CHRISTOPHER JOHN SCHILLING and JOAN MILLICENT SCHILLING and Others v CANARY RIVERSIDE DEVELOPMENT PTE LIMITED and Others LRX/26/2005

UPPER TRIBUNAL
LANDS CHAMBER
LRX/26/2005Case No LRX/26/2005, LRX/31/2005, LRX/47/2005, LRX/65/2005
Between
CHRISTOPHER JOHN SCHILLING and JOAN MILLICENT SCHILLING and OthersApplicantCANARY RIVERSIDE DEVELOPMENT PTE LIMITED and OthersRespondent
Before
His Honour Michael Rich QCVenue Procession House, 110 New Bridge Street, London EC4V 6JLDate 28 April 2006Hearing 10 April 2006 © CROWN COPYRIGHT 2006Property: 2-storey terraced building converted into two self-contained flats:, 65 and 65A Station Road, Hanwell, London, W7;, 32-48 Westferry Circus, Canary Wharf, E14Catchwords: SERVICE CHARGES – Landlord and Tenant Act 1985 section 20C – Relevance of outcome of proceedings - Oppressive conduct – Order in favour of tenants subject to such conduct - Order in respect of part costs where conduct does not affect whole proceedings - Commonhold and Leasehold Reform Act 2002 section 175(6) – Vexatious or unreasonable conduct.
[1]After a combined hearing in respect of the tenants’ and the landlords’ appeals against the LVT’s determination as to service charges dated 11th January 2005, and the landlords’ appeal against the same LVT’s determination dated 30th May 2005, on the payability as part of the service charge, of costs which the landlords had incurred in successfully resisting the same tenants’application to a differently constituted LVT for the appointment of a manager, I issued Decisions respectively dated 6th December 2005 and 16th December 2005. Reference should be made to those Decisions for the circumstances of those appeals. I will continue in this Decision to refer to the tenants’ and landlord’s appeals against the earlier LVT determination as “the service charge appeals”, and to the landlords’ appeal against the later LVT determination as “the costs appeal”, and similarly refer to the tenants’applications as made to the LVT.[2]In respect of the service charge applications the LVT issued a separate “additional determination” dated 28th February 2005, making an order under s.20C of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1985 and also ordering the landlords to reimburse the tenants the fees incurred by them in making the application to the LVT. The landlords’ appeal against the additional determination was listed to be part of the combined hearing in respect of which I have issued the Decision dated 6th December 2005, but as recorded in paragraph 2 of that Decision it was adjourned for hearing until after that Decision had been issued. The LVT’s determination on the costs application also included a determination making an order under s. 20C, and for reimbursement of application fees. The appeal against that determination was, as is recorded in paragraph 3 of the Decision dated 16th December 2005, also stood over to be heard after the issue of that Decision.[3]By the Decisions dated 6th December 2005, I dismissed the tenants’ service charge appeal but in part allowed the landlords’ service charge appeal. By the Decision dated 16th December 2005, I dismissed the landlords’ costs appeal on the ground that the demand for an additional service charge to be paid before the year end was not made in conformity with the provisions of the lease. In the course of my Decision however, I disagreed with each of the substantive grounds upon which the LVT had decided that such costs were not payable by way of service charge.[4]On 10th April 2006, I heard the outstanding appeals against the LVT’s determinations under s.20C of the Act of 1985 ( by which term I include also the fees orders in each case). At the same time, I heard an application by the tenants for an order under s.20C in respect of the costs incurred by the landlords on the appeals which I had already determined as above. I also heard the landlords’ application for costs limited as provided by s.175(6) and (7) of the Commonhold and Leasehold Reform Act 2002 in respect of the tenants’ service charge appeal. This Decision is my decision on those four matters. 3[5]I shall as a preliminary to the decision on each matter set out the relevant statutory provisions and make some general comments on their meaning and application. Statutory Provisions[6]Section 20C of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1985 (inserted by the Landlord and Tenant Act 1987) provides:
“(1) A tenant may make an application for an order that all or any of the costs incurred .. by the landlord in connection with proceedings before a court or leasehold valuation tribunal, or the Lands Tribunal .. are not to be regarded as relevant costs to be taken into account in determining the amount of any service charge payable by the tenant or any other person or persons specified in the application.”
