“The LVT reluctantly concluded that it was obliged to follow the guidelines in Sportelli and to apply a deferment rate of 5%, in the absence of any compelling evidence or particular features which suggested that the disadvantages of the location and of the property were not taken into account in the capital values. In the light of the Court of Appeal judgment in Sportelli, the proper test is somewhat less strict, namely whether there is sufficient evidence, for example on issues relevant to the risk premium for residential property in different areas, to justify a departure from the 5% starting point. Although some (but not all) of the arguments put forward by the applicant’s expert at the LVT were rejected by this Tribunal in Hildron Finance Ltd v Greenhill Hampstead Ltd (LRA/120/2006), and are unlikely to be accepted if raised again before the Lands Tribunal, it is considered that the proposed appeal is of potentially wide importance and should be considered by the Lands Tribunal.”
“9. We consider that we are obliged to follow the guidelines in Sportelli and to apply a deferment rate of 5%, there being no compelling evidence or particular features which suggest that the disadvantages of the location and of the property are not taken into account in capital values. We do have misgivings as, we think, do most property valuers, about a ‘one size fits all’ deferment rate, and, had it not been for 5 Sportelli, we have little doubt that we would have determined a deferment rate of 7% or thereabouts: certainly no lower than 7%, and possibly higher if hope value is to be disregarded altogether as Sportelli says it must be. Our misgivings arise from our doubts whether the risks to an investor associated with an investment of this type, in a suburban location and with potential management problems associated with unsatisfactory leases, really do justify the same risk rate as high value properties on one of the great estates in Central London. A relatively small difference in the deferment rate can have a very large effect on the price, and, to illustrate this, we have prepared a hypothetical valuation on the basis of a deferment rate of 7% and attached it to this decision at appendix 2 [£26,925 ]. Nonetheless, we accept the Lands Tribunal is entitled to issue guidelines, that it is not for us to say that Sportelli was wrongly decided, and that the guidelines must be followed.”
“We accept that an investor will assume that the building will be standing and will be in good repair at the end of the leases, and he will not reduce his bid to take account of perceived risks at termination, which, he will assume, he can take in his stride.”
“The Tribunal’s later comments on the significance of their guidance do not distinguish in terms between the PCL area and other parts of London or the country. However, there must in my view be an implicit distinction. The issues within the PCL were fully examined in a fully contested dispute between directly interested parties. The same cannot be said in respect of other areas. The judgment that the same deferment rate should apply outside the PCL area was made, and could only be made, on the evidence then available. That must leave the way open to the possibility of further evidence being called by other parties in other cases directly concerned with different areas. The deferment rate adopted by the Tribunal will no doubt be the starting point; and their conclusions on the methodology, including the limitations of market evidence, are likely to remain valid. However, it is possible to envisage other evidence being called, for example, on issues relevant to the risk premium for residential property in different areas. That will be a matter for those advising future parties, and for the tribunals, to consider as such issues arise.”
“77 ….hope value is by its nature speculative, uncertain and incapable of precise assessment. It is the value now with the chance of a future payment...” and continued at paragraph 79: 18 “79 As to the amount of this value, precision is impossible. I cannot accept Mr Maunder Taylor’s view that it is included in the yield of 7%. If I had accepted a 6% yield then I might have been persuaded that this yield is low enough to reflect an element of hope value. A yield of 7% is, however, too high for it to reflect more than investment value. There should be a separate addition for hope value. Mr Ford [the respondent freeholder’s expert] said that an investor would pay 25% of the potential marriage value, representing the hope of the prospect of extracting marriage value by lease extensions in the short to medium term. I agree with Mr Ford’s approach but think that 25% is too optimistic in the circumstances of this case. In my view, a purchaser, although including hope value in his price, would have been more cautious and attributed only 5% of the possible marriage value of the non-participating flats as hope value.”
“7.5.2.1 An alternative way of reflecting hope value would be to reduce the yield. The Leasehold Valuation Tribunal believe that this could be done by reducing the yield from 13% to 11%. On their calculation the collective enfranchisement price was therefore£14,057 . If the yield had been 13% the price would have been£13,792 and therefore the additional price for the hope value was calculated at£265 . In view of the fact that half the marriage value in one flat on the Tribunal’s figures was£2,194 , this is an unrealistic assessment, therefore the yield differential is insufficient. In order to arrive at a similar result to that which I have calculated it would be necessary to reduce the yield in the whole calculation from 9% to 6%.”