NATIONAL CAR PARKS LIMITED ANDREW DONALD BAIRD (Valuation Officer) v PETER ROBIN WOOLWAY (Valuation Officer) RA/232/1996

UPPER TRIBUNAL

LANDS CHAMBER

RA/232/1996

Case No RA/232/1996

Between

NATIONAL CAR PARKS LIMITED ANDREW DONALD BAIRD (Valuation Officer)Applicant

PETER ROBIN WOOLWAY (Valuation Officer)Respondent

Before

The President

Venue 48/49 Chancery Lane, London WC2A 1JR

Date 10 September 2003

Property: Car Parks at Watson Street, Manchester, and Olympia Hilton Hotel, 380/386 Kensington High Street, London W14

Catchwords: RATING – alteration of rating lists – effective date – proposals to reduce RVs – agreement on RVs – transitional relief – withdrawal of appeals in expectation that VO would alter list with effect from 1April 1992 under reg 15 of Non-Domestic Rating (Alteration of Lists and Appeals) Regulations 1993 – before alteration made reg 15 amended by Non-Domestic Rating (Alteration of Lists and Appeals) (Amendment) Regulations 1994 – VO altering list with effect from 1 April 1990 pursuant to amended Regulations – appellant contending effective date should be 1 April 1992 – whether accrued right or legit

[1]These two consolidated appeals concern the rating assessments of public car parks occupied by the appellant. One appeal is from the Manchester Valuation Tribunal and relates to a car park in a former warehouse and on former railway land at Watson Street, Manchester. The second appeal is from the London (South West) Valuation Tribunal and relates to a car park at basement level under the Olympia Hilton Hotel, 380/386 Kensington High Street, London W14. In each case, following a proposal to reduce the rateable value shown for the hereditament in the local rating list, the appellant’s agents reached agreement with the valuation officer on the rateable value. Instead of embodying this agreement in writing, as provided for in the statutory regulations, however, they withdrew the proposal in the expectation that the VO would alter the list in the exercise of his general powers. The VO did alter the list so that it showed the assessment that had been agreed. The issue in each case is what is the correct date from which the alteration so made is to take effect. The answer to this question requires a consideration of the Non-Domestic Rating (Alteration of Lists and Appeals) Regulations 1993 and related regulations; and Mr Peter Village QC for the ratepayer raises arguments based on the valuation officer’s duty to maintain the list, the Interpretation Act 1978, the principle of non-retrospectivity and legitimate expectation.

[2]The regulations and the arguments to which they give rise are somewhat complicated, but the nature of the dispute can be explained relatively simply. The assessments in question are those appearing in the 1990 quinquennial rating lists in respect of the two hereditaments. The lists came into force on 1 April 1990. The proposals to reduce the assessments were made in August 1990. The reductions agreed with the VOs were from £343,500 to £260,000 in the Manchester case and from £60,000 to £18,6000 in the Kensington and Chelsea case. In consequence of these agreements the VOs made the necessary alterations in the lists with effect from 1 April 1990. The appellant contends that the alterations should take effect from 1 April 1992. The explanation for what at first sight is a surprising desire to have the operation of the reductions postponed lies in the transitional arrangement provisions contained in Schedule 7A to the Local Government Finance Act 1988 and statutory instruments made under that Act.

[3]The transitional provisions were introduced to phase in the most substantial increases and decreases in rate bills following the 1990 revaluation and the coming into operation of the 1988 Act. A ratepayer facing a large increase in his rates by reason was entitled to relief so that in the first year of the new list he paid only a proportion of what he would otherwise be liable to pay. The amount of relief was stepped down for subsequent years. In each of the present cases the appellant would be better off if the original higher value appeared in the list for 1990-91 and 1991-92 than if the reduced value appeared. It could take advantage of the transitional relief provisions for those years and then benefit from the reduced value for 1992-93 onwards when the transitional relief would be smaller. 3 The legislation

[4]Under section 41(1) of the Local Government Finance Act 1988 a valuation officer is required to compile and thereafter maintain the local rating list; and the requirement is to compile and then maintain a list that is accurate: see R (on the application of Corus UK Ltd) v Valuation Office Agency [2002] RA 1 per Sullivan J at 14, para 46. Unlike the General Rate Act 1967, which it replaced, the Local Government Finance Act 1988 did not itself give a ratepayer the right to make a proposal for the alteration of a rating list nor did it prescribe when an alteration made to a list was to take effect. Instead section 55 conferred power on the Secretary of State to make regulations on these and related matters, and a rather bewildering succession of regulations have been made under this power from 1990 onwards. The Non-Domestic Rating (Alteration of Lists and Appeals) Regulations 1990 were amended by the Non-Domestic Rating (Alteration of Lists and Appeals) (Amendment) Regulations 1990, the (Amendment) (No 2) Regulations 1990, the (Amendment) (No 3) Regulations 1990 and the (Amendment) Regulations 1992. They were replaced by the Non-Domestic Rating (Alteration of Lists and Appeals) Regulations 1993. These were amended by the (Amendment) Regulations 1994, and there have been, I think, five further (Amendment) Regulations since then. It is the 1993 Regulations and the 1994 (Amendment) Regulations that apply in the present cases.

[5]Under the successive regulations a ratepayer has had the right to make a proposal in defined circumstances and within defined times (1993 Regulations regulation 4). Where the valuation officer “is of the opinion that the proposal is well-founded” he must give notice to the proposer and alter the list accordingly (regulation 9). (As the regulation applied at all times relevant to the present cases, the time within which the alteration had to be made was 6 weeks. This was subsequently altered by (Amendment) Regulations made in 1995 to a reasonable time.) If the VO is not of the opinion that the proposal is well-founded and thus does not act as provided for in regulation 9, one of three outcomes are provided for. The ratepayer may, if he wishes, withdraw the proposal (regulation 10). There may be agreement on an alteration in the list in terms other than those proposed, in which case the VO must alter the list within 6 weeks of the agreement and the proposal is treated as having been withdrawn (regulation 11). Where the proposal is not withdrawn and the valuation officer does not agree to an alteration, he must refer the disagreement to the relevant valuation tribunal (regulation 12). Once so referred, the appeal may be withdrawn (regulation 34(1)); or, if the VO alters the list in accordance with the proposal or agreement is reached under regulation 11, the appeal is treated as withdrawn (regulation 34(4)); or the appeal may be decided by the VT, which may require the VO to alter the list (regulation 44(1)). These, therefore, are the various ways in which the list may be altered as the result of a proposal being made. Apart from this it is open to the VO to alter the list at any time in the performance of his duty under section 41 of the 1988 Act to maintain the list.

[6]It is the provisions in the Regulations dealing with the time from which alterations to the list are to take effect that cause the greatest difficulty. They are the ones that arise for consideration in the present case. The General Rate Act 1967 in section 79 had provided for these matters in a straightforward and simple way. Under subsection (1) the general rule was that an alteration would not take effect earlier than the beginning of the rate period during which the proposal leading to the alteration was made. Under subsection (2) an alteration 4 consequent on a physical change was to take effect only from the date of the change. The 1988 Act by contrast has spawned a succession of extremely complex provisions that have been the subject of numerous amendments in the many sets of regulations that have been made. It is a challenge for anyone to approach an understanding of these provisions, and it must certainly be well beyond the capability of the ordinary ratepayer to do so.

