“(1) Transfers of value are exempt to the extent that the values transferred by them- (a) are attributable to property which becomes the property of a political party 20 qualifying for exemption under this section; … (2) A political party qualifies for exemption under this section if, at the last general election preceding the transfer of value,- (a) two members of that party were elected to the House of Commons, or 25 (b) one member of that party was elected to the House of Commons and not less than 150,000 votes were given to candidates who were members of that party.…”
“The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be 10 secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.”
“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his 15 possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in 20 accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.”
“(1) In this Act “the Convention rights” means the rights and fundamental freedoms set out in — 30 (a) Articles 2 to 12 and 14 of the Convention, (b) Articles 1 to 3 of the First Protocol, and (c) Article 1 of the Thirteenth Protocol, as read with Articles 16 to 18 of the Convention. 6 (2) Those Articles are to have effect for the purposes of this Act subject to any designated derogation or reservation (as to which see sections 14 and 15). (3) The Articles are set out in Schedule 1. …”
“(1) So far as it is possible to do so, primary legislation and subordinate legislation must be read and given effect in a way which is compatible with the Convention 10 rights. (2) This section — (a) applies to primary legislation and subordinate legislation whenever enacted; (b) does not affect the validity, continuing operation or enforcement of any incompatible primary legislation; and 15 (c) does not affect the validity, continuing operation or enforcement of any incompatible subordinate legislation if (disregarding any possibility of revocation) primary legislation prevents removal of the incompatibility.”
“These obligations, values and objectives are not of an appropriate nature to give rise to directly effective rights: many are simply aspirational; others are designed to take effect between member states; those which refer to the creation and 15 functioning of the European Parliament do not provide detailed rules on the treatment of funding of political parties under the tax systems of member states. The addition of Article 4(3) does not change their nature.”
“I take there to be direct discrimination when the category of those receiving a certain advantage and the category of those suffering a correlative 5 disadvantage coincide exactly with the respective categories of persons distinguished only by applying a prohibited classification.”
“The discrimination is direct where the difference in treatment is based on 10 a criterion which is either explicitly that of sex or necessarily linked to a characteristic indissociable from sex. It is indirect where some other criterion is applied but a substantially higher proportion of one sex than of the other is in fact affected.” ”
“ “Personal characteristics” is not a precise expression and to my mind a binary 30 approach to its meaning is unhelpful. “Personal characteristics” are more like a series of concentric circles. The most personal characteristics are those which are innate, largely immutable, and closely connected with an individual’s personality: gender, sexual orientation, pigmentation of skin, hair and eyes, congenital disabilities. Nationality, language, religion and politics may be almost innate 35 (depending on a person’s family circumstances at birth) or may be acquired (though some religions do not countenance either apostates or converts); but all are regarded as important to the development of an individual’s personality (they reflect, it might be said, important values protected by articles 8, 9 and 10 of the Convention). Other acquired characteristics are further out in the concentric 40 circles; they are more concerned with what people do, or with what happens to them, than with who they are; but they may still come within article 14 (Lord 21 Neuberger instances military status, residence or domicile, and past employment in the KGB). Like him, I would include homelessness as falling within that range, whether or not it is regarded as a matter of choice (it is often the culmination of a series of misfortunes that overwhelm an individual so that he or she can no longer cope). The more peripheral or debateable any suggested personal characteristic is, 5 the less likely it is to come within the most sensitive area where discrimination is particularly difficult to justify.”
“….while it may well be the case that there was no other difference in treatment between the applicant and the others with whom he compared himself, his status, as a man who had been adjudged father in legal proceedings, was obviously 20 different from the status of those fathers who had not, and even more different from the status of mothers. In other words, his status was not defined by the difference in treatment complained of. That, it seems to me is the true principle: the “status” must not be defined solely by the difference in treatment complained of, for otherwise the words “on any ground such as …” would add nothing to the 25 article.”
“109. … I agree with Mr Stone that the aim of the legislation is evident from the words of the statute, namely to promote private funding of political parties. The definition of political parties that qualify for exemption in s24(2) IHTA is designed to ensure that what may be a valuable tax relief is limited to prevent abuse of the 35 relief. It does so by restricting donations to those political parties that play a meaningful role within national political debate.”
