“(1) A party may give notice of the withdrawal of their appeal— (a) by providing to the Tribunal a written notice of withdrawal of the appeal; or (b) orally at a hearing, and in either case must specify the reasons for that withdrawal. (2) The Tribunal must (save for good reason) treat an appeal as withdrawn if the respondent notifies the Tribunal and each other party that the decision (or, where the appeal relates to more than one decision, all of the decisions) to which the appeal relates has been withdrawn and specifies the reasons for the withdrawal of the decision. (3) The Tribunal must notify each party in writing that a withdrawal has taken effect under this rule and that the proceedings are no longer regarded by the Tribunal as pending.”
“There is no proper basis for concluding that the Israeli state would persecute the Applicant for a convention or any other reason, nor is there any reason to conclude that it would not be willing and able to provide adequate protection in respect of any risk presented by non-state actors.”
“the Respondent wishes to grant the Appellant Refugee Status and thereby seeks permission to withdraw their decision.”
“I am writing with regard [sic] the above named who has/have an outstanding appeal before the First-tier Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber). This matter has been reviewed ahead of the scheduled hearing. The review has considered: • the grounds of appeal • the evidence submitted • any material changes since the date of the decision under appeal In the light of the review, it has been concluded the decision to refuse is no longer appropriate and the immigration decision is therefore withdrawn. It is anticipated that refugee leave will be granted, subject to any further checks which are required and the appellant providing any documents requested. If leave is not granted a new decision will be made. It is requested HMCTS accepts the decision as withdrawn and vacates the appeal hearing.” • the grounds of appeal • the evidence submitted • any material changes since the date of the decision under appeal It is requested HMCTS accepts the decision as withdrawn and vacates the appeal hearing.”
“(a) urgently disclose the internal minute recorded on file on which the SSHD based the decision to withdraw the refusal; (b) confirm that the SSHD accepts that our client meets the Immigration Rules with respect to Article 8 and also qualifies for Article 8 leave outside of the Rules; (c) confirm that the SSHD will grant our client refugee status.”
“we have withdrawn the above case and have granted the Appellant refugee leave on the basis of a change in the country situation in Israel.”
“on the grant, the basis of WD (which means withdrawal – our addition) is meeting the refugee convention requirements. The leave implemented would be consistent with those rules. POU are not experts on implementation. It falls outside our sphere of knowledge; how and what precise conditions will be attached. The A is not disadvantaged as an allowed appeal would be subject to the same implementation process.”
“14) The application will now fall to be granted. The type of grant will be dependent on the basis upon which it was withdrawn, i.e., refugee status or leave under Article 8 private life […] This will be updated once we are able to liaise with the Senior Caseworker.”
“I had understood that under the "withdrawn to grant" process, the triage minute would act in place of the grant minute, and that it would be a case of the secondary casework team implementing the decision, unless ALAR are minded to change their position and/or withdraw the triage minute and replace it.”
“it would be good to understand whether this was going to be a reconsideration or a withdrawal to grant case as I am not clear…”
“I’ve read the ITN and note that in the ‘Next Steps’ section you state to Ministers: “The application will now fall to be granted.” “Confess I'm slightly lost here - my understanding was the purpose of the application coming back to asylum was that we would consider it. We will need to consider it in detail but based on an initial look at the claim it was (and still is) a very weak claim and the country information is also problematic (although we will seek further input from CPIT on this). So there is a chance that we would want to maintain the refusal. I'm in a pretty difficult position here on what to advise our operational colleagues. Is there clear guidance that you have received that we must grant? Or are ALAR content for us to explore how we can potentially refuse. I think our hands are massively tied by what's gone before but I'm very uncomfortable with the approach of just granting this.” (Our emboldening). It is apparent to us that from then on the department headed by Ms Bickerton took the approach that this was a WTR. Or, if it was a WTG, they took on the responsibility of resiling from a SLE representation. We are not clear whether Ms Bickerton fully understood the difference. On the 17th of April 2024, Muriel Kelly, who is a Secondary Asylum Casework Lead, emailed Ms Bickerton and others a link to the Guidance for HOPOs on withdrawing decisions. She highlighted that according to the guidance, a decision could be withdrawn if “new evidence […] leads to the conclusion that […] a grant of leave or status, subject to security and other checks, is now appropriate.”
