‘The Ombudsman uses this provision to publish significant public statements on historical and current investigations as well as the publication of cases studies in annual and thematic reports and in press articles’. (para 1.9). 89. The Ombudsman has two investigations directorates – the Current and Historical Investigations Directorates. The Historical Investigations Directorate ‘investigates grave or exceptional matters relating to the actions of police officers during the conflict in Northern Ireland between 1968 and 1998 (commonly known as ‘The Troubles’)’ 90. Under section 51(4) the Ombudsman is required to (‘shall’) exercise her powers ‘in such manner and to such extent as appears to her to be best calculated to secure’ the efficiency, effectiveness and independence of the police complaints system and the confidence of the public and of members of the police force in that system. 91. The relevant social and historical context in Northern Ireland includes a long history of sectarian violence and a sharply divided society. This means that ‘the public’ and ‘members of the police force’ will include people with different sectional community interests. As Mr McKay put it, under section 51(4) it is for the Ombudsman to decide the manner in which she exercise her powers to secure the confidence of two opposing groups of the public in a divisive environment. 92. It is in this context that section 63 must be construed. We note that section 63 contains the word ‘received’ and the phrase ‘in connection with any of the functions’ of the Ombudsman. Both of these operate to limit the scope of the section. The section could have been drafted more widely to apply to all information ‘held’ by the Ombudsman in connection with any of her functions. It could have been drafted to apply to all information received by the Ombudsman, or all information held by the Ombudsman. Given that the provision is penal, it is not surprising that it was not so widely drafted. 93. We do not accept that the section is intended to cover any information held by the Ombudsman the disclosure of which would run the risk of revealing the identity of persons who could be targeted by terrorists or could lead to the ‘jigsawing’ of different strands of information to achieve that purpose. That is not the provision that has been enacted. 94. The legislature has chosen to use the word ‘received’ to provide a boundary to the information covered by section 63. In the light of the context above, the legislature must have chosen the word ‘received’ because its intention was to ensure the confidentiality of information provided to the Ombudsman by a third party. 95. This is particularly important in the social and historical context because (a) there must be public confidence in the Ombudsman and (b) there are real risks to the personal safety of those making complaints and those named in complaints or those who could be identified by terrorists piecing together information. Making section 63 subject to a criminal penalty is intended to give confidence to the public and to those making complaints and ensures that the Ombudsman can carry out her investigative functions effectively in the specific circumstances in Northern Ireland. 96. In our view, the meaning of ‘received’ contended for by the Commissioner conveys the intention that we attribute to the legislature. ‘Received’ clearly covers information sent to the Ombudsman by a third party. If the Ombudsman generates information that includes or is drawn from information provided by a third party, we consider that this is also information ‘received’
‘A person taking on work for or in connection with the provision of a dwelling …’
‘In my judgment, this phrase connotes the creation of a new dwelling’ per Mr Recorder Jackson QC; Saigol v Cranley Mansions Ltd (unreported)6 July 1995 ; [1995] CA Transcript No 658: ‘Mr Ticciati was in my view correct in submitting the ‘provision’ was a word which prima facie involved the creation of something new’, per Hutchison LJ. 40. The emphasis is therefore on those who do work which positively contributes to the creation of the dwelling. That may include architects and engineers who prescribe how the dwelling is to be created, not just those who physically create it. It does not, however, include those whose role is the essentially negative one of seeing that no work is done which contravenes building regulations. Building control ensures that the dwelling is legal and properly certified, but it does not positively contribute to the provision or creation of that dwelling. 66. Although it is not a case on the meaning of ‘in connection with’, some further assistance can be derived from Ben-Odeco Ltd v Powlson (Inspector of Taxes)[1978] 1 WLR 1093 ,[1978] STC 460 . That case concerned the availability of capital allowances undersection 41(1) of the Finance Act 1971 , which contained the words ‘expenditure on the provision of machinery or plant’
‘Statutory interpretation is an exercise which requires the court to identify the meaning borne by the words in question in the particular context.’ (R v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions, Ex p Spath Holme Ltd[2001] AC 349 , 396). Words and passages in a statute derive their meaning from their context. A phrase or passage must be read in the context of the section as a whole and in the wider context of a relevant group of sections. Other provisions in a statute and the statute as a whole may provide the relevant context. They are the words which Parliament has chosen to enact as an expression of the purpose of the legislation and are therefore the primary source by which meaning is ascertained. There is an important constitutional reason for having regard primarily to the statutory context as Lord Nicholls explained in Spath Holme, 397: ‘Citizens, with the assistance of their advisers, are intended to be able to understand parliamentary enactments, so that they can regulate their conduct accordingly. They should be able to rely upon what they read in an Act of Parliament.’ 30. External aids to interpretation therefore must play a secondary role. Explanatory notes, prepared under the authority of Parliament, may cast light on the meaning of particular statutory provisions. Other sources, such as Law Commission reports, reports of Royal Commissions and advisory committees, and Government White Papers may disclose the background to a statute and assist the court to identify not only the mischief which it addresses but also the purpose of the legislation, thereby assisting a purposive interpretation of a particular statutory provision. The context disclosed by such materials is relevant to assist the court to ascertain the meaning of the statute, whether or not there is ambiguity and uncertainty, and indeed may reveal ambiguity or uncertainty: Bennion, Bailey and Norbury on Statutory Interpretation, 8th ed (2020), para 11.2. But none of these external aids displace the meanings conveyed by the words of a statute that, after consideration of that context, are clear and unambiguous and which do not produce absurdity. In this appeal the parties did not refer the court to external aids, other than explanatory statements in statutory instruments, and statements in Parliament which I discuss below. Sir James Eadie QC for the Secretary of State submitted that the statutory scheme contained in the 1981 Act and the 2014 Act should be read as a whole. 31. Statutory interpretation involves an objective assessment of the meaning which a reasonable legislature as a body would be seeking to convey in using the statutory words which are being considered. Lord Nicholls, again in Spath Holme, 396, in an important passage stated: ‘The task of the court is often said to be to ascertain the intention of Parliament expressed in the language under consideration. This is correct and may be helpful, so long as it is remembered that the ‘intention of Parliament’ is an objective concept, not subjective. The phrase is a shorthand reference to the intention which the court reasonably imputes to Parliament in respect of the language used. It is not the subjective intention of the minister or other persons who promoted the legislation. Nor is it the subjective intention of the draftsman, or of individual members or even of a majority of individual members of either House. … Thus, when courts say that such-and-such a meaning ‘cannot be what Parliament intended’, they are saying only that the words under consideration cannot reasonably be taken as used by Parliament with that meaning.’