“There are four stages, which I can summarise as involving consideration of (i) whether there is a legitimate aim which could justify a restriction of the relevant protected right, (ii) whether the measure adopted is rationally connected to that aim, (iii) whether the aim could have been achieved by a less intrusive measure 10 and (iv) whether, on a fair balance, the benefits of achieving the aim by the measure outweigh the disbenefits resulting from the restriction of the relevant protected right.”
“Nonetheless, there are compelling reasons for according the full area of judgment 10 allowed to the UK under the Convention in matters of social and economic policy to the legislature and the executive. Within the UK's constitutional arrangements, the democratically elected branches of government are in principle better placed than the courts to decide what is in the public interest in such matters. Those branches of government are in a position to rank and decide among competing 15 claims to public money, which a court adjudicating on a particular claim has neither the information nor the authority to do. In making such decisions, the legislature and the executive are also able and institutionally designed to take account of and respond to the views, interests and experiences of all citizens and sections of society in a way that courts are not. Above all, precisely because 20 decisions made by Parliament and the executive on what is in the public interest on social or economic grounds are the product of a political process in which all are able to participate, those decisions carry a democratic legitimacy which the judgment of a court on such an issue does not have. For such reasons, in judging whether a difference in treatment is justified, it is now firmly established that the 25 courts of this country will likewise respect a choice made by the legislature or executive in a matter of social or economic policy unless it is ‘manifestly without reasonable foundation’.”
“…the fact that the Strasbourg court uses the MWRF test when applying the margin of appreciation and that the same margin of appreciation does not necessarily apply at the national level does not entail that domestic courts cannot also use the MWRF test. It is being used as a means of allowing the political 10 branches of the constitution an appropriately generous measure of leeway when assessing the proportionality of measures concerning economic and social policy. The seven-Justice decision in MA surely settled the point for the foreseeable future.”
“Parliament must have a wide discretion in deciding what should be regarded as a sufficient public benefit to justify exemption from taxation and in my opinion it was entitled to take the view that public access to religious services was such a 20 benefit.”
“In my opinion Parliament's decision as to the scope of the exemption was within 25 the discretionary area of judgment afforded to it by that paragraph.”
“The principles applicable when, say, insurance companies challenge interferences with their property rights should not be more favourable to them than 35 the principles applicable when children challenge discrimination in their right to respect for their family lives.”
“That we are concerned here, not only with the right to property, but also with the right to respect for family life is clearly relevant to the issue of justification.”
“Moreover, this is not a case, in my judgment, where it is not possible for the court to interpret para 3(3) of Sch 10A 'so far as possible' in conformity with European Union law because the provision, as so interpreted, would raise policy issues as to 35 its effect which the court cannot, in performance of its role, resolve. Such issues might arise for instance (to take a very different case) if the interpretation of a statute in conformity with a European Union directive required the court to limit a provision of domestic law which had been inserted to protect third parties, such as creditors or consumers, and some equivalent protection would have to be 40 provided. In those circumstances, the task of interpretation might go beyond the judicial role of interpretation…”
“This would represent a major change in the law, having far reaching 35 ramifications. It raises issues whose solution calls for extensive enquiry and the widest public consultation and discussion. Questions of social policy and administrative feasibility arise at several points, and their interaction has to be 51 evaluated and balanced. The issues are altogether ill-suited for determination by courts and procedures. They are pre-eminently a matter for Parliament…”
“The threshold question is whether, by applying section 3, it is possible, as a matter of interpretation, to 'read down' section 11 (c) of the 1973 Act so as to include 10 additional words such as "or two people of the same sex one of whom has changed his/her sex to that of the opposite sex". This would in my view not be an exercise in interpretation however robust. It would be a legislative exercise of amendment making a legislative choice as to what precise amendment was appropriate.”
“These are matters for decision by Parliament, not the courts. It is impossible for a court to attempt to evaluate these ramifications or assess what would be the views of Parliament if changes are needed.”
“140. In our judgment, the underlying question of direct effect in this case is not quite as straightforward as the Divisional Court perceived it to be. The authorities 25 do not seem to us to say that, simply because you can spell out of treaty provisions a clear, precise and unconditional obligation on a member state, that obligation will automatically be directly enforceable. The question of direct effect is also concerned with whether the provisions in question are in the nature of general rules imposing on member states mutual duties of genuine co-operation and assistance, 30 and whether there are likely to be legitimate differences that exist between the practices of the member states concerning the detailed rules and procedures for implementing the general rules. These factors will have a bearing on whether the provisions are properly to be regarded as being of direct effect.”