“The LGBT crowd with the assistance of the progressive School systems are destroying the minds of normal children by promoting mental illness” “the far-left have hijacked the learning environment and they insist on cramming their perverted vision of gender fluidity down the throats of unsuspecting school children who are a government mandated captive audience”
“(a) Lack of belief in ‘gender fluidity’. (b) Lack of belief that someone could change their biological sex/gender. (c) Belief in marriage as a divinely instituted life-long union between one man and one woman. (d) Lack of belief in ‘same sex marriage’. Whilst she recognises the legalisation of same sex ‘marriage’, she beliefs [sic] that this is contrary to Biblical teaching. (e) Opposition to sex and/or relationship education for primary school children. (f) A belief that she should ‘witness’ to the world, that is when unbiblical ideas/ideologies are promoted, she should publicly witness to Biblical truth. (g) A belief in the literal truth of the Bible, and in particular Genesis 1 v 27: ‘God created man in His own image, in the image of God He created him; male and female He created them’.”
“60. … might conclude that someone who associated herself with such a post (as Mrs Higgs had done) not only felt strongly that gender fluidity should not be taught in schools but was also was hostile towards the LBGT community, and trans people in particular.”
“61. … the act of which we concluded Mrs Higgs was accused and eventually found guilty was posting items on Facebook that might reasonably lead people who read her posts to conclude that she was homophobic and transphobic. That behaviour, the School felt, had the potential for a negative impact in relation to various groups of people, namely pupils, parents, staff and the wider community. It was a suspicion that she had done so that brought about the entire process. 62. We were also conscious that Mrs Higgs made it clear that she had no intention of desisting from making any further such posts in the future. The suggestion that she might was not, as Mr Stroilov [the claimant’s then advocate] suggested, an invitation to her to renounce her beliefs. … had those beliefs been simply stated on her Facebook page in the form which they appear … above, no further action could or would have been taken against her. …. 63. We concluded that not only the dismissal but the entire proceedings taken against Mrs Higgs were motivated by a concern on the part of the School that, by reason of her posts, she would be perceived as holding unacceptable views in relation to gay and trans people – views which in fact she vehemently denied that she did hold. 64. In short, that action was not on the ground of the beliefs but rather for a completely different reason, namely that as a result of her actions she might reasonably be perceived as holding beliefs that would not qualify for protection within the Equality Act (and, as we say, beliefs that she denied having).”
“Ground 1: The ET erred in law in failing to consider proportionality of the Respondent’s interference with the Appellant’s manifestation of her religious/philosophical beliefs. Ground 2: The ET erred in law in failing to consider whether the interference with the Claimant’s Convention rights was ‘prescribed by law’. Ground 3: The ET erred in law in holding that the employer could lawfully restrict the Appellant’s right to freedom of speech to the language of an ET pleading; see (ET 30 and 62). Ground 4: The ET reached an impermissible conclusion and/or failed to properly explain its reasons for attributing … reasons [of one of the decision-makers] to all other decision-makers; alternatively, misdirected itself in identification of the relevant decision-makers. Ground 5: The ET erred in law in finding that the Respondent did not discriminate against the Claimant when it investigated and/or dismissed her by reason of the complainant’s objection to the Claimant’s beliefs. Ground 6: The ET erred in law in finding that it was reasonable for third parties reading the Claimant’s posts to conclude that she was homophobic or transphobic. Alternatively, that finding is perverse. Ground 7: The ET’s finding that the reason for dismissal was (or was solely) because of the views of third parties about the posts rather than the School’s own views about those posts (ET 60, 61) results from the following errors of law: (a) an employer cannot escape liability by pointing to pressure from a third party whose own motivation was discriminatory …; (b) Stereotyping a protected characteristic is a discriminatory reason …; (c) Alternatively, this finding is perverse.”
“74. No reasonable and informed person … could conclude other than the posts [by the claimant] were a critique of a certain approach to education, whether held by members of the LGBT community or non-LGBT secular liberals.”
“31. … It was perfectly open to the tribunal to reach the conclusion that it was reasonable for a reader of the posts to conclude that the person who shared and endorsed the posts in the terms she did was homophobic and/or transphobic.”
