Marigolds Management Limited v Karen Barnes & Ors [2026] UKUT 186 (LC)

[2026] UKUT 186 (LC)

Case Nos: LC-2025-754

LC-2025-773

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL (LANDS CHAMBER)

Between

MARIGOLDS MANAGEMENT LIMITEDAppellant

KAREN BARNES and othersRespondent

JOHN MONEY AND MISS JANET CLINCH and othersAppellant

APPEALS AGAINST A DECISION OF THE FIRST-TIER TRIBUNAL (PROPERTY CHAMBER)

Ref: CHI/45UC/PHI/2024/0018- 0025, 0027- 0031 & 0034 and HAV/45UC/PHI/2025/0612 to 0630 & 0633

11 May 2026

TRIBUNALS, COURTS AND ENFORCEMENT ACT 2007

PARK HOMES – PITCH FEE REVIEW – validity of notices – whether the holder of the site licence is necessarily the owner for the purposes of the Mobile Homes Act 1983 – level of pitch fee to which the consumer prices index (CPI) increase is to be applied – reasons for displacing the presumption of a CPI increase

MARIGOLDS MANAGEMENT LIMITED

Respondent

The Marigolds Park, Shripney Road, Bognor Regis, West Sussex, PO22 9PB

His Honour Judge Johns KC

Determination on written representations

The following cases were referred to in this decision:

Wyldecrest Parks (Management) Ltd v Whiteley[2024] UKUT 55 (LC)

The Beaches Management Ltd v Furbear[2024] UKUT 180 (LC)

Date 2026-05-11

Introduction

[1]This decision deals with two appeals from the First-tier Tribunal (FTT) in cases concerning pitch fees at The Marigolds Park, Shripney Road, Bognor Regis, West Sussex PO22 9PB (the Park). It involves considering the provisions of the Mobile Homes Act 1983 (the 1983 Act) which govern proposed changes to the pitch fees paid by occupiers of park homes on protected sites. Under those provisions, to be found in paragraphs 16 to 20 of Schedule 1, Part 1, Chapter 2 to the 1983 Act, the owner must first serve a written notice with the owner’s proposals. In order for any proposed change to be effective, there must then be either the agreement of the occupier or a determination of the FTT on an application. There is a presumption that the pitch fee will change in line with the consumer prices index (CPI).

[2]Both appeals are brought with the permission of the FTT. Marigolds Management Limited (MML) appeals against the FTT’s determination that it was not the owner of the Park within the meaning of the 1983 Act at the time of pitch fee review notices given by MML on 25 September 2023 (the 2023 Notices) so that those notices were invalid. The other appeal concerns the FTT’s determination of pitch fees under 25 September 2024 pitch fee review notices (the 2024 Notices). It is brought by a group of park home owners who were not respondents to the application under the 2023 Notices. The FTT fixed their new pitch fees under the 2024 Notices by applying the percentage increase to a different and higher starting point than for other respondents. A further application by MML for permission to appeal the FTT’s decision on one pitch, pitch 62, is also before this Tribunal and is dealt with at the end of this decision.

Background and FTT proceedings

[3]MML holds a lease of the Park, which is a protected park home site. It also holds the site licence for the Park from the local authority, being Arun District Council (the Council). But until at least May 2024 that lease was subject to leases of each individual pitch at the Park. Those leases were held variously by three different companies, namely Silk Tree Properties Ltd, Sussex Mobile Homes Ltd, and West Sussex Mobile Homes Ltd. These pitch leases were assigned to MML in May 2024.

[4]There were two sets of proceedings before the FTT for the determination of pitch fees at the Park. Both were brought by MML. They had different but overlapping respondents. The first set of proceedings (the First Proceedings) named 14 respondents and concerned the 2023 Notices. That was, of course, before the assignment of the pitch leases to MML. The second set of proceedings (the Second Proceedings) named 20 respondents, 7 of whom were not respondents to the First Proceedings. I will refer to these 7 as the Solely Second Proceedings Respondents. The Second Proceedings concerned the 2024 Notices, being notices given after the assignment of the pitch leases to MML. The 2024 Notices sought to increase the pitch fees by 2.2%, being the current annual figure for inflation in the CPI.

