“The French passport 06AP29633X issued in 2006 with the name of Reine Chimi DOB 03.09.1977 has been fraudulently obtained. The investigation conducted by the French authorities have proven that the birth certificate provided when applying for the document was a false certificate consequently the document has been cancelled since the 30.07.2007.”
“40 Deprivation of Citizenship (1) In this section a reference to a person’s “citizenship status” is a reference to his status as – (a) a British citizen, (b) a British overseas territories citizen, (c) a British Overseas citizen, (d) a British National (overseas) (e) a British protected person or, (f) a British subject. (2) The Secretary of State may by order deprive a person of a citizenship status if the Secretary of State is satisfied that deprivation is conducive to the public good. (3) The Secretary of State may by order deprive a person of citizenship status which results from his registration or naturalisation if the Secretary of State is satisfied that the registration or naturalisation was obtained by means of – (a) fraud, (b) false representation, or (c) concealment of a material fact.” (a) a British citizen, (b) a British overseas territories citizen, (c) a British Overseas citizen, (d) a British National (overseas) (e) a British protected person or, (f) a British subject. (a) fraud, (b) false representation, or (c) concealment of a material fact.”
“40A Deprivation of citizenship: appeal (1) A person who is given notice under section 40(5) of a decision to make an order in respect of him under section 40 may appeal against the decision to the First-tier Tribunal. (2) Subsection (1) shall not apply to a decision if the Secretary of State certifies that it was taken wholly or partly in reliance on information which in his opinion should not be made public – (a) in the interests of national security, (b) in the interest of the relationship between the United Kingdom and another country, or (c) otherwise in the public interest.” (a) in the interests of national security, (b) in the interest of the relationship between the United Kingdom and another country, or (c) otherwise in the public interest.”
“[95] The decision in Begum is clear about the approach which SIAC should take to this issue in a case which does not involve Convention rights. The question is whether SIAC may take a different approach in a human rights case, and in particular, whether SIAC may make its own assessment of the interests of national security. The key point is that when the House of Lords considered the appeal in Rehman SIAC had full jurisdiction to decide questions of fact and law (see paragraph 74, above), and could exercise differently any administrative discretion conferred on the Secretary of State (see paragraph 73, above). Despite that full jurisdiction, SIAC's role on an appeal was limited in the way that Lord Hoffmann described. [96] The Supreme Court considered obiter, in passages which are, nonetheless, strongly persuasive, what approach SIAC should take to Convention rights. In the passages which I have quoted or summarised in paragraphs 72, 83, and 85 the Supreme Court said that when SIAC has to decide whether the Secretary of State has acted incompatibly with an appellant's Convention rights, SIAC's function is not a secondary reviewing function. It has to decide for itself whether the impugned decision is lawful. It has to decide the matter 'objectively on the basis of its own assessment'; it 'must reach its own view…as an independent tribunal, rather than reviewing the decision of the Secretary of State'. [97] The parties' submissions might suggest that there is a tension between those passages. I do not consider that there is. Even when SIAC had full jurisdiction in fact and law, and had power to exercise the Secretary of State's discretion afresh, there were narrow limits on its institutional capacity to review the Secretary of State's assessment of the interests of national security. SIAC has full power to review the compatibility of the Secretary of State's decisions with Convention rights. That means that SIAC must assess the risk of any breach of article 3, and the proportionality of any interference with qualified rights for itself. It does not entail, in my judgment, however, that SIAC can, in assessing proportionality, substitute its evaluation of the interests of national security for that of the Secretary of State. The starting point for an assessment of proportionality is that the Secretary of State's assessment goes into one side of the balance, unless it is susceptible to criticism in one of the ways described in Rehman. […] [102] In my judgment, SIAC must apply the approach which is described in Begum to the Secretary of State's assessment of the interests of national security in an article 8 case, just as much as it should in a case in which Convention rights are not at issue. That was the approach of the Supreme Court in Lord Carlile's case. I accept that there are significant procedural differences between an appeal to SIAC and the application for judicial review in that case. Nonetheless, there is a common principle, which is that in both contexts, what is balanced against the Convention rights of the appellant or claimant is the assessment of the executive, tested in the limited ways which are described in Rehman and endorsed in Begum. Despite its expert membership, SIAC does not have the institutional competence to assess the risk for itself as a primary decision-maker. Nor is it democratically accountable. If SIAC were to call the risk incorrectly, the executive, not SIAC, would suffer the political fallout. The executive can be removed at a general election; SIAC cannot. I have had the advantage of reading Sir Stephen Irwin's judgment in draft. I do not understand him to be differing in any way from my statement of the test which SIAC should apply in an appeal, such as this, in which article 8 rights may be engaged.”
