“Confirm Date03 July 2020 ”
“I do accept that there is a risk of fire and that people should have a smoke alarm”
“in a manner unlikely to cause harm to C or to another person, either during or after completion of the activity”
“Primary dwelling fires made up 41 per cent of primary fires and 18 per cent of all fires in 2017/18”
“Primary fires are those that meet one of the following criteria – a) occurs in a (non-derelict) building, vehicle or outdoor structure, b) involve a fatality, casualty or rescue or c) attended by five or more pumping appliances”
“I’d love that to be my submission, but in light of RJ, I can’t”
“Part III: Conclusions The cause and origin of the fire and its escape from Flat 16 2.12 In Chapter 21 I consider the cause and origin of the fire and find that it was started by an electrical fault in a large fridge-freezer in the kitchen of Flat 16, for which Behailu Kebede bears no blame. I have not been able to establish the precise nature of the fault in the fridge-freezer, but consider that to be of less importance than establishing how the failure of a common domestic appliance could have had such disastrous consequences. That question is pursued in Chapter 22, in which I find that: a. The fire is most likely to have entered the cladding as a result of hot smoke impinging on the uPVC window jamb, causing it to deform and collapse and thereby provide an opening into the cavity between the insulation and the ACM cladding panels through which flames and hot gases could pass. It is, however, possible (but less likely) that flames from the fire in the fridge-freezer passed through the open kitchen window and impinged on the ACM cladding panels above. b. The fire had entered the cladding before firefighters opened the kitchen door in Flat 16 for the first time at 01.14. c. A kitchen fire of that relatively modest size was perfectly foreseeable. The subsequent development of the fire 2.13 The progress of the fire after it had entered the cladding is considered in Chapter 23. Once the fire had escaped from Flat 16, it spread rapidly up the east face of the tower. It then spread around the top of the building in both directions and down the sides until the advancing flame fronts converged on the west face near the south-west corner, enveloping the entire building in under three hours. I find that: a. The principal reason why the flames spread so rapidly up, down and around the building was the presence of the aluminium composite material (ACM) rainscreen panels with polyethylene cores, which acted as a source of fuel. The principal mechanism for the spread of the fire horizontally and downwards was KT and SH v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (PIP)[2020] UKUT 252 (AAC) KT v SSWP CPIP/3062/2016 SH v SSWP CPIP/2660/2017 53 the melting and dripping of burning polyethylene from the crown and from the spandrel and column panels, which ignited fires lower down the building. Those fires then travelled back up the building, thereby allowing the flame front to progress diagonally across each face of the tower. b. The presence of polyisocyanurate (PIR) and phenolic foam insulation boards behind the ACM panels, and perhaps components of the window surrounds, contributed to the rate and extent of vertical flame spread. c. The crown was primarily responsible for the spread of the fire horizontally, and the columns were a principal route of downwards fire spread.”