[7]The 1990 Regulations in regulation 4 prescribed the time from which an alteration to the list was to take effect in a number of circumstances; but it made no provision for determining when an alteration to the list, made to correct an inaccuracy in the list on the date on which it was compiled, should take effect. The omission was evidently discovered in time to make the (Amendment) Regulations 1990, which came into force on the same day as the principal regulations, 1 April 1990. So far as relevant regulation 2 of the (Amendment) Regulations 1990 provided:

“(2) In regulation 4 (time from which alteration to have effect), after paragraph (6) there shall be added - ‘(6A) An alteration made to correct an inaccuracy in a list on the day it was compiled shall have effect from that day.’”

This provision was, however, subject to regulation 6 of the 1990 Regulations, which provided: “Limit to start of year

[6]No alteration such as is described in regulation 4 other than -(a) an alteration in pursuance of a proposal disputing the accuracy of a previous alteration,

(b) an alteration to enter a completion day determined under Schedule 4A to the Act, or

(c) an alteration required by order of a tribunal under Part V of these Regulations, shall have effect from a day earlier than the first day in the year in which the alteration is made.”

[8]Thus, where a ratepayer made a proposal to reduce the value shown in the list for his hereditament, or if the VO altered the list so as to reduce such value, the alteration would only take effect on the first day of the year in which the alteration was made, notwithstanding that the alteration was made in order to correct an inaccuracy in the list on the day it was compiled. The only exceptions to this were (a), an alteration in pursuance of a proposal disputing the accuracy of a previous alteration, and (c), an alteration required by order of a VT in its decision or an appeal.

[9]Regulation 6 of the 1990 Regulations was replaced by a new regulation 6 by regulation 4 of the (Amendment) (No.2) Regulations 1990, which came into force on 27 September 1990. The new regulation 6 provided: 5 “6.-(1) No alteration such as is described in regulation 4 other than an alteration - (a) in pursuance of paragraphs (3) and (4) (completion notices)(c), or (b) made in pursuance of the order of a tribunal under Part V of these Regulations shall have effect from a day earlier than the first day in the relevant year.

(2) Where the alteration is made in pursuance of a proposal other than a proposal disputing the accuracy of a previous alteration to the list, the relevant year is the year in which the proposal was made.

(3) Where the alteration is made in pursuance of a proposal disputing the accuracy of a previous alteration to the list, the relevant year is the year in which the disputed alteration was made.

(4) In any other case, the relevant year is the year in which the alteration is made.”

[10]Thus an alteration made to correct an inaccuracy in the list on the day it was compiled, if made by the VO under his general power to maintain the list, would take effect on the first day of the year in which the alteration was made; while an alteration made in pursuance of a proposal (other than one disputing the accuracy of a previous alteration) would take effect on the first day of the year in which the proposal was made.

[11]The replaced regulation 6 was then itself replaced by the (Amendment) Regulations 1992, regulation 4 of which substituted the following:

“Alterations on and after 1st April 1992 6A.– (1) Where, in relation to an alteration which falls to be made on or after 1st April 1992, other than an alteration – (a) made in pursuance of paragraph (3) and (4) (completion notices) of regulation 4, (b) required to be made as mentioned in regulation 6B, or (c) made in pursuance of the order of a tribunal under Part V of these Regulations, the day determined in accordance with regulation 4 as the day from which it has effect precedes 1st April 1992, the alteration shall have effect, subject to paragraph (2), from 1st April 1992. (2) Where the alteration – (a) is made in consequence of a proposal made before 1st April 1992, or (b) is made, pursuant to regulation 32(2), in relation to an alteration mentioned in regulation 16(3) and made before that day, and (c) would have had effect, had regulation 6 continued in force, from a day earlier than 1st April 1992, the alteration shall have effect from that earlier day. 6 (3) Where – (a) an alteration is made in accordance with paragraph (1) or (2); and (b) within the period of six weeks beginning with – (i) in the case of an alteration of which notice is given under regulation 8(2), the day of service of the notice, (ii) in any other case, the day on which the list is altered, the person who at the time of the alteration was the ratepayer in relation to the hereditament to which the alteration relates requires the valuation officer, by notice in writing served on him, to substitute for the day shown in the list the day that would have been determined, as regards that alteration, in accordance with regulation 4 if paragraph (1) or, as the case may be, paragraph (2) had not applied, the valuation officer shall alter the list accordingly. (4) In this regulation and regulation 6B below, “regulation 6” means the regulation for which this regulation and regulation 6B are substituted. Alterations: further provisions 6B. Where, in relation to an alteration made before 1 April 1992 - (a) the day from which the alteration has effect was determined in accordance with regulation 6; and (b) that day is not the day which, but for regulation 6, would have been determined in accordance with paragraph (2), (5), (6), (6A) or (6B) of regulation 4, as the case may be, the person who on 1st April 1992 is the ratepayer as regards the hereditament to which the alteration relates may, by notice in writing given to the valuation officer at any time before a new list is compiled, require him to substitute, for the day shown in the list, the day that would have been determined in accordance with regulation 4 (ignoring for this purpose regulation 6) as regards that alteration; and the valuation officer shall alter the list accordingly.”

[12]Where regulation 6A(2)(c) said “had regulation 6 continued in force” what it evidently meant was:

“if this regulation and regulation 6B had not been substituted for regulation 6.”

Thus, while, with certain exceptions, alterations made on or after 1 April 1992 would take effect from that date, the status quo was maintained in relation to alterations made pursuant to proposals made before 1 April 1992. An alteration made to correct an inaccuracy in the list on the day it was compiled, if made by the VO under his general power to maintain the list, would take effect on 1 April 1992 (under regulation 4(6A) and regulation 6A(1)); while an alteration made in pursuance of a proposal made before 1 April 1992 to correct an inaccuracy in the list on the day it was compiled (other than a proposal disputing the accuracy of a previous alteration) would take effect on the first day of the year in which the proposal was made (under regulation 4(6A) and regulation 6A(2)).

[13]The 1990 Regulations as amended were replaced by the 1993 Regulations. It is these latter Regulations that apply in the present case. Regulations 13, 15 and 16 reproduced the 7 provisions of regulations 4 and 6A and 6B respectively in the 1990 Regulations. For the purposes of later reference the particular provisions to be noted are these:

“13.– (1) This regulation has effect subject to regulations 15,…and 44… (7) An alteration made to correct an inaccuracy in a list on the day it was compiled shall have effect from that day. (8) An alteration made to correct an inaccuracy in a list (other than an alteration which falls to take effect as provided in the foregoing provisions of this regulation) shall have effect from the day on which the list became inaccurate… 15.– (1) Where, in relation to an alteration that falls to be made on or after 1st April 1992, other than an alteration – ...(c) made in pursuance of the order of a tribunal under Part VI of these Regulations, the day determined in accordance with regulation 13 as the day from which it has effect precedes 1st April 1992, the alteration shall have effect, subject to paragraph (2), from 1st April 1992. (2) Where the alteration – (a) is made in consequence of a proposal made before 1st April 1992, and (b) would have had effect, had the former regulation 6 continued in force, from a day earlier than 1st April 1992, the alteration shall have effect from that earlier day… (4) In this regulation and regulation 16 below, ‘the former regulation 6’ refers to regulation 6 of the 1990 Regulations before the substitution made by regulation 4 of the Non-Domestic Rating (Alteration of Lists and Appeals) (Amendment) Regulations 1992.”

