"The responsible person is Adrian Leigh Stewart. He is a director and undertakes continuous professional development. Richard Safadi is also a director"
‘13 Determination of applications for operators’ licences (1) Subject to sections 11 and 45(2), on an application for a standard licence a traffic commissioner shall consider— (a)whether the requirements of subsections (3) and (5) are satisfied, and (b)if he thinks fit, whether the requirements of subsection (6) are satisfied. (2) Subject to sections 11 and 45(2), on an application for a restricted licence a traffic commissioner shall consider— (a)whether the requirements of subsections (4) and (5) are satisfied, and (b)if he thinks fit, whether the requirements of subsection (6) are satisfied. (3) For the requirements of this subsection to be satisfied the traffic commissioner must be satisfied that the applicant fulfils the following requirements, namely— (a) that he is of good repute, (b) that he is of the appropriate financial standing, and (c) that he is professionally competent; and the traffic commissioner shall determine whether or not that is the case in accordance with Schedule 3. (4) For the requirements of this subsection to be satisfied the applicant must not be unfit to hold an operator’s licence by reason of— 8 (a) any activities or convictions of which particulars may be required to be given under section 8(4) by virtue of paragraph 1(e) or (f) of Schedule 2, or (b) any conviction required to be notified in accordance with section 9(1). (5) For the requirements of this subsection to be satisfied it must be possible (taking into account the traffic commissioner’s powers under section 15(3) to issue a licence in terms that differ from those applied for) to issue a licence on the application in relation to which paragraphs (a) to (e) will apply— (a) there are satisfactory arrangements for securing that— (i)Part VI of the Transport Act 1968 (drivers’ hours), and (ii) the applicable Community rules, within the meaning of that Part, are complied with in the case of the vehicles used under the licence; (b) there are satisfactory arrangements for securing that the vehicles used under the licence are not overloaded; (c) there are satisfactory facilities and arrangements for maintaining the vehicles used under the licence in a fit and serviceable condition; (d) at least one place in the traffic commissioner’s area is specified in the licence as an operating centre of the licence-holder, and each place so specified is available and suitable for use as such an operating centre (disregarding any respect in which it may be unsuitable on environmental grounds); (e) the capacity of the place so specified (if there is only one) or of both or all the places so specified taken together (if there are more than one) is sufficient to provide an operating centre for all the vehicles used under the licence. (6) For the requirements of this subsection to be satisfied the provision of such facilities and arrangements as are mentioned in subsection (5)(c) must not be prejudiced by reason of the applicant’s having insufficient financial resources for that purpose.’
“69. Turning back to sections 26 and 27 of the 1995 Act, I would conclude that for revocation to be possible under the former or mandatory under the latter, it is the commissioner who must be satisfied of the ground of revocation, and not the licence holder who must satisfy him to the contrary. That seems to me to be the natural way to regard both the language of those sections, and the situations contemplated in them. The context is that of a licence holder and the possible revocation of his licence. Revocation can only be done on some specified ground (section 26) or because one or other of the three fundamental requirements is no longer satisfied (section 27). Under section 26(4), the commissioner can only act if “the existence of” a ground comes to his notice. It is counter-intuitive to think of a licence holder being required to negative 10 the existence of a ground raised against him. So with section 27. The commissioner must revoke if “it appears to him” that the licence holder is no longer of good repute or of appropriate financial standing or professionally competent. That seems to me to mean that the commissioner must be satisfied that the requirements are no longer fulfilled. If it had been intended to place the same burden on the licence holder as had been placed on the original applicant, then the same language as that found in section 13 would have been used.”
