PC RESIDENTS (FINCHLEY ROAD) LIMITED v FOLASADE JIBIKE ABIOLA 25 Palace Court, 250 Finchley Road, London NW3 [2025] UKUT 120 (LC)

UPPER TRIBUNAL
LANDS CHAMBER
[2025] UKUT 120 (LC)Case No LC-2024-623
Between
PC RESIDENTS (FINCHLEY ROAD) LIMITEDApplicantFOLASADE JIBIKE ABIOLA 25 Palace Court, 250 Finchley Road, London NW3Respondent
Before
Martin Rodger KCMichael Dickin for Appellantinstructed directly for AppellantDate 3 April 2025Catchwords: LANDLORD AND TENANT – SERVICE CHARGES – FTT misunderstanding accounting information and basis of agreement – lease providing for year-end surplus to be credited to leaseholder – whether landlord entitled to retain surplus as a credit to reserve fund – costs of proceedings – section 20C, Landlord and Tenant Act 1985 – appeal allowed in part

Introduction

[1]There are four issues in this appeal from a decision of the First-tier Tribunal, Property Chamber (the FTT) in which it determined an application under section 27A, Landlord and Tenant Act 1985 by the respondent, Mrs Folasade Jibike Abiola, concerning the amount payable to the appellant, PC Residents (Finchley Road) Ltd, as service charges under the lease of her flat at 25 Palace Court in Finchley.[2]The FTT determined that there were significant surpluses on the service charge accounts for the building for the years 2019 to 2022, and these should be repaid to the leaseholders rather than being retained in a reserve fund. It recorded significant reductions in the service charges payable for those years which it said had been agreed between the parties. And it made an order under section 20C, Landlord and Tenant Act 1985 protecting the respondent from liability to contribute to the costs of the proceedings through the service charge.[3]The issues for which this Tribunal gave permission to appeal are:[1]Whether the FTT misunderstood or overlooked evidence when it determined the amount of the surpluses for the years 2019 to 2022.[2]Whether the appellant is entitled to retain any surplus as an additional contribution towards the reserve fund or whether it is required to repay or credit the relevant share of any surplus to each leaseholder’s service charge account.[3]Whether the FTT misunderstood what it was told during the hearing and inaccurately recorded what the parties had agreed about certain charges for repair and maintenance.[4]Whether, in view of the errors said to have made by the FTT, its decision to make an order under section 20C should be set aside and redetermined. At the hearing of the appeal the appellant was represented by Michael Dickin. The respondent had been represented by counsel before the FTT and filed a response to the notice of appeal, but she did not attend and was not represented at the hearing of the appeal.