[14]Since it is clear that the object of these regulations is to make the same provision as the equivalent regulations in the 1990 Regulations as amended, one must, I think read in to regulation 15(2)(b), after the reference to the former regulation 6 continuing in force, the additional words:

“and if this regulation [ie regulation 15] had not been made and if in the former regulation 6 the reference to regulation 4 was a reference to regulation 13 of these Regulations.”

This is certainly the way in which I understand both parties to have read and applied the provision, and I believe it can only be reasonably read in this way. The effect of regulations 13 and 15 in each of the present cases, before the 1994 (Amendment) Regulations, therefore, was that, if the VO had altered the list so as to give effect to the agreed assessment, the alteration would have taken effect on 1 April 1992 (under regulation 13(7) and regulation 15(1)); and, if the list had been altered in consequence of the appellant’s proposal of 23 (or 5) August 1990, the alteration would have taken effect on 1 April 1990 (under regulation 13(7) and regulation 15(2)). 8

[15]Regulation 44(1), which deals with the orders that a VT may make when deciding an appeal, is also to be noted. It reproduced the corresponding provision in the 1990 Regulations (regulation 42(1)), and it provided:

“44.– (1) On or after deciding an appeal under regulation 12 or 28, the tribunal may, subject to paragraph (4), require a valuation officer, in consequence of the decision, by order to alter a list in accordance with any provision made by or under the Act.”

Paragraph (4) provides that, except in the case of certain alterations affecting the extent of the hereditament, where the decision is that the rateable value should be an amount greater than both the amount shown in the list at the date of the proposal and the amount contended for in the proposal, the order must require the list to be altered with effect from the day on which the decision is given. Under regulation 47(5) the Lands Tribunal, when determining an appeal from a VT, may confirm, vary, set aside, revoke or remit the decision or order of the tribunal, and may make any order the tribunal could have made.

[16]The different effective dates that applied to an alteration made to correct an inaccuracy in a list on the day it was compiled, depending on whether the alteration was one made by the VO under his section 41(1) duty or in consequence of a proposal, led to the practice under which rating surveyors, having agreed a reduction with the VO on the basis of a proposal made in the first year of the new list, would take stock of the situation to see whether, in the light of the transitional relief provisions, it would be more beneficial to the ratepayer to have the alteration taking effect on 1 April 1992 rather than on 1 April 1990. If the later date would be more beneficial, the proposal would be withdrawn, and the VO could be expected to alter the list of his own motion. This practice was curtailed by a provision in the 1994 (Amendment) Regulations. These were made on 7 July 1994 and they came into force on 9 July 1994. The exclusions in regulation 15(1) from the 1 April 1992 rule were extended so as to include (d), alterations falling within a new paragraph, (3E). One of the alterations referred to in (3E) was an alteration made so as to reduce the rateable value shown in the list for a hereditament (paragraph (3E)(a)(i)). From 9 July 1994 on, therefore, where the VO made an alteration to correct an inaccuracy in the 1990 list on the day it was compiled and the alteration reduced the rateable value as shown in the list, the alteration took effect, pursuant to regulation 13(7), on 1 April 1990.

[17]The final provision that needs to be noted is regulation 34 of the 1993 Regulations. Under paragraphs (1) and (2) of that regulation an appeal might be withdrawn before the commencement of a hearing or of consideration of written representations where notice to that effect was given to the clerk by the valuation officer, but only if every other party to the appeal had given written consent to him for the withdrawal of the appeal. The facts

[18]There is no dispute of primary fact. There are agreed statement of fact and unchallenged witness statements by Mr D R Lilley FRICS, MCIArb, Mr S D Todd MRICS, IRRV, Mr M H Brankin Dip Surv, MRICS, Mr P J Mason MRICS, Mr K Maudsley FRICS, IRRV, Mr P R Woolway FRICS, and Mr C M Birks MRICS, IRRV. Mr Lilley (of NAI Gooch Webster, previously J Trevor & Sons) and Mr Mason (of Montagu Evans) acted for the appellant 9 ratepayer in relation to the Manchester and Kensington and Chelsea hereditaments respectively (and also in relation to other National Car Parks hereditaments) and were responsible for the negotiations with the VOs. Mr Todd and Mr Brankin were at material times a Valuer and a Senior Valuer respectively in the Manchester Office of the Valuation Office Agency and were responsible for dealing with the rating list entry of the Manchester hereditament. Mr Maudsley was a Senior Valuer in the Kensington office of the VOA and was one of the valuers responsible for settling the appeals relating to NCP car parks in Kensington and Chelsea. Mr Woolway is the respondent VO in the Kensington and Chelsea appeal and was VO at the material times. Mr Birks is the Group Rating Manager of National Car Parks Ltd and was in that capacity directly involved in the revaluation for the 1990 lists.

[19]The Manchester hereditament was entered in the rating list that came into force on 1 April 1990 as “Car Park, Former Warehouse and Railway Land, Watson Street, Manchester M2” with an assessment of £343,500 RV. It comprised the converted lower floors of a multi- storey warehouse together with an extensive area of open land to the rear, all occupied as a public car park. On 23 August 1990 J Trevor & Sons served on the VO a proposal to alter the entry in the list by reducing the assessment to £1.

[20]The appeal resulting from this proposal was due to be heard by the Manchester South Valuation Tribunal on 31 January 1994. Negotiations with a view to a resolution of the appeal took place between Mr Lilley and Mr Todd during December 1993 and January 1994, and a meeting between them took place in Manchester on 17 January 1994. On 26 January 1994 Mr Todd and Mr Steven Cooper of J Trevor & Sons had a meeting at the subject premises and agreed that the useable capacity of the public car park was 1042 spaces. The next day 27 January 1994 Mr Lilley and Mr Todd spoke on the telephone and agreed that the proper assessment was £260,000 RV. Mr Lilley’s agreement to this figure was subject to the approval of his client, and later that day Mr Lilley spoke to Mr Birks and received his instructions to accept the reduction, subject to the operation of the transitional relief provisions. Mr Lilley carried out the necessary calculations and these showed that it would be financially beneficial if the August 1990 proposal were to be withdrawn and he were to request the VO to alter the assessment in the list to £260,000 with effect from 1 April 1992. Mr Lilley then telephoned the clerk to the VT to notify him of his instructions to withdraw the appeal.

