BA (Demonstrators in Britain - risk on return) Iran CG [2011] UKUT 36 (IAC)

UKUT-IAC
BA (Demonstrators in Britain - risk on return) Iran CG
[2011] UKUT 36 (IAC) · 2010-10-06
[18]“[18] Where, as here, the tribunal has objective evidence which "paints a bleak picture of the suppression of political opponents" by a named government, it requires little or no evidence or speculation to arrive at a strong possibility – and perhaps more – that its foreign legations not only film or photograph their nationals who demonstrate in public against the regime but have informers among expatriate oppositionist organisations who can name the people who are filmed or photographed. Similarly it does not require affirmative evidence to establish a probability that the intelligence services of such states monitor the internet for information about oppositionist groups. The real question in most cases will be what follows for the individual claimant. If, for example, any information reaching the embassy is likely to be that the claimant identified in a photograph is a hanger-on with no real commitment to the oppositionist cause, that will go directly to the issue flagged up by art 4(3)(d) of the Directive. ”50. We were taken to two decisions of the Refugee Status Appeals Authority of New Zealand both of which considered whether there was a real chance of the Iranian appellants being persecuted on return to Iran because of sur place activity in New Zealand. In the first the appellant arrived in New Zealand in 2004 and almost immediately claimed refugee status. Refugee appeal number 76454 , 8 March 2010, resulted from his third refugee claim. It was on the basis that he had been a person leading protests in New Zealand at which radical slogans had been chanted about the widely disputed presidential election in 2009. He had attended the protests in the middle of June 2009, wore a green scarf, held a placard and chanted slogans such as “down with the dictator” and “death to the dictator”, the dictator being a reference to Ayatollah Khamenei, the Supreme Leader of Iran. In later demonstrations the appellant became responsible for keeping the slogans chanted during those held in Auckland. The first demonstration resulted in a four minute item on New Zealand’s TV 1 News, including footage, briefly, of the appellant’s image. On 17 June the New Zealand Herald published a story about the protest and a photograph showed the appellant holding a placard. Later that month, or early in July, he learnt from his brother that his image had appeared on satellite television in Iran on Voice of America’s Persian News Network. He also became aware that he had appeared in footage uploaded to YouTube at a point where he was leading the demonstrations.51. The Authority recorded that it was not aware of any report by an NGO dealing with what happened to persons moved or deported to Iran whom the Iranian authorities knew or suspected of participating in post election protests while abroad: para [57]. It noted that the country information established that Iranian security and intelligence services, including those working at the airports, were increasingly sensitised to the role that new media such as YouTube, Facebook and Twitter could play as an intelligence gathering tool or as a mechanism to stifle dissent: para [59]. It also noted that in the light of the increasing sensitivity by the regime to the role of the new media in assisting with intelligence gathering there was an increased likelihood that the TV 1 broadcast and the YouTube videos might have been viewed by Iranian Embassy staff in New Zealand and some participants identified. The broadcast by Voice of America into Iran increased the chance that some participants in the New Zealand demonstrations might have been identified by the Iranian authorities.52. As to the appellant, he was clearly identifiable in both the TV 1 and a Voice for America broadcasts and on YouTube. He could be seen in these in a prominent position. The slogans being chanted were radical. The Authority continued as follows:
“In terms of assessing the risk to the appellant against this evidential void, the Authority notes the documented history of serious human rights abuses perpetrated against detainees in Iran generally and, more specifically, against some persons detained after engaging in peaceful public protest over the 2009 elections. It is in these circumstances appropriate for the Authority to apply a benefit of the doubt. Noting that the appellant has on occasions played a more 'leadership' role and the radical tone of the appellant's activity on these occasions has been captured in YouTube video postings, the Authority finds, by a narrow margin, that there is a real chance the appellant will be detained on arrival and interrogated about that activity. In this circumstance the Authority accepts that there is a real chance that he will be subjected to serious harm amounting to his being persecuted because of the particular nature of his involvement in leading the chanting of radical slogan on these occasions. The first principal issue is answered in the affirmative.”
