REHMAN & OTHERS v CITY OF BRADFORD METROPOLITAN DISTRICT COUNCIL ACQ/162-5/2000

UPPER TRIBUNAL
LANDS CHAMBER
ACQ/162-5/2000Case No ACQ/162-5/2000
Between
REHMAN & OTHERSApplicantCITY OF BRADFORD METROPOLITAN DISTRICT COUNCILRespondent
Before
P H Clarke FRICSVenue HuddersfieldDate 11 September 2001Hearing 28 and 29 June 2001Property: 234, 236, 238 & 240, Manningham Lane,, BradfordCatchwords: COMPENSATION – compulsory acquisition of derelict properties in Bradford – ownership – rights of way – comparables – inadmissibility of Tribunal’s decision on value of adjoining property – claimants’ valuer’s figures accepted
[1]These are four references heard together to determine the compensation payable for the compulsory acquisition of derelict properties in Bradford.[2]John Collins appeared for the claimants and called John Rastrick Padgett MRICS, a director of Eddisons Commercial Limited of Bradford, Aziz Rehman, claimant, owner of 240 Manningham Lane; and Dilhad Khan, claimant, owner of 238 Manningham Lane.[3]Vincent Fraser QC appeared for the acquiring authority and called Ivor James BSc, a property services officer with Bradford Metropolitan District Council; John Philip Rishworth BSc MRICS, a senior property services officer in the Asset Management Department of the Council; and David Fisher BSc CEng MICE MIHT, senior development engineer in the Structural Engineering Unit of the Council. FACTS[4]The parties have been unable to prepare a statement of agreed facts. From the evidence I find the following facts.[5]On 18 November 1998 the City of Bradford Metropolitan District Council (234-244 Manningham Lane and 2-4 Clifton Street, Bradford) Compulsory Purchase Order 1998 was confirmed. It included 234-240 Manningham Lane, the properties which are the subject of these references. Notices to treat were served on 26 July 1999 and notices of entry on 14 December 1999. The acquiring authority (“the Council”) took possession of the properties on 14 February 2001. This is the agreed date of valuation.[6]The subject properties were situated on the east side of Manningham Lane, between Clifton Street and Thorncliffe Road, in a predominantly commercial location approximately one and a half miles to the north of Bradford City Centre. Manningham Lane is one of the main radial roads leading out of Bradford and carries a heavy volume of traffic. The subject properties were built in the last quarter of the 19th century on the site of a former quarry with loosely placed fill some 14 metres deep. They comprised part of a terrace of 4-storey dwellinghouses built of stone with pitched slate and tile roofs. The bay windows of nos.234 and 240 had been removed. The basement of no.234 was at one time used for warehousing. The properties had been empty for some years and were in a derelict condition at the date of valuation. They have now been demolished. An access road at the rear of 226-230 Manningham Lane led from Thorncliffe Road to gates on the boundary of 234 Manningham Lane. The site of no.240 extended to the rear of nos.236 and 238. The agreed site areas are: no.234, 280 square metres; no.236, 145 square metres; no.238, 137 square metres; no.240, 440 square metres. 2[7]Evidence regarding the condition of the subject properties and the estimated cost of structural repairs was given by Mr Fisher, on behalf of the Council, and accepted by the claimants. The relevant part of his expert report is as follows:- “Exteriors The front slope of the roof of the terrace had originally been clad in slate but Nos.236 and 238 had been reclad in modern tiling, leaving open holes where the roof lights were intended to go. Nos.234 and 240 were completely unclad, with the roofing felt and tiling battens exposed. On the rear slope some of the original tiles were still in place but roughly 90% of the roof was unclad. The felt and battens were in place but there were extensive holes in them, not only at roof light positions but also where the felt had torn and ripped. Vegetation growth was common along the gutter line and also at the bases of the chimney stacks. The line of the roof was reasonably straight with slight sags between supporting walls. The front wall of the terrace was reasonably plumb but with a slight tendency to bulge outwards at first floor level. Much of the masonry was smoke stained. There appeared to be a distinct hinge point in the terrace at the side of the door to no.240; a full height vertical crack was evident and, from the slope of the sills and lintels, subsidence had clearly taken place to the right of this crack. Elsewhere along the front