“89. A claims officer may extend the period referred to in paragraph 87, 88 or 88A, where the claims officer is satisfied that: (a) due to exceptional circumstances the applicant could not have applied earlier; and (b) the evidence presented in support of the application means that it can be determined without further extensive enquiries by a claims officer.”
“87……, an application must be sent by the applicant so that it is received by the Authority as soon as reasonably practicable after the incident giving rise to the criminal injury to which it relates, and in any event within two years after the date of that incident.”
“17(m) Of course ignorance is no defence and no excuse for delay.”
“17(p) There is a delay between the acquirement of actual knowledge and the claim date but as the appellant’s partner points out this is minimal compared to the five year delay [beforehand]. In any event that delay is immaterial as it is the period of almost five years which the Tribunal considers to be fatal to the application. 17(q) The Tribunal’s conclusion is that in the light of the above the Appellant chose to pursue other matters such as the swimming pool issue or to seek justice ie the prosecution of the “offender” in the index event rather than look into the possibility of compensation. 17(r) The Tribunal also calls in aid page C2005 to show the fact that the appellant knew about the use of solicitors for the purpose of obtaining compensation as that document is issued by Capita on the instructions of Pannone and Partners LLP in connection with a compensation claim. 17(s) Thus as the appellant was pursuing other matters at the time it is difficult to conclude that her health prevented her from looking into the question of being able to seek compensation…. 17(u) If, however, the Tribunal were incorrect in that conclusion they would also point out that the Appellant would fall foul of paragraph 89(b) because the evidence before the Tribunal and [CICA] in support of the application is not sufficient in the Tribunal’s view. 17(v) The Tribunal agree with the Presenting Officer [for CICA]’s view that despite the volume of documentation it is not clear that the causal injuries would fall within the tariff set out in the Scheme. 17(w) In addition, further medical evidence would be required in the form of reports because the Appellant refers to PTSD, multiple sclerosis and limb pain. It is also likely that psychological reports would be required. 17(x) In the Tribunal’s view this meant that paragraph 89(b) could not be satisfied.”
“given that the Applicant was expressly told by the CAB that she needed to see a solicitor about the matter in 2012, it is clear that the Applicant could have applied earlier than 2016. That is, she clearly could have applied earlier by doing that which she was advised to do in 2012, namely seek the advice from a solicitor. However, she chose not to do.”
“45. The other matter mentioned by the FTT is the reliance placed by the appellant on her ignorance of the criminal injuries compensation scheme until after she had been to see Rape Crisis and subsequently reported the matter to the authorities. In paragraph 15 of its decision, the FTT conclude that such ignorance of the scheme could not reasonably be described as an exceptional circumstance insofar as the petitioner was not a child at the date of the incident, did not suffer from any intellectual or cognitive deficit and who was intelligent, educated and socially aware. I have touched upon this already, though only briefly. Taken by itself this reasoning is unexceptional. As Mr Pirie pointed out, the petitioner could have made enquiries and found out about the scheme. But this is to take too narrow a view. The petitioner’s ignorance of the scheme has to be taken as part of the bigger picture, which is that of a victim of rape manifesting the reticence commonly seen amongst such victims as described in the authorities to which I have referred. The question is whether such a person, who is ex hypothesi reluctant to speak to anyone about the incident let alone report matters to the authorities, could reasonably be expected to make enquiries about a compensation scheme which depended upon her telling others about what had happened. There is no doubt that ignorance of the scheme can be a relevant factor…. But much will depend upon the underlying circumstances and the reason for that ignorance. It is wrong, therefore, to consider ignorance of the scheme as a self-contained point – rather it is part and parcel of the package of circumstances which resulted in the petitioner not applying for compensation earlier. I should add, however, that I do not accept the argument advanced by Mr Pirie to the effect that because a majority of victims of rape or other sexual assault do not know about the possibility of making a claim for criminal injuries compensation under the scheme until they have reported the matter to the authorities, then it follows that ignorance of the scheme cannot be an exceptional circumstance justifying an extension of the time limit for making an application. For the reasons outlined above, the question of exceptionality must be considered in relation to the whole package of circumstances relied on.”