[21]Despite Mr Lilley’s attempted withdrawal of the appeal, the VT on 31 January 1994 considered it. On 3 February 1994 it issued a decision determining that the assessment should be reduced to £260,000 with effect from 1 April 1990. On 18 and 23 February 1994 Mr Lilley wrote to the clerk of the VT asking that the decision be set aside under regulation 45 of the 1993 Regulations. Since there was no objection to this from the VO the VT issued a certificate on 8 March 1994 setting aside the decision. On 10 March 1994 J Trevor and Webster (as the firm was now called) wrote to the VO formally withdrawing the appeal and requesting him to alter the list to show an assessment of £260,000 with effect from 1 April 1992. On 22 April 1994 Mr Todd left the Manchester office to take up new duties in the City of London. Before leaving he had made arrangements for the list to be altered in accordance with the request in the letter of 10 March 1994. On 28 April 1994 the VO gave his notice to the VT withdrawing the appeal. 10

[22]The VO did not in fact alter the list to show the agreed assessment of £260,000 until 30 August 1994. By that time the 1994 (Amendment) Regulations had been made and had come into force (on 9 July 1994), so that the alteration showed as the effective date, in accordance with the amended regulations, 1 April 1990. What had happened following Mr Todd’s departure was that the VO’s clerical staff had on 9 May 1994 prepared a form, form VO 7001 (referred to as a “pink”), in relation to the appeal hereditament, annotating it with the remark “Please review as per SDT [ie Mr Todd]”. Mr Brankin, who had assumed Mr Todd’s responsibilities for car parks, did not feel that he could simply accept Mr Todd’s valuation despite the fact that it had been agreed with Mr Lilley. He considered that he needed to familiarise himself with the type of property concerned, the local level of rateable values, VT decisions and the history of the case. He could not do this immediately and it was not until 5 August 1994 that, having done the necessary research, he authorised the reduction to the agreed figure of £260,000. The clerical staff made the alteration on 30 August 1994.

[23]On 10 November 1994 J Trevor & Webster served a proposal on the VO for the list to be altered so as to show 1 April 1992 as the effective date. This proposal was the subject of the appeal determined by the Manchester Valuation Tribunal. In its decision of 13 May 1996 the VT dismissed the ratepayer’s appeal. It is against that decision that the appellant now appeals.

[24]The hereditament in the Kensington and Chelsea appeal was included in the rating list that came into force on 1 April 1990 as “Car Park and premises, Bst 380-386 Kensington High Street, London W14 8NL” with an assessment of £60,000 RV. On 5 August 1990 Montagu Evans, as agents for the appellant, served on the VO a proposal to alter the entry by reducing the assessment to £1. The appeal relating to this proposal was due to be heard by the London (South West) Valuation Tribunal on 13 April 1994. Discussions between Mr Mason and Mr Maudsley took place between 11 March and 8 April 1994, and on the latter date they reached agreement that the assessment should be reduced to £18,600. They also reached agreement on the assessments of other NCP car parks, and following their discussion Mr Maudsley faxed to Mr Mason agreement (or, where appropriate, withdrawal) forms.

[25]On 12 April 1994 Mr Mason wrote to the VO enclosing signed withdrawal forms in respect of three of the NCP car parks. He also invited him to treat the letter itself as notice of withdrawal of the appeals on the subject hereditament and five other NCP car parks and to “serve Notices at the figures agreed between us retrospective to 1 April 1992”. The appeal relating to the subject hereditament was withdrawn on 6 May 1994 by notice given by the VO to the clerk of the VT. On 27 July 1994 (by which time the 1994 (Amendment) Regulations were operative) the VO issued a notice stating that he had altered the list by reducing the assessment of the subject hereditament to £18,600 with effect from 1 April 1990. This alteration was challenged by a proposal served on 17 November 1994, which contended that the effective date should be amended to 1 April 1992. The appeal was heard by the VT, which dismissed it on 16 September 1996, and the appellant now appeals against the VT’s decision.

[26]In his statement Mr Woolway described the internal procedure of valuation offices under which alterations to valuation lists were made. The caseworker would ask the clerical section 11 to raise a VO report on a pink form, and this would then go to the caseworker to specify the revised entry. His own office, and, he believed, most other offices, worked to a target of dealing with all such reports within a period of 3 months. Mr Lilley, in a supplementary statement, pointed out that 78 days elapsed between the agreement in respect of the Kensington and Chelsea appeal and the alteration of the list and 125 days in the Manchester appeal. It had taken 30 days for the pink to be raised in the Kensington and Chelsea case and a further 35 days for it to be completed. In the Manchester case the periods were 43 days and 64 days respectively.

[27]There was no dispute as to the facts that I have set out. There was, however, dispute as to whether in each case, as the appellant claimed, these facts showed that there was an understanding that the VO would alter the list so as to show the agreed value with effect from 1 April 1992 and that he would do so within a reasonable time. I return to this matter later. Appellant’s submissions

[28]Mr Village submitted that prior to the coming into force of the 1994 (Amendment) Regulations, the VO in each case was under an obligation to alter the list in accordance with the agreements on value that had been reached with effect from 1 April 1992, and the appellant had acquired the right to have the list altered accordingly; so that, by virtue of the Interpretation Act 1978 and the common law principle of non-retrospectivity in legislation, the obligation and the right continued and continue to be effective notwithstanding the coming into force of the Regulations. In addition to these submissions based on what were claimed to be the appellant’s statutory entitlements and the Interpretation Act and the principle of non-retrospectivity, Mr Village also contended that the appellant had a legitimate expectation that the list would be altered in accordance with the law as it was before the 1994 (Amendment) Regulations came into force.

[29]Mr Village originally submitted that the source of the VO’s statutory obligation was regulation 9 of the 1993 Regulations. That regulation provides that, where the VO is of opinion that a proposal is well-founded, he must serve notice that he propose to alter the list accordingly and must within 6 weeks thereafter alter the list. The agreement reached by the VO in each case showed, Mr Village said, that the VO had concluded by or on the date of the agreement that the proposal was well-founded. Thus he had an obligation to serve notice of the requisite alteration, and to make the alteration within six weeks; and the ratepayer had a corresponding right that the alteration should be so made. Mr Village said that by virtue of regulation 15(1) the alteration made by the VO would have taken effect on 1 April 1992.

[30]The alternative, and ultimately the primary, basis upon which Mr Village put the source of the VO’s statutory obligation was under section 41(1) of the 1988 Act. Under that provision the VO was under a duty to maintain a list that was accurate. Upon it becoming apparent that the list was wrong, the duty arose for the VO to amend the list. It became apparent that the list was wrong, Mr Village said, when agreement was reached in each case on the correct value of the hereditament. In the Manchester case, he said, the agreement was reached on 30 January 1994, and in the Kensington and Chelsea case the agreement was reached either on or by 8 April 1994 or alternatively on or by 12 April 1994. 12

[31]The agreement that was reached in each case, Mr Village said, was that the correct value was £260,000 (or £18,600), and there was an understanding between the parties that the appeal would be withdrawn and that the VO would alter the list so as to show the agreed assessment with effect from 1 April 1992, and that he would alter the list within a reasonable time. The agreement on value conferred on the ratepayer a right that the VO would act in this way in the performance of his statutory duties. The right, he said, crystallised when the appeal was withdrawn. (I think by this he meant the date on which the ratepayer wrote to the VO requesting withdrawal of the appeal – 10 March 1994 in the Manchester case, 12 April in the Kensington and Chelsea case – rather than the date on which the VO withdrew the appeal under regulation 34 – 28 April 1994 in the Manchester case, 6 May 1994 in the Kensington and Chelsea case. Nothing, however, appears to turn on the difference between these dates.) If the understanding was that the list would be altered within a reasonable time, such time would have elapsed, Mr Village said by the date, 9 July 1994, on which the 1994 (Amendment) Regulations came into force.

