“…a Judge should address an application for relief from sanction in three stages, as follows: i) The first stage is to identify and assess the seriousness or significance of the failure to comply with the rules. The focus should be on whether the breach has been serious or significant. If a judge concludes that a breach is not serious or significant, then relief will usually be granted and it will usually be unnecessary to spend much time on the second or third stages; but if the judge decides that the breach is serious or significant, then the second and third stages assume greater importance. ii) The second stage is to consider why the failure occurred, that is to say whether there is a good reason for it. It was stated in Mitchell (at para. [41]) that if there is a good reason for the default, the court will be likely to decide that relief should be granted. The important point made in Denton was that if there is a serious or significant breach and no good reason for the breach, this does not mean that the application for relief will automatically fail. It is necessary in every case to move to the third stage. iii) The third stage is to evaluate all the circumstances of the case, so as to enable the court to deal justly with the application. The two factors specifically mentioned inCPR rule 3.9 are of particular importance and should be given particular weight. They are (a) the need for litigation to be conducted efficiently and at proportionate cost, and (b) the need to enforce compliance with rules, practice directions and court orders… 14. The following further guidance can also be distilled from the judgment in Hysaj: (i) There is no merit in constructing a special rule for public authorities; they have a responsibility to adhere to the court’s rules even if their resources are ‘stretched to breaking point’ [42]; (ii) A solicitor or public body having too much work will rarely be a good reason for failing to comply with the rules [42]; (iii) Particular care needs to be taken in appeals concerning claims for asylum and humanitarian protection to ensure that appeals are not frustrated by a failure by a party’s legal representatives to comply with time limits. The nature of the proceedings and identification of responsibility for a failure are matters to be considered at the third stage of the process [42]; (iv) The inability to pay for legal representation cannot be regarded as providing a good reason for delay [43]; (v) In most cases the merits of the appeal will have little to do with whether it is appropriate to grant an extension of time. Only in those cases where the court can see without much investigation that the grounds of appeal are either very strong or very weak will the merits have a significant part to play when it comes to balancing the various factors that have to be considered at stage three of the process [46]. … 16. Although none of the decisions cited above were made in the specific context that presents itself in the instant matter, we can see no good reason, and none was advanced by the parties, as to why the approach commended in Mitchell, Denton and Hysaj should not equally be applied to the First-tier Tribunal’s, and Upper Tribunal’s, consideration of an application for an extension of time to apply for permission to appeal (assuming of course that the notice of appeal was actually filed out of time). Nothing in the approach rehearsed above is in discord with the overriding objective of either the 2014 FtT Rules or 2008 UT Rules to deal with cases justly and fairly; indeed, it is the aspiration of achievement of these very objectives which was identified by the court in Denton, at [24], as underpinning the rationale for the third stage of the process of consideration.”