[5]By its decision dated 10 October 2025 (the Decision), the FTT determined that the 2023 Notices were invalid as MML was not the owner within the meaning of the 1983 Act at the time they were given. And that the 2024 Notices were valid, MML by then having become the owner by virtue of the assignment of the pitch leases.

[6]Save for pitch 62, it also determined that there should be an increase of 2.2% in pitch fees as at 1 November 2024 under the 2024 Notices. The FTT’s decision did, however, treat the Solely Second Proceedings Respondents differently in applying that increase so as to arrive at the new pitch fee. Given its finding as to the invalidity of the 2023 Notices, the new pitch fee for other respondents was the figure produced by increasing the 1 November 2022 figure by 2.2%. But for the Solely Second Proceedings Respondents, the new pitch fee was calculated by increasing the 1 November 2023 figure by 2.2%.

[7]The FTT decided not to apply the 2.2% increase to pitch 62. There had been a reduction in the size of that pitch which the FTT considered was a sufficiently weighty factor to rebut the presumption of a CPI increase. Mr Sunderland, representing MML before the FTT, had resisted that conclusion by reference to a settlement agreement entered into by Ms Gee, the occupier of pitch 62, but did not produce a copy of that agreement. The FTT recorded that it did not know the contents of the agreement nor any of the detail of the background to it.

Appeal in the First Proceedings

[8]MML appeals the determination of the FTT that the 2023 Notices were invalid. It does so on the ground that the FTT was wrong to find that MML was not the owner within the meaning of the 1983 Act at the time of the 2023 Notices. It relies on the fact that MML held the site licence at that time.

[9]There was, in my judgment, no error by the FTT here.

[10]The “owner”, being the person entitled to give a pitch fee review notice, is defined in s.5 of the 1983 Act. “owner, in relation to a protected site, means the person who, by virtue of an estate or interest held by him, is entitled to possession of the site or would be so entitled but for the rights of any persons to station mobile homes on land forming part of the site”.

[11]Given the pitch leases, MML was not entitled as at the date of the 2023 Notices to possession of the pitches subject only to the rights of the occupiers, being the respondent park home owners. While MML held a lease of the Park, that lease was subject to the pitch leases which MML did not then hold. MML was not therefore entitled to possession. The persons entitled to possession, subject to the rights of the occupiers, were the companies holding the pitch leases. Accordingly, the FTT was right to find that MML was not the owner so that the 2023 Notices were invalid.

[12]That is despite MML holding the site licence. As made clear in the very helpful discussion of the law applying to park homes given by the Deputy President in Wyldecrest Parks (Management) Ltd v Whiteley

[2024] UKUT 55 (LC)

, “12. The law regulating protected sites in England is found in two separate statutory regimes. Subject to irrelevant exemptions, section 1 of the Caravan Sites and Control of Development Act 1960 requires a site licence to be obtained from the local authority for use of land as a caravan site. A site licence can be granted subject to conditions (section 5) and almost invariably it will be. 13. The Mobile Homes Act 1983 (‘the 1983 Act’) governs the terms on which someone may station a mobile home on land and occupy it as their only or main residence. It does so by implying standard terms into every agreement between the owner of a site and the occupier of a pitch entitling the occupier to station their home on the pitch (section 2). These terms were amended in 2013 and regulate every important aspect of the relationship between owner and occupier including the duration and termination of pitch agreements, the maintenance and repair of the mobile homes and sites, the payment and review of pitch fees, the sale of homes and so on.”

[13]It must be acknowledged that the definition in the Caravan Sites and Control of Development Act 1960 (the 1960 Act) of the person required to hold a site licence, referred to as the “occupier”, includes words like those in the definition of owner in the 1983 Act. Section 1(3) of the 1960 Act provides that, “In this Part of this Act the expression ‘occupier’ means, in relation to any land, the person who, by virtue of an estate or interest therein held by him, is entitled to possession thereof or would be so entitled but for the rights of any other person under any licence granted in respect of the land: Provided that where land amounting to not more than four hundred square yards in area is let under a tenancy entered into with a view to the use of the land as a caravan site, the expression ‘occupier’ means in relation to that land the person who would be entitled to possession of the land but for the rights of any person under that tenancy.”