wall, the first floor string course undulated somewhat indicating further, lesser subsidence. Vertical cracks were also evidence at the sides of the front doors and the bay window to No.238, indicating an outward movement of the more ornate masonry at these locations. There was also an opening up of the masonry joints at the front gable eaves corner of No.234. The back wall of the terrace was similarly distorted with sloping sills and lintels. No.240 appeared to have had it’s back wall built in it’s entirety at some stage, leaving a toothed joint at the junction with No.238: the latter was now some 50-75 mm proud of No.240, indicating the amount of outward movement that had taken place in the original back wall. The hinge point on the front wall was also reflected on the back with a series of vertical cracks and fractured sills and lintels running down the wall close to the junction between Nos.238 and 240. Interiors Internally, access to the four properties was hampered by the condition of the structure. Horizontally, entry to virtually all of the houses could be gained via holes or roughly formed doorways in the separating walls. Vertically however, access was limited by the difficulty of finding a staircase in a safe condition. Safe staircases were found in one or other property to all but the attic level where the staircases had virtually collapsed, and this level could be inspected in one house only and then only from the half landing between the first and second floors. Generally the interiors of these properties were derelict. Ceilings were in a state of collapse virtually everywhere, with plaster and ceiling laths either missing or hanging down, and with the plaster covings dropping, fallen or badly cracked. Floor joints thus exposed were seen to be badly damp stained throughout and extensively fire damaged in places. Wall plaster was frequently missing, leaving the studwork 3 or brick work exposed. Severe vertical or diagonal cracks were evident in much of the internal brickwork. Floorboards were frequently missing. An extensive series of holes of the order of 1m diameter had been deliberately punched in virtually all internal walls and suspended timber floors. Conclusions Consideration of the defects observed in these properties shows four main structural problems: Subsidence of all of these houses,[2]Outward movement of the front and particularly of the back walls, and their separation from the main cross walls;[3]General instability of the walls caused by the formation of large holes in the internal walls and floors.[4]Virtual dereliction of the properties following their abandonment and the fire damage.” Repairs to prevent further subsidence which would have been expected were the installation of piling and ground beams to support the walls off the quarry base, the installation of steel straps to tie the walls to the cross walls and floors and the rebuilding of the rear walls incorporating steel straps. The approximate costs of structural repairs was £125,000 for piling and ground beams and £52,000 for the stabilisation of walls. Temporary works to maintain the stability of the properties during these repairs would have been £10,000. All costs relate to the four subject properties.[8]The claimants each held the freehold interest with vacant possession. No.234 had a right of way over the access road to Thorncliffe Road.[9]On 19 June 2000 the Council referred the determination of compensation to this Tribunal. On 20 March 2001 it was ordered by the Tribunal that these references be heard together with the references ACQ/133 and 161/2000 relating to adjoining properties. At the hearing, however, it was recognised that these four references, with the same counsel and witnesses, should be heard together and hearings, before and after this hearing, were held to deal with the other references. On 31 May 2001 an application by the Council to call a third expert witness (a quantity surveyor) and to adduce further expert evidence was refused on the grounds that further expert evidence would not be proportionate to the amounts of compensation claimed and offered. This application was renewed at the start of the hearing and was again refused on the grounds of proportionality and that late admission of this new evidence would require an adjournment of the hearing which was undesirable. CLAIMANTS’ CASE 4[10]Mr Padgett valued the subject properties in the following amounts: no.234, £19,500; no.236, £17,500; no.238, £17,500; no. 240, £22,500. He relied upon two comparables: the recent determination of compensation by this Tribunal