“26. Finally, the judge did not attach any weight to the failure on the part of the Home Office decision makers to discharge (or even consider) statutory duty unders 55(3) of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009 (to have regard to any guidance given to Secretary of State).The relevant guidance in the 2009 UKBA document ‘Every Child Matters’. 27. In JO and Others (section 55 duty) Nigeria[2014] UKUT 00517 (IAC) “cursory, casual or superficial” engagement with the guidance was said “not to be in accordance with the specific duty imposed by section 55(3) or the overwhelming duty to have regard to the need to safeguard and promote the welfare of any children involved in or affected by the relevant factual matrix” - (para 12) 28. At para 42 the Judge accepts that “there is little evidence before [her] as to the child’s opinions or as to the effect upon the child of the appellant’s deportation.” 29. However the judge fails to acknowledge that this lack of evidence is a result of the non-compliance of the Home Office caseworkers with the SSHD’s guidance. Such non-compliance amounts to grave breach of statutory duty under s 55(3) and is sufficient – without more – to undermine the Home Office decision. 30. JO is a solid authority behind the proposition that failure on the part of the FtT to consider whether the Secretary of State had complied with the statutory duty imposed by section 55 – namely to have regard to the statutory guidance – “is the fundamental error of law infecting the FtT’s decision.” – (paras 16-17).””
"1. States Parties shall assure to the child who is capable of forming his or her own views the right to express those views freely in all matters affecting the child, the views of the child being given due weight in accordance with the age and maturity of the child. 2. For this purpose, the child shall in particular be provided the opportunity to be heard in any judicial and administrative proceedings affecting the child, either directly, or through a representative or an appropriate body, in a manner consistent with the procedural rules of national law." 35. There are circumstances in which separate representation of a child in legal proceedings about her future is essential: in this country, this is so when a child is to be permanently removed from her family in her own best interests. There are other circumstances in which it may be desirable, as in some disputes between parents about a child's residence or contact. In most cases, however, it will be possible to obtain the necessary information about the child's welfare and views in other ways. As I said in EM (Lebanon) v Secretary of State for the Home Department[2008] UKHL 64 ,[2009] 1 AC 1198 , at para 49: "
"in many cases . . . there are risks of a conflict of interest between the child and their most obvious representative (parent(s)). If the hearing of the child is undertaken through a representative, it is of utmost importance that the child's views are transmitted correctly to the decision-maker by the representative."
"These provisions, read purposively and in context, make it plain that the task of the appellate immigration authority, on an appeal on a Convention ground against a decision of the primary official decision-maker refusing leave to enter or remain in this country, is to decide whether the challenged decision is unlawful as incompatible with a Convention right or compatible and so lawful. It is not a secondary, reviewing, function dependent on establishing that the primary decision-maker misdirected himself or acted irrationally or was guilty of procedural impropriety. The appellate immigration authority must decide for itself whether the impugned decision is lawful and, if not, but only if not, reverse it." 24. Paragraph 24 of ZH does not assist the appellant. Baroness Hale plainly contemplated that the tribunal must consider Section 55. If Baroness Hale had been of the view that the tribunal was excluded from doing so because its only option was to remit to the Secretary of State, I am confident that Baroness Hale would have said so. Further, paragraph 71 of DS (Afghanistan) v SSHD[2011] EWCA Civ 305 does not assist the appellant. Section 55 had not been mentioned at the tribunal hearing in that case. Lloyd LJ stated at paragraph 71: "
“there is no element of choice or discretion”
“They are effectively airbrushed.”
“These principles also give sustenance to the proposition that the duties enshrined in section 55 cannot be properly performed by decision makers in an uninformed vacuum. Rather, the decision maker must be properly equipped by possession of a sufficiency of relevant information.”
“The first is that the decision maker must be properly informed. The second is that, thus equipped, the decision maker must conduct a careful examination of all relevant information and factors. These principles have a simple logical attraction, since it is difficult to conceive how a decision maker could properly have regard to the need to safeguard and promote the welfare of the child or children concerned otherwise. Furthermore, they reflect long recognised standards of public law. Being adequately informed and conducting a scrupulous analysis are elementary pre-requisites to the inter-related tasks of identifying the child’s best interests and then balancing them with other material considerations.”