However the Authority concluded that the case turned on its own specific facts and that the situation inside Iran was dynamic so that the risk presently existing might dissipate with time. 53. The second Refugee Status Appeals Authority decision is Refugee appeal number 76345 , 30 June 2010. There the appellant claimed to have absconded while on bail in Iran. That had been granted in respect of what he said were false charges brought against him by a high ranking police officer. The police officer had a vendetta against him because he accused the colonel’s son of theft. He attended demonstrations in Auckland in response to the 2009 presidential elections in Iran. He had no part in organising the events but held placards and joined in chanting slogans. Towards the end of June 2009 the appellant had telephoned his family and had told his mother that he had attended at least one protest. Two or three days later she contacted him and reported that two members of the Iranian authorities had visited her home asking where he was, whether she knew any of his friends and what they had talked about. In late 2009 he learned that video footage of some of the protests had been posted onto internet sites on YouTube, two of which contained footage in which he could be seen for several seconds in one of the items, fleetingly in the other. 54. The Authority rejected the appellant’s account, apart from the sur place activities. That included the suggestion that the Iranian authorities had overheard the telephone call with his mother. As to the possible threat of harm to the appellant because of his participation in the protests, the Authority quoted reports such as that in the Wall Street Journal , 4 December 2009. It concluded that the evidence did not establish that all individuals identified as having participated in the protests have been routinely mistreated. While some were physically mistreated, these appeared to be a small minority and there was no information as to the particular profiles of the individuals concerned. The footage of the New Zealand protests recorded that the appellant was one among many individuals. He played no part in leading the organisation of the protests. He had no history of posting material critical of the Iranian government on the internet, whether in a blog, on Facebook or Twitter. Nor did he fall within any of the categories such as that of student activist. Even if the appellant was to be detained briefly and questioned on return, the country information did not establish that ordinary protesters such as the appellant were at risk of serious harm. THE PARTIES’ SUBMISSIONS 55. As advanced by Mr Basharat Ali the appellant’s case was built on the evidence. It began with the Iranian regime’s uniformly brutal human rights record and its ill-treatment of political and other dissidents. The general background evidence demonstrated very serious human rights abuses being committed by the Iranian regime against those it viewed as being opposed to it, no matter where they are on the political spectrum, and whether or not they were on the periphery. The intelligence apparatus was multi-layered, sophisticated in its intelligence gathering and ruthless in its suppression of dissent. Those regarded as not brutal enough had been dispensed with, so that only hardline officials remained. The gathering of intelligence in Europe was widely reported. The photographing, filming and identification of dissidents and those opposed to the Iranian regime were widespread. 56. As to the appellant, Mr Basharat Ali submitted, he had attended demonstrations in London which have been filmed by the Iranian Embassy. Footage of his participation at one demonstration has been loaded onto YouTube. His photograph has been published in an opposition magazine with highly objectionable content. There was a reasonable degree of likelihood that the appellant has been identified by the Iranian authorities, given the meticulous way they collect data and seek to match names to faces. The expert had opined that MOIS officials at the airport would have easy access to reports and material submitted to Tehran by their agents at Embassies abroad such as London, or to the data collected by its internet surveillance units based in Iran, where it is almost certainly electronically stored and retrievable. 57. This appellant would be returning from the United Kingdom, which has been singled out for fomenting unrest in Iran after the 2009 elections. Those returned from here were at a particular risk of being mistreated. In the case of the appellant he is likely to be a forced return from the United Kingdom and is without a valid visa. That would draw attention to him and trigger a search of any footage collected. The possibility that he may be known to someone in the Embassy or Embassy circles and already had been named could not be excluded. Although he left the country legally and his passport is still valid, his student visa expired in October 2009, around a year ago. Coupled with a forced return, which would surely not escape the notice of the airport authorities in Iran, the lapsed visa was likely to draw attention to him and uncover that he has claimed asylum in the United Kingdom. That would in turn lead to an investigation. Given his age group and his student visa, there was a considerable risk that Iranian security would consult the archived films and photographs to determine whether he had participated in protests in the United Kingdom. 