[32]The effect of the 1994 (Amendment) Regulations was to revoke a ratepayer’s entitlement to have the list altered by the VO with effect from 1 April 1992. However, said Mr Village, by virtue of section 16(1) of the Interpretation Act 1978 the ratepayer’s rights in the present cases were preserved. So far as relevant, section 16(1) provides that where an Act repeals an enactment the repeal does not, unless the contrary intention appears, affect the previous operation of the enactment repealed or anything duly done under that enactment; nor does it affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under that enactment; or affect any remedy in respect of such right, privilege, obligation or liability; and any such remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced as if the repealing Act had not been passed. Under section 23 these provisions apply to subordinate legislation. Further or alternatively, Mr Village submitted, sections 16 and 23 merely gave effect to the common law principle of non-retrospectivity.

[33]Mr Village submitted that the right of the ratepayer to have the list altered so as to show the agreed assessment with effect from 1 April 1992 was an accrued right for the purposes of section 16, and the VO’s duty to alter it in this way was an obligation incurred. The same applied for the purposes of the principle of non-retrospectivity. He said that an agreement such as the one in the present case was capable of giving rise to rights and obligations that were preserved by section 16, and he referred to Briggs v Thomas Dryden & Sons

[1925] 2 KB 668

. The rights and obligations acquired and incurred by virtue of the statutory provisions were preserved both under section 16 and the principle of non-retrospectivity. He said that this was clear from the decision of the Court of Appeal in Chief Adjudication Officer v Maguire

[1999] 2 All ER 859

and the cases cited in that decision. Whether a right had been acquired or had accrued under a statute depended on the true construction of the statute, but so long as there was on this basis an entitlement it did not matter that it was inchoate or contingent. The right that Mr Village contended that the appellant had under regulation 9 to have the list altered within 6 weeks of the agreement on value was, he said, an accrued right. Similarly the VO’s obligation under section 41 to alter the list once the value had been agreed, or once value had been agreed and the appellant had withdrawn his appeal, gave rise on the appellant’s part to such a right. The effect of the 1994 (Amendment) Regulations was to revoke the entitlement that the ratepayer had hitherto enjoyed to have the list altered with effect from 1 April 1992, and this was a revocation of subordinate legislation for the purposes of sections 16 and 23 of the Act 13

[34]On the common law principle of non-retrospectivity Mr Village referred to formulations of the principle in Yew Bon Tew v Kenderaan Bas Mara

[1983] 1 AC 553

, 558 (Lord Brightman), L’Office Cherifien des Phosphates v Yamashita-Shinninon Steamship Co Ltd (“The Boucraa”)

[1994] 1 All ER 20

, 28 (Lord Mustill) and Secretary of State for Social Security v Tunnicliffe

[1991] 2 All ER 712

, 723 (Mustill LJ). He said that the cases showed the common law principle of non-retrospectivity to be one of construction. A statute was not to be construed as having retrospective effect unless clear words were used to show that such effect was intended. He said that the cases established three main criteria which determined whether a statute should be construed as having retrospective effect. The first was the terms of the legislation. As to this, there was nothing, he suggested, in the terms of regulation 15(1)(d) and (3E) that indicated that the provisions were to have retrospective effect. Alternatively, if it was not clear that they were to have retrospective effect, they should be treated as though they did not, particularly as the consequences of giving them retrospective effect would be very serious for the appellant. The second criterion was whether rights had been acquired or had accrued. He submitted that they had. Thirdly there was the question of fairness, and he submitted that it would be unfair to give the provisions retrospective effect in view of the expectation that the appellant had had that the VO in each case would perform his statutory duty in accordance with the understanding that the parties had reached.

[35]On legitimate expectation Mr Village said that in each case the appellant had a legitimate expectation that the respondent would alter the list to show with effect from 1 April 1992 the assessment that had been agreed. The expectation was that the VO in each case would perform his statutory duties, and that meant his statutory duties as defined by the legislation that was in force at the time when those duties were incurred, namely the 1993 Regulations in their unamended form. The understanding that the parties had reached embodied this expectation. R v North and East Devon Health Authority, ex p Coughlan

[2001] QB 213

showed that the courts now recognised the principle that in appropriate circumstances public authorities must give effect to legitimate expectations of substantive benefits. While it was not necessary as a matter of law for the claimant to establish that he relied to his detriment on the words or conduct of the public authority, as a matter of fact such reliance would usually be relevant to the question whether for the authority to resile from the expectation would be an abuse of power (R v Secretary of State for Education and Employment, ex p Begbie

[2000] 1 WLR 1115

per Peter Gibson LJ at 1124; R (on the application of Bibi) v Newham LBC

[2002] 1 WLR 237

, per Schiemann LJ at paras 28-31). Taxpayers had a legitimate expectation that they would be “taxed according to statute, not concession or a wrong view of the law” (R v Inland Revenue Commissioners , ex p MFK Underwriting

[1990] 1 WLR 1545

, per Bingham LJ at 1569). In addition the European Court of Justice had held that the principle of legitimate expectation applied so as to preclude a national legislative amendment that retroactively deprived a taxable person of the right enjoyed prior to that amendment to obtain repayment of taxes collected in breach of a European Directive (Marks & Spencer plc v Commissioners of Customs and Excise

[2002] 3 CMLR 9

at paras 44-45).

[36]For the Respondent Miss Nathalie Lieven had relied on Marks & Spencer plc v Fernley (VO)[1999] RA 409 for the proposition that, even if the appellant’s arguments were correct in relation to the duties of the VO, the valuation tribunal had a free-standing right to amend the list under regulation 44(1) with effect from 1 April 1990. Mr Village submitted that while Marks & Spencer v Fernley established that the VT had power, despite the other provisions of the Regulations, to amend the list from an earlier time than the VO could have done, 14 nevertheless the VT could only exercise that power in accordance with the law. Since the appellant had a vested right by virtue of the agreements with the VO to have the list altered in each case with effect from 1 April 1992, the VT was bound to exercise its power under regulation 44(1) so as to give effect to this right. Respondent’s submissions

[37]Miss Lieven for the respondent submitted that the appellant could not rely on section 16(1)(c) of the Interpretation Act because on the facts it had no vested right that the list in each case would be altered. A contingent right was insufficient (Abbott v Minister of Lands [1895] 425). In pursuing its proposals the appellant could have taken a number of courses. It could have entered into a written agreement under regulation 11 of the 1993 Regulations, and this would have had the effect of requiring the VO to alter the list in accordance with the agreement within a set time period. The appellant chose not to do this because the advantages of transitional relief would not have flowed to it. In practice the appellant was seeking to gain all the benefits of an agreement under regulation 11 while having deliberately chosen not to enter into such an agreement and incur the disbenefits of doing so. Alternatively the appellant could have pursued its appeal to the VT, but again it chose not to do that because it would not have gained the transitional relief benefits that it sought to secure. Instead the appellant chose to withdraw the appeal without entering into a regulation 11 agreement. In taking this course the appellant took the risk that the VO had no obligation to alter the list in any particular way or to do so by any particular date. The only obligation that rested on the VO was to maintain the list in accordance with section 41. The appellant had no right in this respect which could have accrued. There was no agreement that the list would be altered. Indeed the evidence showed that the appellant’s agents had been keen to avoid anything that might be called an agreement. In any event, even if there was some sort of binding agreement giving rise to rights, there was no evidence that there was any agreement that the list would be altered by any particular date or within any particular timescale or in accordance with the existing regulations in the event that they might be altered. The most that could possibly be implied was that the VO was under an obligation to alter the list in accordance with the law as it was at the time of the alteration.

