“24. It is important to emphasise that the type of engagement envisaged by this activity is engagement that is face-to-face. Nevertheless, as a starting point only, it is of some relevance to note that [the appellant] is a paid part-time employee……albeit…most of her engagement with those she helps is by telephone and, therefore, not face-to-face. As part of that job she speaks to people who are vulnerable. The nature of such a job is to support and encourage those who may themselves be reluctant to talk about their difficulties…..[the appellant] must build something of a relationship with others so as to try and help them. Albeit not face-to-face, the [appellant’s job role] is at its very essence one of social engagement. [Her] evidence made this clear. For example, she explained that one of those who she helped was known to be aggressive. [The appellant] spoke to her manager to gain guidance on how to manage difficult individuals and took that advice on board. Both [the appellant] and her manager were clearly of the view that dealing with difficult, aggressive people was something she was able to do, albeit while doing so on the telephone. 25. However, although [the appellant] has a considerable capacity to engage with others by telephone, the key question for the tribunal was, could she, at the relevant time, also engage with other people face-to-face. 26. The tribunal accepted that [the appellant] has a certain wariness of people she does not know, and of large groupings, but judged that her difficulties in this regard are not to the extent that she cannot engage socially face-to-face. 27. [The appellant lives in] a small town with a range of shop sizes. She accepted that she shops in a good-sized [supermarket store in the town], rather than at one of the smaller stores in the town. She does this weekly, Just, for a moment, taking by itself the evidence she gave to the tribunal regarding these visits, it seemed to the tribunal that she was describing inter-personal action within the store in such a way that she was socially engaging face-to-face. She did not say that she did not like queues, but she was clearly able to go shopping on her own when other customers were present and would interact with them when spoken to. At the date of the decision, [the appellant] was also shopping in other shops in [the town], for example at the local pet shop. 28. She struck the tribunal as someone who likes people. She visits family…and has friends and neighbours with whom she can sustain relationships. She will go to a café in [the town] with her friend….She will also meet neighbours to share meals…..This is all consistent with what the tribunal made of her evidence when she described her trips to the shops and how she managed with people when inside a store. 29. There was other evidence in the case to support the impression that [the appellant] had given the tribunal in evidence. She visits her employer….specifically to meet colleagues face-to-face. Although she knows these colleagues, there would have been a time when she did not, and would have had to build the relationships she now has with them.”
“I would have set aside the decision on the basis of the third limb of social engagement appears not to have been dealt with but there is authority that a relationship can be very limited in time. Which approach should the tribunal take of the two raised?”
“4.5 It is my submission that the FtT has erred in law in both its fact finding and duty to provide adequate reasons for their decision. The conclusion from the FtT on how they assessed the claimant’s functional abilities appears limited in their reasoning. It seems that what the FtT has provided at paragraphs 26-29 of the SoR in relation to daily living activity 9 – Engaging with other people face to face appears to be no more than a rehearsal of the evidence before them and a conclusion without an adequate explanation. 4.6 With regards to the issue raised by DTJ Jacques in their decision notice when granting the claimant permission to appeal to the UT. The Secretary of State’s representative respectfully suggests that out of the two decisions referred to in this submission…., the Court of Appeal decision in Hickey v SSWP[2018] EWCA Civ 851 , is the more authoritative decision and therefore should be relied upon by the FtT. 4.7 Moving onto the representative’s grounds of appeal concerning daily living activity 9. The claimant has a number of physical and mental health difficulties including a longstanding history of severe anxiety and depression, post-traumatic stress disorder, panic attacks, palpitations, stress reaction and chest pain. She is prescribed antidepressant medication Citalopram 30mg daily to help with the symptoms of her mental health problems and had recently undertaken counselling/talking therapy from January 2021 to July 2021. She has also been re-referred to a psychologist on 18/10/21. The claimant stated that she has a great deal of difficulty engaging with others face to face due to her anxiety ….] 4.8 The FtT note in paragraph 11 of the SoR that the claimant’s representative had invited them to consider awarding the claimant points for a number of descriptors including daily living descriptor 9b – Needs prompting to be able to engage with other people. The FtT in paragraph 26 of the SoR appear to accept the claimant has a “…wariness of people she does not know and of large groupings…” but concluded that “…her difficulties in this regard are not to the extent that she cannot engage socially face-to-face.” 4.9 In reaching their conclusions the FtT in paragraph 27 of the SoR appear to have placed some weight on the claimant’s evidence that she 26 shops weekly at the [supermarket store in her town] and smaller shops in the locality. The evidence she provided to the FtT in their view seemed to be “…describing inter-personal action within the store in such a way that she was socially engaging face to face. She did say that she did not like queues, but she was clearly able to go shopping on her own when other customers were present and would interact with them when spoken to. At the date of the decision [claimant] was also shopping in other shops in [her town], for example the local pet shop.” 4.10 Whilst it is acknowledged that the claimant shops at the [supermarket in her town] and also at smaller local shops in [her town], I would note that her shopping trip to the [supermarket] is done on a weekly basis. It is also unclear when reading the SoR how frequently she would shop at the local shops in [her town]. Would this be on a weekly basis as well? If so, then her shopping trips are not occurring on the majority of days. 4.11 The FtT appear to suggest that the claimant’s verbal evidence during the hearing was describing “…inter-personal action within the store in such a way that she was socially engaging face to face.”
