“1. Not to convert use or occupy the premises or suffer the same or any part thereof to be converted used or occupied into or for a shop warehouse public house or place for the sale of beer ales or wines or other spirituous liquors or into or for a place for carrying on any art trade manufacture or business whatsoever or otherwise than as a single private dwellinghouse only in one occupation with garage the latter which shall be used as a private garage for the purposes of the said dwellinghouse only.”
“(1) The Upper Tribunal shall… have power from time to time, on the application of any person interested in any freehold land affected by any restriction arising under covenant or otherwise as to the user thereof or the building thereon, by order wholly or partially to discharge or modify any such restriction… on being satisfied- … (aa) that in a case falling within sub-section (1A) below the continued existence thereof would impede some reasonable user of the land for public or private purposes… or, as the case may be, would unless modified so impede such user; or … (c) that the proposed discharge or modification will not injure the persons entitled to the benefit of the restriction: and an order discharging or modifying a restriction under this sub-section may direct the applicant to pay to any person entitled to the benefit of the restriction such sum by way of consideration as the Tribunal may think it just to award under one, but not both, of the following heads, that is to say, either- (i) a sum to make up for any loss or disadvantage suffered by that person in consequence of the discharge or modification; or (ii) a sum to make up for any effect which the restriction had, at the time when it was imposed, in reducing the consideration then received for the land affected by it. (1A) Sub-section (1)(aa) above authorises the discharge or modification of a restriction by reference to its impeding some reasonable user of land in any case in which the Upper Tribunal is satisfied that the restriction, in impeding that user, either- (a) does not secure to persons entitled to the benefit of it any practical benefits of substantial value or advantage to them; or 9 (b) is contrary to the public interest; and that money will be an adequate compensation for the loss or disadvantage (if any) which any such person will suffer from the discharge or modification. (1B) In determining whether a case is one falling within sub-section (1A) above, and in determining whether (in any such case or otherwise) a restriction ought to be discharged or modified, the Upper Tribunal shall take into account the development plan and any declared or ascertainable pattern for the grant or refusal of planning permissions in the relevant areas, as well as the period at which and context in which the restriction was created or imposed and any other material circumstances. (1C) It is hereby declared that the power conferred by this section to modify a restriction includes power to add such further provisions restricting the user of or the building on the land affected as appear to the Upper Tribunal to be reasonable in view of the relaxation of the existing provisions, and as may be accepted by the applicant; and the Upper Tribunal may accordingly refuse to modify a restriction without some such addition.”
“The general purpose is to facilitate the development and use of land in the public interest, having regard to the development plan and the pattern of permissions in the area. The section seeks to provide a fair balance between the needs of development in the area, public and private, and the protection of private contractual rights. “Reasonable user” in this context seems to me to refer naturally to a long term use of land, rather than the process of transition to such a use. The primary consideration, therefore, is the value of the covenant in providing protection from the effects of the ultimate use, rather than from the short-term disturbance which is inherent in any ordinary construction project.”
“When one remembers that Parliament is authorising the Lands Tribunal to take away from a person a vested right either in law or in equity, it is not surprising that the Tribunal is required to consider the adverse effect upon a broad basis.”
“Notwithstanding anything in paragraph 1 of the Fourth Schedule above, two detached dwellings may be constructed in accordance with the planning permission granted on20 April 2015 under reference APP/Q0505/W/14/3001638 or any renewal of that permission and any other matters approved in satisfaction of the conditions attached to that permission.”
" (1) The costs of and incidental to – … (b) all proceedings in the Upper Tribunal, shall be in the discretion of the Tribunal in which the proceedings take place. (2) The relevant Tribunal shall have full power to determine by whom and to what extent the costs are to be paid. (3) Subsections (1) and (2) have effect subject to Tribunal Procedure Rules."
“Applications undersection 84 of the Law of Property Act 1925 1) On an application to discharge or modify a restrictive covenant affecting land, the following principles will be applied in respect of the exercise of the Tribunal’s discretion regarding liability for costs. 2) … 3) With regard to the costs of the substantive proceedings, because the applicant is seeking to remove or diminish particular property rights that the objector has, unless they have acted unreasonably, unsuccessful objectors to an application will not normally be ordered to pay any of the applicant’s costs. And successful objectors will usually be awarded their costs unless they have acted unreasonably”
“The general principle applied in the civil courts, and which the Tribunal usually follows, is that the unsuccessful party will be ordered to pay the costs of the successful party, but that the court may make a different order (CPR 44.2 (2)). That principle is modified in the Tribunal in the case of applications under section 84, for the reason explained in paragraph 12.5(3). An objector who wishes simply to retain their existing legal rights, and who behaves reasonably in connection with the proceedings before the Tribunal, is not normally ordered to pay the costs of the applicant, even if the application to release or modify the restriction is wholly successful.”
“There remains a short question of costs. The Lands Tribunal, after ordering the developers to pay the council’s costs up to and including the date of the certificate of compliance, ordered the council to pay all costs of the developers after that date. But the council was awarded compensation by the Lands Tribunal and, although the amount of compensation awarded was far less than the council had claimed, it does not appear that there had been any offer by the developers of any amount of compensation. The member of the Tribunal did not give any special reason for ordering the council to pay the developers’ costs from the date of the certificate of compliance, and in my judgment that was not a proper order to make. I would 35 therefore allow this appeal on this question of costs and would declare instead that each side should bear its own costs of the proceedings in the Lands Tribunal after the date of the certificate of compliance.”