in respect of 2 Clifton Street (£12,000) and the settlement by the Council of compensation for the acquisition of 4 Clifton Street (£15,000). He applied these figures to the subject properties by reference to relative site areas and estimated gross internal floor areas and value judgment. Mr Padgett’s valuations represented cleared site value for each property. He assumed, on information from the claimants, that all the subject properties had a right of way to Thorncliffe Road. Mr Padgett said that he was familiar with Salt Street and Iddesleigh Street (Mr Rishworth’s comparables) but considered these locations to be inferior to Manningham Lane. Mr Padgett did not investigate the planning position when preparing his valuation.[11]Two of the claimants gave evidence (Mr Rehman and Mr Khan (D)) regarding ownership of the subject properties and rights of way. I deal with this evidence below. COUNCIL’S CASE[12]Mr James gave evidence regarding the settlement of compensation for the acquisition of 4 Clifton Street. He gave this evidence in the hearing of reference ACQ/133/00 but was cross-examined by Mr Collins on the part of his evidence relating to 4 Clifton Street. This evidence is relevant in these references. The compensation payable for the acquisition of 4 Clifton Street was the subject of a reference to this Tribunal but was agreed in November 2000 with the claimant’s valuer before the hearing. The agreed compensation was £15,000. This residential property was let at £250 per month. Mr James arrived at his figure of £15,000 by capitalising the rent at 5 YP (20% yield in perpetuity). This represented investment value. The building was in poor structural condition and had a life of only five years. Mr James did not have a figure in mind for the cost of repairs when he reached this agreement but he was aware that Mr Fisher’s estimate was £35,650. Mr James had previously offered £5,000 for this property in 1997.[13]Mr Rishworth valued the subject properties as follows: no.234, £2,750; no.236, £2,250; no.238, £2,250; no.240, £3,000. His original valuation of no.234 was increased by 10% during the hearing to reflect the value of the right of way. Mr Rishworth relied on two comparables: 154 Salt Street and 6, 8, 12 and 16 Iddesleigh Street. He rejected 4 Clifton Street as a good comparable on the grounds that this property was occupied and, even though it was structurally defective and beyond economic repair and had a short life, it was capable of attracting rental income in the short term. It therefore had a higher value.[14]154 Salt Street was a house built about 100 years ago on the site of an old quarry. It is one mile from the subject properties. The Council offered to buy this property for £5,000 in March 1994. It was sold by auction in July 1995 for £3,500. The properties in Iddesleigh Street are about two and half miles from the subject properties. These houses were built about 100 years ago but were structurally sound. In the early 1990s the street declined and was declared a clearance area in July 1995. A compulsory purchaser order was made in 1997. The properties were acquired by the Council as follows: no.6 bought in March 1997 for £2,000; no.8 bought in February 1998 for £2,000; no.12, bought in May 1996 for £2,000; 5 and no.16 bought in April 1997 for £2,000. Residential values for this type of property in Bradford have changed little over the past five years and not at all relative to the subject properties. All the houses in Iddlesleigh Street were derelict and fire damaged at purchase. However, there were no site problems.[15]The Council obtained an estimate for the demolition of 234-244 Manningham Lane and 2 and 4 Clifton Street in the sum of £31,949.82. This is about £4,000 per property. DECISION[16]I have inspected the subject properties and the surrounding area. The properties have now been demolished. Before I consider compensation I should deal with three subsidiary issues.[17]The first is whether the subject properties should be valued as four separate properties or as one combined site. Mr Padgett valued the four plots individually but said that the market might take the view that a purchaser would buy the four sites together. Mr Rehman, one of the claimants, said that the whole block was owned by a consortium of owners. Mr Khan (D) confirmed a joint purchase and said that he was allocated ownership of 238 Manningham Lane. Mr Collins, in his closing submissions, recognised that four separate references have been made but said that it is legitimate to look at the four sites. There were four owners willing to sell together. The question is what is to be paid to each owner. Mr Fraser QC said that the claimants are registered as individual owners at the Land Registry. There is no evidence before me as to value as a single site.