“…panic attacks are frequently triggered by social engagement. I will cancel meeting family members because I can’t cope or it causes a panic attack. During lockdown my neighbours tried to involve me with a social event but I found this impossible to cope with and ended up crying and having a panic attack as it was too difficult for me… I had to leave work due to stress related issues earlier this year…I became so stressed I was having outbursts and shouting at people. This is the first time it has happened in a work context but it is a frequent occurrence with my family. My emotions overcome me and I am unable to control myself properly.” 4.16 Should not the FtT have used their inquisitorial function to address the above evidence concerning the claimant’s difficulties engaging with others? Especially, given that it is contradictory to the evidence they have relied upon in paragraph 28 of the SoR. On the face of it the above evidence suggests the claimant has difficulties in socially engaging with others including family members where she will shout at them and in some instances will cancel meeting them because she cannot cope or experiences a panic attack. I would also respectfully note that whilst the claimant’s first award of PIP in 2015 included 2 points for daily living activity 9b, could it be that whilst this is not indicative of the same claimed difficulties some years later, however that the claimed difficulties are longstanding, specifically given that the claimant has at the date of decision resumed counselling….. 4.17 Although the FtT is entitled to give weighting to whatever evidence that they choose, where there is conflicting evidence they must in the first instance explore and consider it a holistic manner and provide sufficient reasons explaining why they preferred the evidence that they had. In this appeal the FtT does not appear to have done that. There seems to be a distinct lack of reference to the evidence provided by the claimant concerning her difficulties engaging with others and her difficulty in establishing relationships with others, which she seems to activity avoid if at all possible and appears to be inconsistent with the evidence relied upon by the FtT in the SoR. Additionally, the contradiction in the evidence before them has not been addressed by the FtT when reaching their conclusions concerning daily living activity 9. 4.18 Therefore, it could be said that had the FtT given appropriate consideration to all the evidence, including accurately identifying the effects of the claimant’s conditions, the FtT may have considered the claimant’s limitations. As such, I submit that the FtT have failed to give adequate reasons as to why evidence in parts was not accepted when deciding not to award points. 4.19 I respectfully submit the FtT has materially erred in law, for the reasons I have detailed in my submission, which has resulted in the FtT making insufficient findings of facts and reasons in the SoR to support and explain their decision with regards to the claimant’s appeal. Had the claimant been awarded points for a descriptor within daily living activity 9 such as descriptor 9b this would have been sufficient for the standard rate of the daily living component to have been awarded to the claimant.”
“With respect to the FTT, regardless of whether fleeting interactions in a supermarket can count as forming a relationship…., the evidence on which the FTT relied does not even go so far as to allow a determination that the Appellant was forming relationships. The Appellant’s evidence of interactions she did manage in was not particularised in detail and was qualified by other statements which suggested even this was difficult for her.”
“Daily living component 78:-(1) A person is entitled to the daily living component at the standard rate if— (a) the person's ability to carry out daily living activities is limited by the person's physical or mental condition…. . (2) A person is entitled to the daily living component at the enhanced rate if— (a) the person's ability to carry out daily living activities is severely limited by the person's physical or mental condition…. (4) In this Part “daily living activities“ means such activities as may be prescribed for the purposes of this section.