“When I was originally listed to hear this case at short notice prior to its first hearing date earlier this year I did consider whether I had a conflict and indeed sought advice from both Counsel and judicial office holder colleagues. In considering the issue, I had in mind the words of Lord Browne-Wilkinson giving the judgment of the House of Lords In Re Pinochet where their Lordships concluded that Lord Hoffmann should have been automatically disqualified from hearing the case because of his directorship of a body closely associated with a party. I do not, nor is it suggested that I do, have any association with any party in this current case, although I am a communicant member of the Church of England, whose Archbishops’ Council is the intervenor, and so it is not a matter for automatic disqualification. I have, in the past served as a trustee or advisory board member of charities in the diversity and inclusion world some of which have stated views on the issues arising in this case. My previous appointments have included the Albert Kennedy Trust, Anne Frank Trust, LGBT Foundation, Pride in London, and Refugee Council. I was also national lead member for equality and social inclusion within the Local Government Association and the City of London Corporation’s inclusion lead and served as [sic] on the Government’s Review of the Public Sector Equality Duty. However, I do not currently hold any such office, which again removes the need for automatic disqualification. Whilst I do have views on the topics at the heart of the case, and indeed have expressed some of those views publicly but in an entirely private capacity with no reference to my judicial office, I did not consider them grounds for recusal, for a number of reasons: I have held judicial office for almost twenty years, sitting as a Justice of the Peace in some of the busiest courts in the land. In doing so I have always upheld my Judicial Oath “to do right to all manner of people after the laws and usages of this realm, without fear or favour, affection or ill will.”
“The extracts from my Twitter account are accurate and represent views I have expressed over recent years on matters relating to LGBTQ+ rights. These are however by no means the only topics on which I tweet, which may not be clear looking at only those identified in the annex to the witness statement. Indeed, in the past 12 months I have tweeted 133 times, which break down as: 42 relating to my duties as a City of London Common Councillor 37 relating to my interests in sport and sport governance 27 relating to LGBTQ+ rights and charities 8 relating to other charity trusteeships 19 on a wide range of other issues I have never hidden either my gender identity as a non-binary person or my sexual orientation as a bi/queer person, nor indeed have I ever hidden my commitment to supporting the rights of LGBTQ+ people. Likewise, I have always been passionate in supporting the rights of people with other protected [characteristics] including people of faith, of whom I am one. That said, I reiterate the commitment made in my previous submission that my publicly expressed views - none of which relate to the current case - would have no impact in my approach to this or any other case. I remain fully committed to acting within the context of my judicial oath and to judging each case on the merits of the facts and applicable law and on no other basis.”
“The question is whether the fair-minded and informed observer, having considered the facts, would conclude that there was a real possibility that the tribunal was biased.”
“47. … it would be a mistake to approach it in this context as if its only meaning were pejorative. The essence of it is captured in the [European] Convention [of Human Rights] concept of impartiality. An interest in the outcome of the case or an indication of prejudice against a party to the case or his associates will, of course, be a ground for concluding that there was a real possibility that the tribunal or one of its members was biased …. But the concept is wider than that. It includes an inclination or pre-disposition to decide the issue only one way, whatever the strength of the contrary argument. A doubt as to whether this is the case is enough, so long as it can be justified objectively.”
“might unfairly regard (or have unfairly regarded) with favour, or disfavour, the case of a party to the issue under consideration by him”
“Bias includes giving the impression of having pre-judged any issue.”
“2. The observer who is fair-minded is the sort of person who always reserves judgment on every point until she has seen and fully understood both sides of the argument. She is not unduly sensitive or suspicious, as Kirby J observed in Johnson v Johnson(2000) 201 CLR 488 , 509, para 53. Her approach must not be confused with that of the person who has brought the complaint. The “real possibility” test ensures that there is this measure of detachment. The assumptions that the complainer makes are not to be attributed to the observer unless they can be justified objectively. But she is not complacent either. She knows that fairness requires that a judge must be, and must be seen to be, unbiased. She knows that judges, like anybody else, have their weaknesses. She will not shrink from the conclusion, if it can be justified objectively, that things that they have said or done or associations that they have formed may make it difficult for them to judge the case before them impartially. 3. Then there is the attribute that the observer is “informed”
“Everything will depend on the facts, which may include the nature of the issue to be decided.”
“19. … It is very important that proper disclosure should be made in such cases, first, because it gives the parties an opportunity to object and, secondly, because the judge shows, by disclosure, that he or she has nothing to hide and is fully conscious of the factors which might be apprehended to influence his or her judgment. When such disclosure is made, it is unusual for an objection to be taken. …”
“58. … this can only be one factor, and a marginal one at best. Thus, to take two opposite extremes, disclosure could not avoid an objection to a judge who in the light of the matter disclosed clearly ought not to hear the case; and non-disclosure could not be relevant, if a fair-minded and informed observer would not have thought that there was anything even to consider disclosing. …”
“2. … it is not the role of this Employment Appeal Tribunal to express any view as to the merits of either side of that debate (which we shall refer to as the ‘transgender debate’); its role is simply to determine whether, in reaching the conclusion that it did, the tribunal erred in law. …”