“4….She [the Appellant] indicated in her appeal form that she did not wish to attend a hearing. Having reviewed the appeal bundle to page 41 I considered that as neither party had objected to a decision without a hearing that it was appropriate to decide the matter on the papers.”
“9. Although her mother died in early May, [PE] was not providing care to her as her mother lived abroad. At no time was she given information by an officer of the respondent or other relevant person that a claim would not succeed. While it may be the case that she was not directed to entitlement to backdate, failure to do this is not one of the circumstances which applies. 10. Further I do not consider that the death of her mother, while clearly a significant event, amounts to a domestic emergency for the purposes of the regulations. No definition is provided in the Regulations for a domestic emergency. Further, bereavement is provided for elsewhere in the regulations (Regulations 29(4) and (5)) as a circumstance in which the date to claim can be extended for up to a month, It is therefore covered by Regulation 29(4) and 29(5). 11. In my view, in relation to the 3-month period set out in Regulation 29 (2), none of the relevant circumstances which require the respondent to consider whether or not [PE] could reasonably have been expected to have claimed earlier apply. 12. In any event, even if her mother’s bereavement were a “domestic emergency, I do not consider that as a result of that she could not reasonably have been expected to claim earlier…”
“11. Determining the appeal on the papers: It is arguable that the tribunal failed to give adequate reasons at paragraph 4 of the Statement of Reasons about why it decided to determine your appeal on the papers. The Upper Tribunal has confirmed in DT v SSWP (UC)[2019] UKUT 268 (AAC) and in MM v SSWP (ESA)[2011] UKUT 334 (AAC) that the tribunal must acknowledge explicitly that it has considered both whether the parties have consented to a decision being made without a hearing and that it can (fairly) decide the appeal without one, and to explain why. The tribunal did not address the second limb of this test in its Statement of Reasons. 12. How the tribunal interpreted domestic emergency and bereavement as grounds within regulation 29: At paragraph 10 of its Statement of Reasons, the tribunal wrote that it did not consider the death of your mother (which it acknowledged was a significant event) would constitute a domestic emergency under regulation 29(3) of the 2013 regulations. The tribunal stated domestic emergency is not defined, and that bereavement is covered elsewhere in regulation 29(5), which the tribunal noted allows a JSA claim to be backdated for up to 3 months. 13. It is unclear that bereavements and domestic emergencies are necessarily exclusive of each other in the way the tribunal appears to have envisaged. Regulation 29 confirms a bereavement involving a close relative could allow a JSA claim to be backdated as long as the bereavement occurred within one month before the claimant made the JSA claim, and as a result of those circumstances the person could not reasonably be expected to make the claim earlier than they did. 14. However, there is nothing in the wording of regulation 29 that prevents a situation involving a bereavement from also constituting a domestic emergency. A hypothetical example might involve a claimant dealing with the aftermath of an accident or incident in which a close relative died, and in which the claimant / other family members were injured or as a result of which their home was extensively damaged (or both). While “domestic emergency” is not defined in the 2013 regulations this approach is consistent with the Oxford English Dictionary definitions of: (a) “domestic” as including: “of or belonging to the home, house or household”, and (b) “emergency” as including: “a juncture that arises or ‘turns up’ especially a state of things unexpectedly arising and urgently demanding immediate attention.” 15.The examples and wording used at paragraph 14 above carry a particularly difficult and disruptive quality. It may therefore be more difficult for a claimant to demonstrate they have had a domestic emergency than that they have had a bereavement. This is consistent with the more generous period of up to 3 months of backdating permitted in regulation 29(3). 16. However, there is no clear reason to conclude that situations involving a bereavement are always (and only) dealt with under regulation 29(5)(f) and are carved out from being capable of consideration under regulation 29(3)(e) in appropriate circumstances. 17. It is therefore unclear that circumstances involving a bereavement would only be provided for in regulation 29(5)(f), Given the wording of paragraph 10 of the Statement of Reasons, it is unclear that the tribunal correctly directed itself in law on this point. This is broadly similar to the point you make in point (6) of your reasons for appeal.” (a) “domestic” as including: “of or belonging to the home, house or household”, and (b) “emergency” as including: “a juncture that arises or ‘turns up’ especially a state of things unexpectedly arising and urgently demanding immediate attention.”
“16. Addressing the second ground, a domestic emergency is a serious set of circumstances that affects a person’s home or household and requires immediate action in response. The fact that regulation 29(5)(f) contains a separate and specific provision for the death of a close relative does not, I would suggest, require that regulation 29(3)(e) must be construed as not including the death of a close relative. In relation to the death of a close relative, the former provision applies to all such deaths, regardless of the effect of the death on the appellant, while the latter applies to the subset of deaths that comprises, or gives rise to, the specific and unusual state of affairs that is a domestic emergency that affects the appellant in circumstances in which it is not reasonably practicable for him or her to obtain assistance from another person to make a claim for UC. 17. There is no reason to think that the existence of the broad, unconditional one-month extension of time was intended to preclude a longer extension of time in cases where the death of close relative serves to bring about the obstacles to making a timeous claim for which a three-month easement is generally granted by regulation 29(3)(e). On this view, the FTT has misconstrued the relevant legislation.”