“The Tribunal shall decide the appeal on the merits and by reference to the grounds of appeal set out in the notice of appeal.”
“Any application and/or submissions by the appellant, including any application for disclosure and/or amendment to the notice of appeal and/or any request for the confidential treatment of any part of the notice of appeal, be filed and served by 5.00pm on10 July 2007 .”
“33. …the basic thrust of rule 11 is to limit the possibilities of amendment after an appeal has been introduced. That forms part of the case management system of the Tribunal, which is in general based on the philosophy that an appellant is expected to set out his arguments on appeal as fully as possible in writing at an early stage… 34. That principle is in turn part of the Tribunal’s emphasis on written procedure, which itself is directed to assisting the Tribunal in deciding often complex cases expeditiously and efficiently. It should also be noted, in this connection, that most appeals come before the Tribunal following an administrative procedure in which many points will already have been canvassed. … 37. It is important that this approach is in general adhered to as regards the notice of appeal, not least so that the respondent authority may properly plead, in its defence, to the notice of appeal, and that the Tribunal itself may, at an early stage, begin to read into the case, the basic framework of which is set by the notice of appeal and defence.”
“ Ofcom erred in determining whether the price charged which fell between the incremental and stand-alone costs was fair, reasonable and non- discriminatory (paragraphs 5.15-5.74) (57) In the absence of any real ability to negotiate, Ofcom could not have concluded that the charges being imposed were fair, reasonable and non- discriminatory , and should have departed from these Guidelines to do so . Ofcom either did not conclude that the price charged by Sky was fair, reasonable and non- discriminatory or, in the alternative, if it did so conclude, it erred in finding that the price was fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory because: a) There was no evidence before it to support such a conclusion; or 19 b) Any evidence that there was in fact suggested that the prices were not fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory.” (57A) The central question is whether the price arrived at represents a reasonable contribution towards reasonably incurred common costs as one would expect in a competitive market. The caveat to this approach is that relative contributions might vary between users on account of other considerations, such as size, ability to pay and having identified those common costs from which each broadcaster actually benefits. Within these boundaries, the service provider may receive a reasonable return on its investment made. (57B) It was necessary for Ofcom to determine what price was fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory”
“(73) Sky provides various types of set-top boxes, including upgraded and more sophisticated set-top boxes. The set top box subsidy should not have been treated as a common cost, since it was not part of the EPG listing services. The Guidelines provide that the set top box subsidy constitutes an externality arising form ( sic ) the subsidy relationship between Sky and its subscribers from which the independent channel providers benefit. The proper way for Ofcom to proceed in the case of an externality is not the same as it would be had they been right in its assumption that the subsidy was a common cost, which Sky would be free to 21 recover by marking-up the price of its various products to cover that cost. (See paragraph 95.) Rapture submits that, should it have to make a contribution to Sky for its subsidy of the set-top box, which it denies, only the costs associated with basic set-top boxes should be taken into account (see paragraph 32 of David Henry’s witness statement). 73A. Regulatory precedent established that Ofcom should investigate properly at least the following: a What proportion of the subsidy cost actually leads to benefits to independent channel providers – this means following the chain of causation from the payment of the subsidy, to the numbers of additional subscribers, to the behaviour of those additional subscribers and also evaluating the time over which the causation is effective; What proportion of the cost of the subsidised set top box equipment is relevant; Whether it is indeed appropriate for Sky to receive recompense for the costs if ( sic ) has incurred in this way – in particular what harm would occur if it did not do so; If so, who should pay – should smaller firms, or those who might be discouraged from bringing additional competition and investment bear the same burden as large and established players. Although Ofcom correctly identified that the price charged by Sky to b c 73B d Rapture for EPG services was between the floor of the incremental costs and the ceiling of the standalone costs, it erred in: a) Failing properly or at all to assess whether the cost was “a reasonable contribution to the common cost” (see paragraph 91 below); b Failing properly or at all to assess whether the cost applied should vary between users, and, in particular, whether the cost applied was fairly and reasonably