"26. … the 1989 Act draws a clear and sensible distinction between different kinds of question. The question whether a child is "in need" requires a number of different value judgments … but where the issue is not what order the court should make but what service should the local authority provide it is entirely reasonable to assume that Parliament intended such evaluative questions to be determined by the Public Authority, subject to the control of the courts on the ordinary principles of judicial review. Within the limits of fair process and "
"51. It seems to me that the question whether or not a person is a child for the purposes of section 20 of the 1989 Act is a question of fact which must ultimately be decided by the court. There is no denying the difficulties that the social worker is likely to face in carrying out an assessment of the question whether an unaccompanied asylum seeker is or is not under the age of 18. Reliable documentary evidence is almost always lacking in such cases. So the process has to be one of assessment. This involves the application of judgment on a variety of factors, as Stanley Burnton J recognised in R (B) v Merton London Borough Council[2003] 4 All ER 280 , para 37. But the question is not whether the person can properly be described as a child. Section 105 (1) of the Act provides: "in this Act … 'child' means, subject to paragraph 16 of Schedule 1, a person under the age of 18"
“Dear Teacher, My name is [RK]. I am 16 years old and I came from Iran. I don’t have a father or mother. I was 10 years old when my father and mother died. I don’t have any brothers or sisters.”
“I find that the appellant’s untruthfulness when questioned in France and his subsequent denial that he was fingerprinted there affects the credibility of his claim under Section 8 of the 2004 Act. Indeed, when he was interviewed initially, he said in his screening interview that he had been fingerprinted in France and he gave a false name because he was afraid of being deported to his own country. The fact that the appellant has been untruthful on more than one occasion caused me to believe that he cannot be accepted as a witness of truth, looking at the whole of the evidence in the round.”
“I therefore accept as a finding of fact that the appellant lied when he denied in his substantive asylum interview that he had not been fingerprinted and I also find that he lied to me during the appeal hearing when he denied the same. What I do find is that he gave a false name in France when detected by an Immigration Officer and he also gave a false date of birth. The point is that although he was clearly the same person and there is the fingerprint match, I am not satisfied that the appellant gave his true date of birth to the Immigration Officer in France.”