rate of pay, the total number of hours and the start and end date. It said that the contract covered the period 2 September 2019 to 17 January 2020. The second claimant had already begun to work for the respondent, doing preparation rather than teaching, prior to 2 September 2019.[34]On 18 February 2020 a letter was sent to him confirming the details of a contract, with a start date of 27 January 2020 and an end date of 26 June 2020.[35]On 18 September 2020, a number of letters were sent to him confirming details of contracts in respect of a number of different modules. They each specified a start date of 1 September 2020 and an end date of 22 January 2021.[36]On 8 February 2021 a number of letters were sent to him, each offering “a fixed term contract as an Hourly Paid Lecturer … subject to the original terms and conditions issued to you”. These specify a teaching start date and a teaching end date, and cover the period 8 February 2021 to 11 June 2021.[37]On 9 July 2021, a letter was sent to the second claimant in respect of a “temporary fixed term contract as an Hourly Paid Lecturer” for doing preparatory work on the design and writing of an MA. The start date is specified as 22 June 2021, and the end date is specified as 22 August 2021. Later letters in respect of the same work cover the period 1 September 2021 to 30 September 2021, and 27 September 2021 to 28 January 2022.[38]There are a number of similar documents in respect of what are said to be temporary fixed term contracts in respect of various modules. A number say they cover 4 October 2021 to 28 January 2022; one says 15 November 2021 to 19 February 2022; a number say 14 February 2022 to 10 June 2022; a number say 3 October 2022 to 4 February 2023; a number say they cover 13 February 2023 to 6 June 2023 (stating that these dates are the teaching start and end dates).[39]The second claimant was required to work outside of the periods stated on the face of these documents. For example, although a number of documents say they cover the period from 14 February 2022 to 10 June 2022, he was emailed by the university registry on 14 June 2022, who gave a deadline for him to send marks for students. Had he not provided those marks, the relevant students would have failed, would not have been able to progress to the next academic year and would not have been able to complete their degree. On 30 June 2022, he sent the registry marks for a student whose work he had previously been unable to grade. On 17 August 2022, registry emailed him regarding the deadlines for the results of resits: there was an additional assessment window in the week of 5 September 2022.[40]I accept the second claimant’s oral evidence that he similarly continued to work for the respondent after 6 June 2023 e.g. marking and providing information to the university registry, so that students would be able to progress. I accept the second claimant’s evidence that throughout the period leading up to 20 September 2023, he continued working as normal. That is unsurprising, given the context. That context includes his being told on 1 December 2022, by Dorota Watson, that the contracted hours for Hourly Paid Lecturers accommodate preparation and marking.[41]On 6 September 2023 Dorota Watson offered the second claimant teaching on one module in semester 1 and teaching on two modules in semester 2 of the next academic year. The hours less were considerably lower than those the second claimant had taught previously, and he did not accept the offer.[42]On 14 September 2023 Dorota Watson emailed the second claimant and said (among other things) that she acknowledged and respected his concern about receiving fewer hours this semester, and stated that he now had four years service as an Hourly Paid Lecturer. On 20 September 2023 Mrs Hannah Chapman, HR Partner, acknowledged that the work on offer to the second claimant was significantly lower than in previous years and offered him compensation for what she described as “part redundancy”. (Mrs Chapman now says that this term was an error. She says that the intention was to offer compensation for the reduction in teaching hours as a goodwill gesture.) Mrs Chapman emailed the second claimant again on 5 October 2023. She stated (among other things) that he had been engaged via a series of temporary fixed term contracts as an Hourly Paid Lecturer, and that since he had not accepted the hours which had been offered, he was not currently an employee of the respondent, his last fixed term contract having ended on 6 June 2023.[43]On 18 October 2023 the second claimant was emailed a copy of what was described as a temporary fixed term contract. The attached document was a letter dated 17 October 2023 which says that it is an “offer” of a “Temporary Fixed Term Hourly Paid Lecturer Contract” in respect of PhD supervision. It stated that the teaching start and end date were both 4 October 2023, and it is ostensibly for one hour’s teaching at the rate of £350 an hour on 4 October 2023. Mrs Chapman’s evidence is that this document was only produced because the claimant was owed pay for PhD supervision work he had done over the course of the previous academic year, and the respondent’s internal systems could only process this payment if such a document was produced. However she also conceded in her evidence that she did not know what the claimants were asked to do and did not have firsthand knowledge of the degree of responsibility they had. I find that the second claimant did undertake PhD supervision in the academic year 2022/2023 and infer that there was an agreement at some point prior to or during the academic year 2022-2023 that Mr Reid would give PhD supervisions in return for remuneration. He was the second supervisor for a student called Hakeem. I accept the second claimant’s evidence (supported as it is by the evidence of the first claimant) that he supported the PhD student, and corresponded with them, and with their other supervisor, throughout the summer break in 2023 and into the new academic year 2023/2024.