The facts

[5]The respondent is the long leaseholder of Flat 25 at Palace Court, 250 Finchley Road, London NW3, a block containing commercial premises on the ground floor and basement and 21 flats on the upper floors. The appellant owns the freehold of the block and is itself owned by the leaseholders of the flats.[6]The respondent acquired her lease of Flat 25 by assignment in 2009. It had originally been granted by the appellant to a predecessor of the respondent on 14 April 1978 and is for a term of 150 years from a date in 1977.[7]The lease includes conventional obligations for the repair and maintenance of the building by the landlord and for the payment of service charges by the leaseholder (referred to in the lease as the Tenant).[8]The Landlord’s covenants are in the Fifth Schedule of the lease and include obligations to repair the exterior and common parts of the block, to carpet, furnish and keep clean the interior common parts, to decorate the external parts of the block at least once in every five years and so on.[9]The leaseholder’s covenants are in the Fourth Schedule and include, at paragraph 2, an obligation to pay as additional rent in two equal instalments on account, 6.1% of an estimate of the Landlord’s expenditure in performing its obligations during the current financial year and 10% of the cost of maintaining the lift. The paragraph continues as follows (I have adjusted the layout to aid comprehension):
“… and as soon as possible following the end of each such financial year the Landlord shall provide the Tenant with a summary of such expenses certified by its accountants or managing agents and subject to the provisions of Clause 5(iii) of this Lease any necessary or subsequent adjustment certified as due from or to the Tenant by such accountants or managing agents of the Landlord (whose certificate shall be binding upon the Landlord and the Tenant) shall be paid by the Tenant or credited to the Tenant on the date for payment following the issue of such certificate.”
[10]The reference to clause 5(iii) of the Lease in the above extract is to the following agreement (again adjusted to aid comprehension):
“5(iii) The Landlord shall at its absolute discretion create a reserve fund to provide towards the renewal of equipment and/or materials required for the provision of the services and amenities herein provided and/or for carrying out works other than those of an annual recurring nature and such sum as from time to time the Landlord shall notionally allocate to such fund shall be deemed to be an expense incurred by the Landlord in discharge of its covenants herein contained and accordingly a proportion of any sum so allocated shall be included in the amount to be estimated under the provisions in paragraph 2 of the Fourth Schedule provided that any sum so allocated and paid by way of further and additional rent shall be set aside by the Landlord and utilised only for the purpose for which it was so allocated and provided further that such sums so allocated and paid shall not be subject to adjustment under the provisions of paragraph 2 of the Fourth Schedule and accordingly in ascertaining whether any sum is to be paid by or credited to the Tenant under paragraph 2 of the Fourth Schedule there shall be disregarded any sum allocated by the Landlord and paid by the Tenant under the provisions of this sub- clause.”
[11]Clause 5(iii) authorised the creation of a reserve fund and the inclusion of contributions to it in the annual estimate of expenditure. This sum was to be allocated to the reserve and was exempted from the balancing adjustments required by the concluding part of paragraph 2 of the Fourth Schedule. It was the practice for a sum of £10,000 to be allocated to the reserves in the estimate for each year. But additionally it is said to have been the practice for many years for any surplus of service charges collected over costs incurred to be paid into the reserve at the end of the year, rather than being credited to each leaseholder.[12]Relations between the appellant and the respondent and between the respondent and the directors of the appellant (of whom she was formerly one) have not always been cordial. In her evidence to the FTT the respondent referred to proceedings between the parties as long ago as 2009 and to a dispute over reimbursement of director’s expenses in 2018. In 2021 the appellant commenced proceedings in the County Court for the recovery of arrears of service charges and in a draft defence which she later relied on in the FTT the respondent identified charges for the years 2019 and 2020 which she disputed or required to be justified.[13]In 2018 the appellant had appointed a new firm of managing agents, NG Properties (UK) Ltd (NGP), and it was they who had arranged for summaries of expenditure for 2018 onwards to be prepared and certified by the appellant’s accountants, as required by paragraph 2 of the Fourth Schedule to the lease (see [9] above). According to Debra Fisher, of NGP, the summaries were prepared with the requirements of section 21, Landlord and Tenant Act 1985, in mind. The accountants also prepared annual service charge accounts, which adopted the accounting standard agreed between relevant professional bodies, known as Tech 03/11.[14]Section 21 of the 1985 Act has been amended many times but the version in force between 2008 and April 2023 allows a tenant to require their landlord to supply a written summary of costs incurred in the last accounting period which are relevant costs in relation to the service charges payable by the tenant or demanded by the landlord in that or any other period (section 21(1)). A landlord who receives such a request is required to comply with it within one month or, if later, within six months of the end of the period to which the request relates. The summary is required to show how the costs have been or will be reflected in demands for service charges. It must also show which are costs in respect of which no demand for payment was received by the landlord within the relevant period, which are costs in respect of which a demand was received but not paid, and which are costs which were both demanded and paid during that period (section 21(5)).[15]The summaries commissioned by NGP and provided to leaseholders did double service, both as the certified summary of expenses required by paragraph 2 of the Fourth Schedule, and as a pre- emptive response to any request for a summary under section 21. They were prepared at the end of June each year and provided details of total costs incurred in the preceding year, which were then divided between the three categories required by section 21(5). For example, the summary for 2019 showed a breakdown of expenditure in 17 categories (cleaning, repairs, insurance, lift maintenance etc) totalling £107,013 which it then broke down into costs for which no demand had been received during 2019 (£8,342), those demanded but not paid (£4,775), and those both demanded and paid (£93,897). The summary also included a figure for the total service charge demanded for the year, which was the original budget figure, which in 2019 was £110,200.

