‘It is well-established that the Convention must be interpreted in accordance with its broad humanitarian objective and having regard to the principles, expressed in the preamble, that human beings should enjoy fundamental rights and freedoms without discrimination and that refugees should enjoy the widest possible exercise of these rights and freedoms.’
‘F. The provisions of this Convention shall not apply to any person with respect to whom there are serious reasons for considering that: (a) he has committed a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime against humanity, as defined in the international instruments drawn up to make provision in respect of such crimes; (b) he has committed a serious non-political crime outside the country of refuge prior to his admission to that country as a refugee; (c) he has been guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.’
‘F. The provisions of this Convention shall not apply to any person in respect to whom there are serious reasons for considering that: ….. (b) he has committed a serious non-political crime outside the country of refuge prior to his admission to that country as a refugee;’
‘F. Les dispositions de cette Convention ne seront pas applicable au personnes dont on aura des raison sérieuses de penser : ….. (b) qu’elles ont commis un crime grave de droit commun en dehors du pays d’accueil avant d’y être admises comme réfugiés;’
‘2. A third country national or a stateless person is excluded from being a refugee where there are serious reasons for considering that: ….. (b) he or she has committed a serious non-political crime outside the country of refuge prior to his or her admission as a refugee; which means the time of issuing a residence permit based on the granting of refugee status; particularly cruel actions, even if committed with an allegedly political objective, may be classified as serious non-political crimes; ….. 3. Paragraph 2 applies to persons who instigate or otherwise participate in the commission of the crimes or acts mentioned therein’
‘7(1) A person is not a refugee, if he falls within the scope of Article 1D, 1E or 1F of the Geneva Convention. (2) In the construction and application of Article 1F(b) of the Geneva Convention: (a) the reference to serious non-political crime includes a particularly cruel action, even if it is committed with an allegedly political objective; (b) the reference to the crime being committed outside the country of refuge prior to his admission as a refugee shall be taken to mean the time up to and including the day on which a residence permit is issued. (3) Article 1F(a) and (b) of the Geneva Convention shall apply to a person who instigates or otherwise participates in the commission of crimes or acts specified in those provisions.’
‘Taking these various sources of law into account one can arrive at the following definition. A crime is a political crime for the purposes of Article 1F(b) of the Geneva Convention if, and only if (1) it is committed, for a political purpose, that is to say, with the object of overthrowing or subverting or changing the government of a state or inducing it to change its policy; and (2) there is a sufficiently close and direct link between the crime and the alleged political purpose. In determining whether such a link exists, the court will bear in mind the means used to achieve the political end, and will have particular regard to whether the crime was aimed at a military or governmental target, on the one hand, or a civilian target on the other, and in either event whether it was likely to involve the indiscriminate killing or injuring of members of the public. Although I have referred to the above statement as a definition, I bear in mind Lord Radcliffe’s warning in Reg v Governor of Brixton Prison, Ex parte Schtraks [1964] A.C. 556, 589 that a question which was first posed judicially more than 100 years ago in In re Castioni [1891] 1 Q.B. 149 is unlikely now to receive a definitive answer. The most that can be attempted is a description of an idea. But to fall short of a description would, in Lord Radcliffe’s words, be to abdicate a necessary responsibility, if the idea of a political crime is to continue to form part of the apparatus of judicial decision-making.’
‘189. The violence with which demonstrations are suppressed cannot be blamed on excesses on the part of middle-ranking members of the AFDL police. It was President Kabila himself who, in referring to demonstrations in Bukavu and Maniema in June, warned that if such demonstrations continued, he would have participants shot, adding: “I’m going to impose a bit of discipline.”’
‘A paramilitary police force known as the Police d’intervention rapide (PIR), Rapid Intervention Police, is also often used to arrest dissidents. These security forces have no known powers under Congolese or any other law to carry out arrests or detentions. In cases of arrest, members of these security forces usually neither reveal their identity nor the place where they are taking their victims, leaving relatives unsure who is responsible for the arrests or where the arrested persons are to be detained. These security forces are not answerable to the judiciary and are only responsible to the Presidency, whose powers are unquestionable under the DRC’s current transitional constitution.’
