“11 Costs 11.1 The Buyer [Liverpool City Council and Liverpool PSDA] shall pay£2,000 plus VAT towards the Seller’s costs incurred in connection with the withdrawal of the objection to the PSDA CPO. 11.2 Notwithstanding the Purchase Price contained in clause 3 nothing in this Agreement will prevent the Seller from pursuing a claim in the Lands Tribunal under theLands Tribunal Act 1949 for the appropriate amount of compensation to be determined under the Land Compensation Acts PROVIDED THAT: 11.2.1 the Seller must submit its referral within a period of 6 months from the date hereof (time being of the essence) or the seller will be deemed to have accepted the Purchase Price in full and final settlement of payment for its interests in the Property; and 11.2.2 the Seller acknowledges and accepts that the Buyer by completing this Agreement does not accept if the Seller were to pursue a claim in the Lands Tribunal for compensation (as if its interest in the Property has been compulsorily acquired pursuant to the PSDA CPO) it would be entitled to compensation (excluding costs and interest) in excess of the Purchase Price. 11.3 If the Seller does make a referral to the Lands Tribunal and it is determined (or the parties agree) that the amount of compensation (excluding costs and interest) lawfully due would have exceeded the Purchase Price then the Buyer shall within 28 days of the determination by the Lands Tribunal (or agreement by the parties) pay to the Seller the difference between the Purchase Price and the compensation figure determined by the Lands Tribunal (or agreed by the parties) and the reasonable and proper costs incurred by the Seller.”
“The application of the general principle of fair and adequate compensation bristles with problems. As useful guidelines there are three conditions which must be satisfied. First, it goes without saying that a prerequisite to an award of compensation is that there must be a causal connection between the resumption or acquisition and the loss in question... The adverse consequences to a claimant whose land is taken may extend outwards and onwards a very long way, but fairness does not require that the Acquiring Authority shall be responsible ad infinitum. There is a need to distinguish between adverse consequences which trigger a claim for compensation and those which do not. ...[A]s a matter of general principle, to qualify for compensation the loss must not be too remote. That is the second condition. Fairness requires that claims for compensation should satisfy a further, third condition in all cases. The law expects those who claim recompense to behave reasonably. If a reasonable person in the position of the claimant would have taken steps to eliminate or reduce the loss, and the claimant failed to do so, he cannot fairly be expected to be compensated for the loss or the unreasonable part of it. Likewise if a reasonable person in the position of the claimant would not have incurred, or would not incur, the expenditure being claimed, fairness does not require that the authority should be responsible for such expenditure. Expressed in other words, losses or expenditure caused by, or be the consequence of, or be due to the resumption.” 19 Based upon these general principles, Lord Nicholls went on to set out the following questions that govern the issue of whether rule (6) compensation should be made on the basis of extinguishment or relocation (at 128): (1) Can the business be relocated, or has it effectually been extinguished? Most businesses are capable of being relocated but exceptionally this may not be practicable; for example, another suitable site may not exist. If the business is not capable of being relocated then perforce compensation will have to be assessed on the extinguishment basis. (2) Does the claimant intend to relocate? The claimant must have reached a firm decision to relocate his business, and he must be reasonably assured that he will be able to do it. (3) Would a reasonable businessman relocate the premises?”
“Subject to the following provisions of this section the Lands Tribunal may order that the costs of any proceedings before it incurred by any party shall be paid by any other party and may tax or settle the amount of any costs to be paid under any such order or direct in what manner they are to be taxed”
“Our determination of compensation at£6,660,000 is well below the claimants’ figure of£12,260,000 . It is£2,910,000 above the Secretary of State’s figure but£5,600,000 below the claimants’ figure. In our judgment, the latter was significantly higher than can be supported by reliable evidence, particularly with regard to the price per acre (£638,015 based upon comparables south of the Thames, which we found to be wholly dissimilar to the reference land and unreliable in other respects, compared to our determination of£475,000 and the Secretary of State’s figure of£460,000 ). Overall, we find that the claimants’ value was assessed at a particularly high figure and this should result in a reduction in costs. The claimants’ entitlement to the recovery of costs should be reduced to three-quarters…”
“Leaving aside the impact or influence (if any) of the CPR upon awards of costs in the Lands Tribunal it is my view that the proper approach of the Tribunal for the costs of a successful claimant (i.e. a claimant who is awarded more than the amount of an unconditional offer by the respondent) should be that he is entitled to his costs incurred in the proceedings in the absence of some ‘special reason’ to the contrary. Whether such special reason exists in any given case is a matter for the judgment of the Lands Tribunal. Plainly it may exist where wasted or unnecessary costs have been incurred for procedural reasons as a result of the conduct of the claimant (e.g. abandoned issues, unnecessary adjournments, or failure to comply with directions of the Tribunal). However, so far as the nature and substance of the case advanced by the claimant is concerned, special reasons should only be regarded as established 46 where the Tribunal considers that an item of costs incurred or an issue raised was such that it could not on any sensible basis be regarded as part of the reasonable and necessary expenses of determining the amount of the disputed compensation. This would apply not only to a claim advanced without any statutory basis but to other examples of manifestly unreasonable conduct which may give rise to unnecessary expense in the course of the proceedings. It means, in my view, that, following the hearing of a compensation reference in the Lands Tribunal in which the claimant has been successful, a special reason for departing from the usual order for costs should only be found to exist in circumstances where the Tribunal can readily identify a situation in which the claimant’s conduct of, or in relation to, the proceedings has led to an obvious and substantial escalation in the costs over and above those costs which it was reasonable for the claimant to incur in vindication of his right to compensation.”
“Turning to the question of expert evidence, if the amount of the ‘exaggerated’ claim is based on the valuation, opinion and evidence of the claimant’s expert witness, it will rarely be appropriate in my view to make an adverse costs order against the successful claimant. Valuation is an inexact science. In any case where, by reason of the nature or features of the subject site and/or the state of the market in respect of sites for similar development, there is no close or obvious comparable available, there is bound to be legitimate room for argument and difference of opinion as to the validity or usefulness of a proffered comparable, whether by reason of its location, nature or proposed use. If the Tribunal concludes that, on examination, or as a result of argument, the comparison between the comparable relied on and the subject site is inapt or unhelpful, that should not ordinarily invite a penalty in costs on the grounds that its assertion or resultant discussion has taken up the time of the Tribunal unnecessarily.”