“We have established that the policing and crime office has removed the right of appeal from their "Unreasonable behaviour" policy contrary to Article Six of the European Convention of Human Rights, and have done so without seeking appropriate legal advice, and we have established that they are intercepting these emails with no legal authority and that they know they have no legal authority. They appear to do this on the basis that they think it unreasonable to expect that where the police have agreed to a course of conduct in response to a complaint and do not follow that course, that the policing and crime office should at least record that fact and seek an explanation. The question here is: is they [sic] mayor aware of the lawbreaking by her policing and crime office, and if so, then what reason was she told to justify it?”
“I am writing to ask what are your policing objectives with regards to the criminal misconduct in the high offices of state, as I believe that this crime represents by far the biggest threat to the people of West Yorkshire. Despite a number of letters on the subject during your consultation period, I can find no mention of misconduct anywhere in your Crime Plan. I trust that you are aware of the offence, but for the benefit of the readers, the CPS guidelines are available here: https://www.cps.gov.uk/legal-guidance/mi... From the wilful seeding of care homes with a deadly virus, to the treaty formally known as "Oven Ready", and now called the Northern Ireland Protocol, this government is established and defined by the abuse of the public's trust. The lies about partygate, the open market in peerages and the torrent of public money into the pockets of donors: the list goes on and on. Much of the United Kingdom's constitution is founded on "The Good Chap" principle and the Good Chap principle relies on the public's trust. If that trust is abused then it threatens the very fabric of our society: this is why such abuse is a criminal offence. We are governed by criminals and crime is a matter for the police. What are this areas objectives in relation to this crime?”
“21. WYCA stated in its response to the complainant dated28 March 2022 that it ‘has noted the number of requests that you have submitted under the FOIA – albeit from alternative email addresses, yet all the same or similar nature. Several attempts have been made to advise, under Section 16 of the FOIA, alternative methods to communicate with the Combined Authority yet the pursuit of submitting such questions under the FOIA is both disproportionate and not in the public interest.” 22. WYCA pointed out to the Commissioner that it had explained to the complainant on a number of occasions that the FOIA was only for information held in a clearly reportable format and was not intended for general correspondence, complaints or used as a means to change the policy or legislation, which a lot of his requests were seeking to achieve. 23. WYCA advised the Commissioner that on9 November 2021 it implemented its unreasonable behaviour policy to restrict and limit the complainant’s contact with it for the following reasons: • “Refusing to accept that issues are not within the remit of the Mayor, the Deputy Mayor for Policing and Crime or the staff in the Policing and Crime Team despite having been provided with information about what we can and cannot assist with; • Sending multiple forms of communications to the wider Combined Authority A in an attempt to change the outcome of his communications with the Policing and Crime Team; • Sending numerous emails/letters, often within short periods of time, frequently repeating questions that had already been answered. In particular, continuing to involve the Information Governance team in his complaints about Members of Parliament and the BBC despite being told on a number of occasions how these crime reports are submitted in these circumstances and who is responsible for considering them. • Make comments about staff members ability to perform their role with the intention to be inflammatory.” 24. WYCA confirmed that, the implementation of the policy did not revoke the complainant’s rights under FOIA or the UK General Data Protection Regulations. However, it considers that the complainant then turned to FOIA and the GDPR to make requests as a means to continue to correspond with it and to circumvent the unreasonable behaviour policy decision. It stated ‘It was simply due to the fact that restrictions had been placed on the Requestor, with the imposition of the unreasonable behaviour policy, that he looked to access the Combined Authority through requests under the FOIA.’ … 27. WYCA has also provided the Commissioner with a timeline of the complainant’s engagement with it. This includes complaints, FOI requests, subject access requests and general correspondence. It is clear that all communications from the requester are on the broad topics outlined at paragraph 23 above. The timeline also evidences that the application of the unreasonable behaviour restrictions has not diminished the requester’s contact with WYCA, but rather has resulted in an increase in using FOIA to continue to revisit matters which have either been resolved or to raise complaints and concerns about the way WYCA is handling his correspondence.”
“28. The Commissioner has considered the context and history in which the present request has been made, along with the subject matter of the respective requests, and determines that it is vexatious for the same reasons as those set out in his Decision Notices IC-168381-Q2J4 and IC 213303-S5B4 dated 20 and24 April 2023 respectively. He also notes that in its response to the complainant’s requests referenced in those decision notices, WYCA put him on notice that similar future requests would not be responded to by virtue of Section 17(6) of FOIA. Therefore, in all the circumstances, the Commissioner finds it would be unreasonable for WYCA to issue a further refusal notice under Section 17(5) of FOIA. 29. 29. The Commissioner is satisfied WYCA authority has successfully applied section 17(6) to the complainant’s request dated4 May 2022 .”
“30. Although not subject to this Decision Notice, the Commissioner has noted similar subsequent requests made by the complainant to WYCA dated17 May 2022 and4 March 2023 where WYCA has relied on Section 17(6) of FOIA. 31. It is likely the Commissioner would also find these requests vexatious for the reasons mentioned above and the Commissioner will consider his powers under section 50(2)(c) of FOIA to refuse to deal with subsequent complaints relating to similar requests on the basis that they are vexatious or frivolous.”
“17. We accept, as noted above, that there is a high hurdle in establishing that a request is vexatious. We have no reason to doubt the sincerity of the appellant’s belief that there has been a significant degree of wrongdoing of prominent people during COVID and that the appellant has sought to report crimes which he believes those people have committed. It is against that background that we have considered this request. 18. We observe first that the initial formulation of the request on4 May 2022 “Is the mayor aware of the law breaking by her policing and crime office, and if so, then what reason was she told to justify it” is not a matter which is easily considered as recorded information. The second complaint is, at best, a request for policing objectives and is more in the form of a statement as to the appellant’s beliefs than a request for information.”