“80:-(1) For the purposes of this Part, the following questions are to be determined in accordance with regulations— (a) whether a person's ability to carry out daily living activities is limited by the person's physical or mental condition; (b) whether a person's ability to carry out daily living activities is severely limited by the person's physical or mental condition… (3) Regulations under this section— (a) must provide for the questions mentioned in subsection… (1)… to be determined, except in prescribed circumstances, on the basis of an assessment (or repeated assessments) of the person; (b) must provide for the way in which an assessment is to be carried out; (c) may make provision about matters which are, or are not, to be taken into account in assessing a person. (4) The regulations may, in particular, make provision— (a) about the information or evidence required for the purpose of determining the questions mentioned in subsections (1) and (2); (b) about the way in which that information or evidence is to be provided; (c) requiring a person to participate in such a consultation, with a person approved by the Secretary of State, as may be determined under the regulations (and to attend for the consultation at a place, date and time determined under the regulations).”
“4(1) For the purposes of section 77(2) and section 78 or 79, as the case may be, of the [WRA], whether C has limited or severely limited ability to carry out daily living or mobility activities, as a result of C's physical or mental condition, is to be determined on the basis of an assessment…. (2A) Where C’s ability to carry out an activity is assessed; C is to be assessed as satisfying a descriptor only if C can do so— (a) safely; (b) to an acceptable standard; (c) repeatedly; and (d) within a reasonable time period…. (4) In this regulation— (a) “safely” means in a manner unlikely to cause harm to C or to another person, either during or after completion of the activity; (b) “repeatedly” means as often as the activity being assessed is reasonably required to be completed; and (c) “reasonable time period” means no more than twice as long as the maximum period that a person without a physical or mental condition which limits that person’s ability to carry out the activity in question would normally take to complete that activity.”
“(a) interact with others in a contextually and socially appropriate manner; (b) understand body language; and (c) establish relationships.”
“8. On appeal, the First-tier Tribunal found that the claimant scored two points for activity 9b and two points for needing prompting or assistance to make complex budgeting decisions, but that was not enough to allow an award. The presiding judge spent almost two pages explaining the tribunal’s decision on activity 9. She recorded detailed findings about how the claimant managed or avoided contact with men in his daily life. The essence of the tribunal’s reasoning was this: The Tribunal considered the extent to which [the claimant] could engage socially with people he did not know. There was nothing to indicate that he could not engage with women, indeed he chose to do so. At the least therefore some of the people that he met were not going to provide a difficulty for him. In respect of the remainder while he was by himself he might find engaging difficult but with someone there to encourage and support there was nothing to indicate that social engagement as a reciprocal exchange (rather than friendship or a longer relationship) would not be possible. 11. I have decided that the tribunal did make an error of law by not dealing with head (c) of the definition of ‘engage socially’ and by not appearing to have taken sufficient account of regulation 4(2A), despite setting it out. I will concentrate in my analysis on how a tribunal should approach that aspect of engaging with other people face to face. 12. The Secretary of State’s representative has cited from the three-judge panel in JC v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions[2014] UKUT 352 (AAC) . That case concerned activity 16 (coping with social engagement due to cognitive impairment or mental disorder) in Schedule 2 to theEmployment and Support Allowance Regulations 2008 (SI No 794). There may be much of value in that decision for activity 9, but I do not find anything particularly relevant to head (c) of the definition that applies in the personal independence payment legislation. 13. I do not accept that establishing a relationship means no more than ‘the ability to reciprocate exchanges’. There is more to it than that. A brief conversation with a stranger about the weather while waiting for a bus does not involve establishing a relationship in the normal sense of the word. Nor does buying a burger or an ice cream, although both involve reciprocating exchanges. 14. Heads (a) and (b) are important parts of establishing relationships, but more is required. Relationships vary in duration (from fleeting to life-long), nature (acquaintance, business, friendship, partnership, sexual) and intensity. Head (c) refers to relationships without qualification. I take that to mean that it is concerned with skills relevant to relationships in general rather than with a particular type of relationship. And the focus is on establishing a relationship rather than nurturing or developing one. 15. The claimant is able to establish relationships with women, but that still leaves roughly half the population that cause him a problem. I have not had argument on this, but I consider that difficulties of that magnitude would be sufficient to satisfy the definition. 16. I am not going to attempt to list the essential characteristics of a relationship. ‘Relationship’ is a word that we all use and the law reports are replete with example of judges explaining why it is a mistake to try to define such words. Not only is that task difficult if not impossible, it is also dangerous. I doubt that I would have envisaged the facts of this case if I had tried to compile as. I doubt that I would have envisaged the facts of this case if I had tried to compile a list. That is why I have not attempted itemise the various skills that are brought to bear in establishing a relationship. 17. The way I have approached this case – and the approach I would recommend to the First-tier Tribunal – is to begin by asking what it is that the claimant says is preventing or inhibiting establishing relationships. Assuming that the tribunal accepts the evidence, the next question is whether that forms part of the claimant’s physical or mental condition for the purposes of section 78 of the Welfare Reform Act [2012].”