[44]On 26 October 2023 the second claimant emailed to say that HR had informed him that his university email would be removed, and that he would need a university email if he was “to continue to perform the second supervisor function for Hakeem”, which he would be more than happy to do. I find on this basis that on 26 October 2023, the second claimant was still Hakeem’s PhD supervisor.[45]The second claimant received payment in respect of his work as a PhD supervisor at the end of October 2023.[46]Early conciliation took place from 3 November 2023 to 6 November 2023.[47]The second claimant’s university email account was removed on 30 November 2023.[48]The second claimant presented his claim on 12 March 2024.[49]The second claimant was line managed by Ms Watson and Mr Varsamis.[50]His remuneration was pensionable and his payslips show that he paid contributions to the Teacher’s Pension Scheme 2015.[51]When working as an Hourly Paid Lecturer he was not able to subcontract but needed to provide the services required of him personally.[52]The second claimant had a union representative. The Third Claimant[53]The third claimant (Mr Soboye) made a presentation to students of Fashion Design on 23 January 2017, for which he invoiced the respondent. He provided fitting and styling for a BA fashion show on 8 May 2018, for which he invoiced the respondent. He was a guest lecturer on four occasions in 2019 and assisted with the fashion show in 2019, sending the respondent an invoice dated 13 June 2019. He was also paid for a session on Fashion and Textiles which had taken place on 29 January 2020.[54]There were five “Temporary Fixed Term Hourly Paid Lecturer Contract[s]” under which he delivered: one hour’s introduction to fashion and textile students on 17 February 2021; an hour on 4 March 2021; an hour on 24 March 2021; a session on 26 May 2021; and three hours on 16 June 2022.[55]Early conciliation took place from 12 November 2023 to 14 November 2023.[56]The third claimant presented his claim form on 20 March 2024.
The Law
[57]In the Employment Rights Act (‘ERA’), “employee” means an individual who has entered into or works under (or, where the employment has ceased, worked under) a contract of employment, and “contract of employment” means a contract of service, whether express or implied, and (if it is express) whether oral or in writing: s. 230(1) and (2) ERA.[58]When considering whether a contract is a contract of service or a contract for services the starting point is Ready Mixed Concrete v Minister of Pensions and National Insurance 1968 1 ALL ER 433, QBD. Factors include:(i) whether the worker agrees to perform his own work and skill in consideration of a wage or other remuneration;(ii) whether the worker agrees that in the performance of that service he will be subject to the other’s control;(iii) whether the other provisions of the contract are consistent with being a contract of service.[59]In some circumstances an employment tribunal can disregard the terms of a written agreement and instead base its decision on a finding that the documents did not reflect the parties' true intentions. The essential question is: "what was the true agreement between the parties?". The true agreement will often have to be gleaned from all the circumstances of the case, of which the written agreement was only a part: Autoclenz Ltd v Belcher and ors [2011] ICR 1157, SC.[60]A claim for ‘ordinary’ unfair dismissal can only be brought by an employee who has been continuously employed for a period of not less than two years ending with the effective date of termination: s. 108(1) ERA. Chapter 1 of Part XIV of the ERA makes provision regarding continuous employment. A person's employment during any period must be presumed to have been continuous, unless the contrary is shown: s. 210(5) ERA.[61]Any week in which an employee’s relation with his employer are not governed by a contract of employment, during the whole or part of which an employee is absent from work on account of a temporary cessation of work, counts in computing the employee's period of employment: s. 212(3)(b) ERA. The word “temporary” means lasting for only a relatively short period of time, and the Tribunal must assess whether any interval between fixed term contracts is short relative to the combined duration of the two fixed term contracts: Ford v Warwickshire County Council, [1983] I.C.R. 273, HL. It is no bar to s. 212(3)(b) ERA applying that there is a series of fixed term contracts of employment, and that after each came to an end the employer had no obligation to offer further work and the employee had no obligation to accept any further work that was offered: Cornwall County Council v Prater, [2006] I.C.R. 731, CA.