[18]The Lands Tribunal has no jurisdiction to decide questions of title (Mountgarret v Claro Water Board). Four references to this Tribunal have been made in respect of four different ownerships and I must separately determine the values of these four interests (see section 3 of the Land Compensation Act 1961). Mr Padgett and Mr Rishworth both valued the properties separately. I heard no evidence that a purchaser would have bid for the four sites together.[19]The second issue concerns rights of way from Thorncliffe Road to the rear of the subject properties. There was, and still is, a surfaced access road from Thorncliffe Road at the rear of 226-230 Manningham Lane to a gate (now a fence) in the southern boundary of 234 Manningham Lane. It was agreed at the hearing that the owners of this property had a right of way over the access road to Thorncliffe Road. It was in dispute whether the owners of nos.236-240 had rights of way over each other’s properties and over the access road leading to Thorncliffe Road. The boundary walls of the four properties had been removed to provide an open yard at the rear of the buildings.[20]Mr Khan (D) of 238 Manningham Lane gave evidence that the properties were originally owned by Rimingtons, chemists, who surfaced the rear yard and use the access road to Thorncliffe Road. Large vehicles were parked in this yard. After the properties were 6 purchased he and Mr Rehman of no.240 came on to the land frequently. Vehicles were parked in Clifton Street and access gained by the gate. The vehicles and equipment to carry out works on the buildings came over the access road. There was never any question regarding these rights of access. All owners enjoyed free and unlimited access to the buildings over the access road. Mr Collins, in his closing submissions, said that when the claimants purchased their land the effect of section 62 of the Law of Property Act 1925 was to pass to them the rights of way enjoyed by the previous owners. There is no evidence to the contrary. There has been no challenge to the exercise of these rights. Mr Fraser, in his closing submissions, said that the alleged rights of way are not on the title and have not been used for a sufficient length of time. There is no evidence that the owners of the access road to the rear of 226-230 Mannningham Lane have expressly or impliedly granted rights of way to the owners of 236-240 Manningham Lane.[21]I make the point again that this Tribunal has no jurisdiction over matters of title. My approach is to ask whether a purchaser or purchasers of nos.236-240 would have increased their price for each of these properties for the existence of a possible right of way to Thorncliffe Road? It is agreed that 234 Manningham Lane had a right of way and, at the hearing, Mr Rishworth increased his valuation of this property by 10% to reflect this fact. I have no evidence, however, to suggest that the values of the other three properties would have been increased to reflect the possible existence of rights of way over the other properties (including no.234) and over the access road at the rear of 226-230 Manningham Lane.[22]My last subsidiary issue concerns the admissibility of the recent decision of this Tribunal (N J Rose) in Khan (S) v Bradford Metropolitan District Council (ACQ/132/2000) regarding 2 Clifton Street. At the hearing I ruled that this decision was inadmissible as a comparable. My reasons are as follows. A decision of this Tribunal on a question of fact or opinion is indirect or secondary evidence and can be given little or no weight in different proceedings in this Tribunal, even if it is admissible. This follows the decision of Hoffman J in Land Securities plc v Westminster City Council where the issue was whether an arbitrator’s award determining the market rent of an office building on review was admissible evidence in another rent review relating to adjoining offices. Hoffman J, after referring to the admissibility of comparables comprising market or review rents, said (page 155):
“An arbitration award on the other hand is an arbitrator’s opinion, after hearing the evidence before him of the rent at which the premises could reasonably have been let. The letting is hypothetical, not real. It is therefore not direct evidence of what was happening in the market. It is the arbitrator’s opinion of what would have happened.”