‘The information contained in this report shows that a large number of human rights violations by government forces take place in areas far away from the armed conflict zones. Whereas the authorities have often claimed that they were not aware of specific violations, it is clear that many of the violations were ordered or condoned by government and security officials. Thus, members of the security forces believe that they will continue to enjoy impunity because the human rights violations they commit are no different, in nature or scope, from those ordered by the authorities. This is especially the case with regard to human rights violations against human rights defenders, journalists and members of opposition political parties. Moreover, these violations, particularly of the right to freedom of expression and association, started long before the armed conflict broke out in August 1998. Armed conflict may have exacerbated the situation, but it is most often used as a pretext to justify an unacceptably widespread scale of human rights violations.’
‘Civilian authorities did not maintain effective control of the security forces, and there were frequent instances in which elements of the security forces acted independently of government authority. In addition, different individuals of the same security service effectively had different chains of command and often responded to orders from different individuals, including former commanders and political leaders whom they had followed before the Government was established. Members of the security forces were poorly trained, poorly paid, and undisciplined, and they committed numerous serious human rights abuses with impunity.’
‘During and after the military operations in Kinshasa and Bas Congo, soldiers, police officers, and intelligence agents loyal to President Kabila deliberately killed, injured, arbitrarily arrested, and tortured hundreds of persons. They acted at the direction of Kabila or his advisors and with the objective of reinforcing Kabila’s control. These subordinates worked through both formal and informal channels, relying on first one and then another of several state security forces – including the paramilitary Republican Guards, a “secret commission”, the special Simba battalion of the police, and the intelligence services – as circumstances dictated – to tighten control over perceived opponents.’
‘MONUC human rights investigators received little cooperation from government officials in their efforts to ascertain the facts about and responsibilities for the Bas Congo violence. They nonetheless produced a report on June 13, 2008, concluding that the aim of the operation appeared to have been to cripple the BDK. The investigators criticized the use of the Simba battalion, a special force of police troops with more military than police training, as “at best misguided, or at worst a deliberate decision to conduct a military-style operation aimed at punishing the BDK and severely reducing its capacity as a group. The weapons and tactics used during the operation further reinforces the conclusion that there may have been “a premeditated plan to use lethal force against the BDK.’
‘we did that and if they were causing trouble and there were a lot of them we would be called’
‘refusing to do that was what caused me the problems from my chiefs and the authorities of my country’
‘In order to receive your pay you had to agree to do these bad things.’
‘we had the choice, you go and do these bad things or bad things will happen to you.’
‘They told us to go back up and they sent other officers in to fire guns.’
‘They were bodyguards of authorities [and] they prevented all things against the [government].’
‘No. Other people did, but not us. That was not an appropriate technique.’
‘We used plastic bullets not real ones.’
‘I couldn’t arrest them so another member of my team arrested them [and] gave them to the authorities.’
‘I was not able to while I had the tear gas.’
‘No. My orders are to give discipline to my team.’
‘No. We didn’t know how they would treat them.’
‘35. The ill treatment of groups, individuals and civilians in the DRC, in the context of the crimes you have been associated with are not considered to have been political acts or indeed to have been motivated by political ideology. The general approach of brutality and corruption was not limited by political considerations. Moreover, participation in serious crimes including participation in handing over individuals to the authorities or colleagues who were subsequently interrogated, tortured and/or put to death is not suggested to be convention political activity nor would it be accepted as such. It is considered that the crimes you have been involved in are serious, non-political and were committed prior to entering the UK.’
‘I would put people in handcuff[s] and take them to the Office – this is where my job and authority would end. The Office would then decide further about whether they were guilty or not.’
‘as a result of the rumours/stories I have heard, I felt terrible for handing people over to the authorities, however, I did not have a choice but to do this.’