[62]Section 95(1) ERA provides that: (1) For the purposes of this Part an employee is dismissed by his employer if (and, subject to subsection (2), only if)— (a) the contract under which he is employed is terminated by the employer (whether with or without notice), (b) he is employed under a limited-term contract and that contract terminates by virtue of the limiting event without being renewed under the same contract, or (c) the employee terminates the contract under which he is employed (with or without notice) in circumstances in which he is entitled to terminate it without notice by reason of the employer's conduct.[63]A contract of employment is a “limited-term contract” if:(a) the employment under the contract is not intended to be permanent; and(b) provision is accordingly made in the contract for it to terminate by virtue of a limiting event: s. 235(2A) ERA. In the case of a contract of employment for a fixedterm, “limiting event” means the expiry of the term: s. 235(2B)(a) ERA. In the case of a contract for employment made in contemplation of the performance of a specific task, “limiting event” means the performance of the task: s. 235(2B)(b) ERA.[64]Section 97 ERA provides that:(1) Subject to the following provisions of this section, in this Part “the effective date of termination” — (a) in relation to an employee whose contract of employment is terminated by notice, whether given by his employer or by the employee, means the date on which the notice expires, (b) in relation to an employee whose contract of employment is terminated without notice, means the date on which the termination takes effect, and (c) in relation to an employee who is employed under a limitedterm contract which terminates by virtue of the limiting event without being renewed under the same contract, means the date on which the termination takes effect.(2) Where— (a) the contract of employment is terminated by the employer, and (b) the notice required by section 86 to be given by an employer would, if duly given on the material date, expire on a date later than the effective date of termination (as defined by subsection (1)), for the purposes of sections 108(1), 119(1) and 227(3) the later date is the effective date of termination.[65]Section 86(1)(b) ERA provides that an employee whose period of continuous employment is two years or more but less than twelve years is entitled to not less than one week's notice for each year of continuous employment.[66]Section 111(2)(a) ERA provides that a tribunal shall not consider a claim of unfair dismissal unless it is presented before the end of the period of three months beginning with the effective date of termination.[67]Section 111(2)(b) ERA provides an exception. There are two limbs to this test. A tribunal may consider a claim presented outside the normal time limit, if it is satisfied that:• it was not reasonably practicable for the claim to be presented within the normal time limit; and• the claimant has presented it within such further period as the tribunal considers reasonable.[68]The normal time limit is extended by section 207B ERA to take account of the obligation to enter into early conciliation facilitated by ACAS.[69]Where a contract of employment is terminated without notice, section 97 ERA (the relevant parts of which are quoted above) extends the effective date of termination by adding the statutory notice period under s. 86 to which the employee is entitled, but only for the purposes of s. 108(1) (qualifying period of continuous employment), s. 119 (calculation of basic award) and s. 227(3) (calculation of a maximum week’s pay). It does not extend time for the purposes of s. 111: Duniec v Travis Perkins Trading Co Ltd, EAT [2014] 0482/13, at [13 - 14].[70]Section 23(2)(a) ERA provides that a tribunal shall not consider a complaint relating to a deduction by the employer unless it is presented before the end of the period of three months beginning with the date of the payment of the wages from which the deduction was made. Again, the normal time limit is extended by section 207B ERA to take account of the obligation to enter into early conciliation facilitated by ACAS. And, again, if the tribunal is satisfied that it was not reasonably practicable for the complaint to be presented before the end of the period of three months, the tribunal may consider the complaint if it is presented within such further period as the tribunal considers reasonable: s. 23(4) ERA.[71]The burden of proof for establishing that it was not reasonably practicable to present the claim in time is on the claimant.[72]In Palmer and Another v Southend-on-Sea Borough Council 1984 ICR 372, the Court of Appeal held that ‘reasonably practicable’ means something like ‘reasonably feasible’.[73]The presentation of a complaint is not reasonably practicable if there is some impediment which reasonably prevents, or interferes with, or inhibits, presenting it. The impediment may be physical, for instance the illness of the complainant or a postal strike. The impediment may be mental, namely, the state of mind of the complainant in the form of ignorance of, or mistaken belief with regard to, essential matters. However a state of mind can only be regarded as an impediment making it not reasonably practicable to present a complaint within the period of three months, if the state of mind is reasonable: Wall's Meat Co. Ltd. v Khan, [1979] I.C.R. 52.