“[13] The Appellant had said in his asylum interview that lots of young men from the village were forced to take part in fighting by the Taliban. The background material suggests that forced recruitment was a rare occurrence and only usually occurred from refugee camps. The Appellant’s father was not a medic and had no particular value to the Taliban, as was the case for the Appellant. It was difficult to reconcile the evidence from the Appellant that there had been many forced recruits from his village with the background material suggesting otherwise. … [18] I have considered the Appellant’s material claims in accordance with paragraph 339L of the Immigration Rules and noting that he was 16 years of age at the time of his asylum interview. He was not consistent as regards some very significant features of his claim. The discrepancies about whether his father arranged the agent or his father’s friend, he only mentioned in his screening interview that his mother had been killed and his assertions of forced recruitment run counter to the background material available. I have also noted the inconsistencies outlined in his age assessment and have discounted the explanation that this was due to interpreting difficulties, noting the nature and extent of the inconsistencies. I am unable to find the Appellant credible and cannot accept his material claims. As such, I find that the Appellant does not have a well-founded fear of persecution should he return to Afghanistan. I do not accept that his parents were killed by the Taliban, that his father was a forced recruit or that the Taliban attempted to recruit the Appellant. He is not at risk from Taliban retribution or from the authorities or community implying his allegiance to the Taliban.”
“In areas where AGEs [Anti-Government Elements] exercise effective control, they are reported to use a variety of mechanisms to recruit fighters, including recruitment mechanisms based on coercive strategies. In a traditional form of war mobilization knows as lashkar, every household is expected to contribute a man of fighting age. In areas where AGEs exercise effective control, as well as in IDP settlements in Afghanistan, they are reported to use threats and intimidation to enforce this mechanism to recruit fighters for the insurgency. People who resist recruitment are reportedly at risk of being accused of being a government spy and being killed or punished. There are reports of families linked to the insurgency giving boys to AGEs as suicide bombers, in the hope of gaining status with the AGE in question. ALP [Afghan Local Police] commanders have also been reported to forcibly recruit local community members, including both adult men and children, into ALP forces. In light of the foregoing, UNHCR considers that, depending on the specific circumstances of the case, men and boys of fighting age living in areas under the effective control of AGEs, or in areas where pro-government forces and AGEs are engaged in a struggle for control, may be in need of international refugee protection on the ground of their membership of a particular social group. Depending on the specific circumstances of the case, men and boys of fighting age living in areas where ALP commanders are in a sufficiently powerful position to forcibly recruit community members into the ALP may equally be in need of international refugee protection on the ground of their membership of a particular social group. Men and boys who resist forced recruitment may also be in need of international refugee protection on the ground of their (imputed) political opinion. Depending on the specific circumstances of the case, family members of men and boys with this profile may be in need of international protection on the basis of their association with individuals at risk.”
“(a) Forced Recruitment by AGEs In areas where AGEs exercise effective control over territory and the population, they are reported to use a variety of mechanisms to recruit fighters, including recruitment mechanisms based on coercive strategies. Persons who resist recruitment, and their family members, are reportedly at risk of being killed or punished. AGEs are reported to continue to recruit children, both boys and girls, to carry out suicide attacks and as human shields, as well as to participate in active combat, to plant IEDs, to smuggle weapons and uniforms, and to act as spies, guards or scouts for reconnaissance.”
“In light of the foregoing, UNHCR considers that, depending on the specific circumstances of the case, men of fighting age and children living in areas under the effective control of AGEs, or in areas where pro-government forces,AGEs and/or armed groups affiliated to ISIS are engaged in a struggle for control, may be in need of international refugee protection on the ground of their membership of a particular social group or other relevant grounds. Depending on the specific circumstances of the case, men of fighting age and children living in areas where ALP commanders are in a sufficiently powerful position to forcibly recruit community members into the ALP may equally be in need of international refugee protection on the ground of their membership of a particular social group or other relevant grounds. Men of fighting age and children who resist forced recruitment may also be in need of international refugee protection on the ground of their (imputed) political opinion. Depending on the specific circumstances of the case, family members of men and boys with this profile may be in need of international protection on the basis of their association with individuals at risk.”