The applications made in these cases to the LVT and to this Tribunal have in each case been made on behalf of the original applicants (Dr and Mrs Schilling) and of other “joined applicants” ( whose names are set out in the LVT determinations and in the case of this Tribunal in the Schedule to the application to the Registrar referred to in paragraph 3 of my Service Charge Decision).[7]The sole guidance as to how such application is to be determined is contained in sub- section (3) as follows:
“The court or tribunal to which the application is made may make such order on the application as it considers just and equitable in the circumstances.”
[8]By s. 175(6) of the Commonhold and Leasehold Reform Act 2002, the general power of the Lands Tribunal under s.3(5) of the Lands Tribunal Act 1949, to award the costs of any proceedings before it, is subject to restriction in the case of appeals from LVTs, as follows:
“The Lands Tribunal may not order a party to pay costs incurred by another party in connection with the appeal unless he has, in the opinion of the Lands Tribunal, acted frivolously, vexatiously, abusively, disruptively or otherwise unreasonably in connection with the appeal.”
If the Lands Tribunal does make an award on such grounds, sub-section (7) and the orders made under it, provide that the amount that each party may be ordered to pay shall not exceed a maximum of £500.[9]In Tenants of Langford Court v. Doren Limited (LRX/37/2000) (5th March 2001), a case to which the LVT made reference in their determinations, I attempted to set out the principles by which the discretion under s.20C should be exercised. I did so however by making clear that the only principle is to be found in the words which I have set out from s.20C(3),. as follows: “28. In my judgement the only principle upon which the discretion should be exercised is to have regard to what is just and equitable in all the circumstances. The 4 circumstances include the conduct and circumstances of all parties as well as the outcome of the proceedings in which they arise.[29]I think that it can be derived from the decision of the Court of Appeal in the Iperion Case ( Iperion Investment Corporation v Broadwalk House Residents Ltd [1995] 2 EGLR 47) that where a court has power to award costs, and exercises such power, it should also exercise its power under s.20C, in order to ensure that its decision on costs is not subverted by the effect of the service charge.[30]Where, as in the case of the LVT, there is no power to award costs, there is no automatic expectation of an Order under s.20C in favour of a successful tenant, although a landlord who has behaved improperly or unreasonably cannot normally expect to recover his costs of defending such conduct.[31]In my judgement the primary consideration that the LVT should keep in mind is that the power to make an order under s.20C should be used only in order to ensure that the right to claim costs as part of the service charge is not used in circumstances that makes its use unjust. Excessive costs unreasonably incurred will not, in any event, be recoverable by reason of s.19 of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1985. Section 20C may provide a short route by which a tribunal which has heard the litigation giving rise to the costs can avoid arguments under s.19, but its purpose is to give an opportunity to ensure fair treatment as between landlord and tenant, in circumstances where even although costs have been reasonably incurred by the landlord, it would be unjust that the tenants or some particular tenant should have to pay them.[32]Oppressive and, even more, unreasonable behaviour however is not found solely amongst landlords. Section 20C is a power to deprive a landlord of a property right. If the landlord has abused its rights or used them oppressively that is a salutary power, which may be used with justice and equity; but those entrusted with the discretion given by s.20C should be cautious to ensure that it is not itself turned into an instrument of oppression.”[10]As the LVT pointed out, the LVT does now have power to award costs, although only to the extent and in the same circumstances as the Lands Tribunal on appeal (see paragraph 10 of the 12th Schedule to the Act of 2002 which is, in effect reproduced in s.175(6) and (7) set out above) This however results only in this gloss on what I said in paragraph 30 of Doren, that if a tenant has obtained an order for costs on the ground that the landlord has acted improperly in one of the ways necessary to justify such an order, the LVT should also exercise its power under s.20C so that its decision on costs is not subverted by the effect of the service charge (see paragraph 29 and the Iperion Case). If a tenant had so acted that an award of costs was made against him, it is unlikely that an order in his favour under s.20C would be just or equitable. In neither of the cases under appeal was the LVT asked to make any order as to costs other than under s.20C.[11]Of greater significance in applying the principles which I sought to set out was the fact that the application in the Doren Case was made on behalf of all the tenants, whereas the applications considered by the LVT in these cases were on behalf of a maximum of forty four out of 280 tenants. In the Iperion case Staughton LJ (in a passage partly reproduced at paragraph 25 of Doren) made the distinction between such cases very clear. In Iperion, an 5 award of costs had been made against the landlord in favour of the Plaintiff tenant. Staughton LJ said at p.49 M:
“..the defendant’s costs, and the costs which it has to pay the plaintiff, are in the general expenditure which can be taken into account in calculating the service charge. But they are to be left out of account when calculating the 7.4% share payable by the plaintiff. We were not asked to make any similar order under s.20C .. in relation to the other tenants and do not do so. Indeed it would be a disaster for the defendant, a company owned by the residents of Broadwalk House, if such an order were made; the company would presumably be insolvent unless it could raise further capital.”