[74]A claimant’s ignorance of(a) the right to bring a claim, or(b) how to make it or(c) the time limit for making it, will not automatically lead to a finding that it was not reasonably practicable for the claimant to present the claim in time. Where ignorance is a factor, the tribunal needs to be satisfied that the claimant's ignorance was reasonable in all the circumstances: Marks & Spencer plc v Williams-Ryan, [2005] EWCA Civ 470, at [21]. Analysis and Conclusions The First Claimant[75]The first claimant was engaged under a series of contracts in respect of each module he taught in a semester. The documentation recording those contracts repeatedly used the words “fixed term contract” and “temporary fixed term contract”. These documents specified start dates and end dates. The engagements under those contracts were not intended to be permanent.[76]These contracts all concern teaching on a module in a semester. (The exception is the contract in respect of Showcase support in July 2022. The following analysis of the contracts concerns only the contracts for teaching a module in a semester, although the Showcase contract is relevant to the subsequent discussion below of whether first claimant had two years continuous service.) They all required the first claimant not only to teach in a semester but also to do the necessary preparation, marking and assessment, and administration related to that teaching. The first claimant did not receive documentation stating this. But it was the clear practice. It appears to be what business efficacy required. In any event, the first claimant was told by Dorota Watson that preparation, admin and marking were included in the Hourly Paid Lecturer rate.[77]Some of the documents recording contracts for the teaching of a module in a semester specify what are said to be fixed term contract start dates and fixed term contract end dates. Some of them specify what are said to be teaching start and end dates. However the marking and administration associated with the second semester’s teaching would in reality often stretch into the summer break, past the dates specified in these documents. The first claimant was told by Dorota Watson and Sotirios Varsamis that he was expected to work after the end dates specified in the written contractual documentation. Had he not done the necessary marking and provided the necessary information to the university registry, students would have been unable to progress to the next year and unable to obtain a degree. Business efficacy required him to do the marking and administration associated with his semester 2 teaching in the summer break. Each contract for teaching a module in a semester was however a contract in respect of that teaching, and the preparation, marking, and administration associated with teaching that module in that semester. It was (to use the words of s. 235(2B)(b) ERA) a contract made in the contemplation of the performance of a specific task i.e. for the teaching of a specific module in a semester and for the preparation, marking and assessment, and administration associated with that teaching.[78]Were these contracts of employment? The first claimant was line managed by Ms Watson and Mr Varsamis. His remuneration was pensionable and his payslips show that he paid contributions to the Teacher’s Pension Scheme 2015. When working as an Hourly Paid Lecturer he was not able to subcontract, but needed to provide the services required of him personally. Having taught in one semester, he was not obliged to accept the offer of teaching in the next semester, and the respondent was not obliged to offer him teaching in the next semester. But there was mutuality of obligation during the course of each of these contracts. I conclude that these were contracts of employment, and the first claimant was an employee of the respondent within the meaning of s. 230 ERA.[79]These contracts were limited-term contracts of employment within the meaning of s. 235(2A) ERA. Employment under each of them was not intended to be permanent. Each contract was made in contemplation of the performance of a specific task (the teaching of a module in a semester and the associated preparation, marking and admin), and terminated by virtue of the performance of the specific task which it required.[80]Did the first claimant have two years continuous service? There were breaks between some of the periods covered by the second claimant’s contract. However it is no bar to s. 212(3)(b) ERA applying that there is a series of fixed term contracts of employment, and that after each came to an end the employer had no obligation to offer further work and the employee had no obligation to accept any further work that was offered: Cornwall County Council v Prater. Similarly it is no bar to s. 212(3)(b) ERA applying that there is a series of limited-term contracts of employment, and that (as here) after each came to an end the employer had no obligation to offer further work and the employee had no obligation to accept any further work that was offered.