[38]The argument that the appellant had a legitimate expectation that the VO would alter the list with effect from 1 April 1992 was, said Miss Lieven, misconceived. Firstly, Coughlan and Bibi established that it was necessary for the public authority to have made a clear promise or a clear statement on which it was reasonable to rely. Here the VO had made no statement that he would alter the list in a particular way, and certainly no statement that he would alter the list at a particular date or in accordance with the law applying at the date of the withdrawal. Secondly, even if there had been such a statement, it would have been unreasonable for the appellant to have relied on it when it could have secured its rights by entering into an agreement under regulation 11. Thirdly, if the VO had made any such statement, it would have been an unlawful fetter on his discretion, and Miss Lieven relied in this respect on Begbie. Fourthly there was no detrimental reliance on any representation made by the VO. This was because of the choices that the appellant’s representatives faced. If they had not withdrawn the appeals, they would not in any event have been able to obtain the transitional relief that they sought to obtain, so that if they had relied on any representation it would not have been a detrimental reliance. Finally, there was no legitimate 15 expectation that the list would be altered within a reasonable time. No representation was made to the appellant about when the list would be altered, and the VO’s only duty was to act in accordance with section 41.

[39]Miss Lieven, as I have already said, placed reliance on the decision of the Court of Appeal in Marks & Spencer v Fernley. The court there held that a VT’s power under regulation 44 to amend a list was different from and went beyond that of a VO. The VT was not bound, said Miss Lieven, by any agreement made between the VO and a ratepayer but had to decide the issues before it in accordance with the law. It was therefore open to the VT to amend the list with effect from 1 April 1990, and it did so; and in consequence all the appellant’s arguments in relation to agreements and legitimate expectations were irrelevant because the VT had a separate power to make the order that it did. Conclusions (1) The agreements and the understandings

[40]Mr Village did not suggest that there was any agreement between the parties other than on the correct assessment in each case. He said, however, that there was an understanding between them that the appeal would be withdrawn and that the VO would alter the list so as to show the agreed assessment with effect from 1 April 1992 and/or that he would alter the list within a reasonable time. It is, of course, clear that in each case the VO was aware of why it was that the appellant’s agents wished to pursue the course of withdrawing the proposals and looking to the VO to make alterations at the assessments agreed under his general statutory power. It is also clear that the VO, with whom agreement had been reached on value, was happy to go along with this procedure. The evidence does not, however, show in either case that there was any agreement or understanding between the parties that the VO would alter the list to show the assessment that had been agreed with effect from 1 April 1992, whether or not that remained the correct date under the applicable regulations when the alteration was made.

[41]In Manchester case the position that had been reached following the agreement on value and Mr Lilley’s consequent wish to pursue the course I have referred to is clear, in my judgment, from the letter that he wrote to Mr Todd the VO on 10 March 1994. This was after the VT had issued their decision (3 February1994) and had then, at Mr Lilley’s request, set it aside (8 March 1994). The letter said:

“We refer to the recent telephone conversation between Mr Todd and Mr Lilley and, on behalf of National Car Parks Limited, hereby withdraw the appeal lodged by us on that Company’s behalf on 15 August 1990 in respect of the above hereditament, being a public car park. We must state that the above withdrawal should not be considered to imply acceptance of the correctness of the Rateable Value appearing in the List in respect thereof, the withdrawal having been made in the light of statutory regulations relating to Transitional Relief. 16 Additionally, we hereby request that you now issue a Notice, effective from the 1st April, 1992 amending the List so as to include the above mentioned hereditament as follows:- Car Park: former Warehouse and Railway Land, Watson Street Rateable Value £260,000.”

[42]The terms of this letter are not couched in terms of an agreement. They simply show that Mr Lilley was adopting the course of withdrawal in the expectation that the VO would then alter the list to show the value that had been agreed. In the Kensington and Chelsea case, on the other hand, Mr Mason said that he had had a meeting on 3 February 1994 with Belinda Dodds of the VO’s staff and the appeal case was one of a batch of cases that they had discussed. He said, “Agreement was reached in relation to the assessments discussed at that meeting and I agreed to withdraw the appeals while Miss Dodds agreed to issue Notices at the agreed assessments and with effect from 1 April 1992.” Mr Mason then wrote to Mr Maudsley withdrawing that appeal and others and requesting the issue of notices showing alterations with effect from 1 April 1992.

[43]Mr Maudsley in his witness statement said that after receipt of Mr Mason’s letter he asked his office to process the withdrawn appeals and to raise reports that in due course would lead to the alterations being made. The request in relation to the appeal hereditament was for the rateable value to be reduced to £18,600 with effect from 1 April 1992. He went on :

“This choice of effective date was dictated by the legislation then in force, not by any agreement made with Mr Mason or his client. Mr Mason and I simply had a common understanding that 1 April 1992 was the correct date for any alteration made by the Valuation Officer of his own motion to correct an inaccuracy in the list as originally compiled.”

This explanation is clearly not in conflict with the evidence of Mr Mason, and I accept it as accurately stating the understanding of Mr Mason and Mr Maudsley as to the effective date. I find that a similar understanding informed the dealings between Mr Lilley and Mr Todd. The nature of the procedure that the appellant was looking to the VO to carry out was to alter the list to the agreed assessment in the exercise of his general duty to maintain the list and in accordance with the regulations. Amendment of the regulations was by then a not infrequent occurrence, and it seems to me inconceivable that the VO could be taken to be undertaking to alter the list with effect from 1 April 1992 even if, at the time he altered it, the regulations as then existing required him to apply some other effective date. (2) “VO to alter list within a reasonable time”

[44]Mr Village submitted that the VO in each case was under a duty, having agreed the assessment and after the appeal had been withdrawn, to alter the list within a reasonable time; and in each case, he said, such reasonable time would have ended before the 1994 (Amendment) Regulations came into force. I cannot accept the submission that the VO was 17 under any duty or obligation to alter the list within a reasonable time. Such a requirement cannot, in my judgment, be read into the very general terms of his duty under section 41 to maintain the list, and there is no basis for importing some contractual obligation to qualify his statutory duty. It is possible that he could not delay so long in making the alteration that it would be “conspicuously unfair” and thus an abuse of power (see Corus [2002] RA 1 at para 54), but it seems to me impossible to say that a delay of the number of months that occurred in these cases could be characterised as an abuse of power. It is only because the regulations had been amended in a way that was adverse to the appellant before the alterations were made that they now complain. It is not suggested, however, that either VO deliberately delayed so that the 1994 (Amendment) Regulations might be made and might come into force before the alterations were made. (3) VO’s duty to alter the list

[45]Mr Village’s submissions started with the contention that the agreement reached in each case between the appellant’s agents and the VO, gave rise to a duty on the part of the VO to alter the list at the reduced assessment agreed between them with effect from 1 April 1992. The statutory source of this duty was identified by Mr Village as either regulation 9 of the 1993 Regulations or alternatively section 41 of the 1988 Act. On either basis, he said, if the VO had made the agreed alteration before the 1994 (Amendment) Regulations came into force, under the provisions of regulations 13 and 15 of the 1993 Regulations the alteration would have taken effect on 1 April 1992.

