“Under post-Brexit cabotage rules, the number of cabotage journeys (ie movements carrying goods within the UK) an EU-based vehicle can perform after its incoming international journey is limited to two, after which the vehicle must depart the UK within seven days of tipping the inbound international load. This limit was temporarily relaxed between October 2021 and30 April 2022 to help tackle driver shortages. But on26 May 2022 the cabotage limit was again in force.”
“Formal witness statement(s), evidence, and written representations will be provided once the information-gathering process is complete and, in any event, within such time limits as the Traffic Commissioner sees fit to direct”
“17. … I have reminded myself of the five categories of knowledge as established by the Upper Tribunal (paragraph 57 of the Senior Traffic Commissioner’s Statutory Guidance Document 7 refers. The first is actual knowledge. 18. In considering whether there was actual knowledge that the vehicle was contravening the law, I bear in mind that the appellant is the company .. not any individual. For the ground of appeal to be made out, the company … must show that it had no knowledge of its vehicle’s illegal cabotage operations in the period 19-26 May 2022 . 19. I did consider Mr Perry’s evidence that the two planners had got things mixed up owing to exhaustion and a poor handover. But I was not convinced that a botched handover on Wednesday 25 May was a plausible explanation for illegal cabotage which began (according to both driver Mobbs and to DVSA’s analysis of the vehicle’s tachoscan data) on the evening of Monday 23 May. The evidence the planners did not know of the illegal cabotage is therefore very flimsy (to put it no higher). 20. Having considered the evidence produced both in advance of and at the hearing, and irrespective of whether Messrs Dood and Groot had actual knowledge. I find that the company did have actual knowledge of this. The reasons for reaching this finding are: i) Driver Mobbs, who Mr Perry confirmed understood the rules relating to cabotage, knew that he was carrying out more than the two permitted cabotage journeys. Although not directly employed by (JPT) (he is employed through the UK company), he was the agent of the Dutch company in the week in question. The company’s agent knew that the vehicle’s schedule had passed into illegality during the week in question; ii) The schedulers in the Netherlands planned the incoming international journey on 18/19 May 2022 and (collectively) planned at least five cabotage journeys thereafter before the outgoing international leg due to take place on 26 May. Whether any individual scheduler knew that the permitted number of cabotage journeys was about to be exceeded or had been exceeded is immaterial. The fact is that the company as a whole had this knowledge and failed – whether through poor systems, miscommunication, human error or deliberate act – to prevent it. 21. I have reminded myself of paragraph 59 of Statutory Document 7. This relates to the question of whether a company had taken steps to prevent illegal cabotage, which is not in fact the ground claimed in this application. However, it is worth citing at length because it illustrates starkly how insouciant the company has been in the face of the 2019 warning in causing or permitting further illegal cabotage operations since then. 22. (the TC then set out paragraph 59) 23. In re-reading this paragraph and its lengthy list of the kind of evidence which an appellant might be expected to produce, I am struck by the fact that (JPT) has not been able to produce any documentary evidence of any such actions. No evidence of journey planning systems or guidance, or of training for schedulers has been provided. No evidence of any investigation or any other action following the October 2019 warning letter from DVSA has been provided. No evidence of the discipling of the schedulers has been provided. 24. As I mention above, the failure to provide such evidence is not strictly relevant to my finding that the company had actual knowledge of its transgression, but it illustrates the point that the company had actual knowledge of its transgression from October 2019 at the latest but failed to take any action to avoid a repetition and to design its systems to ensure that its servants and agents had the same knowledge which the company as a corporate entity had. 25. (JPT) has failed to demonstrate that it did not know that vehicle 57-BK-V2 was being used during the period 19-26 May 2022 in contravention of Section 2 of the 1995 Act. That being the case, its application for the return of the vehicle is refused ..” i) Driver Mobbs, who Mr Perry confirmed understood the rules relating to cabotage, knew that he was carrying out more than the two permitted cabotage journeys. Although not directly employed by (JPT) (he is employed through the UK company), he was the agent of the Dutch company in the week in question. The company’s agent knew that the vehicle’s schedule had passed into illegality during the week in question; ii) The schedulers in the Netherlands planned the incoming international journey on 18/19 May 2022 and (collectively) planned at least five cabotage journeys thereafter before the outgoing international leg due to take place on 26 May. Whether any individual scheduler knew that the permitted number of cabotage journeys was about to be exceeded or had been exceeded is immaterial. The fact is that the company as a whole had this knowledge and failed – whether through poor systems, miscommunication, human error or deliberate act – to prevent it. 21. I have reminded myself of paragraph 59 of Statutory Document 7. This relates to the question of whether a company had taken steps to prevent illegal cabotage, which is not in fact the ground claimed in this application. However, it is worth citing at length because it illustrates starkly how insouciant the company has been in the face of the 2019 warning in causing or permitting further illegal cabotage operations since then. 22. (the TC then set out paragraph 59) 23. In re-reading this paragraph and its lengthy list of the kind of evidence which an appellant might be expected to produce, I am struck by the fact that (JPT) has not been able to produce any documentary evidence of any such actions. No evidence of journey planning systems or guidance, or of training for schedulers has been provided. No evidence of any investigation or any other action following the October 2019 warning letter from DVSA has been provided. No evidence of the discipling of the schedulers has been provided. 24. As I mention above, the failure to provide such evidence is not strictly relevant to my finding that the company had actual knowledge of its transgression, but it illustrates the point that the company had actual knowledge of its transgression from October 2019 at the latest but failed to take any action to avoid a repetition and to design its systems to ensure that its servants and agents had the same knowledge which the company as a corporate entity had. 25. (JPT) has failed to demonstrate that it did not know that vehicle 57-BK-V2 was being used during the period 19-26 May 2022 in contravention of Section 2 of the 1995 Act. That being the case, its application for the return of the vehicle is refused ..”