I speculated that the LVT’s refusal in Doren to make the s.20C order which was asked, namely on behalf of all tenants reflected such thinking. I said at the end of paragraph 25:
“It may well have thought that the request for an order in respect of charges to other tenants than the successful appellants was an attempt to squeeze the landlord out of its property.”
[12]In spite of making clear that the only guidance as to the exercise of the discretion that can be given is to apply the stautory test of what is just and equitable in the circumsatances, I did, in Doren, attempt to set out, more extensively, some relevant principles which I thought should guide the exercise of the discretion under s.20C. I did so because it was for that purpose that permission to appeal had been given (see paragraph 4 of the Decision) I do not resile from anything that I there said. Such guidance should however be treated as illustrative rather than exhaustive. Moreover, the circumstances of the appeal and the nature of the argument addressed upon it, which is recorded in the Decision, should not be overlooked.[13]The proceedings in which the costs arose in Doren were an application for the appointment of a manager of a block of flats in which the applicant tenants had been successful. Part of the LVT’s reasoning for appointing a manager, however, was that “.. the existing managing agents were acting under great difficulty in managing a block where some of the tenants were patently obstructive and where funds were severely limited.” The appeal to the Lands Tribunal was by way of review only, and my decision was to uphold the LVT’s refusal to allow an order to “follow the event” of the tenants’success, even in a case where the LVT’s decision necessarily meant that the landlord had been at least to some extent at fault. When therefore I referred in paragraph 30 of my Decision to “a landlord who has behaved unreasonably” I meant more than, for example, its being found that some costs had not been reasonably incurred so as to entitle the tenant to a declaration under s.19 of the Act of 1985. The ratio of the Decision is “there is no automatic expectation of an Order under s.20C in favour of a successful tenant.” So far as an unsuccessful tenant is concerned, it requires some unusual circumstance to justify an order under s.20C in his favour.[14]On the other hand I did express the view at paragraph 27 of the Decision that if I had been exercising my own discretion it was “likely that I would have made an Order in respect of some part of the costs in favour of the appellants, who had after all laid out their costs in 6 support of a case where they were successful.” I was expressing the view from which I do not depart, that at least so far as the actual applicants are concerned the outcome is to be given weight in considering whether to make an Order and may affect whether the right of recovery should be limited to part only of the costs incurred by the landlord. I therefore referred, at paragraph 28 of the Decision, to the “outcome of the proceedings” as one of “the circumstances” to which sub-section (3) requires the consideration of what is just and equitable to have regard. This was said in the context of an application for the appointment of a manager, which meant that the tenants had undoubtedly been successful. In service charge cases, the “outcome” cannot be measured merely by whether the applicant has succeeded in obtaining a reduction. That would be to make an Order “follow the event”. Weight should be given rather to the degree of success, that is the proportionality between the complaints and the Determination, and to the proportionality of the complaint, that is between any reduction achieved and the total of service charges on the one hand and the costs of the dispute on the other hand.[15]In paragraph 28 of Doren I drew attention as relevant “circumstances” beside “the outcome” and “the conduct of all parties” to “the circumstances of all parties”. I had particularly in mind the circumstances of a residents’management company such as was the landlord in Iperion or a reversioner with only nominal ground rents such as was Doren Limited. I do regard it as a circumstance which may affect what is just and equitable in a particular case whether the landlord is such as was a party to those cases or, as in the present proceedings, has an interest which goes beyond the reversion upon flats let on long leases and has relevant resources deriving from the estate of which those flats form a part, such that disputes before the LVT can fairly be regarded as part of the cost of its investment. The Service Charge s.20C appeal[16]In its additional determination, the LVT directed itself as follows:
“What has to be decided .. essentially is whether it would be unjust for the Applicants to be required to pay the Respondent’s costs in connection with these proceedings. In considering this decision .. a principal issue will be whether the Respondent has acted oppressively in connection with the proceedings.”
