‘… either we will reach some form of agreement or I will do a full written decision and everything will remain on the cards.’
‘We would certainly not put you to the trouble of a full written decision.’
“ In order to take action under s.26 or to make a finding of loss of good repute under s.27 or to make an order of disqualification of directors under s.28 of the Act, the Traffic Commissioner was obliged to make an assessment of the nature, number and gravity of the breaches of regulations revealed by Mr Prime’s investigations and whether there was any evidence of instruction, encouragement or acquiescence on the part of the Appellant. That assessment and the Traffic Commissioner’s findings of fact based upon that assessment should be clearly set out in his decision. They are not. In relation to the Appellant’s systems and the steps taken by the Appellant to prevent breaches of the regulations, the Traffic Commissioner was further obliged to make an assessment of the evidence and make appropriate findings of fact, indicating the weight, if any, to be given to that evidence. It is not apparent from the Traffic Commissioner’s decision that such an assessment was made or that he made the appropriate findings of fact. It is a further requirement that the Traffic Commissioner consider the weight, if any, to be attached to the Appellant’s general record, performance, reputation and enforcement history. Again, such an assessment is not evident from the substance of the decision. In the absence of any adequate reasoning, it is impossible to assess what matters were taken into account by the Traffic Commissioner, the weight he placed upon those matters and 7 whether he made the appropriate balancing exercise when considering the extent to which he should exercise his enforcement powers. In the circumstances we are satisfied that the appeal must succeed.”
“Not only is the operator entitled to see what the Traffic Commissioner had in mind when reaching a decision, it is also important for the Upper Tribunal to be able to do so, if the decision is appealed. There is, clearly, no need to set out those trivial factors that could have no influence on the decision either on their own or in combination with other matters. And, as the Tribunal has repeatedly recognised, a Traffic Commissioner cannot be expected to balance one factor against another with the precision of a set of scales. But the Traffic Commissioner should set out the basis on which the decision has been reached with sufficient clarity and detail to enable others to see the rationale and justification for the decision. In short, reasons have to be adequate and intelligible.”
‘We have to say that the Traffic Commissioner does not give any analysis of his reasoning at all. He sets out what has occurred at the public inquiry and says that he has taken everything into account. But he then goes directly into his conclusions. What weight did he attach to the monitors’ evidence? To what extent did he accept their conclusions? What did he make of Mr Buchanan’s warnings about the unreliability of the sampling? What about traffic conditions in Bristol itself? There was overwhelming evidence to the effect that traffic congestion in the city is particularly bad: did he accept that it was a special case? We recognise the difficulties that the Traffic Commissioner faced but think that some analysis was necessary in the light of the evidence which was presented to him. In reality, all these matters were left in the air. We think that the details mentioned needed to be considered by him and that if they had been they would have driven him inexorably to the conclusion that a case for finding a failure to operate a local service was unsustainable, and outside the ambit of reasonableness. The effect of this is that the finding itself, the attachment of the condition and the determination under s.111 of the Act must all be set aside.’
‘9. It is usual for operators to appeal the decisions of Traffic Commissioners either wholly or partly upon the basis that their reasons were inadequate with reliance being placed upon the Transport Tribunal’s decision 2002/1 Bryan Haulage (No.1). The importance of that decision should not be overstated. Traffic Commissioner’s do not need to rehearse in their decisions, the entirety of the evidence that has been put before them, neither do they have to repeat and determine every point that has been raised, only those which go the principal issues in the case. An appeal based on inadequacy of reasoning will not succeed unless it can be shown that the operator has been genuinely and substantially prejudiced by the failure to provide an adequately reasoned decision.’
‘5. The one criticism we have of the decision is that it was given at the end of the public inquiry without a written decision being produced subsequently. This Tribunal has previously stated that when an operator’s licence is to be revoked, a written decision should accompany or follow any oral determination. It is only after the full documentation has been thoroughly read, that there can be any understanding of why the Traffic Commissioner reached his decision in this case. Decisions should contain sufficient detail to allow a person with experience of the haulage industry to understand the basis upon which the decision was arrived at.’
‘5. The Traffic Commissioner clearly felt that the Minute dated16 January 2008 , (see paragraph 2(iii) above), ought not to have been disclosed to Mr. Cunningham. In the absence of any other document from which the reason (or lack of reason) for the refusal of the application to cancel the services at short notice can be determined we disagree with that view. In our view the Appellants were entitled to know the basis on which the application was refused and they were entitled to know whether or not the correct test had been applied. In the absence of a reasoned decision or a fully reasoned letter giving the grounds for refusal, (neither of which was provided), it seems to us that disclosure of the underlying documentation was essential. How else could the correctness of the decision be challenged? How else could the Tribunal give reasons for saying either that the decision was wrong or that it was correct?’
‘10. Not only is the operator entitled to see what the Traffic Commissioner had in mind when reaching a decision, it is also important for the Upper Tribunal to be able to do so, if the decision is appealed. There is, clearly, no need to set out those trivial factors that could have no influence on the decision either on their own or in combination with other matters. And, as the Tribunal has repeatedly recognised, a Traffic Commissioner cannot be expected to balance one factor 10 against another with the precision of a set of scales. But the Traffic Commissioner should set out the basis on which the decision has been reached with sufficient clarity and detail to enable others to see the rationale and justification for the decision. In short, reasons have to be adequate and intelligible.’
‘Traffic Commissioners already appear to feel constrained to include standard paragraphs and phrases in their decisions despite the principle that an appellate Tribunal will generally assume that a first-instance decision-maker correctly understands the legal framework unless something was done or said that indicates to the contrary. In our view, the routine recitation of standard phrases adds little to the substance of a decision – what matters most is what the Traffic Commissioner thinks, and why he thinks it.’
“Parliament provided that reasons shall be given, and in my view that must be read as meaning that proper, adequate reasons must be given. The reasons that are set out must be reasons that will not only be intelligible, but which deal with the substantial points that have been raised.”
“The obligation to give reasons for the decision in [a case involving a conflict of evidence] imports a requirement to do more than only to state the conclusion, and for the determining authority to state that on the evidence the authority is not satisfied that the statutory conditions are met, does no more than this. It affords no guide to the selective process by which the evidence has been accepted, rejected, weighed or considered, or the reasons for any of these things. It is not, of course, obligatory thus to deal with every piece of evidence or to over elaborate, but in an administrative quasi-judicial decision the minimum requirement must at least be that the claimant, looking at the decision should be able to discern on the face of it the reasons why the evidence has failed to satisfy the authority. For the purpose of the regulation which requires the reasons for the review decision to be set out, a decision based, and only based, on a conclusion that the total effect of the evidence fails to satisfy, without reasons given for reaching that conclusion, will in many cases be no adequate decision at all.”
“The giving of reasons may among other things concentrate the decisionmaker’s mind on the right questions; demonstrate to the recipient that this is so; show that the issues have been conscientiously addressed and how the result has been reached or alternatively alert the recipient to a justiciable flaw 11 in the process. On the other side of the argument, it may place an undue burden on decision makers; demand an appearance of unanimity where there is diversity; call for the articulation of sometimes inexpressible value judgments; and offer an invitation to the captious to comb the reasons for previously unsuspected grounds of challenge.”