“There are a number of reasons as to why it might be thought the appellant’s prospects of success on appeal, if permission were to be given, would be weak. I am currently finding it hard to understand why, if things did not happen in the way NR has described, she would not only say that they had but take the trouble to report matters to the police with a view to a prosecution and all that such would entail for her. If she is lying, she has invented a quite detailed account involving three claimed sexual encounters. There was opportunity for her to have met the appellant either at the school she was attending or at the centre given the nature of his work and it appears that had they done so, that would have alerted the applicant to NR’s young age. The statement of PM might also be regarded as affording some corroborative support to NR’s account regarding not only the fact of the sexual activity but as to her claim that he knew she was only 15 at the time. Further, whilst the appellant asserts that he met NR as a result of her telephoning him on a number of occasions, that she presented as being an 18-year-old who herself worked with children, and that the impetus for sexual interaction came from her (he told me at the permission hearing she had expressly invited him round for sex), all of that, on one view, might seem implausibly bold for a 15-year-old.”
“the Upper Tribunal may set out findings of fact. It will need to distinguish carefully a finding of fact from value judgments or evaluations of the relevance or weight to be given to the fact in assessing appropriateness. The Upper Tribunal may do the former but not the latter. By way of example only, the fact that a person is married and the marriage subsists may be a finding of fact. A reference to a marriage being a "strong" marriage or a "mutually-supportive one" may be more of a value judgment rather than a finding of fact. A reference to a marriage being likely to reduce the risk of a person engaging in inappropriate conduct is an evaluation of the risk. The third "finding" would certainly not involve a finding of fact.”
“… the evidence before the Upper Tribunal is necessarily different from that which was before the DBS for a paper-based decision. Even if the appellant can do no more than repeat the account which they have already given in written representations, the fact that they submit to cross-examination, which may go well or badly, necessarily means that the Upper Tribunal has to assess the quality of that evidence in a way which did not arise before the DBS.”