“25. The Tribunal had the benefit of a comparable property situated in Manchester Road, Middleton and offered to let at an asking rent of£425 per calendar month – equating to£98.00 per week. 26. However the comparable property had the benefit of some carpets and curtains, although it also had storage radiators, and the Tribunal must value the differences between the two properties, particularly the dilapidations so far as they affect rental value. Having done so, it determined that the market rent for the property is£81 per week, calculated as follows: Market Rent for similar property in good condition and without defects£98.00 Deductions Lack of furnishings and white goods Dilapidations as listed£6.00 £11.00 £17.00 £17.00 Market Rent for the Property£81.00 27. This rent will take effect from30 September 2013 being the date specified by the Respondent in the notice of increase.”
“… and offered to let at an asking rent of£395.64 per calendar month – equating to£91.23 .”
“However the comparable property’s rent will include any service charge which will remain the responsibility of the person letting the property. Although the service charge of£6.77 per week will be payable separately from the rent (as it is variable) it must be deducted from the above market rent, making a net market rent of£74.23 per week.”
“The market rent is clearly set out in both and the only difference between them is that in one the variable service charges deducted at the commencement of the calculation and in the other at the end.”
“If the Tribunal takes any action in relation to a decision following a review without first giving every party an opportunity to make representations, the notice under paragraph (2) must state that any party that did not have an opportunity to make representations may apply for such action to be set aside and for the decision to be reviewed again.”
“(4) Where the First-Tier Tribunal has under sub-section (1) reviewed a decision the First-tier Tribunal may in the light of the review do any of the following – (a) correct accidental errors in the decision or in a record of the decision; (b) amend reasons given for the decisions; (c) set the decision aside.”
“The rule applies only to “an accidental slip or omission in a judgment or order.”
“I fully accept and understand the difficulties in which an expert finds himself acting as a arbitrator. There is an unavoidable inclination to rely on one’s own expertise, and in respect of general matters that is not objectionable but is desirable and a very large part of the reason why an arbitrator with expert qualifications is chosen. Nevertheless, the rules of natural justice do require, even in an arbitration conducted by an expert, that matters which are likely to form the subject of decision, in so far as they are specific matters, should be exposed for comments and submissions of the parties. If an arbitrator is impressed by a point that has never been raised by either side then it is his duty to put it to them so that they have an opportunity to comment. If he feels that the proper approach is one that has not been explored or advanced in evidence or submission then again it is his duty to give the parties a chance to comment. If he is to any extent relying on his own personal experience in a specific way then that again is something that he should mentioned so that it can be explored. It is not right that a decision should be based on specific matters that the parties have never had a chance to deal with, nor it is right that a party should first learn of adverse points in the decision against him. That is contrary both to the substance of justice and to its appearance.”
“It is entirely appropriate that, as an expert tribunal, an LVT should use its knowledge and experience to test, and if necessary to reject, evidence that is before it. But there are three inescapable requirements. Firstly, as a tribunal deciding issues between the parties, it must reach its decision on the basis of evidence that is before it. Secondly, it must not reach a conclusion on the basis of evidence that has not been exposed to the parties for comment. Thirdly, it must give reasons for its decision. In the present case the tribunal rejected the evidence of both the experts on relativity and it was entitled to do this providing its reasons for doing so were explained. But in basing its decision on “its own knowledge and experience, particularly in relation to relativities which had been agreed between the parties or their valuers in other similar cases” it was in error because those agreements on relativity had not been identified nor had the parties had the opportunity to comment on them.”