“In applying the Crompton case it seems to us that traffic commissioners and the Tribunal have to reconsider their approach. In cases involving mandatory revocation it has been common for findings to have been made along the lines of ‘I find your conduct to be so serious that I have had to conclude that you have lost your repute: accordingly, I have also to revoke your licence because the statute gives me no discretion’. The effect of the Court of Appeal’s judgment is that this two-stage approach is incorrect and that the sanction has to be considered at the earlier stage. Thus, the question is not whether the conduct is so serious as to amount to a loss of repute but whether it is so serious as to require revocation. Put simply, the question becomes ‘is the conduct such that the operator ought to be put out of business?’. On appeal, the Tribunal must consider not only the details of cases but also the overall result.” [Emphasis Added]
“The third point taken by Mr. Laprell was that the Traffic Commissioner gave no reasons for concluding that ‘the conduct was such that the Appellant company ought to be put out of business’. There will be cases where it is only necessary to set out the conduct in question to make it apparent that the operator ought to be put out of business. We are quite satisfied that this was not such a case. On the contrary this was a case which called for a careful assessment of the weight to be given to all the various competing factors. In our view before answering the ‘Bryan Haulage question’ it will often be helpful to pose a preliminary question, namely: how likely is it that this operator will, in future, operate in compliance with the operator’s licensing regime? If the evidence demonstrates that it is unlikely then that will, of course, tend to support a conclusion that the operator ought to be put out of business. If the evidence demonstrates that the operator is very likely to be compliant in the future then that conclusion may indicate that it is not a case where the operator ought to be put out of business. We recognise, of course, that promises are easily made, perhaps all the more so in response to the pressures of a Public Inquiry. What matters is whether those promises will be kept. In the present case the Appellant company was entitled to rely on that old saying that ‘actions speak louder than words’.” [Emphasis Added]
“The principles that derive from these and other cases on the point can be simply stated. The imposition of a period of disqualification following revocation is not a step to be taken routinely, but nor is it a step to be shirked if the circumstances render disqualification necessary in pursuit of the objectives of the operator licensing system. Although no additional feature is required over and above the grounds leading up to revocation, an operator is entitled to know why the circumstances of the case are such as to make a period of disqualification necessary. Additionally, periods of disqualification can range from comparatively short periods to an indefinite period, and can be confined to one traffic area or be extended to more than one. An operator subject to a period of disqualification is entitled to have some explanation, or a glimpse into the Traffic Commissioner’s mind, so that he understands why a particular order for disqualification has been made. The giving of brief but adequate reasons will also promote a consistent approach, and explain why distinctions are made as between different cases and different people.”
“44….The first instance decision is taken to be correct until the contrary is shown…An Appellant, if he is to succeed, must persuade the appeal court or tribunal not merely that a different view of the facts from that taken below is reasonable and possible, but that there are objective grounds upon which the court ought to conclude that a different view is the right one…The true distinction is between the case where the appeal court might prefer a different view (perhaps on marginal grounds) and one where it concludes that the process of reasoning, and the application of the relevant law, require it to adopt a different view. The burden which an Appellant assumes is to show that the case falls within this latter category.”
"Having seen and heard from Mr Safadi I am not convinced at all that he is a changed man and the level of compliance of the operator company at the time of the Public Inquiry in October 2019 was poor"
‘…..Actionformat Ltd: The Traffic Commissioner has noted that the correspondence address and operating centre on this application are the same as Actionformat Ltd, whose licence was revoked. The Traffic Commissioner will have regard to that company’s attendance at a public inquiry on22 June 2016 at which the revocation order was given as well as the disqualification of their sole director Richard Safadi. It is also noted that Companies House records show that Mr Safadi was a previous director of Ammanford Recycling Ltd. ….Ammanford limited; The Traffic Commissioner has noted that the correspondence address and operating centre on this application are the same as Ammanford Ltd, whose application for an operator’s licence was later withdrawn. It is noted that Richard Safadi was also the company director named on that application.’
‘60.Mr Safadi has had a previous licence revoked in June 2016 when disqualification was considered but not imposed on accepting that he had acted out of ignorance, rather than by deceit, in operating his licence under the wrong trading entity. There can be no such concession on this occasion, and I note that the withdrawal of the Ammanford limited licence application in August 2016 followed questions form the OTC about the non-disclosure of possibly relevant earlier convictions and a bankruptcy order.’
‘35. I find that the operator company through its directors, has deliberately concealed Mr Safadi’s involvement in the operator company, most particular in April 2017, and again in Mr Safadi’s non-attendance in October 2019. ….. 49……Yet as a director, Mr Safadi was complicit in not attending the Public Inquiry in October 2019 when he knew Mr Jones was acting for the operator company. He also did not nothing personally to rectify the non-disclosure and his statement disagreement with the advice [not to declare his convictions].’
‘I find that the number and seriousness of the false declarations and failures to inform the OTC of highly relevant matters is a clear breach of the explicit undertakings made when obtaining an operator’s licence and totally inconsistent with the conduct expected of legitimate operators.’