[14]But that suggests merely either that the Council was wrong to grant a licence to MML or that the grant resulted from the operation of the proviso, which has no counterpart in s.5 of the 1983 Act. And it is not anyway known what information was given to the Council. The grant of a licence certainly in no way bound the FTT to find that MML was in law the owner for the purposes of the 1983 Act. That was a question for the FTT to answer. For the reasons I have given, I am satisfied that it did so correctly.

Appeal in the Second Proceedings

[15]The Solely Second Proceedings Respondents appeal the FTT’s use of the 1 November 2023 figure as the starting point for arriving at the new pitch fee by the application of the increase of 2.2%. In its decision giving permission to appeal, the FTT made clear at [47] that, “The Tribunal accepts that its determination of the Pitch Fee for November 2024 onward is necessarily wrong if the previous Pitch Fee as stated in the 2024 Pitch Fee Review Notices was not in fact the correct starting point from which to calculate the new fee.”

[16]I consider that the figure in the 2024 Notices, being the 1 November 2023 sum, was not the correct starting point so that the FTT’s determination of the new pitch fee for the Solely Second Proceedings Respondents did represent an error.

[17]The statutory provisions governing increases in pitch fees are, at least, clear as to the methods of increase. There must be either agreement or a determination by the FTT on an application. By paragraph 16 of Schedule 1, Part 1, Chapter 2 to the 1983 Act, “16. The pitch fee can only be changed in accordance with paragraph 17, either—(a) with the agreement of the occupier, or

(b) if the [FTT], on the application of the owner or the occupier, considers it reasonable for the pitch fee to be changed and makes an order determining the amount of the new pitch fee.”

[18]Accordingly, as spelled out by Judge Cooke in The Beaches Management Ltd v Furbear

[2024] UKUT 180 (LC)

at [12], “So if an increase in the pitch fee is proposed by the site owner and the occupier does not agree to it, the pitch fee will not be changed unless the FTT so decides.”

[19]Here, the 1 November 2023 figure was that proposed in the 2023 Notices. It is apparent from the Decision that there was no agreement to that proposal by any of the respondents to the cases before the FTT. I take that from the Decision at [109] to [111]. “109. The Respondent contends that the Applicant ignored the queries raised about the entitlement of it to the pitch fee in 2023 and then in 2024 and that the pitch fee continued to be taken by UK Properties Management Limited- which the Tribunal understands from previous experience to be the company used effectively as the agent for the purpose of collection of pitch fees, and in the event payable also service charges (of which more below)- by direct debit from residents, save from in 2023- 2024 the 14 Respondents and in 2024- 2025 the 20 Respondents who were able to stop the sums being taken. That is said to be despite all residents having refused to pay and the direct debits being taken anyway. Ms Gee said that there was chaos with the Applicant not being recognised, having not been previously named, and sums being sought to be taken for its benefit via direct debits not set up related to it, as stated in correspondence [4/ 1554]. Assertions are made of bullying and intimidation of elderly residents by employees of the above company and/ or another in the Wyldecrest group of companies. The Respondent’s statement of case accepts that this Decision is only binding on the parties to the proceedings but nevertheless the Tribunal is asked to direct the Applicant to comply with the effect of such other refusals.110. The Applicant’s Reply in the 2024 proceedings says that the Respondents have continued to pay, which is inconsistent with the Respondents’ position, which the Tribunal finds a little surprising but where in the absence of any suggestion that the Respondents have agreed the proposed pitch fee, there is no impact on this Decision. Other allegations above are not responded to.