The FTT proceedings

[16]In the event, the 2021 court proceedings were not formally served and were struck out. A new claim was issued by the appellant on 6 June 2023 seeking payment of £24,817 plus interest said to be outstanding for the years 2019 to 2023. In response, on 15 June 2023, the respondent commenced her own application in the FTT under section 27A, 1985 Act, asking it to determine her service charge liability for the same years. She also requested an order under section 20C, 1985 Act, to prevent the recovery from her of any contribution to the costs of the proceedings (she did not ask for protection for any other leaseholder).[17]The FTT gave directions for the appellant to provide copies of service charges accounts and estimates and for the parties to cooperate in the production of a schedule of disputed items. The respondent was to begin by identifying those charges which she challenged, with reasons. When the appellant responded to the schedule it was to provide copies of all relevant invoices relating to the matters disputed by the respondent.[18]In the completed schedule the respondent listed some, but not all, of the items shown in the annual expenditure summaries. For example, for 2019, she disputed lift expenditure, buildings insurance, external repairs, gardening, management fees and the annual contribution towards reserve funds of £10,000. She also took from the 2019 service charge budget two further items which did not feature in the summary of expenditure, health and safety costs, and professional fees.[19]She adopted a similar approach in the schedule of disputed charges for 2020, identifying 17 items of which ten were taken from the summary of expenditure and seven from the budget. Some items appeared both in the budget and in the summary of expenditure, but for different amounts (for example, £600 had been budgeted for emergency lighting testing, but only £576 had been spent). Other items had been budgeted for, and were disputed by the respondent in the schedule, but no corresponding expenditure had been incurred (for example, £500 had been budgeted for pest control but nothing had been spent). Finally, some items were given different names in the budget from those which appeared in the summary of expenditure (a sum of £13,000 was budgeted under the heading “porter”, but the corresponding expenditure in the summary was of £14,256 described as “cleaning”); the respondent disputed both items.[20]The respondent took the same approach to the years 2021 and 2022, combining budget items and certified expenditure in the same schedule. She did not dispute any expenditure in 2023 (which had not yet been certified) nor did she challenge any internal repair item. She provided no details of any specific ground of challenge although she did file a witness statement referring to her draft defence in the original Court proceedings as explaining her concerns. That defence was expressed in very general terms, effectively putting the appellant to proof that the expenditure had been incurred and was reasonable.

The FTT’s decision

[21]Both parties had instructed counsel for the hearing before the FTT, but the appellant’s counsel did not attend (apparently due to transport difficulties). The FTT’s decision to proceed in his absence may have contributed to the confusion which followed.[22]The FTT issued its decision on 19 January 2024, but on 6 June 2024 it issued a revised version in response to the appellant’s request for permission to appeal. It said that it had reviewed its decision and issued an amended version correcting accidental errors and omissions. This Tribunal subsequently granted permission to appeal the reviewed decision of 6 June.[23]The FTT identified four issues. The first was whether the appellant was entitled to retain the year end surplus in a reserve fund or whether it had to be credited back to the respondent. It decided that the surpluses for each year should be credited back to the service charge account. It then quantified what it understood to be surpluses for each of the years in dispute and directed an adjustment in the respondent’s favour, as follows:
“The following amounts based on the amounts in the Income and Expenditure Accounts should be credited to the service charge account for Palace Court and the appropriate percentage share deducted from the applicant’s outstanding account: 2019: £29,502 Applicant’s share £1,799.62 2020: £8,744 Applicant’s share £533.38 2021: £10,559 Applicant’s share £644.10 2022: £17,125 Applicant’s share £1,044.62”
[24]The fourth issue identified by the FTT was whether the appellant had incurred the sums shown in its annual accounts for repairs and maintenance and for electricity. It recorded in the decision that the dispute regarding charges for electricity was agreed during the lunch break. That left only the charges for repairs and maintenance. The respondent’s counsel was recorded by the FTT as having confirmed that only external repairs and maintenance were challenged. Counsel proposed that the FTT should simply add up the invoices which had been disclosed and then compare the result with the expenditure recorded in the annual accounts. The FTT then recited that calculation as follows: “37. 2019: The invoices total £964. The accounts recorded £1897 therefore the service charge account should be reduced by £933 and the applicant’s contribution by £60.55.[38]2020: The invoices total £3027.66. The accounts recorded £6416 therefore the service charge account should be reduced by £3,388.34 and the applicant’s contribution by £220.24.[39]2021: The invoices total £7790.53. The accounts recorded £10,085.63 therefore the service charge account should be reduced by £2,295.10 and the applicant’s contribution by £149.18.[40]2022: No invoices had been disclosed for 2022. It is assumed that some maintenance has been carried out therefore the applicant proposes that a 50% reduction be made in the expenditure in the accounts of £4,500 based on previous year’s amendments. This would reduce the applicant’s contribution by £137.25.”[25]After mentioning some points made by the parties the FTT continued: “43. After lunch the repairs and maintenance issues were agreed between the parties. £472 was agreed on the balance of probabilities to be a not unreasonable contribution for the repairs and maintenance for 2022.[44]The Tribunal has no jurisdiction following the agreement between the parties.” Although the FTT recorded what had been agreed for 2022 (which I interpret as meaning that £472 was payable by the respondent as her contribution rather than that £472 had been expended by the appellant) it did not say what had been agreed for the earlier years. When it was later asked to clarify what it meant it declined, repeating that, after the parties had reached agreement, it no longer had jurisdiction. It then added:
“The figures provided were for the benefit of the parties and were not disputed at the hearing.”
That might be taken to imply that the figures at [37]-[39] recorded what the FTT understood to have been agreed for the years 2019 to 2021.[26]Finally, the FTT considered that it was just and equitable in the circumstances for an order to be made under section 20C, 1985 Act, so that the appellant “may not pass any of its costs incurred in connection with the proceedings before the tribunal through the service charge.” When it was asked for permission to appeal the FTT clarified that the order was intended to benefit the respondent only and did not prevent the appellant from recovering the costs of the proceedings through the service charges payable by other leaseholders.

