Claire Jeffcoat v Hudson Business Centres Ltd [2026] EAT 91

[2026] EAT 91

Case No EA-2022-SCO-000023-DT

EMPLOYMENT APPEAL TRIBUNAL

52 Melville Street

Venue Edinburgh, EH3 7HF

Date 16 June 2026

Before

THE HONOURABLE LADY HALDANE

Between

MISS CLAIRE JEFFCOATAppellant

- and –

Between

HUDSON BUSINESS CENTRES LTDRespondent

Mr Rad Kohanzad for Appellant

Mr Neill MacDougall (instructed by Jackson Boyd LLP) for Respondent

Hearing Hearing date: 5 May 2026

JUDGMENT

[1]The appellant is Claire Jeffcoat. The respondent is Hudson Business Centres Limited. For convenience I shall refer to the parties as the claimant and the respondent, as they were below. The claimant worked for the respondent as a receptionist for just under two years, between 2016 and 2018. She was dismissed for the stated reason of misconduct, including allegedly bringing the respondent into disrepute. She lodged an ET 1 with the Employment Tribunal on 19 March 2018, making various claims, including unfair dismissal and automatically unfair dismissal. Nothing turns on those matters for the purpose of this appeal. However the claimant also made a claim for disability discrimination, by reference to her dyslexia. She ticked the relevant boxes relating to disability discrimination in the ET1 form, and supplemented her claim on a paper apart. The disability discrimination claim is at the centre of the present appeal, and accordingly it is relevant to set out that aspect of the claim as it appears in a paper apart to the ET1 form:

“I suspect MD harboured some concerns about my dyslexia condition, which is officially a disability. This does not significantly affect my ability to perform my duties as a receptionist/telephonist. I have not received any adverse feedback informally or at annual appraisal and the MD and OM know I have gained a degree in the past and hence my capability is proven. However MD may have felt uncomfortable with tackling any concerns or issues with me about this disability and instead contrived to terminate my employment on an alternative basis. However he failed to establish such justification within his desired timeline and ran up against the requirement to comply with proper procedure, leading to unfair dismissal including for denying the statutory right to be accompanied, with serious consequences.”

MD should be understood as referring to the Managing Director, and OM, the Office Manager.

[2]As might be gleaned from the date the ET1 was presented, this case has had a protracted, and complex procedural history. The present appeal has been taken against aspects of a decision of the ET (EJ Sangster) setting out various case management decisions and orders dated 14th February 2022. The Notice of Appeal originally contained 6 grounds of appeal but following a Rule 3(10) hearing only one ground, reformulated by the EAT with the assistance of counsel who appeared on that occasion on behalf of the claimant, was permitted to advance to a Full Hearing. The re-formulated ground related to the decision to refuse an application to re-label, which failing to amend to allow a claim under s 13 of the Equality Act 2010 (“EqA”). The reformulated ground of appeal is in the following terms:

“The Employment Tribunal erred in law in refusing the Claimant’s application to amend her claim to include a claim for direct discrimination on the ground of disability under s.13 of the Equality Act 2010. The Employment Tribunal failed to consider properly the Paper Apart to the Claimant’s ET1 and to determine whether it contained sufficient factual averments which could on a reasonable and fair reading, taking into consideration all relevant circumstances, support a claim for direct discrimination on the ground of disability.”

The relevant legal framework

[3]Sections 13 and 15 of the Equality Act 2010, so far as relevant to the present matter, are in the following terms (1). A person(a) (A) discriminates against another

(b) (B) if, because of a protected characteristic, A treats B less favourably than A treats or would treat others. 5. ……………………………………………….. (3). If the protected characteristic is disability, and B is not a disabled person, A does not discriminate against B only because A treats or would treat disabled persons more favourably than A treats B……… (1). A person (A) discriminates against a disabled person (B) if— (a). A treats B unfavourably because of something arising in consequence of B's disability, and (b). A cannot show that the treatment is a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim. (2). Subsection (1) does not apply if A shows that A did not know, and could not reasonably have been expected to know, that B had the disability.