58. Thus, the appellant’s profile could trigger an investigation and put him at risk of human rights violations, including torture. As to the appellant’s participation on the protests being opportunistic, there is the statement by the Minister of Justice, Morteza Bakhtiari, on 5 April 2010, that individuals who did not have a political profile in Iran and who had introduced themselves as a political activist solely to get residence abroad would be detained on return at Iman Khomeini International airport and thereafter be subjected to prosecution. Alternatively, there was a real risk that the appellant would be persecuted after entry into Iran, even if he were allowed to pass through the airport without mistreatment. There is no sufficiency of protection available to this appellant and internal flight is clearly not reasonable on the facts of the case. 59. In submissions for the Secretary of State, Mr Tarlow was content to rest his submissions on the evidence of the appellant’s own expert. That acknowledged that of the many arrested after the demonstrations in Iran, most were quickly released. There were a limited number of reports of cases of mistreatment of persons returning to Iran via Tehran Airport, but there was no evidence that it was systematic. The cases of mistreatment had to be placed in the context of the many persons passing through that airport and also the numbers of persons being forcibly returned by the United Kingdom to Iran. Tehran had been described as a middle security airport, and there was no evidence that facial recognition technology was available, not surprising given the sanction on the sale of such technology to Iran. 60. In the Secretary of State’s submission the appellant had not demonstrated that the Iranian authorities could filter the vast amount of material, including their own recordings of demonstrations, or the YouTube upload, momentarily featuring the appellant at the front of the demonstrations. That was a distinguishing feature from the first New Zealand case, no 76454, when the appellant there had appeared on national television and in a photograph in a national newspaper. The Iranians may well have spotters, both at the demonstrations and Tehran airport, but the difficulties in identifying specific persons, such as the appellant were obvious. There was evidence of dissidents, who had escaped mistreatment. The appellant had been found to be opportunistic in demonstrating and he did not fit any of the known categories of those identified for arrest such as student activities. 61. In response to a question from the Tribunal Mr Tarlow wrote to SIJ McGeachy on 29 October giving the information that in the year between March 2009 and March 2010 there were 966 applications for student (now tier 4) visas in Tehran. 641 were issued and 311 refused. (the mismatch of the figures relates to those which were decided in the period but which were received before March 2009). 62. Mr Tarlow also wrote that the maintenance of passenger information as not within the domain of UKBA. An airline which carries returned failed asylum seekers had clarified the position as follows:
“1. The flight manifest and other paper records are not provided to the authorities at the destination airport (Tehran). 2. It is the current airline practice for airline staff (or their agents) at all their destination airports to query the passenger manifest in order to identify the presence of arriving escorted and unescorted removals for the purpose of fulfilling any appropriate handling arrangements upon arrival, or where it is locally required, to obtain pre-clearance from local immigration authorities for passengers on the flight. 3. In case of a local requirement, the data given (verbally) to the local immigration authorities comprises only the names of the escorted or unescorted removal(s). (We are advised that the date of birth is not information that is normally contained within the reservation record).”
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 63. Our task is to assess the risk to an Iranian who has demonstrated here being subjected to persecution if returned to Iran, because of his sur place activity here in the United Kingdom. The starting point is that he is to be returned to a country where on all accounts the human rights situation gives rise to grave concern. In the last year, since the disputed election of June 2009, repression has intensified. Protestors have been detained and in some cases, tortured. There has been a crackdown on dissent. Detainees have been systematically denied access to outside contact and legal assistance. There have been show trials, in some cases leading to severe sentences. That repression inside Iran has been coupled with express threats made by high officials to dissident Iranians abroad. Institutional measures to prosecute such Iranians have been taken. 