He concluded that the award was inadmissible because it had in itself insufficient weight to justify the exploration of otherwise irrelevant issues which its admissibility would require (see page 158). In my judgment the same principle applies to the determination of value by another decision of this Tribunal. There are other reasons in this reference why I should have no regard to the decision in Khan. First, it is subject to appeal. The Council have been granted permission to appeal by this Tribunal. This appeal has not yet been heard by the Court of Appeal. 7 Secondly, the comparable evidence before the member in Khan, on which he based his decision, is before me in these references and can be given direct consideration.[23]I turn now to the question of compensation. I have been referred to three comparables: 4 Clifton Street, 154 Salt Street and 6, 8, 12 and 16 Iddlesleigh Street. I reject the Salt Street and Iddlesleigh Street transactions as unreliable comparables and give them no weight for the following reasons.[24]154 Salt Street was sold by auction in July 1995 for £3,500. In the previous year the Council had offered to buy the property for £5,000. I have three reasons for rejecting this comparable. First, the property is one mile from the subject properties. Secondly, the offer made by the Council in March 1994 was not a completed transaction and was made some seven years before the valuation date in these references. Thirdly, the sale by auction in July 1995 was nearly six years before the valuation date. I was given no reliable evidence as to changes in values between July 1995 and February 2001. I am unable to accept Mr Rishworth’s unsupported opinion that there has been no change during this period.[25]The properties in Iddlesleigh Street were purchased by the Council between May 1996 and November 1998 for £2,000 each. I reject these comparables for three reasons. First, these houses are approximately two and half miles from the subject properties. Secondly, these transactions took place between two and a half and five years before the valuation date and, as I have said, I have been given no reliable evidence as to the changes in values between May 1996 and February 2001. Thirdly, the purchases by the Council, after the declaration of a clearance area and before the making of a compulsory purchase order, were in the shadow of compulsory purchase and are unreliable evidence of the true values.[26]I am left with only one comparable to which I can give any weight, the settlement by the Council of the compensation payable for the purchase of 4 Clifton Street, an immediately adjoining property acquired under the same compulsory purchase order. The price was agreed by Mr James at £15,000 in November 2000 before a Lands Tribunal hearing. This settlement was a considerable increase on his previous offer of £5,000. This agreement was only three months before the valuation date in these references. At the time of purchase 4 Clifton Street was let at £250 per month (£3,000 per annum). The property was in poor structural condition. Mr James was aware of Mr Fisher’s estimated cost of repairs of £35,650 and in cross-examination he acknowledged that the building had an economic life of only five years.[27]Mr Padgett relied on this comparable; Mr Rishworth rejected it on the grounds that 4 Clifton Street was occupied, was not derelict like the subject properties and, although structurally defective and with a short life, it was nevertheless capable of creating rental income in the short term.[28]I agree with Mr Padgett that 4 Clifton Street is a useful comparable. As a settlement it is not, of course, ideal and would normally be given less weight than open market transactions. I have, however, no such transactions on which I can place any reliance. In my 8 judgment, Mr Rishworth was wrong to give 4 Clifton Street no weight when preparing his valuations. This has resulted in his valuations being much too low. The crucial facts, which allow comparison with the subject property, are the admissions by both Mr James and Mr Rishworth that 4 Clifton Street was structurally unsound (Mr James was aware of the estimated cost of repairs of £35,650) and that the building had a very limited economic life (Mr James put this at five years). These admissions allow the settlement figure to be analysed to relate it to the subject properties.