“20. It is accepted that discrimination may exist at a societal level, however this has been considered in the context of your own personal circumstances. You live in Kafr Qasem, a city 20km aways from the Capital Tel Aviv and on one occasion have lived in Tel Aviv. More widely, your town is surrounded by multiple other towns that are largely populated by Israeli nationals of Arab ethnicity. Your extended family, cousins, aunts and uncles also reside close by (AIR 20). You provided details that your extended family members, such as your grandparents, whom you have regular contact with, still reside in Israel. You further state that until recently, your father also lived in Israel (AIR, WS). You have not outlined any problems or issues that your family in Israel have specifically faced that will directly impact you. … 21. … it is considered there is no real risk of harm because you have access to police protection, which by your own account, you have not attempted to approach the police nor sought the protection from the authorities in Israel against any claimed discrimination. You have not tested the protection apparatus in place to support you. Your fear that you will not be provided assistance is considered speculative. External sources also show there are laws in Israel which prevent discrimination and persecution against citizens based on; gender, sexuality, religion, ethnicity, and age (USSD Report, 2023)…. 44. … within your first WS (witness statement) you state your cousin was shot and killed by the police. By your own account you have never had an encounter with the authorities and have therefore demonstrated no reason as to why your cousin’s death suggests there is any adverse interest in you on their behalf.”
“we are not responsible for the ultimate decision, that was a different team”
“My understanding is that whilst the HOPO has the authority to withdraw the decision as not sustainable on appeal, it is for the decision-making team to determine whether someone is a refugee, and therefore entitled to refugee status”
“It is clear beyond doubt, in my view, that the Secretary of State must not use the withdrawal power as a tactical exercise to avoid having to apply for an adjournment. She must only use it if she is genuinely of the view that she might change her mind on reconsidering the material that is put before her. It would be a wrongful exercise, and unfair to an appellant, if she were simply to use this power because she wanted more time to deal with the material that was put forward but had no intention of changing her mind as a result of it.”
“28. […] It is well-established that there is no distinction in law between a government minister and his civil servants. In the present context the minister is the Secretary of State and the civil servants are the HOPOs employed by the Home Office, the organisation which gives effect to the Secretary of State’s decisions and policies and is directly answerable to him. The principle engaged was formulated by the Court of Appeal in Carltona v Commissioners of Works and Others[1943] 2 All ER 560 , at 563A, in these terms: “In the administration of government in this country the functions which are given to ministers (and constitutionally properly given to ministers because they are constitutionally responsible) are functions so multifarious that no minister could ever personally attend to them. To take the example of the present case no doubt there have been thousands of requisitions in this country by individual ministers. It cannot be supposed that this regulation meant that, in each case, the minister in person should direct his mind to the matter. The duties imposed upon ministers and the powers given to ministers are normally exercised under the authority of the ministers by responsible officials of the department. Public business could not be carried on if that were not the case. Constitutionally, the decision of such an official is, of course, the decision of the minister. The minister is responsible. It is he who must answer before Parliament for anything that his officials have done under his authority, and, if for an important matter he selected an official of such junior standing that he could not be expected competently to perform the work, the minister would have to answer for that in Parliament. The whole system of departmental organisation and administration is based on the view that ministers, being responsible to Parliament, will see that important duties are committed to experienced officials. If they do not do that, Parliament is the place where complaint must be made against them.” “This principle has been applied to the immigration context: in R v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex-parte Oladehinde[1990] 2 WLR 1195 at 1218B/D especially, per Lord Donaldson MR. “29. We are of the opinion that the Carltona principle applies to the relationship of Secretary of State and HOPOs. While this principle is, as Lord Donaldson MR recognised in Oladehinde at 125E, capable of being “negative or confined by express statutory provisions”, or by “clearly necessary implication”, neither is identifiable in the present context. In this context we take cognisance of the analysis in Yeo (supra) that the Secretary of State and HOPO’s are a single entity and may be regarded as a litigant in person. It follows that the Secretary of State – and the Secretary of State alone – is fully responsible for the actions of HOPOs. No separate individual liability or responsibility attaches to such persons. As the Secretary of State and the HOPO are indistinguishable in law it follows that in the language of section 29(6) of the 2007 Act a HOPO does not conduct proceedings on behalf of the Secretary of State. Rather, the HOPO is, in this discrete context, the alter ego of the Secretary of State, one and the same person.” “In the administration of government in this country the functions which are given to ministers (and constitutionally properly given to ministers because they are constitutionally responsible) are functions so multifarious that no minister could ever personally attend to them. To take the example of the present case no doubt there have been thousands of requisitions in this country by individual ministers. It cannot be supposed that this regulation meant that, in each case, the minister in person should direct his mind to the matter. The duties imposed upon ministers and the powers given to ministers are normally exercised under the authority of the ministers by responsible officials of the department. Public business could not be carried on if that were not the case. Constitutionally, the decision of such an official is, of course, the decision of the minister. The minister is responsible. It is he who must answer before Parliament for anything that his officials have done under his authority, and, if for an important matter he selected an official of such junior standing that he could not be expected competently to perform the work, the minister would have to answer for that in Parliament. The whole system of departmental organisation and administration is based on the view that ministers, being responsible to Parliament, will see that important duties are committed to experienced officials. If they do not do that, Parliament is the place where complaint must be made against them.”