“Proportionality, the absence of an ‘exceptionality’ rule and the meaning of ‘a primary consideration’ are all, when properly understood, consonant with the force to be attached in cases of the present kind to the two drivers of the decision maker’s margin of discretion: the policies source and the policies nature and in particular to the greatweight which the 2007 Act attributes to the deportation of foreign criminals.” [Our emphasis.] In a later passage, Laws LJ refers to “the extremely pressing public interest in the Appellant’s deportation”: see [58]. Accordingly, in cases of this kind, in the proportionality scales, the factor of the best interests of any affected child, while a matter of undeniable importance, is to be balanced with a public interest of unmistakable potency. This must be borne in mind in every case where, having found a breach of either of the two duties imposed by section 55 of the 2009 Act, the Tribunal is considering the appropriate consequential course. 34. We consider that there are four significant aspects of section 55 of the 2009 Act which do not feature with any prominence in the jurisprudence of the Court of Appeal. The first is that the Secretary of State is the primary decision maker. The second is that the two duties enshrined in section 55 are imposed on the Secretary of State and no one else. The third is the guidance made under section 55(3) and the related statutory duty imposed on decision makers to have regard thereto: this has received at best scant attention, coupled with the fact that there is no meaningful way in which tribunals can give effect to certain aspects thereof. The fourth, as we have highlighted above, is that in the trilogy of decisions examined, the Court of Appeal has not decided the question of whether one of the options available to the Tribunal, where a breach of either or both of the duties imposed by section 55 is found, is to make an order the effect whereof is to require the Secretary of State to make fresh, lawful decision. Thus the fetters imposed on this Tribunal by binding precedent are limited. 35. We would highlight that where either the FtT or the Upper Tribunal finds that there has been a breach by the Secretary of State of either, or both, of the duties imposed by section 55 of the 2009 Act, a further assessment of and decision concerning the best interests of any affected child must be made. The author of such decision will be either the relevant Tribunal or the Secretary of State. There is no other candidate decision maker. We have raised the question of what test or criterion the Tribunal should apply in deciding which of the two candidate agencies should make the fresh decision. We turn to consider this discrete issue further.”
“30. As I have indicated Mr Hogarth submitted that the EAT in these cases ought to have followed Munro. I understood him to mean that as a matter of law, not discretion or good sense, it should have done so. If it is right this implies that this court would also be bound by the Court of Session, at least to the extent that we should be obliged to correct the EAT's failure to follow the Inner House; and that would give effect within this jurisdiction to the Munro judgment. 3 1. I am afraid I regard this argument as nothing but a distraction from the real questions posed by this appeal. However, I acknowledge these following propositions at once. (1) The ET, EAT, and the Court of Session on appeal from the EAT administer in Scotland (with some esoteric qualifications not relevant for present purposes) the same statutory regimes as do the ET, EAT, and the Court of Appeal on appeal from the EAT in England. (2) Indeed the EAT spans the jurisdictions of England Wales and Scotland as a single jurisdiction:s.20 of the Employment Rights Act 1996 provides that it is to be a superior court of record and is to have a central office in London, but may sit in any place in Great Britain. (3) As a matter of pragmatic good sense the ET and the EAT in either jurisdiction will ordinarily expect to follow decisions of the higher appeal court in the other jurisdiction (whether the Court of Session or the Court of Appeal) where the point confronting them is indistinguishable from what was there decided. 3 2. In my judgment, however, none of this brings Mr Hogarth's argument home. The rules of precedent or stare decisis cognisable here are given by the common law. Part of their substance, though not its whole, is that decisions of the Court of Appeal bind the Court of Appeal itself and all lower courts. They include refinements which teach where the edge of precedent is to be found, so that often the earlier decision can be distinguished. I need not go into those. The essence is that precedent confines the very power of the courts subject to it. It is not a rule of discretion or comity or anything of the kind. It is therefore of necessity a doctrine whose reach is limited to the jurisdiction in which the courts in question operate. The House of Lords is no exception; by statute its writ runs to three jurisdictions, and accordingly it binds the lower courts within each of those jurisdictions. Statute might also extend the scope of precedent, as was done by theEuropean Communities Act 1972 , part of whose effect is to give binding force over the national courts to decisions of the European Court of Justice (in matters within the latter's proper competence).Had the Human Rights Act 1998 provided that the courts of the United Kingdom should be bound by decisions of the European Court of Human Rights, rather than take account of them, that would have been another instance. Now, statutory provisions which give dominion to courts in one jurisdiction (international or otherwise) over courts in another are apt, here at least, to father constitutional tensions. But it is at least clear, and here is the point on this part of the case, that it would be a constitutional solecism of some magnitude to suggest that by force of the common law of precedent any court of England and Wales is in the strict sense bound by decisions of any court whose jurisdiction runs in Scotland only or – most assuredly – vice versa. Comity and practicality are another thing altogether. They exert a wholly legitimate pressure. 3 3. Mr Hogarth's argument on this part of the case is thus in my judgment mistaken. The EAT here was not obliged by law to follow the Court of Session. And this court certainly is not.”