“Borhan Osman explains that in some areas where the Taliban is facing opposition and pressure from local anti-Taliban forces, it needs to assert itself in the role of protector and may put some pressure on communities to contribute – financially or by providing fighters. This is the case in Nangarhar where it is confronted with Islamic State groups. In this case, the Taliban liaised with tribal elders from the Khogyani tribe and organised a couple of large gatherings in which it explained that the tribe, the area, and their properties were under attack from foreigners (Pakistani militants rebranding themselves as Islamic State). In these gatherings the Taliban relies on religious discourse, appeal to honour of the people, cultural codes etc to create a consensus among the tribal elders to get their support. It asks for money, food, other supplies and recruits. However, asking for recruits is a last resort. The Taliban prefers to fight itself and will only ask local leaders to provide their local fighters in cases of severe shortage. The Khogyani elders agreed to support the Taliban against IS by providing supplies and not giving shelter to Islamic State fighters. In case of unexpected attacks at night, they might have asked for a couple of men (4-5) per village in order to be able to repel the attack but this mobilisation would have been temporary because the Taliban would move in its mobile special forces in the following days to fight back. Osman explains that he did not know about such a particular case but this is how it would happen according to his information.”
“Antonio Guistozzi says that in Afghan social structures decisions are made by heads of families, tribal elders and community leaders… The decision to mobilise fighters is made by them and Afghans do not refer to ‘forced recruitment’, as they do not think in terms of individual rights. The decisions made by leaders are legitimate and accepted by the social units (family and tribe). Therefore ‘forced recruitment’ is a concept that does not stem from the Afghan social context.”
“[3.10.15] The same Danish report states “UNHCR referred to a leaked ISAF report on the state of the Taliban in relation to the change of strategy of the Taliban. According to this report, the Taliban do not have difficulties in recruiting people for their force. They have many volunteers and there is a willingness to join the movement. The Taliban may recruit collectively in the villages by offering education to poor people’s sons and by brain washing people.” “Based on its research, Co-operation for Peace and Unity” (CPAU) stated that poverty, unemployment, and a desire for higher social status in the community, rather than ideological reasons, are the main factors driving the recruitment to the Taliban. [3.10.16] The EASO report (referred to in 3.10.4) provides a comprehensive insight into the Taliban, a history of the conflict in Afghanistan and recruitment strategies. It notes that “Local and autonomous commanders, tribal structures and religious clerics are the main channels through which recruitment is facilitated within Afghanistan. As a general principle, it could be stated that the local cell – commander, tribe, family or madrassa – is the basic recruitment hub. In general, the direct use of coercion or retaliation for refusing enlistment by the Taliban is not typical for the current Afghan insurgency. There are cases of forced recruitment, but these are considered as exceptional. To gain support and recruit fighters, they relied on economic needs, fear and coercion, pride and honour, tribe and tradition, religious persuasion etc. Clerics played an indispensable role in the recruitment processes.”
“In its conclusion the EASO does not acknowledge the situations of persons joining or supporting the Taleban as result of indirect methods of intimidation such as through instilling fear among the local population by threatening night letters, killing individuals, including children, perceived as spies or supporters of the government, the extortion of fines, as well as pressuring individuals to join the Taliban through tribal, family and religious mechanisms, and other indirect means of coercion. Also, in the current context of reintegration and reconciliation efforts with the Taliban, it is expected that more people, including members of ethnic minority groups, may submit to Taliban demands, fearing reprisals.”
“[3.10.18] Conclusion. The risk from anti government groups will be highest in the areas where they operate or have control. Caseworkers will need to take into account the most up to date country information, the nature of the threat and the particular profile of the claimant. For applicants who can demonstrate a well-founded fear of persecution for reason of their imputed political opinion and who are unable to acquire protection or relocate internally, a grant of asylum will be appropriate. [3.10.19] Forced recruitment by Taliban military commanders, leaders or fighters (i.e.situations where individuals or their families are directly approached and forced to join up under threat of retaliation or violence if they refuse) has to be considered as exceptional. The risk will be highest in areas where armed anti-government groups are operating or have control and in refugee camps but the evidence of recruitment driven more by broader coercive strategies, such as economics, fear, intimidation, pride and honour, religious persuasion and the use of tribal mechanisms to pressurise individuals into joining the Taliban, rather than by force.”
“While forcible recruitment by the Taliban cannot be discounted as a risk, particularly in areas of high militant activity or militant control, evidence is required to show that it is a real risk for the particular child concerned and not a mere possibility.”
“In the Afghan context, there appears to be no agreement about the meaning of forced recruitment to armed groups, instead commentators refer to mobilisation of fighters and agreement within social structures for recruitment, albeit with the use of coercion, duress or force in some cases. There is also the possibility that the term forced recruitment necessarily applies to children because they’re not old enough to make an informed choice as opposed to a more literal use of force for their recruitment.”
“The claims are geographically delimited to “areas where AGEs exercise effective control over the territory and population”