“I think that the Lands Tribunal must have had in mind the question: Who was in control? ‘Agent’ is sometimes rather loosely used to denote a person who, though not a servant, has obliged himself to accept a measure of control comparable with the control exercisable by a master over a servant − a person who is merely the hand of his ‘principal’. What I think that the tribunal must have meant was that the arrangements between the board and the council gave such a degree of control of the hereditament to the council. I do not doubt that an owner of property could so subject himself to the control of another that that other person could be held to be the occupier, although he never was present on the property and exercised his control solely by giving orders to the owner. But any such arrangement must be rare, and counsel were unable to find any reported English case where that had been done. In the present case, I can find nothing in the Case”
“Further, it was agreed that the club use by the branch of these premises was but an instance of the fulfilment by the ratepayers of their statutory duty of maintaining machinery for the social and recreational welfare of their employees, being something stemming from the original consultations with the employees’ side of the industry through the formation of the advisory council and the staff association. The use of the premises by the branch consequently, it was said, was the fulfilment of a purpose of the ratepayers; and (it was argued) in determining occupation for rating purposes it is important to see whose purpose is served by the use that is made of the premises. Now in a general sense this may well be so. But it seems to me that this is a test which supplies no golden rule. Ask any member of the Navigation Road branch whose purpose is served by the use of the premises as their club. Or ask the barman, or any inhabitant of the district whose occasions lead him frequently down Navigation Road. They, I venture to think, would not regard the purpose of the premises as other than to serve the legitimate aims of social intercourse and recreation of the members of the branch and club: though, if further questioned, they would no doubt agree that the ratepayers, as an industrial concern, were anxious that these legitimate aims should be attained by their employees in a suitable manner, and would approve the extent to which the ratepayers facilitated that attainment. In the end, on this ‘purpose’ point, it seems to me that for rating, when there is obviously more than one purpose being fulfilled, direct and immediate control of the premises, otherwise than on a factually merely transitory basis must be the guide line. And on that note I refer back to the view that I have expressed that here the branch runs and controls the vastly preponderant activity on the premises of a club for its members.”
“The facts are, however, that the effective management and day to day running of the club is in the hands of the committee and the club is free to spend its own monies as it pleases. Applying the principles laid down in the Altrincham case, it seems clear to me that the club is in occupation of the appeal premises and occupies them for its own purposes rather than for the purposes of the board. It is true that the board makes use of the premises for its own purposes but on the evidence, those occasions are infrequent and during the period quoted to me there were eight meetings held in five 9 months, normally in one of the small rooms; and of those meetings, three were meetings of retired employees, most of whom would in any case be life members of the club under the rules.”