The decision of the ET

[4]The case management hearing before the ET took three hours. Multiple aspects of the case were explored, and various orders made. The claimant was assisted by a lay representative, who clearly had difficulty at times articulating and focusing his submissions. Prior to the hearing the ET sent to parties a list of what it considered the issues in the case were. This list included reference to ‘discrimination arising from disability under section 15 of the Equality Act 2010, in relation to the claimant’s dismissal. The claimant’s representative was asked to confirm whether he agreed with the list provided as an accurate formulation of the relevant claims. He confirmed that he did, subject to the inclusion of complaints of failure to make reasonable adjustments and direct disability discrimination. This had been foreshadowed in correspondence to the ET prior to the hearing, in which it was stated that the claimant wished to relabel her existing claim to include these heads, or alternatively to amend. In relation to the oral request to relabel, or amend, the ET narrates that exchange in paragraph 27, as follows:

“27 In relation to the application to relabel the existing pleadings/particulars, I asked Mr Shafe to point out the existing pleadings which he felt should/could simply be relabelled. Rather than doing so, he provided me with his view on the procedure regarding the claims to date and stated that the ET1 contained the relevant pleadings.”

[5]The ET then went on to consider the terms of the previous case management hearing in 2019, at which discussion of amendment had also taken place. The context there was an order for further and better particulars in response to which, it was said, the claimant had at times gone beyond the terms and was advised she would need to seek to amend those other matters in. As was observed by Judge Clarke, in his admirably thorough narration of the background to this matter in his reasons appended to the order allowing the Full Hearing, it is not easily possible to discern in the decision of Judge D’Inverno in 2019 a clear judicial determination that the original pleaded case did not contain a complaint of direct disability discrimination. EJ Sangster, in the decision presently complained of, does not directly identify such a determination either, although she appears to proceed on the basis that one was in fact made (see paragraph 28 of the decision).

[6]In any event, in the face of opposition on the part of the respondent to any application to amend on the basis that there were no existing pleadings which could be relabelled and that the terms of the proposed amendment were not clear, the ET determined the matter as follows:

“32 The Tribunal agree with the respondent’s position. Despite the Tribunal’s request, the claimant’s representative did not refer to any pleadings in the ET1 which could be relabelled as claims of direct disability discrimination or failure to make reasonable adjustments. Having reviewed the existing pleadings, the Tribunal concluded that there are no facts pled which could be relabelled to constitute claims of direct disability discrimination or failure to make reasonable adjustments.”

[7]The ET then went on to discuss the requirements applicable to applications to amend and where the claimant’s approach was deficient in that respect before concluding that “35 In these circumstances, the application to amend the claim, by relabelling the existing complaint of unfair dismissal to one of direct disability discrimination and/or failure to make reasonable adjustments is refused, as is the application to amend the claim to include these claims.”

The claimant’s submissions

[8]As Mr Kohanzad, who appeared on behalf of the claimant at the Full Hearing, recognised, the point at the heart of this appeal ultimately was a short and focussed one: had the ET fallen into error in concluding, as it did in paragraph 32, that “there are no facts pled which could be relabelled to constitute claims of direct disability discrimination or failure to make reasonable adjustments.”

[9]The answer to that assertion could be found, he submitted, by looking at the language of the paper apart to the ET1 and to determine what it actually said. The relevant paragraph, paragraph F, begins with the words “I suspect MD harboured some concerns about my dyslexia condition, which is officially a disability.” That, he submitted, could only fairly be construed as a claim for direct discrimination. The passages that followed that first sentence were capable of supporting a claim under section 15, which the ET had clearly recognised and accepted. When invited to elaborate, Mr Kohanzad explained that the contention that the Managing Director may have felt uncomfortable about (read short) having to deal with someone with dyslexia, would meet the ‘something arising from’ test required in section 15 claims. He further submitted that it was entirely usual to seek to rely on both section 13, and, in the alternative section 15 as it was often not possible to identify with certainty which side of the line a claim might fall until the question of what was operating in the mind of the decision maker was explored in evidence. In any event it was clear from that passage in the paper apart that the claimant was putting forward claims under both provisions -she was contending that there had been direct discrimination due to her dyslexia, and also discrimination arising from that condition at the hands of the Managing Director.