[29]Mr James arrived at the figure of agreed compensation by capitalising the rent of £3,000 per annum by 5 YP, which is a yield of 20% in perpetuity. This approach is inconsistent with his evidence that the building had an economic life of only five years. In my view, the correct approach would have been to capitalise the rent for five years with reversion to a site with a building at the end of its economic life. The position in five years time is essentially the position which existed at the valuation date in respect of the subject properties. A site with value on which stood a building of no value. The settlement figure of £15,000 can be devalued on this basis to arrive at the value of the site with an uneconomic building of no value. Using the 20% yield, adopted by Mr James to capitalise the rent, to carry out the capitalisation of the rent for five years and to defer the reversionary value of the site plus an uneconomic building, produces the following devaluation:- Rent £ 3,000 YP 5 years @ 20% 2.99 £ 8,970 Reversion to value of land & uneconomic building £15,000 PV of £1 in 5 years @ 20% 0.402 £ 6,030 £15,000 By an arithmetical coincidence the present value of the land plus an uneconomic building (before deferment) is the same as the settlement figure of £15,000.[30]This figure can now be used to value each of the subject properties. No questions of demolition costs or repairs arise because a direct like for like comparison can be made between 4 Clifton Street (land plus uneconomic building) and the subject properties (land and derelict and uneconomic buildings). The site area of 4 Clifton Street was 75 square metres, much smaller than any of the subject properties, which had site areas ranging from 137 square metres to 440 square metres. Mr Padgett related the price of 4 Clifton Street to the subject properties by reference to site areas and estimated gross internal floor areas. I am doubtful as to the accuracy of the floor areas but the respective site areas (which were agreed) are a useful unit of comparison, although I agree with Mr Padgett that the price for 4 Clifton Street cannot be applied pro-rata to the larger areas of the subject properties, which included greater amounts of backland, particularly 240 Manningham Lane. In my view, it is a matter of overall judgment, rather than calculation, as to how the settlement price is to be applied to the subject properties. Some reducing allowance should be made for the larger sites of the subject properties with greater backland of less value and some appreciating allowance should be made for the better position in Manningham Lane with prospects of higher value commercial use. Overall, I have reached the conclusion that Mr Padgett’s figures (although I recognised that he was in error in valuing the properties as vacant sites and (other than 9 no.234) having the benefit of rights of way) are as figures correct. They are certainly not excessive and I adopt them.[31]Mr Rishworth’s valuations are much too low, being based on out of date comparables one to two and a half miles from the subject properties. In my view, when Mr James agreed the price for 4 Clifton Street, this established a better comparable which, despite the differences, could be used to value the subject properties. Mr Rishworth should have reviewed his earlier valuations in the light of this new and better value evidence. To persist in offering compensation of between £2,250 and £3,000 for properties of larger size and commercial frontage when an immediately adjoining residential property in a side street with only five years of economic life remaining was agreed to be worth £15,000 was, in my view, inconsistent with this settlement.[32]I determine that the amounts of compensation payable for the compulsory acquisition of the freehold interests in the following properties in Manningham Lane under the City of Bradford Metropolitan District Council (234-244 and 2-4 Clifton Street, Bradford) Compulsory Purchase Order 1998 are:- No.234 (Khan (P) and Khan (N)) £19,500 (ACQ/165/2000) No.236 (Khan Mirza & Mirza) £17,500 (ACQ/164/200) No.238 (Khan (D)) £17,500 (ACQ/163/2000) No.240 (Rehman) £22,500 (ACQ/162/2000) A surveyor’s fee under Rydes scale is payable to each claimant.[33]This decision concludes my determination on the substantive issues in these references. It will take effect as a decision when the question of costs has been decided and at that point, but not before, the provisions relating to the right of appeal in section 3(4) of the Lands Tribunal Act 1949 and order 61 rule 1(1) of the Civil Procedure Rules will come into operation. The parties are invited to make submissions as to the costs of these references and a letter accompanying this decision sets out the procedure for submissions in writing. DATED: 15 August 2001 (Signed) P H Clarke ADDENDUM[34]I have received written submissions on costs. 10[35]The claimants seek their costs on the indemnity basis on four grounds. First, that the Council grossly and unreasonably undervalued the subject properties: my awards were at the figures claimed which were considerably above the Council’s valuations. Second, the amounts of compensation awarded were above offers to settle made by the Council on 25 June 2001, the highest of which was £6,500 for 240 Manningham Lane. Third, the Council’s unreasonable approach to these references, including applications for additional expert evidence which were refused by the Tribunal, causing the claimants significant costs which would not have been incurred if the Council had valued the properties properly and reasonably at the outset. Fourth, the provisions of section 4(1)(b) of the Land Compensation Act 1961 should not apply due to special reasons in these references.