64. Against that backdrop of an announced intention to proceed against dissident Iranians abroad, we need to make a judgment about the risk on return for an Iranian, having regard to his sur place activities. In this type of case the factors that bear on that judgment can be conveniently placed under four main heads: (i) the type of sur place activity involved; (ii) the risk that a person will be identified as engaging in it; (iii) the factors triggering inquiry on return of the person and; (iv) in the absence of a universal check on all entering the country, the factors that would lead to identification at the airport on return or after entry. For each factor there is a spectrum of risk. The factors are not exhaustive and may overlap. (i) Nature of sur place activity · Theme of demonstrations – what do the demonstrators want (e.g. reform of the regime through to its violent overthrow); how will they be characterised by the regime? · Role in demonstrations and political profile – can the person be described as a leader; mobiliser (e.g. addressing the crowd), organiser (e.g. leading the chanting); or simply a member of the crowd; if the latter is he active or passive (e.g. does he carry a banner); what is his motive, and is this relevant to the profile he will have in the eyes of the regime> · Extent of participation – has the person attended one or two demonstrations or is he a regular participant? · Publicity attracted – has a demonstration attracted media coverage in the United Kingd om or the home country; nature of that publicity (quality of images; outlets where stories appear etc)? (ii) Identification risk · Surveillance of demonstrators – assuming the regime aims to identify demonstrators against it how does it do so, through, filming them, having agents who mingle in the crowd, reviewing images/recordings of demonstrations etc? · Regime’s capacity to identify individuals – does the regime have advanced technology (e.g. for facial recognition); does it allocate human resources to fit names to faces in the crowd? (iii) Factors triggering inquiry/action on return · Profile – is the person known as a committed opponent or someone with a significant political profile; does he fall within a category which the regime regards as especially objectionable? · Immigration history – how did the person leave the country (illegally; type of visa); where has the person been when abroad; is the timing and method of return more likely to lead to inquiry and/or being detained for more than a short period and ill-treated (overstayer; forced return)? (iv) Consequences of identification · Is there differentiation between demonstrators depending on the level of their political profile adverse to the regime? (v) Identification risk on return · Matching identification to person – if a person is identified is that information systematically stored and used; are border posts geared to the task? 65. As regards the relevance of these factors to the instant case, of especial relevance is identification risk. We are persuaded that the Iranian authorities attempt to identify persons participating in demonstrations outside the Iranian Embassy in London. The practice of filming demonstrations supports that. The evidence suggests that there may well have been persons in the crowd to assist in the process. There is insufficient evidence to establish that the regime has facial recognition technology in use in the UK, but it seems clear that the Iranian security apparatus attempts to match names to faces of demonstrators from photographs. We believe that the information gathered here is available in Iran. While it may well be that an appellant’s participation in demonstrations is opportunistic, the evidence suggests that this is not likely to be a major influence on the perception of the regime. Although, expressing dissent itself will be sufficient to result in a person having in the eyes of the regime a significant political profile, we consider that the nature of the level of the sur place activity will clearly heighten the determination of the Iranian authorities to identify the demonstrator while in Britain and to identify him on return. That, combined with the factors which might trigger enquiry would lead to an increased likelihood of questioning and of ill treatment on return. 66. As regards identification of risk back in Iran, it would appear that the ability of the Iranian regime to identify all returnees who have attended demonstrations, particularly given the number of those who do, on return, remains limited by the lack of facial recognition technology and the haphazard nature of the checks at the airport. The expert frankly admitted that it was extremely difficult to estimate the risk to identified participants in protests against the Iranian government. Mr Basharat Ali’s careful submission was not that all of those returning, or returned from the United Kingdom, would be subject to mistreatment. We conclude therefore that for the infrequent demonstrator who plays no particular role in demonstrations and whose participation is not highlighted in the media there is not a real risk of identification and therefore not a real risk of consequent ill-treatment, on return. 67. In the country guidance determination in SB the Tribunal identified a number of risk factors for those returning to Iran. These we have set out in paragraph 9 above. While we have had considerably more information about some aspects of the procedures at the Iman Khomeini airport on return we consider that the conclusions in that determination remain correct: we have seen no evidence to lead to the conclusion that merely having exited Iran illegally an appellant might be subjected to persecution. While returning from Britain is at present an increased risk factor, the mere fact that an appellant is returning from Britain does not lead to a risk of persecution. DETERMINATION OF THE APPELLANT’S APPEAL 68. In the case of this appellant we note Immigration Judge Chana did not accept the appellant’s claims of what had happened to him and to members of his family in Iran. Her conclusions were upheld by SIJ Storey. Moreover, the appellant left Iran on a properly issued passport with an exit visa. He would be able to return using that passport although, if escorted on removal, the airline would be likely to inform the grounds staff. 