[81]The first claimant’s first specified start date was 1 October 2019. His last specified end date was 6 June 2023. However the first claimant worked after 6 June 2023, doing marking in respect of the modules that he had taught. He submitted grades for students with extensions on 15 July 2023. On 17 July 2023 a student emailed him regarding assignment resits, and he forwarded this email to Mr Varsamis. That was administration regarding the assessment of work done by a student in respect of a module he had taught. On 19 September 2023, he was emailed by a student welfare adviser about the academic support that a tutee of his might require. That was an email sent in the run up to the next semester, about the support that the tutee might require in the future i.e. in the next semester, on the assumption that they would continue to be the first claimant’s tutee. This was admin relating to the future rather than the past semester, and the first claimant did not accept teaching in the next semester. My conclusion is that the last day on which the first claimant did marking or admin relating to his teaching in semester 2 of 2022-2023 was 17 July 2023.[82]It is in the nature of work in a university organised around semesters that there will be breaks in teaching and in the work associated with that teaching i.e. that there will be a cessation of work between semesters. There were some breaks between the period covered by the contracts of employment for one semester and the period covered by the contracts of employment for the next semester. However relative to the combined duration of the period covered by contracts in respect of successive semesters, those breaks were short. My assessment is that where there was a cessation of work between semesters, it was temporary. In the periods where the first claimant did not have a contract of employment between semesters, he was absent from work on account of a temporary cessation of work. Those periods therefore count in computing his period of employment: s. 212(3)(a) ERA.[83]I conclude that the first claimant was continuously employed from 1 October 2019 to 17 July 2023. He therefore meets the two-years continuous service requirement in s. 108(1) ERA.[84]Was the first claimant’s claim for unfair dismissal presented within the time limits in the ERA? He was employed under a limited term contract, and that contract terminated by virtue of the limiting event without being renewed under the same contract. He was, therefore, dismissed: s. 95(1)(b) ERA. The date on which the termination took effect was 17 July 2023, so that was the effective date of termination: s. 97(1)(c) ERA. The first claimant’s case, as presented in the legal section of his witness statement, is that he received a P45 in March 2024. He argues that since this was the first time that it was clearly and unequivocally communicated to him that the respondent considered that he was no longer employed, his effective date of termination was March 2024. I do not accept that for the reason just given. As he was employed under a limited term contract. I must apply the relevant legislation, which is clear that in the case of an employee who is employed under a limited-term contract, the effective date of termination is the date on which the termination takes effect.[85]The effective date of termination was 17 July 2023. The first claimant contacted ACAS four months later (early conciliation took place from 23 November 2023 to 19 December 2023) so he cannot benefit from the early conciliation extension. He presented his claim six months after the effective date of termination, on 19 January 2024. So his claim was not made within three months (there being no early conciliation extension) of the effective date of termination.[86]The first claimant presented his claim for unfair dismissal prior to receiving his P45, so it cannot be said that it was not reasonably practicable to present his claim until he received his P45. The first claimant told me that it was a great shock to him when he suddenly found himself out of employment, and that he was outside of his comfort zone as a designer. However it would have been clear to him from 6 September 2023 that the work he was being offered was much reduced, and it would also have been clear to him by the end of September that he was no longer working for the respondent. Being out of one’s comfort zone is not enough to show that it was not reasonably practicable to present a complaint to the Tribunal. The burden of proof for establishing that it was not reasonably practicable to present the claim in time is on the claimant. There is no evidence that he was impeded from making a claim, that he was ignorant of the time limits, or that any ignorance was reasonable. He said in his closing submissions that he was “not fully aware” of time limits. If he was partially aware, he should have investigated. In any event, it was a reasonable requirement that he should seek to establish the true position. He is a professional and well able to research unfamiliar topics and seek advice. On the basis of the evidence before me, it was reasonably practicable for him to make a claim to the Tribunal within the time limit.