Issue 1: The quantum of the surpluses for the disputed years

[27]When it quantified the service charge surpluses for each year the FTT said specifically that it took the figures from the amounts shown in the Income and Expenditure Accounts. It then indicated that the respondent’s share of the surplus (which it calculated using 6.1%) should be credited back to her and deducted from her outstanding account.[28]The appellant submits that the FTT was mistaken in referring to the income and expenditure accounts to calculate the surpluses. These were prepared on an accrual basis and showed liabilities which accrued during the year. In order to identify what had been expended in the service charge year it was necessary to refer to the summaries of expenditure which were certified by the appellant’s accountant. These showed what invoices had been paid during the year. Where an invoice had been received in one accounting year and paid in a later year it appeared in the expenditure summary for the year in which it was paid, but in the income and expenditure accounts it appeared in the year the invoice became payable.[29]This difference in presentation was particularly important for 2019. The appellant dismissed its former managing agents, replaced its board of directors and instructed new managing agents in October 2018. Mrs Fisher, the new agent, explained in an email to all leaseholders on 3 August 2021 that certain invoices for services supplied before their appointment had been outstanding at the time of their appointment. These were investigated, found to be due, and paid during 2019. The payments certified as having been made during 2019 therefore included payments for services provided, but not paid for, during earlier years. The income and expenditure accounts for 2019 did not include payments made during 2019 for services supplied during 2018. Thus, for example, the summary for 2019 certified that payments of £63,583 were made during 2019 in respect of buildings insurance, whereas the accounts show expenditure of £42,680. The difference between the two figures arose because part of the insurance premium for 2018 was paid during 2019.[30]When it refused permission to appeal the FTT said that the service charge accounts on which it relied were the only certified record of service charge expenditure provided to it. In making that statement the FTT was mistaken. It also had the annual summaries for each of the disputed years, certified by the appellant’s accountants. The summaries were referred to in the respondent’s statement of case, and in the schedule. The fact that the summaries showed different figures for expenditure from those in the annual accounts was also pointed out and relied on by the respondent as supporting an inference that one or other must be inaccurate. The suggested discrepancies were then the subject of evidence from Mrs Fisher, in her own witness statement. It appears, therefore, that the FTT overlooked evidence when it suggested that the only certified statements provided to it were the annual income and expenditure accounts.[31]The surpluses calculated by the FTT did not reflect all of the expenditure during the relevant year. The figures calculated by the appellant are very different. Using the summaries of expenditure and omitting the £10,000 contribution to reserves, the appellant suggests that in 2019 service charges demanded from the residential tenants exceeded its actual expenditure (including sums paid in respect of services provided in previous years) by £6,213. The respondent’s 6.1% share of that surplus would be £378.99, not the £1,799.62 suggested by the FTT. The differences in the next two years were very much smaller, but in 2022 the appellant states that there was a deficit, rather than a surplus, and that a balancing payment was required from leaseholders rather than a credit.[32]I am satisfied that the FTT misunderstood or overlooked evidence, the surpluses it determined cannot be relied on and the respondent is not entitled to the credits it calculated. It is not possible for me to provide alternative figures, nor is it necessary for me to do so. The FTT’s task under section 27A, 1985 Act, was to determine the amount of the service charges payable by the respondent. In the event, the charges were almost all agreed. A mistaken impression was created by the FTT about sums to be credited to the respondent which were different from the sums certified by the accountant or managing agent because they were calculated on a different basis. It is sufficient to set aside the FTT’s determination recorded in paragraph 23 of its decision.

