“No 25 Bishopric Court is a first floor flat in a 4 storey purpose built block of 54 flats C 1930. Though the block is situated close to the centre of town it is poorly sited at the rear of a secondary parade of shops with flats over the shops. A small block of 22 garages is adjacent to the site and there is limited parking at the front with severe clamping restrictions for unauthorised users. An unsightly bin area is situated to the side and close to the front of the building. Bishopric Court is a very plain building with spartan communal staircases leading to galleried open landings serving flats at each floor level. The communal areas are somewhat bleak, have not been well maintained and are due for redecoration. There is one small passenger lift in the centre of the block. However, this was not working at the time of our inspection. The block forms an irregular horseshoe shape around a garden area and overlooks a bowling club at the rear. Overall the block is unattractive and ‘tired’ with evidence of peeling paintwork. There is a general air of a lack of any planned maintenance, or any sign of upgrading, or improvement. The building is of plain brick construction under a part tiled and part flat roof. The dated windows are principally of metal “crittall” style in timber sub frames. The flats are provided with central heating radiators and hot water from a communal oil fired boiler. We inspected Flat numbered 25 internally. The accommodation comprises a small living room, 2 very small bedrooms, a tiny kitchen with dated units and a small bathroom/WC with basic white fittings. Three radiators are provided as part of the communal system.”
“The issues within the PCL were fully examined in a fully contested dispute between directly interested parties. The same cannot be said in respect of other areas. The judgment that the same deferment rate should apply outside the PCL area was made, and could only be made, on the evidence then available. That must leave the way open to the possibility of further evidence being called by other parties in other cases directly concerned with other areas. The deferment rate adopted by the Tribunal will no doubt be the starting point, and its conclusions on the methodology, including the limitations of market evidence, are likely to remain valid. However, it is possible to envisage other evidence being called, for example, on issues relevant to the risk premium for residential property in different areas.”
“In Zuckerman the Upper Tribunal heard evidence that the values of the properties in the Sportelli decision were of a different magnitude to those in Kelton Court, situated in the Midlands. We have concluded that the difference between the value of the flats in this application and those considered in the Sportelli case is very significant. Added to that is Mr Pridell’s experience that building costs in the local area are comparable to those in London. We conclude, therefore, that it is likely to remain economically viable to repair high value flats in PCL for much longer than will be the case for similar sized flats in the subject premises. Even though the flats are leased on full repairing covenants, there is a much greater risk of deterioration at the subject premises than there is in PCL and this is not reflected in the vacant possession values. This leads us to the conclusion that an investor would expect an additional 0.25% in the risk premium to reflect this factor. This is also supported by the decisions in the Re Lethaby case as well as the Zuckerman case.”
“45. As to the prospects for future growth, Mr Pridell produced evidence which he argues shows a much slower growth rate for properties in the local area. He told us that he had adapted the methodology used in the Zuckerman case in his report (having spoken to the leaseholder’s valuer in that case). As the Upper Tribunal noted in Zuckerman , there are limitations on the use of statistical evidence but there, as in this case, the available evidence suggests a significantly lower growth rate than in the PCL. Conversely, in the Re Lethaby decision the leaseholders did not produce any evidence to compare growth rates in East London (where the property is located) and the PCL. 46. Mr Sharp produced evidence in the form of comparison of prices in the Westminster and West Sussex areas to try to show that growth rates are similar in the two areas. However, our reading of his graphs suggests a different conclusion, namely that with the exception of periods between 2003 and 2005 that property prices were higher in the Westminster area, a trend that has become pronounced since the beginning of 2008. 47. The evidence put forward leads us to conclude that an investor who is examining long-term growth would not be confident that the PCL rate of growth would be achieved in the Horsham area and that he would adjust his bid for the subject premises accordingly. Following the reasoning in Zuckerman we conclude that the prospect of such a reduction in an investor’s bid should be assessed by a further increase in the risk premium by 0.5%.”