I entirely accept that way of formulating the question to be decided in the particular circumstances of the Service Charge application. Because however the “outcome” of the application was subject to review on the appeals which I have now decided in my Decision dated 6th December 2005, I did at a preliminary hearing on 1st August 2005 direct that this appeal should proceed by way of re-hearing.[17]The effect of the LVT’s decision on the three categories of service charge over the four years the subject of the tenants’ application can be tabulated thus: 7 Total charged Reduction claimed Reduction achieved Residential £6,009,734 -£2,413,996 -£543,609 Car Park £1,078,140 -£678,724 -£26,752 Estate £1,830,885 -£1,153,258 [included in above figures] £8,918,759 -£4,245,958 -£570,361 Thus, on the LVT’s determination, the landlords were held to have been unreasonable in their claimed service charges to the extent of 6.4%. As I calculate the reduction in the charges payable by Dr and Mrs Schilling, it is .33% of £543,609 that is £1,793.90 plus .909091% of 72.22% of £26,752 that is less than £2. The LVT at paragraph 13 of their Determination described this as having achieved “significant successes”. I do not suggest that the total over four years is insignificant but when compared with either the reductions sought or even the tenants’ own costs before the LVT it was hardly a successful outcome.[18]The result of this Tribunal’s decision on appeal has not been agreed. The Landlords claim that it adds back £208,143 to the residential service charge whereas the Tenants claim that the true arithmetical effect is only some £100,000. The LVT made the point, adopted before me by the tenants, that the service charge account “should have been completely correct in the first place given the class of estate involved.” I do not however think that a reduction in service charge of this order particularly in the context of the massive challenge mounted in a Scott Schedule running to 113 pages, justifies depriving the landlords of their contractual right to recover costs by way of service charge.[19]The vast discrepancy between the items challenged and those where the tenants were successful arose largely from their, in effect, putting the landlords to proof of a large number of inadequately vouched items. As the LVT recorded on page 19 of their Determination dated 11th January 2005, it was admitted on behalf of the Landlords that there had been management failures which led to mislaid vouchers and inadequacies in the accounting. If the additional cost caused by the landlords’ own failures as opposed to the tenants’ unwillingness to accept any proof of expenditure less than vouchers which they knew were not available, had been identified or even estimated, I might well have thought it appropriate to make a s.20C order in respect of such excess costs. The matter was not however so presented.[20]The tenants appeared in person before this Tribunal. Although the appeal was by way of re-hearing, their case was to rely on the LVT’s decision and to challenge the correctness of the appeal Decision. I will therefore consider the extent to which it is appropriate to follow the LVT’s Determination, which I have acknowledged approached their decision correctly, in the light of the substantive determination as amended on appeal.[21]At paragraph 13 of their Determination the LVT began by saying that the landlords’ failures to meet the Schillings’ requests for information would not suffice to justify a s.20C order. I have not been pressed with any detail of this complaint and see no reason to differ from the LVT. 8[22]The LVT, however, went on to except from that conclusion two factors:
“the allegation about intimidating and threatening behaviour” and that “the Applicants had achieved significant success in challenging accounts which should have been completely correct in the first place given the class of estate involved”
. Although the LVT in taking account of the tenants’ success in reducing the service charge adds the expectation that the accounts should have been completely correct having regard to the class of the Estate, I do not think that such consideration when one takes into account the very modest adjustments which have been made following my decision on appeal can possibly justify depriving the landlords of their contractual right to charge the costs of these proceedings to the service charge.[23]There remain the allegations of intimidating and threatening behaviour. At paragraph 16 of their Determination, the LVT identified three examples of such conduct as justifying the order under s.20C. One can, I think be shortly dismissed. It was the landlords’ decision to apply to the High court for a declaration as to the application of the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999. As I made clear in the course of my Decision on the Costs appeal I accepted that the LVT had jurisdiction to determine such issue, but for the reasons I set out particularly at paragraph 44 of that Decision, I did not consider that the LVT was the convenient forum for such dispute. For the landlords to apply to the convenient forum seems to me to be entirely proper, and to make such application against the parties who were seeking to rely on the Regulations cannot possibly be treated as, of itself, oppressive or unreasonable. I have not had any factor in this application drawn to my attention which would justify making an order under s.20C.[24]The LVT treated the landlords’ sending to the members of the Residents’ Committee who joined in the service charge application dated 5th January 2004, a solicitors’ letter dated 15th January 2004 as unjustifiably intimidating and threatening. The letter warned that:
“Our clients have been particularly concerned at suggestions that tenants .. were encouraged to withhold payment of service charge contributions properly due. They are presently calculating their claim incurred prior to commencing an action for procuring breach of contract.”