[46]I have described above the operation of regulations 13 and 15 as they stood before the 1994 (Amendment) Regulations, in relation to an alteration made to correct an inaccuracy in the list on the day it was compiled. Mr Village is undoubtedly right that an alteration made by the VO in the exercise of his general duty to maintain the list would have taken effect from 1 April 1992; but in my judgment he is wrong in his claim that this would also have been the date if an alteration pursuant to regulation 9 had been made. Regulation 9 requires the VO, where he is of the opinion that the proposal is well-founded, to alter the list accordingly. Any such alteration would seem to me to be inescapably an alteration made in consequence of a proposal, so that if the proposal was made before 1 April 1991 to correct an inaccuracy in the list on the day it was compiled, regulation 15(2) would apply to give an effective date of 1 April 1990. I can see no difference in this respect between an alteration made under regulation 9 and one made under regulation 11, where the parties have agreed an alteration at a value other than the one contained in the proposal. If Mr Village were right, therefore, that the source of the VO’s duty to alter the list was regulation 9, this would effectively conclude the case against him.

[47]However Mr Village was, in my judgment, clearly wrong to place reliance on regulation

[9]The regulation applies where the VO “is of the opinion that the proposal is well-founded.” If he is of that opinion he must alter the list “accordingly”. In each of the present cases the ratepayer’s proposal was to reduce the assessment to £1. In neither case, therefore, did the VO agree that the proposal was well-founded. Rateable values were agreed, not at £1, but at £246,000 and £18,600 respectively. There was no question, therefore, of altering the list “accordingly”, ie, in accordance with the proposal, to £1. The relevant provision, if effect was to be given to the agreement under the Regulations, was not regulation 9 but regulation 18 11, which applies where agreement is reached “in terms other than those contained in the proposal”. It was, however, this regulation that the ratepayer was seeking to avoid by withdrawing the appeals, since an alteration made in consequence of such agreement would have taken effect on 1 April 1990.

[48]Mr Village relied more strongly, as I have said, on the VO’s duty under section 41(1) of the 1988 Act to maintain the list, but in my judgment this does not assist him. He said that it was this duty that obliged the VO, once he had agreed the reduced value as correct, to alter the list so as to show that correct value. However, the VO’s duty to compile and then maintain the list – a duty to compile and maintain an accurate list (see Corus supra) – did not come into existence in relation to either of the appeal hereditaments when the agreements on their rateable values were reached in 1994. Nor did the inaccuracies which the agreed alterations were designed to correct come into existence when the rateable values were agreed in 1994. They were inaccuracies in the list on the date it was compiled, 1 April 1990. If, therefore, the VO was in 1994 in breach of his duty to maintain the list – placing him, as Mr Village claims, under an obligation to alter the list so as to show the correct (agreed) assessments, and giving the ratepayer a right to have the alteration made – he was, in my judgment, equally under such a duty, and the consequential obligation and right existed, continuously from the time when the list came into force, ie 1 April 1990. The only effect of the agreement in each case, it seems to me, was to provide evidence that, since the valuers had agreed what the correct value of the hereditament was, that was the value that should have been ascribed to the hereditament in the list on 1 April 1990. I do not think, therefore, that if the obligation and the right for which the ratepayer contends did exist, they would create an entitlement to have the list altered in the first half of 1994 rather than on 1 April 1990. Nor, therefore, would they create an entitlement to have a correct entry in the list that took effect on 1 April 1992 rather than on 1 April 1990.

[49]The discussion in the previous paragraph does, I believe, show the fallacy of Mr Village’s reliance on the VO’s general duty that is contained in section 41(1). It is, in my judgment, no part of the scheme of the Act that section 41(1) should be treated as the statutory foundation for specific duties and rights in relation to the alteration of rating lists. Section 55 is the provision that performs this function. It does so by providing for regulations to be made as to the making of proposals, the procedure to be followed when a proposal is made, the time from which an alteration (whether or not made in consequence of a proposal) is to have effect, and other matters. The successive regulations that have been made under this section have made extensive provision for these matters. The 1993 Regulations gave the ratepayer rights that it could exercise to ensure that the assessment its agents had agreed with the VO would be entered in the list. Under regulation 11(1) the agreement could have been “signified in writing” and the VO would then have been obliged to alter the list to give effect to the agreement. Alternatively the appeal could have proceeded and the ratepayer, exercising its right under regulation 39 to appear at the hearing, could have asked the VT to give effect to the agreement by their order under regulation 44(1). The regulations thus enabled the ratepayer to ensure that the correct assessment, the one that its agents had agreed with the VO, should be entered in the list. Mr Village’s submission was that the appellant’s right to have the list altered crystallised when the appeal was withdrawn; and it thus contained the improbable proposition that the ratepayer in such circumstances gains the right to have the correct value inserted in the list by abandoning the very proceedings provided by the legislation for enabling him to ensure that the list shows the correct value. 19

[50]If the ratepayer had exercised its rights under the regulations, either through a written agreement under regulation 11(1) or by pursuing the appeal to the VT, the list would have been altered with effect from 1 April 1990. It was this that the ratepayer wanted to avoid. It wanted the correct value to appear in the list with effect from 1 April 1992 but it wanted the incorrect value to appear in the list for the previous two years. The agents were therefore at pains to ensure that there was no agreement “signified in writing” that the appeals were withdrawn, and, in the Manchester case, that the VT’s decision determining the appeal should be set aside. The reason the ratepayer wanted an alteration to the list made otherwise than in consequence of its proposal was to secure the purely adventitious benefit that would arise as a result through the operation of the transitional arrangements. If the incorrect assessment appeared in the list for the years 1990-91 and 1991-92 it would take advantage of the relief provisions and thus pay less rates than if the correct assessment had appeared. It was self- evidently no part of purpose of the transitional arrangements that the ratepayer ought to be able to opt to have them applied on the basis of the incorrect, rather than the correct, assessment. It is to be noted that a letter dated 8 July 1994 to the chief finance officers of billing authorities, included as appendix D to Rating Circular no 119, said that the purpose of the amendment in the 1994 (Amendment) Regulations was to enable “an anomaly in the transitional arrangements” to be corrected (see Corus [2002] RA 1 at 5, para 10). Sullivan J clearly accepted that there was an anomaly (ibid para 11). In abandoning its rights under the Regulations by withdrawing its appeal in each case I do not think the ratepayer acquired any right under section 41(1) to have an incorrect assessment kept in the list in order to secure the adventitious benefit that this would bring.