"You need to be prompted by another person to engage with other people. This gives you a score of 2."
"You did display signs of low mood and was [as I see] accompanied to the consultation by a friend and I accept that whilst you are able to engage you require prompting to do so." 15. In response to the decision, on9 September 2014 , a Mr Khan (of Leicester City Council's care management division) wrote on behalf of the appellant to say that, save for three particular scores, she accepted the scores set out in the decision letter. The three challenges related to the scores for i) managing therapy or monitoring her health conditions; ii) reading and understanding signs, symbols and words; and iii) following the route of an unfamiliar journey. On the face of her response, therefore, the appellant accepted the 2 points awarded for activity 9. 16. That acceptance was again confirmed in Mr Khan's written submissions dated9 June 2015 , provided for the purposes of the FTT appeal. 17. However, at the FTT hearing itself on21 August 2015 , an attempt was made by Mr Khan to increase the score for activity 9 from 2 to 4 points. The basis for this late submission is not easy to discern from the manuscript notes of the hearing. Mr Royston [counsel for Mrs Hickey] pointed out that, when answering questions, the appellant said that it was her friend who had motivated her to go to exercise classes. She said that she could not go to the keep-fit classes on her own. She did not meet people at the gym: she went there for an hour and then came back home. It appears that at one point Mr Khan said: "prompt needed – but social engagement needed". 18. The FTT refused the appeal. In paragraph 12 of their statement of reasons, they referred to the counselling which the appellant had had but which ended in November/December 2014. They recorded that the appellant had told them that she did not get on well with the counsellor because she was just given a book to write down what she did and when she was happy or sad. The appellant also said that the counsellor was Polish and she did not understand what she said. This is important because, as noted in Hickinbottom LJ's judgment, the only ground of appeal to this court for which, prior to the hearing, the appellant had permission was based on an argument that the involvement of the counsellor was not properly taken into account by the FTT…. 21. Although the FTT awarded the appellant 7 points in respect of the daily living component (an increase of one point), that was still insufficient to meet the threshold of 8 points for a PIP. In respect of activity 9, they awarded her 2 points. The specific reasons for this were said to be: "18. Activity 9 - Engaging face to face: The Decision Maker has awarded Mrs Hickey 2 points for activity 9(b). The Tribunal accepts this to be correct. The Representative at the outset of the hearing submitted in respect of activity 9(c) - 4 points. From the evidence we heard we concluded that Mrs Hickey does not shy away from people. Sharron is her friend and she prefers (from our conclusions) her company and this a matter of choice. Mrs Hickey engaged with the HP [healthcare professional], us, her Representative and whoever she needs to. She goes to the nutrition programme; to the gym and she loves it; she attends counselling; weight loss programme; Let's Talk – Wellbeing; recently went and had her nails done as she is due to go on a holiday on 23.08.15 and is looking forward to going on it with her friend and this would not be uncommon to do. She has driven to Birmingham without her friend, albeit with her two disabled children. Mrs Hickey demonstrated excellent memory and gave us a good recollection of her conditions and history and how she recently bought another car. She cannot only engage with other people with support from someone who is trained or experienced in helping people to engage in social situations and as such does not satisfy the test for activity 9(c). The correct award is 9(b)." [Lord Justice Coulson then makes extensive reference to the Inner House of the Court of Session’s decision in the Secretary of State for Work and Pensions v MMcK[2017] CSIH 57 . The decision in MMcK was subsequently overturned by the Supreme Court in Secretary of State for Work and Pensions v MM (Scotland)[2019] UKSC 34 . What was decided in MM is not directly relevant in this appeal.] The Issues on this Appeal 38. The appellant now takes three points, none of which was the subject of the original grant of permission. Permission was granted for each new ground by this court during the course of the appeal hearing. 39. The appellant's Ground A (the "qualitative difference" point) was that, in this case, the FTT and the UT wrongly assumed that the things done by a provider of 'social support' must be something other than 'prompting'. Mr Royston said that the principal provider of social support was Sharron, the appellant's friend, who fell within the relevant definition because she was experienced in the provision of such support. Relying squarely on MMcK, Mr Royston said that, if the only need of a claimant was 'prompting', but 'prompting' done by someone who fell within the definition of 'social support' (because they had the necessary training or experience) then that meant that descriptor 9(c) applied, and not descriptor 9(b)….. 