“…The speeches in Ridge v. Baldwin [1964] A.C. 40 show that an administrative body may, in a proper case, be bound to give a person who is affected by their decision an opportunity of making representations. It all depends on whether he has some right or interest, or, I would add, some legitimate expectation, of which it would not be fair to deprive him without hearing what he has to say...”
“Judicial review, now regulated by R.S.C., Ord. 53, provides the means by which judicial control of administrative action is exercised. The subject matter of every judicial review is a decision made by some person (or body of persons) whom I will call the "decision-maker" or else a refusal by him to make a decision. “To qualify as a subject for judicial review the decision must have consequences which affect some person (or body of persons) other than the decision-maker, although it may affect him too. It must affect such other person either: “(a) by altering rights or obligations of that person which are enforceable by or against him in private law; or “(b) by depriving him of some benefit or advantage which either (i) he had in the past been permitted by the decision-maker to enjoy and which he can legitimately expect to be permitted to continue to do until there has been communicated to him some rational grounds for withdrawing it on which he has been given an opportunity to comment; or (ii) he has received assurance from the decision-maker will not be withdrawn without giving him first an opportunity of advancing reasons for contending that they should not be withdrawn. (I prefer to continue to call the kind of expectation that qualifies a decision for inclusion in class (b) a "legitimate expectation" rather than a "reasonable expectation," in order thereby to indicate that it has consequences to which effect will be given in public law, whereas an expectation or hope that some benefit or advantage would continue to be enjoyed, although it might well be entertained by a "reasonable" man, would not necessarily have such consequences. The recent decision of this House in In re Findlay [1985] A.C. 318 presents an example of the latter kind of expectation. "Reasonable" furthermore bears different meanings according to whether the context in which it is being used is that of private law or of public law. To eliminate confusion it is best avoided in the latter.)”
“So if, in a case involving no breach of statutory duty, the [public authority] makes an agreement or representation from which it cannot withdraw without substantial unfairness to the [citizen] who has relied on it, that may found a successful application for judicial review … If a public authority so conducts itself as to create a legitimate expectation that a certain course will be followed it would often be unfair if the authority were permitted to follow a different course to the detriment of one who entertained the expectation, particularly if he acted on it.”
“For reasons which will appear I propose to consider the substantive issue before that of jurisdiction. The law in relation to legitimate expectation created by a public body was concisely stated by Bingham LJ in the recent case of R v Board of Inland Revenue, ex p MFK Underwriting Agencies Ltd[1990] 1 All ER 91 at 110,[1990] 1 WLR 1545 at 1569–1570. Bingham LJ said: 'In so stating these requirements I do not, I hope, diminish or emasculate the valuable developing doctrine of legitimate expectation. If a public authority so conducts itself as to create a legitimate expectation that a certain course will be followed it would often be unfair if the authority were permitted to follow a different course to the detriment of one who entertained the expectation, particularly if he acted on it. If in private law a body would be in breach of contract in so acting or estopped from so acting a public authority should generally be in no better position. The doctrine of legitimate expectation is rooted in fairness. But fairness is not a one-way street. It imports the notion of equitableness, of fair and open dealing, to which the authority is as much entitled as the citizen.' “The doctrine has many similarities with the principles of estoppel in private law. In my judgment the matters that the applicant has to prove in this case are these. (1) A clear and unambiguous representation (see per Bingham LJ in Ex p MFK Underwriting Agencies Ltd[1990] 1 All ER 91 at 110,[1990] 1 WLR 1545 at 1569–1570). (2) That since the applicant was not a person to whom any representation was directly made it was within the class of persons who are entitled to rely upon it; or at any rate that it was reasonable for the applicant to rely upon it without more (see A-G of Hong Kong v Ng Yuen Shiu[1983] 2 All ER 346 at 351,[1983] 2 AC 629 at 638). (3) That it did so rely upon it. (4) That it did so to its detriment. While in some cases it is not altogether clear that this is a necessary ingredient, since a public body is entitled to change its policy if it is acting in good faith, it is a necessary ingredient where, as here, an applicant is saying, 'You cannot alter your policy now in my case; it is too late'. (5) That there is no overriding interest arising from their duties and responsibilities for the proper conduct or due encouragement of horse-racing as required in their charter which entitled the Jockey Club to change their policy to the detriment of the applicant. “The burden of proving the first four points is, in my judgment, upon the applicant. It is the submission on behalf of the Jockey Club that it has failed to satisfy this burden in each respect. As to the fifth requirement, it seems to me that that is a matter for the Jockey Club to establish.”