111. The Tribunal observes that on the above basis it is less than clear that other residents have agreed to the increased pitch fee, as opposed to payment having been taken from them without agreement and hence the ongoing need for determination of any increased pitch fee (or potentially any to the Applicant) payable. In principle, payment being taken despite objection does not amount to agreement to pay generally by the pitch occupiers and does not amount to acceptance of any pitch fee increase specifically creating any entitlement to any increased sum on the part of the Applicant unless and until the Tribunal so determines. The Tribunal rejects Mr Sunderland’s contention that payment equates to agreement, nor does it identify that the pitch lessees who had stated objection to the increase were the ones who needed to apply. However, no attempt should be made to reach a determination on matters not related to the parties before the Tribunal within these particular proceedings. The Tribunal cannot in any event give the Applicant any direction in respect of parties not before it (and not only because it does cannot know whether it would be correct to do so where it lacks knowledge of the refusals/ agreement).”

[20]According then to the Decision at [110], there was not even a suggestion that “the Respondents” (by which the FTT made clear at [9] that it meant all the respondent parties before it in the two sets of proceedings), had accepted the increase to the 1 November 2023 figure.

[21]Nor was there any determination of such figure in favour of MML by the FTT. On the contrary, it had determined in favour of the other respondents that there were no valid pitch fee review notices, the 2023 Notices being invalid. And for the Solely Second Proceedings Respondents there had not even been an application to the FTT to fix the 1 November 2023 figure in line with MML’s proposal.

[22]There was therefore no legal foundation for the 1 November 2023 figure as a valid starting point.

[23]Nor was there a good case management reason for using it. In that regard, I am satisfied that there was no acceptance or admission in the statement of case for the respondents to the Second Proceedings that the 1 November 2023 figure was the starting point. That is apparent from the fact of the FTT’s different determination of the 1 November 2024 pitch fee for the respondents other than the Solely Second Proceedings Respondents. For those respondents, the 2.2% increase was applied to the 1 November 2022 figure. And no distinction was made in the statement of case between those respondents and the Solely Second Proceedings Respondents. Further, the respondents’ statement of case invited the FTT to go back beyond the previous notice; being the course the FTT took for other respondents. “The Respondents are not challenging the 2.2% CPI rate that was used in the proposal - we agree that it was the correct rate applicable at the time the Pitch Review Forms were served. There may be weighty factors to displace that of course but if not, then there are strong arguments that it can only be a applied to a previous pitch fee amount instead of that being paid in the year before the 2024 proposal.”

[24]In addition, an earlier heading in the statement of case was “2023 and 2024 Pitch Fee Reviews (both relevant to this case)”.

[25]The basis for treating the Solely Second Proceedings Respondents differently was explained in this way the FTT at [189] of the Decision:

“In terms of the sums, the relevant Notices are those containing sums 2.2% higher than the 1st November 2022 (and indeed 1st November 2023 given there was valid Notice on which to base an increase) figure where Respondents are parties to the 2024 proceedings. For the other Respondents the sums are those in the single Notice received by each of them. As explained above any lack of agreement to the 2023 increase is not a matter before the Tribunal in relation to them.”

[26]The “lack of agreement” “explained above” appears to be a reference to [109] to [111] of the Decision, already quoted above. The distinction in those paragraphs, though, is a different one, being between the parties before the FTT and those park home owners not party to the proceedings at all. What is said in those paragraphs does not seem to me to justify treating the Solely Second Proceedings Respondents differently from the other parties to the Second Proceedings.

[27]Finally on this, I should record that the 2023 Notices for the Solely Second Proceedings Respondents appear in the hearing bundle for the Second Proceedings which was before the FTT. They are, unsurprisingly, in the same form as the other 2023 Notices in evidence. In particular, they name MML, wrongly, as owner. No different possible argument about them is therefore disclosed by their form.

Permission to appeal in relation to pitch 62

[28]MML seeks permission to appeal the FTT’s determination not to apply the 2.2% increase to pitch 62 having regard to a reduction in the size of that pitch. The grounds of appeal are that there was a settlement agreement which should prevent Ms Gee relying on the reduction in pitch size, and that the reduction in size came some time ago, in 2020, so that it should not have been taken into account as late as 2024.