“21. Whilst there may not have been a particular burden in this case given the notification supplied earlier that further requests could be seen as vexatious, there is a pattern here of requests relating to a specific area, that is the wrongdoing by public figures and the extent to which it has not been properly investigated by West Yorkshire Police. We note that this is not in our view a well-focused request for information and that there is a pattern here of multiple FOIA requests being submitted over a significant period 22. In assessing the motive, we observe that there is no need to provide a reason for making a request for information but the proper application of Section 14 cannot sidestep the question of the underlying rationale or justification for the request. What may begin as a reasonable request may, in the wider context of what has happened subsequently, result in requests being increasingly distant from the starting point. That, we consider, is a relevant factor in this case. 23. We also see little or no value or purpose in this request given that it is not in reality a request for recorded information but is seeking evidence of an opinion. 24. There is little evidence before us that there has been distress caused to staff, but there is the use of intemperate language and that there are wide-ranging and unsubstantiated allegations of criminal behaviour, as noted in the decision notices. 25. We note that it has been explained to the appellant why West Yorkshire Police had not recorded any reported crime, an explanation that does not appear unreasonable. 26. Taking all of these factors into account cumulatively, we find that WYCA was entitled to refuse the request pursuant to Section 14(1) of FOIA. We consider also that in the circumstances of this case, and on the basis of these findings, and given the previous warning served on the appellant, that under Section 17(6) of FOIA, WYCA were entitled not to issue a refusal notice as they were right in considering that the request was vexatious and had previously properly refused a request on that basis. Accordingly, they were entitled pursuant to Section 17(5) not to have to issue a refusal notice. Accordingly, for these reasons we dismiss the appeal.”
“5. The tribunal considered two requests. One was: ‘is the mayor aware of the lawbreaking by her policing and crime office, and if so, then what reason was she told to justify it?’ The tribunal said that that ‘is not a matter which is easily considered as recorded information.’ 6. I am more concerned about how the tribunal dealt with the other request, which was: ‘I am writing to ask what are your policing objectives with regards to the criminal misconduct in the high offices of state, as I believe that this crime represents by far the biggest threat to the people of West Yorkshire. … ‘We are governed by criminals and crime is a matter for the police. What are this areas objectives in relation to this crime?’ Of this, the tribunal said: Of this, the tribunal said: 18. … The second complaint is, at best, a request for policing objectives and is more in the form of a statement as to the appellant’s beliefs than a request for information. 21. … We note that this is not in our view a well-focused request for information and that there is a pattern here of multiple FOIA requests being submitted over a significant period. 23. We also see little or no value or purpose in this request given that it is not in reality a request for recorded information but is seeking evidence of an opinion. 7. It is true that the request for objectives contained statements of Mr Kennaugh’s beliefs that may not be shared by the public authority, but within it are two clear questions. They ask the same thing and could be answered without reference to the beliefs. The questions seem to me to be well-focused and do not ask for evidence of an opinion. It may be that the answer would lead to further questions, which might be vexatious, and could be treated accordingly.”
“(1) If on an appeal under section 57 the Tribunal considers- (a) that the notice against which the appeal is brought is not in accordance with the law, or (b) to the extent that the notice involved an exercise of discretion by the Commissioner, that he ought to have exercised his discretion differently, the Tribunal shall allow the appeal or substitute such other notice as could have been served by the Commissioner; and in any other case the Tribunal shall dismiss the appeal. (2) On such an appeal, the Tribunal may review any finding of fact on which the notice in question was based.”
“As I read section 17, what the authority has to do is to identify the information covered by the request and then either disclose it or say why it is not doing so. That is an administrative process.”
“33. Mr Swift pointed out that section 17 is not a formal decision that is subject to a form of appeal under section 50. I would generalise that submission and say that the process undertaken by the public authority is not an adjudicative procedure that results in a decision.”
“74. The first decision-maker in the statutory process is the public authority. Its duties are found in Part 1 of FOIA. An authority must confirm or deny whether requested information is held, and communicate the information which it holds, unless a relevant exemption applies: section 1(1). If an authority communicates information it must do so in accordance with section 11. Where it refuses to either confirm or deny, or to communicate information, it must issue a refusal notice in accordance with section 17 setting out all the exemptions claimed and why they apply. A public authority which correctly applies one of the exemptions on which it relies but incorrectly relies on others, and provides reasons and information in accordance with section 17, has complied with its duties under Part 1. It has complied with its duties under section 1 because section 1 permits it to withhold information to which any exemption applies. It has complied with its duties under section 17 because it has set out the basis on which it is claiming all exemptions relied on. It does not matter that it also incorrectly relies on other exemptions because the scheme of Part 1 means that, although a public authority must state all the exemptions which it relies upon, it need only be right about one of them. 75. This analysis is consistent with the powers of the Commissioner to issue a decision notice under section 50(4). Under paragraph (a) the Commissioner must require a public authority to take steps to correct a failure to communicate information or issue confirmation or denial where it is required to do so by section 1(1). But where one exemption is correctly relied on by the authority, there has been no failure to comply with section 1(1) even if the other claimed exemptions do not apply. This explains why section 50(4) does not make any provision for a decision notice to address those other exemptions. Under 4 paragraph (b), the Commissioner must specify the steps to be taken to correct a failure to comply with sections 11 or 17. But, even if an authority wrongly relied on some exemptions included in its refusal notice, this would not amount to a failure to comply with either section.”
“What may seem an entirely reasonable and benign request may be found to be vexatious in the wider context of the course of dealings between the individual and the relevant public authority. Thus vexatiousness may be found where an original and entirely reasonable request leads on to a series of further requests on allied topics, where such subsequent requests become increasingly distant from the requester’s starting point.”