“121. The suggestion that there was a statutory obligation restricting the valuer in his analysis to this basis, thus preventing him from considering unimproved comparables, is plainly wrong. What the valuer has to establish in order to apply the provision in (d) is “what its value would have been if the improvement had not been made” (see Lord Hoffman at Shalson para 19 above). How that value is established is clearly a matter of valuation, and the valuer is not constrained by law to adopt a particular method of doing so. Indeed, both Mr Buchanan [the appellants’ expert valuer] and Mr Briant [the respondent’s expert valuer] admitted they adopt either method (described in evidence as valuing from the top down, or from the bottom up) depending upon the circumstances, in enfranchisement valuations.” and at 123: “123. In my view the best evidence of the value that the house would have had if the improvements had not been made would come from recent sales of similar but unimproved houses in a similar location. The value could be assessed just by reference to those unimproved comparables and if the evidence is sufficiently good, no doubt it should be. But in circumstances where there are no, or insufficient, unimproved comparables from which a figure can be derived, there is nothing to stop a valuer resorting to the top-down basis, either as a primary method, or as an additional method in his search for the right answer.”