[10]The task for the ET was an analytical one – to examine the language of what was pled and decide whether it contained a claim for direct discrimination. However such an analysis was absent from the decision set out in paragraph 32. What was evident from the face of the decision was an exchange between the ET and the claimant’s representative recorded at paragraph 27 where the representative has suggested the existing pleadings were capable of being relabelled. The failure of the lay representative to point specifically to the relevant pleadings appears to have influenced the ET, suggested Mr Kohanzad, but having regard to the relative brevity of the pleadings there was a duty incumbent upon the ET to ‘roll up its sleeves’ (Cox v Adeco & Others

UKEAT/0339/19/AT

) to ascertain for itself whether such a claim existed. Mr Kohanzad couched that submission in a fair and proper recognition of the complexities involved for many litigants in articulating their case, as well as the burden upon the ET and Judges in navigating a heavy burden of work. Nevertheless, he submitted, proper scrutiny of the pleadings by the ET, rather than relying on a lay representative’s inability to identify the relevant pleadings, was what was required. On the assumption that the ET did as it had stated in paragraph 32, that is to say that it had reviewed the pleadings, then it had arrived at a decision that no reasonable tribunal could have arrived at, in failing to recognise a straightforward claim for disability discrimination.

[11]Whilst recognising that the grounds of appeal made reference to an application to amend, Mr Kohanzad submitted that that should probably be read as though in quotation marks, as strictly speaking no application was required to amend in respect of a claim that was already there, but not recognised as such by the ET.

[12]So far as the relevance, if any, of the earlier decision by Judge D’Inverno was concerned, Mr Kohanzad accepted that although the ET did not explicitly state that it considered itself bound by that earlier decision, inferentially the EJ may have believed she was, hence taking the ET down the route of considering a formal amendment was required. However no explicit findings were made by Judge D’Inverno in respect of this aspect of the claim and no argument akin to res judicata or estoppel had been made by the respondents.

[13]In summary, Mr Kohanzad submitted that no reasonable tribunal could have arrived at the decision that there were no pleadings apt to support a claim for direct discrimination. That was the only conclusion that should and could have been reached and in such circumstances it was open to the EAT to allow the appeal, substitute its own finding on that matter and then remit back to the ET. That was the course he invited the EAT to adopt.

Submissions for the respondent

[14]Mr MacDougall, on behalf of the respondents, adopted his written skeleton and invited me to refuse the appeal. He amplified his written submissions by emphasising that the procedural context before the ET was important. The 2019 decisions taken by EJ D’Inverno were in response to an order for further and better particulars, and a subsequent exercise determining which aspect of the further information fell within, and which out with, the order he had made. Implicit in his decision were the conclusion that aspects relating to the section 15 claim were within the terms of the order he previously made, whilst aspects relating to section 13 and section 19 fell outside the scope of the order. Against that background, submitted Mr MacDougall, EJ Sangster had permissibly concluded that any new claim required to be the subject of an application to amend. The process of amendment had been explained by EJ D’Inverno but it was not until December 2021 that the claimant sought to make an application to amend, which was then considered by the ET at the hearing which forms the basis for the present appeal. It was noteworthy, Mr MacDougall observed, that the present appeal was couched in the language of perversity but two Employment Judges had, in effect come to the same decision on different occasions so far as the section 13 claim was concerned.

[15]Mr MacDougall was critical of the terms of the application to amend, which was narrated on page 38 of the Core Bundle by Judge Clarke in his reasons following the Rule 3(10) hearing. There were in fact no specific terms of amendment set out, rather what was made was a request to relabel the existing claim, failing which, an amendment of the claim.. That was what the ET was attempting to engage with when narrating the interaction with the claimant’s representative at paragraph 27 of the decision. This was in effect an open invitation to the representative to take the ET to the relevant pleadings which had not been taken up.

[16]In any event, the submission on behalf of the claimant sought to explain away language that could only at best be seen as a tentative expression of direct discrimination whereas the wording of that paragraph in fact undermined that interpretation and pointed away from such a claim and to one of discrimination under section 15 only. EJ Sangster had struggled to find any pleadings supporting the necessary link to an actual or even grounds to construct a hypothetical comparator, as would be required. The ET could be seen in paragraph 35, to have rightly separated out the constituent parts of the application and had given reasons supporting her decision. She could not be faulted for her approach which displayed no error of law and could not be said to be perverse. The reason for that lack of fault or error was because when the pleadings were looked at through the correct lens the ET was clearly aware that there was a claim for discrimination leading to dismissal but that such claim was properly categorised as solely a section 15 claim.

[17]So far as disposal as concerned, if I were not with him on refusing the appeal, Mr MacDougall agreed that in the alternative it would be open to the EAT to order that a section 13 claim be allowed and then remit the matter back to the ET for further procedure.