Issue 2: Can any surplus be retained and transferred to reserves?

[33]The FTT decided that the appellant was not entitled to transfer any difference between the budgeted expenditure payable by leaseholders and the actual expenditure incurred to reserves, as is said to have been its practice since 1978.[34]Mr Dickin acknowledged that long usage was not a sufficient justification for that practice if, correctly interpreted, the lease required that any surplus be credited to the leaseholders when the annual adjustments were certified. He advanced two arguments in support of the practice.[35]First, he pointed out that clause 5(iii) of the lease gave the landlord a discretion over whether there should be a reserve fund at all, and over the amount to be allocated to it “from time to time”. That is clear enough. He then noted that the clause required only that “a proportion of any sum so allocated” be included in the annual estimate of expenditure prepared under paragraph 2 of the Fourth Schedule. It was therefore permissible, Mr Dickin suggested, for the appellant to nominate, at a different time, a sum which would not become part of the estimate of expenditure and allocate it to the reserves. That is what the appellant did when it allocated year end surpluses to reserves.[36]I do not accept Mr Dickin’s argument for two reasons.[37]First, it is clear from clause 5(iii) that the sum allocated to reserves is exempted from the adjustment required by paragraph 2 of the Fourth Schedule. It would be circular to treat the product of that adjustment as a sum which could then be allocated to reserves.[38]Secondly, and most significantly, the suggestion that the product of the “adjustment certified as due from or to the Tenant” by the accountant can be allocated to reserves at the appellant’s discretion is directly contrary to the instruction that the same sum “shall be paid by the Tenant or credited to the Tenant on the date for payment following the issue of such certificate” as paragraph 2 requires.[39]I agree with Mr Dickin that the reference to “a proportion” of the sum allocated to reserves being included in the estimate is odd; it may be a reference to the payments by equal instalments, or simply be a mistake, but in any event it is not a sufficient reason to depart from the explicit instruction to credit the Tenant.[40]Mr Dickin’s second submission challenged the FTT’s assumption that crediting a surplus required that the sum be paid to the leaseholder or credited against their next demand. He suggested that a sum could still be credited to the leaseholder if it was transferred to reserves. I do not accept that argument either. A sum which is added to the reserve is then available for the appellant to use as it decides. It is not in any sense credited to an individual leaseholder. It cannot be used, for example, to reduce the leaseholder’s obligation to contribute their apportioned part of the £10,000 allocated annually to the reserve. Nor can it be recovered by the leaseholder if they transfer their lease. The fact that the managing agent may be able to calculate how much any individual leaseholder has contributed to the reserves is neither here nor there. The sums in reserve do not stand to the credit of the individuals who contributed them.[41]I am satisfied that the FTT came to the correct conclusion on this issue. The lease provides for any surplus to be credited to individual leaseholders and not taken into reserve. Of course, that does not prevent individual leaseholders from agreeing that any sum otherwise due to them could be credited to the reserve. If all agreed, the practice of previous years could be continued. But no individual could be obliged to agree, nor could a majority insist on agreement. Without unanimity, a voluntary contribution to reserves would not be likely to be attractive. Issue 3: The FTT’s account of what the parties agreed about charges for repairs and maintenance[42]I have set out at [24] and [25] above those parts of the FTT’s decision in which it explained the dispute over charges for external repairs and maintenance and recorded that the parties had reached agreement. It is significant that the FTT did not purport to determine the dispute. There is therefore no decision against which the appellant can appeal. The appellant’s dissatisfaction is with the impression given by the FTT that the parties’ agreement was in accordance with the submissions of the respondent’s counsel which it recited in the decision.[43]It is clear that the respondent’s counsel initially failed to appreciate that the issues raised by the respondent in the schedule was only concerned with the cost of external repairs and maintenance. The figures recorded by the FTT were taken directly from counsel’s written argument and compared the invoices disclosed by the appellant with the aggregate of the sums shown in the annual accounts for internal repairs and maintenance and external repairs and maintenance. But the invoices disclosed by the appellant related only to external repairs and maintenance, as those were the only sums put in issue by the respondent in her schedule, and the FTT had properly limited disclosure to those matters which were in dispute. The comparison proposed by the respondent’s counsel was therefore a false one.[44]Fortunately, the respondent’s counsel appreciated his mistake and, as the FTT recorded at [36] of the decision, he explained to the FTT that only external repairs and maintenance had been challenged in the schedule. It was on that basis that the parties were then able to agree the sums payable, which were not those recorded by the FTT. Any different impression given by the FTT was therefore incorrect.[45]I do not know what the parties agreed and I was told that, as far as the appellant was aware, the agreement had not been recorded in writing (possibly because it was unnecessary to do so if the respondent simply admitted the figures she had previously disputed). In any event, it is clear that something was agreed and that, except for 2022, it was not recorded by the FTT. That is regrettable, though not the fault of the FTT if it was not told the figures. The FTT was technically correct that once the parties had reached agreement it no longer had jurisdiction to make a determination under section 27A, but that would not have prevented it from recording what had been agreed for 2019, 2020 and 2021 in its decision. Had it done so, there would have been no room for later dispute. I do not know if there has been any further dispute over what was agreed, but if there has, it will be necessary for it to be determined in the continuing County Court proceedings.