applied to the particular case of Rapture (see paragraph 47) Failing to assess whether the price arrived at between the floor and the ceiling was one which would be expected in a competitive market (see paragraphs 40, 44, 56A and 70) Wrongly including the cost of all set-top boxes in the calculation of the stand-alone cost, including upgrades and replacements (see also paragraph 74); Failing to discount the cost of the set-top box over the correct period of one year (see paragraphs 62-65); Failing to treat the set top box subsidy as an externality instead of a common cost; Relying on the Platform Model for calculating individual contribution to EPG services. c d e f) g) 22 (74) In addition should Rapture have to contribute to Sky’s set-top box subsidy, it should only have to contribute towards the costs corresponding to the parts of the set-top box that it actually uses for the EPG service. Indeed, Rapture does not use all of the facilities in the set-top box, as most are for the benefit of those broadcasters taking conditional access or access control services. Rapture, therefore, contests Ofcom’s finding at paragraph 5.5.4.1 that it considered it unnecessary to investigate this issue and that “the direct costs associated with conditional access and access control services comprise only a relatively small proportion of total platform costs” (Determination paragraph 5.56) 74A. Ofcom erred, therefore, in including the cost of all set-top boxes in the category of common costs relevant to the service provided by Rapture, rather than ensuring that Rapture contributed only to the common costs from which it benefited. In particular, it failed to apply the provisions of the Guidelines: a) which required Ofcom to consider whether “the services offered [are], if technically feasible … sufficiently ‘unbundled’, so that the broadcaster only pays for what it needs” [Guidelines para 2.3]; and b) which provided that “Oftel would expect that the result of negotiations between providers and the broadcaster is that common costs are likely to be distributed amongst different bundles or single channels at differential levels depending on the overall balance of benefits which could accrue to the provider and the broadcaster”. ”
“ 76A. In particular, Ofcom: a) failed adequately to consider whether there was a close linkage between Rapture’ ( sic ) retail revenues and the access charge, as required by the Guidelines. See paragraph 78 below. [See Guidelines paras 3.7, 3.14 and 3.15] 26 b) erred in concluding that “Sky had no grounds on which to justify a reduced EPG listing charge to Rapture” [Determination para 5.193] c) erred in concluding that any business plan of financial projections submitted by Rapture “would not have provided a compelling case for Sky to reduce its EPG listing charges in Rapture’s case” [Determination para 5.193] d) wrongly took into account the fact that “Ofcom is not currently aware … of any comparable broadcasters being priced off the Sky Platform due to the level of the rate card EPG listing charge” [Determination para 5.203] e) erred in concluding that the indicative rate card charge for an EPG listing was not set at a level which would price Rapture off the Sky Platform and was clearly “affordable” and that Sky’s EPG listing charge was not at a level which could have plausibly priced Rapture off the Sky Platform [Determination para 5.204] ”
“ Ofcom erred in failing to ensure that Rapture was not discriminated against (paragraphs 5.205 – 5.249) 97A Ofcom were obliged to ensure that the price and terms and conditions of access were not discriminatory: a) As between a provider who is a broadcaster itself and other broadcasters; and b) Between broadcasters generally. 97B Ofcom’s obligation to ensure non-discrimination between broadcasters generally included the obligation to ensure not only that irrelevant distinctions were not made, but also that relevant distinctions were made. In particular, Ofcom should have ensured that: a) Small broadcasters were treated differently than large broadcasters in determining a fair and reasonable price for access; and b) Free-to-air broadcasters were required only to contribute to the common costs in relation to which they benefited. 97C. See paragraphs 46-48, 56, 57-60, 70, 72-74A, 76A and 91 above. ”
“This Ground was represented throughout the Original Notice of Appeal as indicated by the cross-references. It is elucidated in one place by this change for the sake of clarity.”
“5. Take into account its duties contained in sections 3 and 4 of theCommunications Act 2003 , including its duties to secure a sufficient plurality of providers of different television services, its duty to have regard to the interests of consumers in respect of choice and its duty to promote competition.” 31 The words of this proposed paragraph, up to and including “Communications Act 2003 ” are unobjectionable. We do not consider that the word “including” is appropriate, since any order must either refer to specific duties or to all of the duties under sections 3 and 4 of the 2003 Act. We therefore allow this proposed amendment, limited as follows: “5. Take into account its duties contained in sections 3 and 4 of theCommunications Act 2003 .”
“5. Take into account its duties contained in sections 3 and 4 of theCommunications Act 2003 .”