[29]I have decided that permission to appeal should be refused, there being no real prospect of MML showing that the FTT was wrong in its treatment of pitch 62.

[30]As to the settlement agreement, MML did not produce the agreement nor a detailed account of it before the FTT, so that there was an insufficient evidential foundation for any estoppel or other bar on Ms Gee arguing against the proposed increase in 2024.

[31]MML has recently produced a copy of the settlement agreement to this Tribunal, but there has been no application or request for fresh evidence, let alone any explanation as to how such a request could come within the limited circumstances in which fresh evidence is admitted on an appeal; that somewhat restrictive approach being designed to strike a fair balance between the need for concluded litigation to be determinative of disputes and the desirability that the judicial process should achieve the right result. Further, the document came only after the parties’ statements of case on the appeal had been filed (those being filed in accordance with the Tribunal’s directions as extended), again without explanation. In those circumstances, any discretion could be expected to be exercised against permitting MML to rely on this late evidence in an appeal on this point.

[32]As to the reduction in pitch size coming some time ago, I see no warrant in the 1983 Act for excluding from consideration a factor which arose a few years before the pitch fee being considered. Paragraph 18 of Schedule 1, Part 1, Chapter 2 to the 1983 Act sets out a list of factors to which the FTT must have “particular regard”. They include at paragraph 18(1)(aa) and (ab), “(aa) in the case of a protected site in England, any deterioration in the condition, and any decrease in the amenity, of the site or any adjoining land which is occupied or controlled by the owner since the date on which this paragraph came into force (in so far as regard has not previously been had to that deterioration or decrease for the purposes of this subparagraph); (ab) in the case of a protected site in England, any reduction in the services that the owner supplies to the site, pitch or mobile home, and any deterioration in the quality of those services, since the date on which this paragraph came into force (in so far as regard has not previously been had to that reduction or deterioration for the purposes of this subparagraph);”

[33]A reduction or deterioration within those subparagraphs must therefore be taken into account by the FTT when determining a pitch fee, whether or not it occurred within the last year, provided only that it came after those subparagraphs came into force (being 2014) and account has not previously been taken of it by the FTT.

[34]It is well established that the FTT may also have regard to other factors not listed where they are of sufficient weight to displace the presumption of a CPI percentage increase – see the discussion of the law in this area by the Deputy President in Whiteley.

[35]The reduction in pitch size was treated by the FTT as one such other factor. Given that there is expressly no statutory limitation under which the FTT is prevented from looking beyond a year back when considering the reductions or deteriorations set out in subparagraphs 18(aa) and (ab), there is no justification for imposing such a limit on the FTT’s consideration on this other factor of reduction in pitch size. If such a factor had already been taken account of in an earlier determination, then by analogy to the paragraph 18 provisions, it would likely to be given little or no weight by the FTT in a later determination. An earlier agreement of a pitch fee which clearly took into account such a factor could also be expected to affect the weight attached to it on a later determination. Neither scenario applies here.

[36]It follows from the above that:(1) MML’s appeal in the First Proceedings is dismissed.

(2) The Solely Second Proceedings Respondents’ appeal in the Second Proceedings is allowed.

(3) Permission to appeal the FTT’s determination not to apply the 2.2% increase to pitch 62 is refused. His Honour Judge Johns KC 11 May 2026 Right of appeal Any party has a right of appeal to the Court of Appeal on any point of law arising from this decision. The right of appeal may be exercised only with permission. An application for permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal must be sent or delivered to the Tribunal so that it is received within 1 month after the date on which this decision is sent to the parties (unless an application for costs is made within 14 days of the decision being sent to the parties, in which case an application for permission to appeal must be made within 1 month of the date on which the Tribunal’s decision on costs is sent to the parties). An application for permission to appeal must identify the decision of the Tribunal to which it relates, identify the alleged error or errors of law in the decision, and state the result the party making the application is seeking. If the Tribunal refuses permission to appeal a further application may then be made to the Court of Appeal for permission.