“95. In Arbib the adjustment of 0.25% was intended to reflect both the greater management problems associated with flats and the possibility that there might be a better prospect of growth in the house as opposed to the flat market. As to the second of these factors we accept Mr Clark’s view that any disparity between growth rates for houses and flats is likely to even out over the longer term. We think, however, that an adjustment needs to be made to reflect the management problems, although we do not consider it appropriate to differentiate between flats that are the subject of head leases and those which are not. Nor do we think that the management concerns are necessarily so much less for a single flat than for a block to warrant a different adjustment. Even where flats are efficiently managed, service charge and repairs problems inevitably occur, and the management exercise in itself is, we feel, sufficiently more complex to warrant a generalised 0.25% addition for flats. We do not consider that any fine-tuning below this percentage is justified. 96. Because what we are considering is a long-term investment it is the prospect of management problems arising during the course of the tenancy that is the important consideration rather than the state of affairs at the time of valuation. Our view is that the potential for problems to arise is inherent in all leases and that standard adjustment is therefore appropriate. We do not rule out the possibility that there could be a case for an additional allowance where exceptional difficulties are in prospect, but this would need to be the subject of compelling evidence.” (2) The LVT referred to paragraph 56 of the Zuckerman decision which is in the following terms: “The provisions of [The Service Charge (Consultation Requirements) (England) Regulations 2003 ] are potentially extremely serious for landlords (see the Lands Tribunal decision dated11 April 2008 (George Bartlett QC, President and N J Rose FRICS) in London Borough of Camden and The Leaseholders of 37 flats at 30-40 Grafton Way , (LRX/185/2006, unreported). I accept Mr Rutledge’s evidence that, although LVT’s have only heard a limited number of service charge appeals relating to properties in Birmingham, there have been other examples of landlords of such properties agreeing to bear part of the cost of disputed items without the need for a Tribunal hearing. The 2003 Regulations came into force on31 October 2003 . I am satisfied that by September 2007, the first date with which I am currently concerned, the market was more aware of the dangers posed by the regulations than was the case in Sportelli , where the properties fell to be valued between 2¼ and 3¾ years earlier. I conclude that, in the eleven cases with which I am currently concerned, investors would have required an addition of 0.5% to reflect the greater management problems associated with flats than with houses. In reaching this conclusion, I have borne in mind that the subject flats are no longer subject to the original head lease. Had that head lease still been in existence, I would not have considered it appropriate to depart from the Sportelli uplift of 0.25%.” (3) The LVT stated that it found it difficult to reconcile the position taken in Zuckerman (which indicated that the additional 0.25% would not have been added had the head lease still been in existence) with the statement in paragraph 95 of Sportelli (which indicated that the Lands Tribunal did not consider it appropriate to differentiate between flats that are the subject of head leases and those which are not). The LVT considered it should follow Sportelli because its decisions on the deferment rate were upheld by the Court of Appeal, such that one should not differentiate between cases where the flats have head leases and those where there is no head lease. (4) The LVT noted that in Zuckerman the landlord’s responsibilities included the maintenance of the structure and common areas of the flats and a separate block of garages, private roads and amenity areas. (5) In paragraph 52 of its decision the LVT said: “We conclude that an investor would require an addition of 0.5% to reflect in this case, the greater management responsibilities with flats than with houses. As our inspection revealed, the block bears the marks of a poorly maintained building with higher service charges that (on the basis of our professional experience) are higher that one would expect for a block of this size.” (6) The LVT also referred to the Lands Tribunal decision in Daejan Investments Limited v Benson[2011] 1WLR 2330 where the Tribunal, which included the Senior President of Tribunals (Lord Justice Carnwath – as then was), stated: “… the potential effects – draconian on the one side and a windfall on the other – are an intrinsic part of the legislative scheme.”
“3. – (1) The diminution in value of the landlord’s interest is the difference between – (a) the value of the landlord’s interest in the tenant’s flat prior to the grant of the new lease; and (b) the value of his interest in the flat once the new lease is granted (2) Subject to the provisions of this paragraph, the value of any such interest of the landlord as is mentioned in sub-paragraph 1(a) or (b) is the amount which at the relevant date that interest might be expected to realise if sold on the open market by a willing seller (with neither the tenant nor any owner of an intermediate leasehold interest buying or seeking to buy) on the following assumptions – (a) on the assumption that the vendor is selling for an estate in fee simple or (as the case may be) such other interest as is held by the landlord, subject to the relevant lease and any intermediate leasehold interests; (b) on the assumption that chapter 1 and this chapter confer no right to acquire any interest in any premises containing the tenant’s flat or to acquire any new lease; (c) [this deals with improvements] (d) [this deals with rights and burdens] (3) In sub-paragraph (2) “the relevant lease” means either the tenant’s existing lease or the new lease, depending on whether the valuation is for the purposes of paragraph (a) or paragraph (b) of sub paragraph (1). (4) It is hereby declared that the fact that sub-paragraph (2) requires assumptions to be made as to the matters specified in paragraphs (a) to (d) of that sub-paragraph does not preclude the making of assumptions as to other matters where those assumptions are appropriate for determining the amount which at the relevant date any such interest of the landlord as is mentioned in sub-paragraph 1(a) or (b) might be expected to realise if sold as mentioned in sub-paragraph (2). (5) … (6) …”
“Further factors were identified by the LVT in five bulleted points. They were: the continuing history of litigation between landlord and tenants about services and charges; the ‘very poor tenants’ that made up half the occupancy of the flats; the poor external condition of the premises; noise from the A3006 Bath Road and the overhead flight path: and the flanking road to the industrial estate to the rear. In the light of Sportelli the correct approach when considering matters of this sort is to ask whether or not they are fully reflected in the vacant possession value. If the evidence shows that they are not fully reflected – if they would be of greater concern to the purchaser of the reversion than to the purchaser of the freehold with vacant possession – an adjustment to the risk premium might be justified. We cannot in principle see why such adverse factors as these are not fully reflected in the freehold vacant possession value, and there is nothing in the evidence to suggest that they are not. All of them seem to us to be pre-eminently matters in respect of which a purchaser of the freehold with vacant possession, who proposed either to occupy or to let the flat and expected at some time in the future to sell it, would be concerned to make appropriate allowance in determining how much he was prepared to pay. We can see no reason why the notional purchaser of the reversion, basing himself on this vacant possession value, would make an addition to the deferment rate because of these factors.”
“… the potential effects – draconian on the one side and a windfall on the other – are an intrinsic part of the legislative scheme.”
“It is the best price reasonably obtainable which we are required to assess and the hypothetical purchaser is prudent rather than rash.”