“56. What is still the subject of some controversy is the court's role when a member of the public, as a result of a promise or other conduct, has a legitimate expectation that he will be treated in one way and the public body wishes to treat him or her in a different way. Here the starting point has to be to ask what in the circumstances the member of the public could legitimately expect. In the words of Lord Scarman in In re Findlay[1985] AC 318 , 338, "But what was their legitimate expectation?" Where there is a dispute as to this, the dispute has to be determined by the court, as happened in In re Findlay. This can involve a detailed examination of the precise terms of the promise or representation made, the circumstances in which the promise was made and the nature of the statutory or other discretion. “57. There are at least three possible outcomes, (a) The court may decide that the public authority is only required to bear in mind its previous policy or other representation, giving it the weight it thinks right, but no more, before deciding whether to change course. Here the court is confined to reviewing the decision on Wednesbury grounds (Associated ProvincialPicture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corp[1948] 1 KB 223 ). This has been held to be the effect of changes of policy in cases involving the early release of prisoners: see In re Findlay[1985] AC 318 ; R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex p Hargreaves[1997] 1 WLR 906 . (b) On the other hand the court may decide that the promise or practice induces a legitimate expectation of, for example, being consulted before a particular decision is taken. Here it is uncontentious that the court itself will require the opportunity for consultation to be given unless there is an overriding reason to resile from it (see Attorney General of Hong Kong v Ng Yuen Shiu[1983] 2 AC 629 ) in which case the court will itself judge the adequacy of the reason advanced for the change of policy, taking into account what fairness requires. (c) Where the court considers that a lawful promise or practice has induced a legitimate expectation of a benefit which is substantive, not simply procedural, authority now establishes that here too the court will in a proper case decide whether to frustrate the expectation is so unfair that to take a new and different course will amount to an abuse of power. Here, once the legitimacy of the expectation is established, the court will have the task of weighing the requirements of fairness against any overriding interest relied upon for the change of policy.”
“… the notion of a promise or practice of present and future substantive policy risks proving too much. The doctrine of substantive legitimate expectation plainly cannot apply to every case where a public authority operates a policy over an appreciable period. That would expand the doctrine far beyond its proper limits. The establishment of any policy, new or substitute, by a public body is in principle subject to Wednesbury review. But a claim that a substitute policy has been established in breach of a substantive legitimate expectation engages a much more rigorous standard. It will be adjudged, as I have foreshadowed, by the court’s own view of what fairness requires. This is a principal outcome of this court’s decision in Ex p. Coughlan (see in particular paragraphs 74, 78, 81 and 82). It demonstrates the importance of finding the reach of substantive legitimate expectation.”
“A duty to consult before modifying policy may arise from an explicit promise to do so. … But there is no equivalent expectation that policy itself, and with it any substantive benefits it confers, will not change. It follows that the most that the beneficiary of a current policy can legitimately expect in substantive terms is, first, that the policy will be fairly applied or disapplied in his particular case, and secondly that if the policy is altered to his disadvantage, the alteration must not be effected in a way which unfairly frustrates any reliance he has legitimately placed on it.”
