“Whilst admitting to these oversights, which we will endeavour to prevent in future, we would point out that losing our gross status would prevent us tendering for contract work and thus cause the company to 10 cease trading. I am sure you will agree that removing gross status will cause great hardship which is disproportionate to the level of the oversights discussed above.” p. The Tribunal did not accept that the PAYE non-compliance in late 2010 and 2011 could fairly be described as an “administrative 15 oversight”
“[18] The taxpayer emphasises that it is the scheme as a whole that I must 15 consider. The taxpayer says that the reference to the margin of appreciation is inappropriate where it is a national court considering national legislation. It may well be that the phrase itself is inappropriate, but the concept of deferring to the legislature when it has adopted one out of a variety of solutions to a perceived problem remains the same. Under our constitution 20 Parliament is entrusted with the primary role of devising solutions to national, economic and social problems. The court’s task is limited to that of review. [19] Ferris J in the Vicky case came to the conclusion that the package of measures has an objectively justifiable aim, namely to recover tax from 25 those engaged in the construction industry. One possible solution to the problem would have been to require all contractors to submit to tax deductions when being paid by an employer. That might have been legislative overkill. Another might have been to require all sub-contractors to submit to deduction, but Parliament did not do that. Instead it provided a 30 route by which sub-contractors who could demonstrate a good track record would be permitted to receive payment in gross. Even then Parliament did not say that any failure to comply with obligations would prevent the subcontractor from receiving payment in gross. Minor and technical failures do not count if the taxpayer can also show that minor and technical failures give 35 rise to no doubt about future compliance. [20] So there is in my judgment already a considerable measure of proportionality inherent in the scheme. First, there is the possibility of exemption from the default position. Second, the mere fact of noncompliance with tax obligations does not of itself rule out the grant of 40 exemption. Third, there is the inevitable imprecision of the phrase ‘minor and technical’. Fourth, the statutory question is not whether the failures are minor and technical, but whether in the board’s opinion they are minor and technical. Fifth, although the language of section 561(9) suggests that the function of the Commissioners on appeal is merely to review the Board’s 45 opinion (since the statutory question is not whether the failures are minor and technical but whether in the Board’s opinion they are), Lightman J has held that the Commissioners are in fact free to substitute their own view. I am not invited to depart from that decision. Sixth, the refusal of the certificate is not final. The taxpayer can always apply again if its 50 performance has improved. Can I say that this scheme is devoid of 11 reasonable foundation? I am clear that I cannot. My conclusion therefore is the same as that of Ferris J. [21] The taxpayer relies heavily on the General Commissioners’ finding in paragraph 9(7) that their decision is disproportionate. However, the taxpayer’s broad argument based on proportionality 5 has to have as its starting point a Convention right that has been infringed. If there is no such right, then there is no peg on which to hang the argument based on proportionality. Since I consider that no Convention right has been infringed there is no occasion to resort to section 3 of the Human Rights Act. 10 [22] I consider also that section 3 has not allowed a court to tailor the legislation to the circumstances of an individual hard case. We all know that hard cases make bad law. The court must consider the general run of cases of that kind. If the legislation were to incorporate a general test of proportionality that would place a heavy burden on tax inspectors to conduct 15 a prospective review or forecast of the potential effect of refusal of a certificate on individual businesses. Moreover, it is not said that it will always be disproportionate to refuse a certificate if the result would be that the taxpayer would be put out of business. So there would require to be a judgment by the inspector not only whether a refusal would have that effect, 20 but also whether that effect is proportionate to the failures. [23] There may be social, economic and administrative arguments for and against the imposition of such a burden or there may be other solutions to perceived injustices in the statutory scheme, but they are matters for debate and legislation not for interpretation by a court. In those circumstances I 25 consider that the General Commissioners’ application of a test of proportionality was not a test that the legislation allowed them to apply. What they appear to have done is to have applied the unsuccessful submission for the taxpayer in the Vicky case.…”
“The unsatisfactory result to which reference is made is not just the result of the scheme, it is the result of the statutory scheme and the financial position 40 of the company itself. The effect of the requirement, in the absence of a certificate, to deduct a percentage of payments to the subcontractor on account of his tax liability gives rise to a cash flow problem. I do not seek to minimise the importance of cash flow in the building industry, but it is not the fault of the scheme that a taxpayer who fails to get a certificate may 45 thereby be driven out of business.”