The landlords called the evidence of Mr Ho on their behalf to explain that at the time that the letter was sent service charge arrears were in the region of £600,000. Even accepting that that was the case, in spite of the fact that Mr Ho did not know how that figure had been derived, I do not accept that this was intended as a genuine letter before action, rather than an intimidatory move which counsel accepted before me, was “over the top” and “heavy handed”. The threatened proceedings have, of course, not been issued. The letter’s intimidatory purpose is made the clearer by the threat also of proceedings “with regard to statements, allegations and inferences that have been made that the Estate has been and continues to be improperly run”. The letter made reference, as an example of the alleged misconduct, to a letter from members of the committee which Mr Ho accepted was entirely proper. No evidence of any improper conduct by any committee member was relied on before me. On the other hand, the failures of the landlords’ agents to maintain accounts in proper form were admitted before the LVT.[25]The LVT also regarded the service of the demand for a service charge based on the costs of the tenants’ unsuccessful application for the appointment of a manager, on 19th March 2004 in advance of the certified accounts due after the end of that month as “undoubtedly oppressive 9 and probably intentionally so”. In the absence of any explanation, I have thought it right to draw the same inference. It seems to me that the landlords have so conducted themselves as to try to choke off the complaints of the Shillings and the tenants who joined with them in the service charge application. By the service of this inappropriately timed demand, they, as I conclude, sought to use their right to charge their costs against the service charge as a means of oppression. It is no excuse that they were unsuccessful in dissuading these tenants from pursuing their applications. I do not think that they should be entitled to treat the costs which they have incurred in resisting those applications before the LVT as relevant costs in calculating service charges due from the tenants who were parties to them. I therefore dismiss the landlords’ appeal against the LVT’s “Additional Determination” dated 28th February 2004. The Costs s.20C appeal[26]This appeal was by way of review. The LVT having determined that the costs application should succeed, not only on the ground upon which I have upheld their Determination, but also on each of the three grounds in respect of which I have held that they were wrong, and having also held that the amounts charged were unreasonable to an extent which I have held not be supportable, disposed of the applications under s.20C and under the Fees Order as follows:
“in view of its findings as to liability and quantum, it appears to the Tribunal that these applications must succeed.”
No other reason than the outcome of the application is identified as a reason why an order under s.20C is just and equitable. In the absence of any such reason, I find myself forced to the conclusion that the LVT, in spite of its careful consideration of relevant considerations in its Additional Determination in respect of the s.20C application on the service charge application, failed to consider the relevant factors in exercising its discretion on the same application on the costs application.[27]Since the LVT has accordingly failed to exercise its discretion properly it falls to this Tribunal to do so on the basis of what I have held to be the correct decision on the substantive application. On this basis the tenants have succeeded in having it held that the charge was not payable after it had been demanded on an erroneous basis for, as I have held, the purpose of oppression. That prima facie would be a sufficient reason to make a s.20C order. However the tenants elected to challenge the charge on grounds which I have held to be wrong, and it is in dealing with those grounds that clearly the overwhelming proportion of the landlords’ costs has been incurred. It is not clear to me why it could be said to be just and equitable that the landlords should not recover from the tenants who involved them in such costs, the appropriate part of the costs so incurred.[28]On balance, I think that this is a case where justice and equity are best met by an order under s.20C in respect of part of the costs only, although there is no reason to apportion the fees payable to the LVT, which should be reimbursed in total. I therefore order that the appeal against this part of the LVT’s Determination be allowed to the extent that only two-thirds of the costs incurred on the costs application should be treated as relevant costs in calculating the service charges due from those tenants who joined in the costs application to the LVT. 10 Tenants’ Application for s.20C Order on Appeals[29]In respect of the service charge appeals, the landlord has been successful. As I said at the end of paragraph 13 of this Decision it would require an unusual circumstance to justify an order under s.20C in favour of an unsuccessful tenant. In regard to these appeals, the circumstances of the tenants’ appeal to which I must have regard, and to which I will return in dealing with the landlords’ application for costs, reinforce the reason for not making an order under s.20c which I therefore refuse.