[36]The Council ask for their costs on the standard basis on the grounds that no claims for compensation were delivered by the claimants to enable offers to be made. There are no special reasons to prevent the operation of section 4(1)(b) of the 1961 Act. It was not for the Council to seek particulars of the claims. In the absence of notices of claim the Council were put to trouble and expense in making the references. The Council had acted reasonably.[37]The starting point for my decision on costs is the general rule that the costs of a reference to the Lands Tribunal to determine compensation fall on the acquiring authority without whose resort to the use of compulsory powers there would have been no need for the owner to be compensated (see Emslie and Simpson Limited v Aberdeen District Council (No.2) [1995] 35 RVR 159 and Lesquende Limited v Planning and Environment Committee of the States of Jersey [1998] 1 EGLR 137).[38]The Council, however, say that section 4(1)(b) of the 1961 Act applies in these references. They should receive their costs due to the failure by the claimants to serve notices of claim. Section 4(1)(b) provides as follows:- “Where … -(a) …(b) the Lands Tribunal is satisfied that a claimant has failed to deliver to the acquiring authority, in time to enable them to make a proper offer, a notice in writing of the amount claimed by him, containing the particulars mentioned in subsection (2) of this section; the Lands Tribunal shall, unless for special reasons it thinks proper not to do so, order the claimant to bear his own costs and to pay the costs of the acquiring authority so far as they were incurred …., after the time when in the opinion of the Lands Tribunal the notice should have been delivered.”[39]In my judgment there are two special reasons why the above provisions should not apply in these references. First, I have wholly accepted the claimants’ valuations and awarded compensation at their figures. My awards are considerably greater than the Council’s figures. It is rare for this Tribunal to award compensation at a claimant’s figure without any adjustment, wholly rejecting the acquiring authority’s figure and approach. In 11 my view, this is clearly a special reason why the claimants should not be required to pay the Council’s costs. Second, these acquisitions were of vacant, derelict properties where the compensation represented the value of the land; no question of disturbance arose. The Council was not prevented from preparing valuations and making offers by the absence of notices of claim. In my experience few claimants submit notices of claim wholly in accordance with section 4(1) and (2) of the 1961 Act. The claimants should have lodged claims but, in the circumstances, their failure to do so should not result in any liability for costs.[40]For these special reasons I decline to order the claimants to pay the Council’s costs. I note from the claimants’ submissions that offers to settle at figures well below my awards were made by the Council just before the start of the hearing. I have not been supplied with copies or further details of these offers. Accordingly, I do not consider them further but they may well have been another special reason why section 4(1)(b) should not apply.[41]I find it surprising, and a matter of critical comment, that the Council, having failed in these references so decisively, should not only seek to deprive the claimants of their costs but require them to pay the Council’s costs, all in reliance on what is little more than a technicality. If the Council succeeded in recovering their costs it would lead to a manifestly unjust result. I can find no reason for depriving these successful claimants of their costs and even less reason for ordering them to pay the Council’s costs. The claimants ask for their costs on an indemnity basis but I do not think that I would be justified in departing from the normal practice of awarding costs on the standard basis. In this respect I bear in mind that, although ultimately successful, the claimants failed to lodge claims and three out of the four claimants did not instruct solicitors until shortly before the hearing. It was not known until the day of the hearing how the claimants intended to present their case.[42]I order the Council to pay the claimants’ costs of these references, such costs, if not agreed, to be the subject of a detailed assessment by the Registrar of the Lands Tribunal on the standard basis. DATED: 11 September 2001 (Signed) P H Clarke 12