[87]Further, the claim was not made within a reasonable period. Early Conciliation ended on 19 December 2023, and he did not present his claim until 19 January 2024, a full month after early conciliation ended. The Second Claimant[88]The second claimant had a large number of contracts relating to teaching modules, three contracts relating work on the design and writing of an MA, and a contract relating to PhD supervision.[89]Contrary to what the second claimant says in his witness statement, there were numerous and repeated indications that his roles were temporary. The documents recording his contracts repeatedly used the terms “fixed-term” and “temporary”. They contained start and end dates. The engagements under those contracts were not intended to be permanent.[90]The contracts relating to teaching modules were contracts for the teaching of a specific module in a semester and for the preparation, marking and assessment, and administration associated with that teaching.[91]The second claimant was line managed by Ms Watson and Mr Varsamis. His remuneration was pensionable and his payslips show that he paid contributions to the Teacher’s Pension Scheme 2015. When working as an Hourly Paid Lecturer he was not able to subcontract but needed to provide the services required of him personally. I conclude that he was an employee of the respondent within the meaning of s. 230 ERA.[92]The contracts in respect of teaching modules and the MA were limited-term contracts of employment within the meaning of s. 235(2A) ERA. Employment under each of them was not intended to be permanent. The contracts relating to teaching on modules were made in contemplation of the performance of a specific task (the teaching of a module in a semester and the associated preparation, marking and admin), and terminated by virtue of the performance of the specific task which it required. The contracts in respect of the design and writing of an MA were also made in contemplation of the performance of a specific task.[93]The second claimant’s first contract in respect of teaching a module began no later than 2 September 2019. He continued to work for the respondent after 6 June 2023, marking and providing information to the university registry so that students would be able to progress, which work related to his teaching in semester 2 of 2022/2023. There was an agreement either before or during the academic year 2022/2023 that the second claimant would provide PhD supervisions in return for remuneration. I have found that the second claimant was still Hakeem’s PhD supervisor on 26 October 2023.[94]The second claimant was employed from at least 2 September 2019 to at least 26 October 2023. My detailed findings about the number and duration of his contracts are above. There were some breaks between the periods covered by the various contracts of employment. However relative to the combined duration of the periods covered by the various contracts, those breaks were short. My assessment is that where there was a cessation of work, it was temporary. In the periods where the second claimant did not have a contract of employment, he was absent from work on account of a temporary cessation of work. Those periods therefore count in computing his period of employment: s. 212(3)(a) ERA.[95]I conclude that the second claimant meets the two-years continuous service requirement in s. 108(1) ERA. Indeed, he had four years continuous service (as both Dorota Watson and Mrs Chapman, when calculating his proposed “part redundancy” compensation, thought at the time).[96]What was the second claimant’s effective date of termination? When did his final contract, in respect of PhD supervision, come to an end? There was an agreement either before or during the academic year 2022/2023 that he would provide PhD supervisions in return for remuneration. There is no reliable documentary evidence suggesting that that contract had a fixed term: the only document there is was created retrospectively and purports to have a start and end date of 4 October 2023, whereas the parties agree that PhD supervision started in the academic year 2022/2023. Supervision of a PhD student may well continue over more than one semester and indeed across academic years, as Ms Brown submitted. The second claimant supported the PhD student, and corresponded with them, and with their other supervisor, throughout the summer break in 2023 and into the new academic year 2023/2024. On 26 October 2023 the second claimant was still Hakeem’s PhD supervisor. That would not have been the case if it had been agreed that he would only supervise the student in the academic year 2022/2023. The original agreement that the second claimant would supervise Hakeem for remuneration was not for a fixed term. Nor was this contract made in contemplation of a specific task that had been performed either at the end of the 2022/2023 academic year or indeed at some point in the first semester of the 2023/2024 academic year. The contract of employment for PhD supervision was not a limited-term contract which terminated by virtue of the limiting event. Nor was the second claimant given notice that this contract was being terminated by the respondent. The contract was still in place on 26 October 2023. The respondent, who appears to have believed the contract to be for a fixed term, did not give notice that this contract was being terminated. The contract was terminated by the respondent on 30 November 2023, the day on which his university email account was removed. The effective date of termination was therefore 30 November 2023: s. 97(1)(b) ERA.