“[115] The 1997 Act clearly distinguishes between appeals and applications for statutory reviews (see section 2C-E of the 1997 Act). SIAC must apply the principles which apply on an application for judicial review to the latter, but not the former. On the appeals which are not statutory reviews, SIAC is not confined, on all issues which might arise on that appeal, to applying public law principles, still less to considering only the materials which were before the Secretary of State when the Secretary of State made the impugned decision. There are at least two relevant distinctions. First, on some issues, the law does not require SIAC to apply a traditional public law approach at all (for example, on issues about Convention rights, as is clear from many of the passages in Begum which I have quoted or summarised above) and see paragraph 82, above. Secondly, even where SIAC is limited to applying public law principles (for example, when it considers the Secretary of State’s assessment of the interests of national security), it does not necessarily follow that SIAC should confine itself to material which was before the Secretary of State. For example, SIAC is entitled to take into account material which comes to light on an exculpatory review; and that material might not have been before the Secretary of State when she made the decision. Moreover, SIAC may exclude material which the Secretary of State took into account, for example, if it decides that there is a risk that it was obtained as a result of article 3 ill treatment. In any event, SIAC hears evidence on an appeal, which was not before the Secretary of State, and is entitled to make of that evidence what it may.”
“[28] We therefore conclude that Mr Underwood was correct to submit that the grounds on which a deprivation decision taken for national security reasons can be impugned include all grounds which would be available in a claim for judicial review. He was also, in our view, correct that, if the national security assessment were shown to be flawed by a material public law error, and SSHD was unable to show that the outcome would inevitably have been the same irrespective of this error, the proper course would be to set the decision aside so that the assessment could be conducted again by the Home Secretary.”
“[40] SIAC is, accordingly, not debarred from considering evidence that was not before the decision-maker at the time of a decision. But there are strict limits to what it can do with such evidence when its purpose is to undermine a national security assessment. It is important that there should be clarity about those limits and their implications for a case such as the present: (a) The present case is one where the deprivation decision turns on a national security assessment. So, in practical terms, does the entry clearance decision; if the SSHD was and remains entitled to conclude that U3 poses a risk to the national security of the UK, and we cannot interfere with that assessment, the national security risk is likely to outweigh the Article 8 interests of U3’s family to be together. (b) The statutory appeal regime, as interpreted by the higher appellate courts, does not allow SIAC either on the deprivation appeal or on the entry clearance appeal, to reach its own view about whether U3 poses a risk to national security. (c) This is so even though we have the advantage, which SSHD has not had, of hearing oral evidence from U3 herself and from factual and expert witnesses called on her behalf.”
“1. In deprivation of citizenship appeals, consideration is to be given both to the sustainability of the original decision and also whether upon considering subsequent evidence the Secretary of State's maintenance of her decision up to and including the hearing of the appeal is also sustainable. The latter requires an appellant to establish that the Secretary of State could not now take the same view. 2. Decisions of the Upper Tribunal are binding on the First-tier Tribunal, not only in the individual case by virtue ofsection 12 of the Tribunal, Courts, and Enforcement Act 2007 , but also as a matter of precedent.” […] [43] The judge did not materially err in law by stating that she was bound to follow Ciceri. “As a superior court of record, the Upper Tribunal’s decisions are binding on the First-tier Tribunal, not only in the individual case by virtue of section 12 [of theTribunal, Courts, and Enforcement Act 2007 ], but also as a matter of precedent” (Jacobs, Tribunal Practice and Procedure, Fifth Edition, 13.66, citing R (Cart) v Upper Tribunal[2010] 1 All ER 908 ). This is compatible withsection 107(3) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 and the Practice Directions of the First-tier Tribunal and the Upper Tribunal, which provide for starred cases to be authoritative in respect of the Upper Tribunal, as well as the First-tier Tribunal. In any event, as Jacobs says: “In practice, it may not matter whether or not there is a formal rule of precedent. If the Upper Tribunal will set aside a decision that differs in law from one of its decisions, that is precedent in all but name”. [44] We note, finally, Mr. Saini’s second complaint on this ground: namely that Ciceri ought to have been decided differently, that the logic of Begum should properly be regarded as confined to appeals under section 40(2) of the 1981 Act, and that the correct approach in deprivation appeals under section 40(3) should remain the merits-based assessment espoused by Leggatt LJ in KV (Sri Lanka), at [6]. [45] The complaint fails to engage with the approach adopted by the Judge, who proceeded on a cumulative basis in reaching her decision, considering the respondent’s decision both from the point of view of reviewing that decision on a strictly public law basis – that is on the material originally before the respondent - and also through the prism of the new evidence that was placed before her on appeal. So, she considered both the sustainability of the original decision and also whether upon considering subsequent evidence the respondent’s maintenance of her decision up to and including the hearing of the appeal was also sustainable. The latter required the appellant to establish that the respondent could not now take the same view. The Judge came to the same decision on each basis. The new evidence has been taken fully into account. This ground is dismissed accordingly.”