69. However, we consider that there are a number of factors which would mean that the resources available to the Iranian regime would be used to identify this appellant. He participated in five demonstrations outside the Iran Embassy in London, over a short period, 17 June to 9 July 2009. The appellant’s association in the demonstration was with the secular/nationalist group, UFIN, and his participation in the demonstrations was recorded in the YouTube film and the photograph in UFIN’s publication, Bamdad e Iran . The demonstrators as a whole were chanting incendiary slogans. While the appellant was not a leader or organiser, he was, for at least part of the time, not on the periphery either and the short video on Facebook does show him shouting particularly inflammatory slogans. We place weight on the fact that his face is clearly recognisable in the photograph in Bamdad e Iran and, given the pictures on the cover of that magazine which would certainly be offensive to the Iranian regime, we consider that he is a demonstrator whom the Iranian authorities would particularly wish to identify and that there is a real risk that they would be able to do so; because of the nature of his association with Bamdad e Iran there is also a real risk that he would then face ill-treatment which would amount to persecution because of his political beliefs. Even if he were not picked up at the airport we consider that he would still be at risk on return, as the nature of the Iranian regime is that if they wish to detain a particular individual they have the means to do so. 70. We therefore conclude that, on the low standard of proof, there is a real risk that this appellant would face persecution for a Convention reason on return to Iran and that the decision of the Immigration judge should not stand. We remake the decision allowing this appeal on asylum grounds and for the same reason find that his appeal succeeds on human rights grounds (Article 3). As the appeal is allowed on asylum ground the appellant is not entitled to humanitarian protection. DECISION This appeal is allowed on asylum grounds. This appeal is allowed on human rights grounds. The appellant is not entitled to Humanitarian Protection. Signed The Honourable Mr. Justice Cranston Annex 1 DECISION AS TO MATERIAL ERROR OF LAW i. The appellant is a national of Iran. In a determination notified on 16 December 2009 Immigration Judge (IJ) Chana dismissed his appeal against a decision by the respondent made on 27 November 2009 to remove him from the United Kingdom by way of directions having refused to grant him asylum. His appeal was heard within the fast-track procedure. ii. The grounds for reconsideration contended that the IJ erred in failing to take the case out of the fast track pursuant to para 30 of the Asylum and Imagination (Fast Track Procedure) Rules 2005 so as to enable him to obtain expert evidence relating to risk on return arising from sur place activities; in failing to correctly follow YB (Eritrea) [2008] EWCA Civ 360 ; in making perverse findings in relation to risk on return; in making mistakes as to certain aspects of the appellant’s evidence; and in failing to direct herself as to the correct approach when considering corroborative documentary evidence, in particular the court document for the appellant’s sister’s sentence in Iran and the summons. iii. I shall deal with the last two grounds first as they are the only ones that seeks to challenge the IJ’s findings of fact concerning the appellant’s personal and family history and circumstances. The mistakes of fact identified as having been made at paras 17 and 46, even accepting they are indeed mistakes, were not such as had any material effect on the IJ’s assessment of the appellant’s account. The IJ gave a surfeit of other reasons for rejecting credibility. In addition, the IJ elsewhere clearly proceeded on the basis that there was both a camera used by the Iranian Embassy as well as pictures taken by other persons not connected with the Embassy which found their way on to U-Tube and into the printed media. Her assessment of risk arising from these had regard to each of these. iv. I see no merit in the challenge to the IJ’s treatment of the appellant’s documents. In paras 9 and 49 the IJ correctly noted that she was obliged to consider the appellant’s claim in the light of the evidence as a whole. Although the IJ did not specifically refer to the case of Tanveer Ahmed [2002] UKIAT 00439 , her approach to the various documents submitted by the appellant was entirely consistent with the guidance in that case. The IJ gave sound reasons for placing no reliance on the document relating to his sister’s detention in Iran and the court summons addressed to the appellant’s father dated 19 August 2009. The grounds fail to identify any error in those reasons. The IJ was quite entitled to find these documents unsatisfactory. v. As regards the IJ’s assessment of the appellant’s personal and family history and circumstances, I consider that it was well-reasoned and free of legal error. These grounds fail to mount any real challenge to the IJ’s findings of fact relating to these matters. vi. However, it remains to consider whether the IJ erred in assessing risk on return. This is the focus of the remaining grounds for reconsideration, which I will not deal with individually. Although rejecting most of the appellant’s account (and that of his witness) the IJ did accept that: (i) he had attended five demonstrations in quick succession outside the Iranian Embassy in London from 17 June to 9 July 2009; (ii) that the