[30]In respect of the landlords’ costs appeal, the tenants have been successful, but only on grounds which they did not take themselves. Because of the way in which they had put their application it was necessary for the landlords to bring their appeal in order to get this Tribunal’s decision that they would be entitled to recover costs reasonably incurred as part of the ordinary annual service charge. There is in my judgement no justification for an order under s.20C, which I therefore refuse. Landlords’ Application for Costs of Tenants’ Service Charge Appeal.[31]The tenants appealed the LVT’s Determination on three grounds, which Mr Fancourt QC in making this application, conveniently referred to as(i) “the onus of proof”(ii) “allocation” as between residential and commercial tenants and(iii) the LVT’s “procedure” in refusing to allow them to re-open their case under the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations.[32]The onus of proof ground of appeal raised difficult and arguable questions of an academic nature. At paragraph 10 of my decision on the appeal however I concluded that the LVT did not come to its conclusion on the basis of the onus of proof. As I said “It did so on the balance of probability having heard the evidence. Even therefore if the LVT had mistaken the incidence of the burden of proof, I do not think that that would have vitiated the decision made.” I accept that the tenants who pursued their appeal on this ground had been advised to do so, but Mr Gavaghan, when asked to point to a single item where he could contend that the LVT’s conclusion depended upon the onus of proof, he was unable to do so. The canvassing of this ground of appeal was therefore futile and its pursuit was therefore “vexatious” within the meaning of s.175(6) of the Act of 2002, as I understand it.[33]On the allocation issue Mr Gavaghan contended on behalf of the tenants that S.19(1)(a) of the Act of 1985 should be construed as requiring a reasonable apportionment of costs reasonably incurred, whatever the provisions of the lease. I held that such construction of the statute was wrong, but I do not think that it would be fair to categorise it as “frivolous” so as to make reliance upon it either vexatious or abusive within the meaning of s.175(6).[34]In regard to the “procedure” ground of appeal, I have recorded in paragraphs 20 and 21 of the Decision on the Service Charges appeals, how Mr Gavaghan came to admit that the 11 appeal was unarguable, having been launched without any regard to the reasons which the LVT had given for refusing to exercise its discretion. To bring an appeal against the exercise of a discretion without regard to the reasons given for such exercise seems to me at the least to be behaving unreasonably in connection with the appeal.[35]I have therefore concluded that in respect of two out of the three grounds of appeal upon which the tenants brought their appeal, their actions do bring them within the circumstances which entitle this Tribunal to award costs against them limited to £500 a party. The landlords, in seeking an order, are content to treat joint tenants as a single party and limit their applications accordingly, but they do seek orders not only against the Schillings, but also against those joined tenants who have the benefit of the s.20C orders which I have upheld, made specific application to be allowed to be joined in this appeal at its outset, and have had notice of this application although they did not attend the hearing of it.[36]Being satisfied that there are grounds for making an order, I still have a discretion as to whether to do so. But such discretion must be exercised judicially. I think that if the landlords had not conceded that joint tenants should be treated as single parties for the purpose of sub- s.(7), I would have been justified in exercising a discretion so to treat them. I do have some sympathy for the tenants who have felt some frustration with the difficulty which they have encountered in pursuing claims which they genuinely thought legitimate. It seems to me however that the only proper exercise of my discretion must be to make an order that the appellants in the service charges appeal, including the tenants joined in that appeal as referred to in paragraph 3 of the Decision dated 6th December 2005, do pay one half of the landlords’ costs of resisting the tenants’ service charges appeal (not therefore to include any costs of the landlords’ own appeal) to be assessed by the Registrar, if not agreed, but limited to the sum of £500 for each lessee, treating joint lessees as one person only for the purposes of such limitation. Conclusion[37]I should add that I have been grateful for the helpful way in which the parties have co- operated to enable this Tribunal to conclude these appeals in, what I hope has been as economical a way as possible. I am uncertain whether, as a result of dealing with these appeals as appeals by way of review, there may still be disputes between the parties as to the effect in financial terms of the decisions which I have given. If there are such disputes, which cannot be resolved by agreement, application may be made by any party for directions within 28 days of the date of this decision. Otherwise the Decisions on these appeals and applications are now final. Dated 28 April 2006 His Honour Michael Rich QC 12