“[74] The judgment of Dickson CJ in Oakes provides the clearest and most influential judicial analysis of proportionality within the common law 40 tradition of legal reasoning. Its attraction as a heuristic tool is that, by breaking down an assessment of proportionality into distinct elements, it can clarify different aspects of such an assessment, and make value judgments more explicit. The approach adopted in Oakes can be summarised by saying that it is necessary to determine (1) whether the objective of the measure is 45 sufficiently important to justify the limitation of a protected right, (2) whether the measure is rationally connected to the objective, (3) whether a less intrusive measure could have been used without unacceptably compromising the achievement of the objective, and (4) whether, balancing 14 the severity of the measure’s effects on the rights of the persons to whom it applies against the importance of the objective, to the extent that the measure will contribute to its achievement, the former outweighs the latter. The first three of these are the criteria listed by Lord Clyde in de Freitas, and the fourth reflects the additional observation made in Huang. 5 I have formulated the fourth criterion in greater detail than Lord Sumption JSC, but there is no difference of substance. In essence, the question at step four is whether the impact of the rights infringement is disproportionate to the likely benefit of the impugned measure. 10 [75] In relation to the third of these criteria, Dickson CJ made clear in R v Edwards Books and Art Ltd[1986] 2 SCR 713 , 781–782 that the limitation of the protected right must be one that ‘it was reasonable for the legislature to impose’, and that the courts were ‘not called on to substitute judicial opinions for legislative ones as to the place at which to draw a precise line’. 15 This approach is unavoidable, if there is to be any real prospect of a limitation on rights being justified: as Blackmun J once observed, a judge would be unimaginative indeed if he could not come up with something a little less drastic or a little less restrictive in almost any situation, and thereby enable himself to vote to strike legislation down (Illinois State Board of 20 Elections v Socialist Workers Party (1979) 440 US 173, 188–189); especially, one might add, if he is unaware of the relevant practicalities and indifferent to considerations of cost. To allow the legislature a margin of appreciation is also essential if a federal system such as that of Canada, or a devolved system such as that of the United Kingdom, is to work, since a 25 strict application of a ‘least restrictive means’ test would allow only one legislative response to an objective that involved limiting a protected right.”
“(1) Lightman J says, in relation to the legislative history that it was unlikely that the [1980] amendment was ‘merely’ intended to provide for a Wednesbury type judicial review. But the extension of the jurisdiction 20 effectively to consider the question as to whether or not the conditions were fulfilled leaves the possibility that a review jurisdiction was at least retained in relation to the exercise of any discretion; (2) Lightman J’s discussion in subpara (b) of his reasons reveals that his decision as to full appellate jurisdiction was in the context of the operation of 25 the statute where there was no discretion. It is clear that he regarded the presence of any statutory discretion as being at least potentially indicative of a limited jurisdiction, and also clear that his decision as to full jurisdiction does not determine the tribunal’s jurisdiction in an appeal against the cancellation of a certificate (or thus of registration); 30 (3) Although, as Lightman J notes at [20] a ‘review’ jurisdiction may encompass a full appellate jurisdiction, the use of the phrase ‘include jurisdiction to review’ indicates to us that a review should be something in addition to a full appellate consideration of the operation of the relevant conditions. Indeed Lightman J recognises this possibility in his reason (a); 35 (4) Where a discretion is conferred by statute there is some recognition that there may be policies developed by the body to which the power is given which may influence the exercise of that power. A body given a power may rightly take into consideration the need to act fairly as regards a wide body of taxpayers. The development of such policies would be precluded if 40 the tribunal had the jurisdiction to substitute its own. The issues in relation to CIS certificate are ones in which it would be reasonable to suppose that such policies could be applied.”