[97]The second claimant argues in his witness statement that his effective date of termination was 28 December 2023. This is on the basis that his employment ended on 30 November 2023, and that although he was not in fact given notice he should be treated as having had the 4 weeks notice to which he was entitled. I do not accept that argument. As his employment contract was terminated by the respondent without notice on 30 November 2023, his effective date of termination was the date on which the termination takes effect i.e. 30 November 2023: s. 97(1)(b) ERA. There is no evidence before me on the basis of which I could conclude that the contract in respect of PhD supervision included either an express or an implied requirement for the respondent to provide four weeks notice. As he had four years continuous service, he had a statutory entitlement to 4 weeks notice: s. 86(1)(b) ERA. But, crucially, the statutory notice period is not taken into account when calculating the three-month primary time limit under s. 111: Duniec v Travis Perkins Trading Co Ltd.1 It therefore does not help the second claimant establish that his effective date of termination was 28 December 2023, rather than 30 November 2023.[98]I have concluded that the second claimant’s effective date of termination was 30 November 2023. The primary limitation period therefore ended on 29 February 2024. Early conciliation had taken place prior to the effective date of termination, in the period from 3 November 2023 to 6 November 2023. This period therefore does not extend the primary limitation period: Ms C Raison v DF Capital Bank Ltd and Others [2025] EAT 86. The second claimant presented his claim on 12 March 2024, a fortnight too late. His claims of of unfair dismissal and unauthorised deductions were not made within three months (there not being an early conciliation extension) of the effective date of termination.[99]Was it reasonably practicable for the claim to be made to the Tribunal within the time limit? Ms Brown argued that the respondent had created uncertainty by saying initially that he had four years service and that he would receive a “part redundancy” payment, and then saying on 5 October 2023 that he was not currently an employee, his last fixed term contract having ended on 6 June 2023. That uncertainty would have been compounded when he was emailed on 18 October 2023 with an “offer” of a contract in respect of PhD supervision which said on its face that it had a teaching start and end date of 4 October 2023. However it would have been clear to him by the start of the first semester of the academic year 2023/2024 that he was no longer teaching on course modules. And it would have been clear to him by 30 November 2023 that he was no longer a PhD supervisor. Whatever uncertainty may have remained about what his true employment status was, the reasonable response to that was not to delay making an application to the Tribunal but to seek advice. He had previously sought advice (as he said in evidence) from a union representative. It was reasonably practicable for the claim to be made to the Tribunal within the time limit. 1 Ms Brown, counsel for the second claimant, and Mr Baran, counsel for the respondent, did not refer to Duniec v Travis Perkins Trading Co Ltd in their submissions. I identified it only after the hearing. If the second claimant considers that my understanding of it involves an error of law, he may apply for a reconsideration. The Third Claimant[100]In the period 2017 to 2020, the third claimant was clearly initially an independent contractor, very occasionally providing services for which he invoiced the respondent.[101]He was subsequently engaged under five temporary fixed term hourly paid lecturer contracts, providing services on five different days in the period 17 February 2021 to 16 June 2022. His remuneration under these contracts was pensionable and his payslips show that he paid pension contributions. However, as his payslips say, he was providing one-off specialist services. Even during this period his services were provided very intermittently. I conclude that the third claimant was not an employee.[102]Further, had he been an employee, he did not have two years continuous service. He worked on 13 days in the period 23 January 2017 to 16 June 2022. There were long gaps between his engagements within semesters, which were not due to the breaks between semesters. The long gaps between the occasional days on which he worked are far too long to be considered temporary.[103]Further, had he had two years continuous service, his complaint of unfair dismissal was plainly made too late. His last engagement was on 16 June 2022, under a contract which had a fixed term of one day. The effective date of termination was therefore 16 June 2022. Early conciliation took place from 12 November 2023 to 14 November 2023, over a year later. His claim was presented on 20 March 2024, four months after early conciliation had ended. There is no evidence to suggest that it was not reasonably practicable for his claim to be made in time, or that it was made within a reasonable period.