Iranian Embassy had a camera recording these and other demonstrations held in the aftermath of the mass demonstrations which took place in Iran following the June 12 Presidential elections; that the appellant appeared in a U-Tube video recording of one of these demonstrations outside the London Embassy; and that a Farsi magazine called “Devil” had carried a photograph of the appellant protesting outside the London Embassy. vii. The IJ made two findings as to this evidence: first, that the appellant had “deliberately and opportunistically attempted to establish a claim as a refugee sur place by participating in demonstrations outside the Iranian Embassy” (para 38); second that it was necessary nonetheless to consider whether his sur place activities would expose him to a real risk of suffering relevant harm on return as a result of his participating in demonstrations outside the Iranian Embassy (paras 38-48). In my judgment her finding on the latter issue of risk on return was vitiated by legal error. Essentially she based her assessment on speculation about whether the Iranian authorities would have the resources to identify individuals involved in these demonstrations. She concluded they would not. However, as Sedley LJ stated in YB at para 17, when dealing with a similar factual scenario, it was necessary to consider:[17]“whether the AIT has materially erred in law by(a) relying on the absence of objective evidence that the Eritrean authorities had the ability or desire to monitor the activities of expatriates throughout the UK, or(b) concluding that, even if photographs were taken of demonstrators, it was unlikely that the Eritrean authorities would be able to identify the appellant and/or place his name on a list of people of interest to the authorities.” “18. As has been seen (§7 above), the tribunal, while accepting that the appellant's political activity in this country was genuine, were not prepared to accept in the absence of positive evidence that the Eritrean authorities had "the means and the inclination" to monitor such activities as a demonstration outside their embassy, or that they would be able to identify the appellant from photographs of the demonstration. In my judgment, and without disrespect to what is a specialist tribunal, this is a finding which risks losing contact with reality. Where, as here, the tribunal has objective evidence which "paints a bleak picture of the suppression of political opponents" by a named government, it requires little or no evidence or speculation to arrive at a strong possibility – and perhaps more – that its foreign legations not only film or photograph their nationals who demonstrate in public against the regime but have informers among expatriate oppositionist organisations who can name the people who are filmed or photographed. Similarly it does not require affirmative evidence to establish a probability that the intelligence services of such states monitor the internet for information about oppositionist groups. The real question in most cases will be what follows for the individual claimant. If, for example, any information reaching the embassy is likely to be that the claimant identified in a photograph is a hanger-on with no real commitment to the oppositionist cause, that will go directly to the issue flagged up by art 4(3)(d) of the Directive.” ix. Here too I consider that in the light of the background evidence it is at least right to say that there is a strong possibility that the Iranian authorities have been taking steps to identify from camera evidence and other sources the identities of persons participating in demonstrations outside their Embassy in the latter part of 2009 and that the real question in most cases will be what follows for the individual claimant. The IJ’s speculation to the contrary amounted to a departure from the approach set out in YB (Eritrea) and was not sustainable in fact. x. This leads me to rule on whether or not the case should remain in the fast track. I do not consider it would be just to keep it in the fast-track procedure. As regards the issue of whether a person who has attended a number of demonstrations outside the Iranian Embassy in the second half of 2009 would meet with adverse treatment by the Iranian authorities on return, there is a clear need for more targeted evidence and also for up-to-date evidence. I agree with Mr Aslam that this is a subject on which the Tribunal would be greatly assisted by evidence from an expert with accepted credentials in giving an informed opinion on recent political events in Iran and the likely behaviour of the Iranian authorities towards their national abroad known to have participated in recent demonstrations. xi. I should emphasise, however, that further expert evidence should confine itself to: (1) the general issue of risk to a person who has demonstrated outside the Iranian Embassy since June 12 2009; and (2) the general issue of risk to a person whose demonstrating outside the Iranian Embassy has been found to be opportunistic and not based on any real political convictions or involvements. The expert report should not seek to consider the appellant’s own account of his history and family circumstances. The basis of the further reconsideration in this appeal is that the appellant has been found not credible except in relation to his mere attendance at five demonstrations outside the Iranian Embassy in London post-June 12 2009. DR H H Storey (Senior Immigration Judge) APPENDIX: LIST OF DOCUMENTATION CONSIDERED Item Document Date 1 