[51]There is, in any event, a further objection to Mr Village’s contention. It was not his case that there was an agreement between the parties that the VO would alter the list to show the agreed assessment with effect from 1 April 1992. He said rather that there was an understanding that this would be done, and that the appellant had a right that it would be done that accrued on the withdrawal of the appeal. But whether it is expressed as an agreement or an understanding giving rise to rights and obligations, there is, in my view, a fundamental objection to the argument. The VO’s duty under section 41(1) to maintain an accurate list is a duty owed not to an individual ratepayer but to the public at large. It is a duty, therefore, that cannot be qualified by any agreement or arrangement or understanding between the VO and a ratepayer. The agreement on value could not give rise to any duty on the VO’s part to alter the list to show that value. It could only provide evidence of what the correct value was; so that if, for instance, before the VO altered the list, further evidence became available that suggested that some other value was correct, the VO would not be obliged – indeed he would not be entitled – to ignore this further evidence. (4) Interpretation Act and non-retrospectivity

[52]Since I have rejected Mr Village’s contention that the agreement on value in each case and the withdrawal of the appeal gave rise to a right on the part of the appellant to have the list altered with effect from 1 April 1992 and/or an obligation on the part of the VO to so alter it, the question whether any such right or obligation was kept alive either by the Interpretation Act or under the principle of non-retrospectivity does not arise. 20 (5) Legitimate expectation

[53]I can deal very shortly with Mr Village’s submissions on legitimate expectation. For a legitimate expectation to arise it is necessary that there should either be an express promise given by a public authority or the existence of a regular practice which the person relying on it can reasonably expect to continue: see Council for Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service

[1985] AC 374

, per Lord Fraser of Tullybelton at 401. There was not, as I have found, any express promise by either VO that the list would be altered as agreed with effect from 1 April 1992 even though the regulations might be altered to prescribe a different date. Similarly any regular practice on the part of VOs in altering lists could only be a practice to make alterations in accordance with the law. There is nothing, therefore, in the present cases on which a legitimate expectation can be founded. Moreover there can be no legitimate expectation that would require a public authority to act contrary to law (see R v Secretary of State for Education and Employment, ex p Begbie), so that any legitimate expectation that the VO would amend the list with effect from 1 April 1992 could not have survived the coming into force of the 1994 (Amendment) Regulations. Regulation 44 and Marks v Spencer v Fernley (VO)

[54]Regulation 44(1) empowers a VT, on or after deciding an appeal, to require the VO to alter the list in accordance with any provision made by or under the Act. Under regulation 47(5) the Lands Tribunal, in an appeal from a VT, may make any order that the VT could have made. Miss Lieven’s submission was that the VT was able, indeed it was bound, to order that the alteration to the list should have effect from 1 April 1990; and it would follow, if she is right, that the same would apply in relation to the Lands Tribunal. Miss Lieven placed reliance, as I have already said, on the decision of the Court of Appeal in Marks & Spencer v Fernley (VO). In that case property entered in the 1990 valuation list as three hereditaments was the subject of three proposals by the ratepayer seeking lower rateable values of the three hereditaments and a fourth proposal, also by the ratepayer, asking that the three hereditaments be entered as a single hereditament. On 9 March 1992 the VO altered the list so as to show the three hereditaments as a single hereditament at £13.8m RV with effect from 1 April 1991. (Under regulation 6(1) of the 1990 Regulations as amended by the 1990 (Amendment (No 2) Regulations no alteration other than one in pursuance of a completion notice or the order of a tribunal on appeal was to have effect earlier than the first day in which the alteration was made.) With the four appeals from the ratepayer’s proposals outstanding, the ratepayer was deemed to have appealed against this proposal. On 31 March 1992 the ratepayer made a fifth proposal challenging the effective date of the single hereditament alteration. Some months later it withdrew the first four proposals. Before the VT the VO contended that the effective date should be 1 April 1990 and the ratepayer contended for 1 Apr 1991. The VT determined that there should be a single entry in the list at £10.2m RV with effect from 1 April 1990. The Lands Tribunal upheld this decision.

[55]Among the contentions advanced by the ratepayer in the appeal to the Court of Appeal was that it was not open to the VT to order an effective date earlier than 1 April 1991. Although under regulation 4(6A) of the 1990 Regulations an alteration made to correct an inaccuracy in the list on the day it was compiled was to take effect on that date, this provision was subject to regulation 6; and, under regulation 6 of the 1990 Regulations, the effective 21 date for both VO’s alteration of 9 March 1992 and any alteration made pursuant to the ratepayer’s proposal of 31 March 1992 was 1 April 1991. The Court of Appeal, however, upheld the decision of the Lands Tribunal that regulation 13(7) of the 1993 Regulations (which contained the same provision as regulation 4(6A) of the 1990 Regulations) was the relevant provision. The operation of regulation 15 in the 1993 Regulations (limiting the retrospective effect of alterations under regulation 13) did not apply to an alteration made in pursuance of the order of a VT in an appeal (regulation 15(1)(c), formerly regulation 6(1)(c), and later regulation 6A(1)(c), of the 1990 Regulations), so as to limit the operation of regulation 13(7).

[56]Mr Village’s contention was that the duty of a VT is to determine the appeal in accordance with the law, and in each of the present cases that meant determining the appeal in accordance with the rights and obligations that he said had come into existence through the agreement on value and the understanding about the consequential steps to be taken by the VO. I have rejected his contention that the agreement and understanding in some way qualified the way in which the VO was obliged to carry out his statutory duties. Even if it did, however, any such agreement between the parties would not have bound the VT. As Peter Gibson LJ, with whom Sedley LJ and Sir Christopher Staughton agreed, put it ([1999] RA 409 at 416):

“The valuation tribunal, in my judgment, is not bound by the agreement or late abandonment of points by the appellant. The valuation tribunal must decide the issues before it in accordance with the law, and in doing so, it will no doubt consider that its decision may affect persons other than the parties before it. The powers of a valuation tribunal setting an effective date are not the same as those of a valuation officer altering the list.”

[57]The result is that the effective date of the alterations in respect of each of the appeal hereditaments is determined for the purposes of these appeals by regulation 13(7). Each was an alteration to correct an inaccuracy in the list on the day it was compiled, ie 1 April 1990, and it must accordingly have effect from that day. That was what each VT decided, and the appeals are therefore dismissed.

[58]The parties are invited to make submissions on costs, and a letter dealing with this accompanies this decision. The decision will take effect when, but not until, the question of costs has been determined. Dated 21 August 2003 George Bartlett QC, President 22 ADDENDUM ON COSTS

[59]The respondents ask for their costs and the appellant does not resist this. The appellant must pay the respondents their costs of the appeals, such costs if not agreed to be the subject of a detailed assessment by the Registrar on the standard basis; and, at the request of the respondents, I make clear for the avoidance of doubt that this order is not to apply to such costs as have already been the subject of specific orders. Dated 10 September 2003 George Bartlett QC, President 23