Issue 4: the section 20C application

[46]The final issue concerns the FTT’s decision to make an order under section 20C, 1985 Act. That order was made on the understanding that the respondent had succeeded in her case that she was entitled to substantial credits totalling more than £40,000, whereas the true position was that she was entitled to no more than the appellant’s accountant had calculated and certified which, in aggregate, was around £12,500.[47]It is now apparent that the FTT exercised its discretion on a basis more favourable to the respondent than was justified. I therefore set its section 20C order aside.[48]As her counsel acknowledged in his written argument for the FTT, most of the issues raised by the respondent fell away before the FTT hearing on the basis of the documents provided by the managing agent. Others were agreed, in the appellant’s favour, at the hearing. The respondent did achieve two successes: sums payable for lift maintenance were limited to £100 a year (because a 2017 rolling contract had not been the subject of prior consultation) saving the respondent £265.90 over four years; and she is also entitled to credit for annual surpluses in three out of the four years in dispute. The first success is insignificant but that cannot be said of the second. On the other hand: the respondent has not paid anything since July 2019 and has no obvious defence to the claim for almost £25,000 arrears (plus interest) brought against her; she was herself a director of the appellant until 2018 while the practice of allocating surpluses to the reserve was continuing, and the lift maintenance contract was entered into; and the appellant is jointly owned by all of the leaseholders, who will collectively have to meet any shortfall in the recovery of the costs of the proceedings. In all of those circumstances I am satisfied that it would not be just and equitable for the respondent to be treated differently from her neighbours, and I therefore refuse her application for an order under section 20C.

Disposal

[49]For the reasons I have given, I set aside paragraph 23 of the FTT’s decision (the determination of the amount of the annual surpluses). I also set aside its order under section 20C, 1985 Act and remake the decision on the respondent’s application, which I dismiss. I dismiss the appeal against the FTT’s interpretation of paragraph 2 of the Fourth Schedule and I make no order in respect of the matters agreed before the FTT. Martin Rodger KC, Deputy Chamber President 3 April 2025 Right of appeal Any party has a right of appeal to the Court of Appeal on any point of law arising from this decision. The right of appeal may be exercised only with permission. An application for permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal must be sent or delivered to the Tribunal so that it is received within 1 month after the date on which this decision is sent to the parties (unless an application for costs is made within 14 days of the decision being sent to the parties, in which case an application for permission to appeal must be made within 1 month of the date on which the Tribunal’s decision on costs is sent to the parties). An application for permission to appeal must identify the decision of the Tribunal to which it relates, identify the alleged error or errors of law in the decision, and state the result the party making the application is seeking. If the Tribunal refuses permission to appeal a further application may then be made to the Court of Appeal for permission.