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, “Travel advice for Iran” 24 September 2010 2 Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, “Iran jails rights activist for six years” 18 September 2010 3 Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, “Spouse of jailed Iranian lawyer 'threatened with arrest'” 16 September 2010 4 Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, “Another Iranian diplomat seeks asylum in Norway” 14 September 2010 5 Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, “Iranian diplomats defect in Finland, Belgium” 13 September 2010 6 Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, “Exiled ally talks about jailed Iranian activist's torture allegations” 11 September 2010 7 United Kingdom Border Agency table, “Iran removals and voluntary departures” with an explanatory note 3 September 2010 8 Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, “Iran's human rights lawyers increasingly facing their own days in court” 2 September 2010 9 International Campaign for Human Rights in Iran, “Arrests and convictions of rights activists and lawyers escalate” 1 September 2010 10 International Campaign for Human Rights in Iran, “Reporter's guide” September 2010 11 United Kingdom Border Agency, “Country of Origin Information Report – Iran” 31 August 2010 12 Human Rights Watch, “Iran: Stop abuse of political prisoners” 6 August 2010 13 Reporters Without Borders, “A year in prison and five-year political ban for dissident journalist” 26 July 2010 14 United Kingdom Border Agency, “Operational Guidance Note – Iran” 28 January 2009 (re-issued July 2010) 15 Stratfor Global Intelligence special report, “Iranian intelligence and regime preservation” 21 June 2010 16 Medical Foundation for the Care of Victims of Torture, “A year on from Iran's disputed election, Iranian torture survivors speak out” 21 June 2010 17 Amnesty International, “Iran: Student activist detained in Iran: Behzad Bagheri Kahkesh” 21 June 2010 18 Voice of America News, “In Iran, internet is lifeline and a noose” 9 June 2010 19 The Guardian, “Iran election anniversary protests face severe crackdown” 9 June 2010 20 Amnesty International, “Iranian political prisoners detained for dissent since the 2009 election” 9 June 2010 21 Amnesty International, “Iran's crackdown on dissent widens with hundreds unjustly imprisoned” 9 June 2010 22 Voice of America News, “Fallout from contested Iran election outcome still reverberates” 8 June 2010 23 Reporters Without Borders, “Using skilfully devised strategy, regime's repressive policies succeed” 8 June 2010 24 RAND Corporation, “The rise of the Pasdaran” June 2010 25 Amnesty International, “From protest to prison: Iran one year after the election” June 2010 26 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), “Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression: Summary of cases transmitted to governments and replies received” (Iran excerpt) 26 May 2010 27 The Australian, “'Spies' report back to Tehran on Pre-democracy activists” 24 May 2010 28 Iran Focus, “Two hanged in central Iran prison” 19 May 2010 29 AFP , “Iran confirms death sentence for opposition activists” 15 May 2010 30 Freedom House, “Iran continues use of executions and brutal tactics to silence opposition” 11 May 2010 31 Australian Government Refugee Review Tribunal, “Country Advice Iran – IRN36407 – Overseas protests – Sydney vigil – Post-election protests – Internet monitoring – Social networking websites – Returnees” 15 April 2010 32 The Australian, “Court targets Iranian expats” 9 April 2010 33 The Australian, “Iranian students living in Australia held on trips back to Iran” 8 April 2010 34 The Australian, “Iranian embassy in Canberra 'spying' on activist students” 6 April 2010 35 Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, “Special court to be established for Iranians abroad” 5 April 2010 36 Reporters and Human Rights Activists in Iran, “Son of Tehran stock exchange's former Secretary-General detained for 3 months” 1 April 2010 37 Amnesty International, “Iran executions send a chilling message” 30 March 2010 38 Reporters and Human Rights Activists of Iran, “Letter by Saeed Malekpour: A shocking account of torture, interrogation & forced confessions” 27 March 2010 39 Reporters Without Borders 12 March 2010 40 U.S. Department of State, “2009 Human Rights Report: Iran” 11 March 2010 41 The Times, “BBC an arm of MI6, says Police Chief of Iran” 22 February 2010 42 AFP , “Over 65 reporters face spying charges in Iran: Rights group” 16 February 2010 43 BBC , “MEPs condemn Nokia Siemens 'surveillance tech' in Iran” 11 February 2010 44 Amnesty International, “Iran: Fears for demonstrators as authorities warn of zero tolerance amid ongoing arrests and trials” 9 February 2010 45 CS.Monitor.com, “How Iranian dissidents slip through Tehran’s airport dragnet” 8 February 2010 46 Iran Human Rights Documentation Center, “Violent aftermath: The 2009 election and suppression of dissent in Iran” February 2010 47 Amnesty International, “Submission to the UN universal periodic review for Iran, 7 th session of the UPR working group of the Human Rights Council” February 2010 48 The Times, “Iran hangs alleged dissidents to warn opposition” 29 January 2010 49 Amnesty International, “'Shocking' execution of Iran protesters condemned” 28 January 2010 50 United Kingdom Parliament House of Commons, “Hansard debates 19 January 2010 (oral answers to questions): Iran” 19 January 2010 51 Voice of America News, “Iran demonstrators facing death sentence” 17 January 2010 52 Human Rights Watch, “Iran: End persecution of