“58. The key factor in Coughlan was, Laws LJ said, the limited number of individuals affected by the promise in question. Significantly, so far as concerns the present appeal, he also said at 1131: “The more the decision challenged lies in what may inelegantly be called the macro-political field, the less intrusive will be the court’s supervision. More than this: in that field, true abuse of power is less likely to be found, since within it changes of policy, fuelled by broad conceptions of the public interest, may more readily be accepted as taking precedence over the interests of groups which enjoyed expectations generated by an earlier policy.” “59. Laws LJ considered the evolving case law in this field in Nadarajah v Secretary of State for the Home Department[2005] EWCA Civ. 1363 , albeit on an expressly obiter basis—see [67]. In explaining the basis for substantive legitimate expectations, he made these observations at [68]: “It is said to be grounded in fairness, and no doubt in general terms that is so. I would prefer to express it rather more broadly as a requirement of good administration, by which public bodies ought to deal straightforwardly and consistently with the public. In my judgment this is a legal standard which, although not found in terms in the European Convention on Human Rights, takes its place alongside such rights as fair trial, and no punishment without law. That being so there is every reason to articulate the limits of this requirement—to describe what may count as good reason to depart from it—as we have come to articulate the limits of other constitutional principles overtly found in the European Convention. Accordingly a public body’s promise or practice as to future conduct may only be denied, and thus the standard I have expressed may only be departed from, in circumstances where to do so is the public body’s legal duty, or is otherwise, to use a now familiar vocabulary, a proportionate response (of which the court is the judge, or the last judge) having regard to a legitimate aim pursued by the public body in the public interest. The principle that good administration requires public authorities to be held to their promises would be undermined if the law did not insist that any failure or refusal to comply is objectively justified as a proportionate measure in the circumstances.” “Laws LJ also returned in [69] to the theme of decisions not to fulfil an undertaking for policy reasons falling within the “macro-political” field. I will consider his remarks on this subject in the next section of this judgment…. “62. From these authorities it can be deduced that where a clear and unambiguous undertaking has been made, the authority giving the undertaking will not be allowed to depart from it unless it is shown that it is fair to do so. The court is the arbiter of fairness in this context. And a matter sounding on the question of fairness is whether the alteration in policy frustrates any reliance which the person or group has placed on it. This is quite different, in my opinion, from saying that it is a prerequisite of a substantive legitimate expectation claim that the person relying on it must show that he or she has suffered a detriment.” “The more the decision challenged lies in what may inelegantly be called the macro-political field, the less intrusive will be the court’s supervision. More than this: in that field, true abuse of power is less likely to be found, since within it changes of policy, fuelled by broad conceptions of the public interest, may more readily be accepted as taking precedence over the interests of groups which enjoyed expectations generated by an earlier policy.” “It is said to be grounded in fairness, and no doubt in general terms that is so. I would prefer to express it rather more broadly as a requirement of good administration, by which public bodies ought to deal straightforwardly and consistently with the public. In my judgment this is a legal standard which, although not found in terms in the European Convention on Human Rights, takes its place alongside such rights as fair trial, and no punishment without law. That being so there is every reason to articulate the limits of this requirement—to describe what may count as good reason to depart from it—as we have come to articulate the limits of other constitutional principles overtly found in the European Convention. Accordingly a public body’s promise or practice as to future conduct may only be denied, and thus the standard I have expressed may only be departed from, in circumstances where to do so is the public body’s legal duty, or is otherwise, to use a now familiar vocabulary, a proportionate response (of which the court is the judge, or the last judge) having regard to a legitimate aim pursued by the public body in the public interest. The principle that good administration requires public authorities to be held to their promises would be undermined if the law did not insist that any failure or refusal to comply is objectively justified as a proportionate measure in the circumstances.”
“Has it been settled that the case will proceed through the usual “withdrawn to grant” process (and will be for asylum teams to implement the grant of refugee status)….” (2) Ms Amini’s email of 21 March: “note to implementation team: Asylum DMU/Implementation team must notify POU Birmingham before sending any grant letters out. Further action may be pending that could impact on this decision to grant”; (3) Adrian Trigg’s email of26 March 2024 : “I had understood that under the “withdrawn to grant” process, the triage minute would act in place of the grant minute, and that it would be a case of the secondary casework team implementing the decision, unless ALAR are minded to change their position and/or withdraw the grant minute and replace it.” (4) An email from Asylum National Workflow dated27 March 2024 , referring to “recon” having been “done” on 11th March; (5) The ITN of13 March 2024 , by Dave Johnson, stating that “the application will now fall to be granted” and that the “type of grant will be dependent” on what the Senior Caseworker (Mr Sansom) had to say about the basis for the withdrawal decision; (6) The ITN of14 March 2024 , by Dave Beaumont, explaining that the decision to withdraw was “within the remit” of the decision-maker (Mr Sansom) and advising of the risk of “[a]ny attempt to row back” from this decision; and (7) Mark Hendry’s email of2 April 2024 : “I have discussed with Zahid and he is content for secondary casework to proceed with implementing the grant of asylum, unless there are any objections.”
“the Respondent wishes to grant the appellant refugee status” and “it has been concluded the decision to refuse is no longer appropriate and the immigration decision is therefore withdrawn. It is anticipated that refugee leave will be granted, subject to any further checks which are required”