41. Ground B (the "contemporaneity" point) was the appellant's contention that the FTT and the UT neglected to consider support "not given at the moment of social engagement", in particular support given by Sharron at times other than the appellant's face to face engagements with others….. 42. The appellant's Ground C (the "relationships" point) was to the effect that the FTT and the UT erred in law because they neglected to consider whether the appellant was able to establish relationships, which was part of the definition of 'Engage Socially'. The respondent disputed Ground C on the facts. This was the one part of the appeal which was not affected by the debate about MMcK. Approach to the Points of Law Raised by Grounds A and B. 43. Because of the clear conclusions that I have reached on the facts of this case, it is unnecessary for me to express a concluded view on the points of law arising out of the decision of the Inner House in MMcK, or the argument about the potentially binding nature of that decision; and I do not consider that it would be helpful or appropriate for me to do so…. 46…..for the reasons set out below, I consider that, even if it is assumed in the appellant's favour that the contentions of law made in her favour are correct, it avails her nothing. In my view, the appeal on Grounds A and B fails on the facts. 47. Before explaining the reasons for that view in greater detail, it is necessary to highlight the unsatisfactory way in which the appellant's case has developed over the years. On two occasions prior to the FTT hearing, the appellant indicated that she did not challenge the award of 2 points for activity 9. Thus, none of Grounds A-C can be found in the written submissions provided in advance to the FTT, and it does not appear from the manuscript note of the hearing itself that any of these three points were raised orally. And, although the UT did refer to the qualitative difference point when refusing permission to appeal (because it had been referred to in the submissions), neither Ground B (the contemporaneity point) nor Ground C (the relationship point) arose, so there was no mention of either of them in the decision of UTJ Humphreys. 48. In this way, as so often happens in public law cases, none of the three grounds of appeal now pursued arise directly out of the decision of the FTT, and only one (the qualitative difference point) arises out of the decision of the UT, and even then it is tangential to the UTJ's decision. This haphazard approach has been compounded by the fact that, prior to the hearing of this appeal, the only ground for which permission was granted to appeal to this court was an argument about the counsellor, which (as explained below) was doomed to fail…. Ground A: The 'Qualitative Difference' Point 49. The appellant seeks to argue that, because she received support from her friend Sharron, who was experienced in providing encouragement and other elements of 'prompting', she qualified for the descriptor in 9(c). But there is nothing in the findings of fact by the FTT….which suggests that Sharron was involved in all of the appellant's face to face meetings: indeed, the findings (which repeatedly refer to 'friends' in the plural) appear to be to contrary effect. 50. Furthermore, for this argument to work at all, it presupposes that Sharron was within the definition of 'social support', as a person 'experienced in assisting people to engage in social situations'…...There was no such evidence before the FTT. The absence of such evidence (or any relevant findings) was not a complaint made to the UT. In consequence, I consider that this point is not open to the appellant now. Ground B: The Contemporaneity Point 56. Again, I deal with this on the assumption that….'social support' can be given immediately before the engagement rather than during it; again, I conclude that this is of no help to the appellant on the facts of this case. 57. First, there is nothing in the findings of the FTT to suggest that this argument was ever raised before them, and nothing that demonstrated that Sharron's support was ever given immediately prior to (but not at) the appellant's face to face engagements. Neither did this argument form part of the decision of the UT. For those reasons alone, I do not consider that it is a point available to the appellant on this appeal. 58. Further, the contemporaneity point depends on Sharron being the individual from whom the pre-activity support would come. For the reasons already noted, there was no evidence that she had the experience that would trigger descriptor 9(c)…… Ground C: The Relationships Point 61….the appellant argued that neither the FTT nor the UT analysed or applied the definition of 'Engage Socially', and, that had they done so, they might have found that the appellant was not able to establish relationships without social support, and therefore satisfied descriptor 9(c). 