peaceful activists” 9 January 2010 53 Amnesty International, “Urgent action: Hundreds held in Iran after Ashoura protests” 8 January 2010 54 International Campaign for Human Rights in Iran, “Authorities attempt to crush remaining active human rights NGOs” 6 January 2010 55 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, “Iran: Student protests in Iran; treatment by Iranian authorities of student protestors (December 2007 - December 2009)” 5 January 2010 56 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, “Iran: Treatment by Iranian authorities of relatives of persons who have left Iran and claimed refugee status, including former members of the Bureau of National Security (SAVAK), of a Fedayeen organization, or opposition protestors” 4 January 2010 57 Christian Science Monitor, “Iran uses internet as tool against protestors” 4 January 2010 58 International Committee Against Executions, “Bulletin of the International Committee Against Executions“ January 2010 59 Freedom House, “Freedom in the World 2010: Iran” 2010 60 Wall Street Journal, “Iranian crackdown goes global” 4 December 2009 61 Amnesty International, “Election contested, repression compounded” December 2009 62 Rooz 1260, “Guards threaten to punish activists outside Iran” 9 November 2009 63 Human Rights Watch, “Iran: Stop covering up sexual assaults in prison” 6 November 2009 64 United Press International, “Iranian spies active in Germany” 16 October 2009 65 Human Rights Watch, “Iran: Crisis deepening one year after disputed elections” 17 July 2009 66 Scoop News, “Demonstration outside Iranian embassy in London” 29 June 2009 67 The Telegraph, “Iran 'to downgrade ties with UK' after accusing London of interference in election” 24 June 2009 68 Islamic Republic News Agency, “Students' sit-in protest outside UK embassy cancelled” 23 June 2009 69 Words, “Iran embassy staff secretly film British protesters taking to the streets in wake of election rigging claims” 20 June 2009 70 The Telegraph, “Iranian embassy camera watches protesters in London” 20 June 2009 71 The Free Library, “Embassy camera spies on protests” 19 June 2009 72 Politics.co.uk, “Iranian solidarity protest outside London embassy” 18 June 2009 73 Newspark, “Iran election protest footage, Iranian embassy (London)” 18 June 2009 74 The Guardian, “Students in solidarity protest at Iran embassy” 18 June 2009 75 YouTube, “Protest against Iran's election result” 17 June 2009 76 Demotix, “Election protests outside Iranian embassy” 17 June 2009 77 Flickr, “London Iranian embassy demonstration” 14 – 18 June 2009 78 Anonymous Iran, “June 16 – London – Iranian embassy” June 2009 79 Danish Refugee Council and Danish Immigration Service, “Human rights situation for minorities, women and converts, and entry and exit procedures, ID cards, summons and reporting, etc.” April 2009 80 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, “Iran: The treatment of student protestors or activists (June 2006 - November 2007)” 9 January 2008 81 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, “The treatment of student protestors or activists since 2002” 26 June 2006 82 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, “Arrest warrants and other court documents; trial in absentia in criminal cases; punishment for persons charged with helping anti-revolutionaries; procedure when someone acts as surety” 20 June 2006 83 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, “Exit and entry procedures at airports and land borders, particularly at Mehrabad International airport” 3 April 2006 84 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, “The repatriation of failed refugee claimants to Iran, including reports of claimants being detained, mistreated and tortured upon removal from Canada on the basis they made refugee claims in Canada” 7 December 2005 85 OpenNet Initiative, “Internet filtering in Iran” 86 The National Interest, “The revolution will be mercantilized” Item Case Law Considered Date 1 New Zealand Refugee Status Appeals Authority – Refugee appeal no. 76345 30 June 2010 2 New Zealand Refugee Status Appeals Authority – Refugee appeal no. 76454 8 March 2010 3 SB (risk on return – illegal exit) Iran CG [2009] UKAIT 00053 16 December 2009 4 SZ and JM (Christians – FS confirmed) Iran CG [2008] UKAIT 00082 12 November 2008 5 YB (Eritrea) [2008] EWCA Civ 360 15 April 2008 6 SH (Baha’is) Iran CG [2006] UKAIT 00041 27 April 2006 7 RM and BB (Homosexuals) Iran CG [2005] UKIAT 00117 8 July 2005 8 IK (Returnees – Records – IFA) Turkey CG [2004] UKIAT 00312 2 December 2004 9 FS and others (Iran – Christian Converts) Iran CG [2004] UKIAT 00303 17 November 2004 10 AH (Gashgai nomads – no persecution) Iran CG [2004] UKIAT 00169 22 June 2004 11 ME (Male Adulterer – Convention Reason? – Risk) Iran CG [2003] UKIAT 00166 9 December 2003 12 HA (Article 3 – Refugee – Adultery – Punishment) Iran CG [2003] UKIAT 00095 17 October 2003 13 SS (Risk – Manastry) Iran CG [2003] UKIAT 00035 8 August 2003 14 ZH (Women as Particular Social Group) Iran CG [2003] UKIAT 00207 6 June 2003 15 FT (Fair Trail – Adultery) Iran CG [2002 ] UKIAT 07576 3 April 2003 16 MT (Refugee – Communist Party) Iran CG [2002] UKIAT 06995 3 March 2003 17 BZ DR (Risk – Political Journalist) Iran CG [2002] UKIAT 06452 11 February 2003 18 FM (Risk – Homosexual – Illegal Departure) Iran CG [2002] UKIAT 05660 5 December 2002 19 FK (Persecution – Refugee – Political Writer) Iran CG [2002] UKIAT 01328 2 May 2002 20 SF (Article 3 – Prison Conditions) Iran CG [2002] UKIAT 00973 4 April 2002

Cited in 10 later judgments

and 1 more case