[18]In a brief reply, Mr Kohanzad focussed on the question of language. The respondent’s contention was that the language in the paper apart was too ‘tentative’ to support a section 13 claim, but at the same time accepted that despite being expressed equally ‘tentatively’ the language was apt to support, and was not a barrier to, a claim under section 15. The use of ‘tentative’ language could not prevent there being a section 13 claim if the same type of language was capable of supporting a claim under section 15. In short, the language was redolent of direct discrimination despite it being ‘tentative.’

Analysis and decision

[19]This claim was commenced in 2018 and yet, in 2026, some 8 years later, it remains at the case management stage. That is an unhappy state of affairs and has already been remarked upon with disquiet by Judge Clarke in his reasons attached to his Rule 3(10) decision. It is self-evidently in the interests of both parties that meaningful progress be made. The key question for determination in this appeal is whether the ET fell into error in not accepting that the language of the paper apart was capable of supporting a claim of direct discrimination in terms of section 13, as well as the claim which has been recognised and accepted, of a claim under section 15 of the EqA.

[20]I conclude that having regard to the fact that the claimant is a party litigant, and despite any ‘tentative’ expression of her complaint, the fair reading of the first sentence of paragraph F is that a claim for direct discrimination is what is being advanced. The words “I suspect MD harboured some concerns about my dyslexia condition, which is officially a disability” when viewed in the context of a claim for (amongst other things) discrimination based on disability are capable of being construed as a claim that the claimant was discriminated against because of her disability, in addition to being discriminated against for something arising from that disability, which is how the remainder of that paragraph has been construed. Although the words of HHJ Tayler in Cox v Adeco & Others

UKEAT/0339/19/AT

must be viewed in their context, which was that of an appeal against strike out, nevertheless they resonate in this context too, that is to say, “In some cases, a proper analysis of the pleadings, and any core documents in which the claimant seeks to identify the claims, may show that there really is no claim, and there are no issues to be identified; but more often there will be a claim if one reads the documents carefully, even if it might require an amendment. Strike out is not a way of avoiding rolling up one’s sleeves and identifying, in reasonable detail, the claims and issues; doing so is a prerequisite of considering whether the claim has reasonable prospects of success”.

[21]In reaching this conclusion, it is important to record that I have considerable sympathy with the situation in which the EJ found herself in the present case. Through the course of a three hour case management hearing she had endeavoured to deal with various applications, including for reasonable adjustments, make case management orders, as well as dealing with the nature of the claims being advanced by the claimant and it may be that with the best of intentions, the lay representative was not able to advance matters as much as the EJ would have wished. It may also have been overly optimistic to assume that a written amendment of the requisite detail could be produced by an unqualified lay representative. The undoubtedly complex procedural history up to that point did not assist, and may in fact have served to distract the ET from stepping back and looking at the whole of the pleadings with a fresh lens. The ‘real world’ context of such hearings has also to be recognised, as Mr Kohanzad rightly identified.

[22]All that said, in failing to recognise that the language of the paper apart was able, on a reasonable and fair reading, and taking into account all the relevant circumstances, to support a claim for direct discrimination on the grounds of disability, the ET fell into error. That being so, it was equally an error for the ET to consider that the claimant required to amend to introduce a claim that was already extant on the face of the pleadings. It follows that the claimant succeeds in her appeal.

Disposal

[23]Both parties were in agreement that, were I to decide in the claimant’s favour, then this is one of those cases where the EAT may permissibly substitute its own decision for that of the ET. Put another way, this is not a case where, an error of law having been identified, more than one outcome is possible (Jafri v Lincoln College

[2014] EWCA Civ 449

, per Underhill LJ). I will accordingly uphold the appeal and pronounce an order that the claimant’s claim as set out at paragraph F of the paper apart, supports a claim for direct discrimination under section 13, as well as a claim under section 15 of the EqA. As a result, no amendment is required to introduce a claim under section 13.

[24]Mr MacDougall invited me to remit the matter to the ET with an order for further and better particulars. I consider that this goes too far into the area of further case management which is properly within the province of the ET to determine. However, the order pronounced in the preceding paragraph having been made, I will remit the case to the ET to proceeds as accords, empahsising, once more, that it is desirable and in the interests of all parties that meaningful progress in the determination of this claim be made.