62. I reject this ground of appeal. First, it was not a point taken by the appellant before either the FTT or the UT. Mr Royston expressly accepted during the course of argument that the issue of whether the appellant could "establish relationships" was not in issue before the FTT. There was therefore no specific evidence on the point which Mr Royston now seeks to raise with us. 63. Secondly, it is based on the premise that each aspect of the assessment has to be treated separately by the FTT, so that they deal with each limb one by one. That is incorrect: it is open to the FTT to treat all these matters in the round. That is what the FTT did in this case…. 64. Thirdly, I consider that those findings make it clear beyond doubt that the appellant was able to interact with others and establish relationships. The findings that the appellant "does not shy away from people", and that she "engaged well" with the HP, the FTT and "whoever she needs to", are more than sufficient to demonstrate that the appellant had a clear ability to establish relationships. 65. At paragraph 44 of his skeleton, Mr Royston complains that the relationships which are referred to by the First Tier Tribunal were all established before the appellant's problems began. But there was no evidence of that. It is not open to Mr Royston to endeavour to try and fill the evidential gaps by way of his skeleton argument. Moreover, even on its face, that submission is plainly incorrect: for example, the relationship with the HP obviously came after her problems had begun. 66. This error may have come about because it was inherent in Mr Royston's submissions that, for this purpose, 'relationships' meant only longer-term and regular relationships with others, as opposed to shorter encounters. He said that 'verbal interactions' were insufficient. Again, I disagree with that interpretation. That is not what activity 9 is all about. I consider that this activity encompasses all forms of social engagement, whether the 'relationship' established lasts ten minutes, ten days or ten years. As Ms Broadfoot put it, it is a low threshold. On the facts of the present case, that is why the FTT's finding that the appellant "does not shy away from people" is so significant.” "
“69…..I add some observations of my own only because of the unhappy way in which the issues with which he has dealt have come before this court. 70. On13 June 2016 , Upper Tribunal Judge Jacobs granted permission to appeal to this court on one narrow ground, namely that, whilst Judge Humphrey had dealt with the support the appellant received from her friend, Sharron, she had arguably failed to deal with the support she received from her counsellor. That was, as Judge Jacobs understood it, the only ground upon which permission to appeal was sought. It was a discrete and narrow ground. 71. However, when the grounds of appeal were filed with the appellant's notice on6 September 2016 , the ground for which permission had been given formed just part of one of the three grounds; and the (draft) amended grounds served in December 2016 effectively abandoned the ground for which permission had been granted in favour of the grounds described by Coulson LJ. 72. No formal application to amend the grounds was ever made. This court granted permission to amend during the course of the substantive appeal hearing, because both parties had prepared fully to argue those new grounds; but, as Coulson LJ has described, the result has been that we have considered three points of law which, as hypothetical questions, may be both interesting and potentially challenging, but which do not arise on the facts of the case before us. In my respectful view, it is highly debateable whether permission would have been given for those grounds if, as should have happened, a prompt application to amend had been made and considered in late 2016. This court does not usually grant permission for academic issues which do not arise on the facts of the particular appeal.”
“factors set out in relation to “engaging socially” are nevertheless relevant to the consideration of a person’s ability to engage with other people face to face”
“(a) interact with others in a contextually and socially appropriate manner; (b) understand body language; and (c) establish relationships.”
“6…….the Respondent’s position is that the law relating to daily living activity 9 is correctly stated in Hickey and that RC must be understood in light of that. While the ruling in RC can be read consistently with Hickey, what is important for fact finding in relation to daily living activity 9 is paragraph 66 in Hickey, where the Court of Appeal explains – to paraphrase – that it is the context of social engagement which is important, not its duration, and whether, in the particular context, a person can engage with others appropriately.”
“….a person who can, in face to face engagement with another person, “answer a question or [respond] to a statement with a polite reply” can engage with others in a contextually and socially appropriate manner, and to that extent can have a relationship with others such that no award of points under activity 9 would (all other things being equal) be made.”
“20. The key question is whether, for a particular person, he or she is able to interact (or relate) with others in a contextually and socially appropriatemanner….. 21. If a person can engage appropriately in verbal interactions with other persons face to face, for example, in the supermarket, then they can engage socially even though any ‘relationship’ between the participants is short or fleeting…”