Secretary of State for Work and Pensions v AM (IS) [2010] UKUT 428 (AAC)

UKUT-AAC
Secretary of State for Work and Pensions v AM (IS)
[2010] UKUT 428 (AAC) · 2010-11-29
[27]Starting with the law, the position in CPC/3891/2004 was that the Secretary of State was seeking to argue that on the facts of that case there had by implication indeed been an outcome decision, properly notified, and so the tribunal had jurisdiction to consider the claimant’s appeal. Mr Commissioner Mesher, drawing on his reasoning in another case, CIS/1720/2004 , rejected that submission, ruling that there had never been an outcome decision. He explained (at paragraph 13):[13]“I have no doubt that the Secretary of State's written submission to the appeal tribunal was wrong to state that a decision had been made that the claimant was not entitled to pension credit, whether as a single person or otherwise, from 6 October 2003. It was in my view simply assumed that that consequence would follow from a determination that the claimant and Mrs G were living together as husband and wife. But there is no room for assumptions of that sort in the formal system of decision-making. Every person who makes a claim for benefit is entitled to a decision as to whether or not the claim is successful for the period covered by the claim. No such decision was ever given on the claim for pension credit in the present case. There is also no room for the making up of decisions that were not actually made and reproducing such fictitious decisions in official submissions, even if that is the result of confused thinking rather than bad faith. ”28. It seems plain that the letter to the claimant in CPC/3891/2004 did not in terms state that he was not entitled to benefit; rather it advised that he had been found to be living together and that in the case of a couple either partner could be the claimant. Indeed, the letter apparently invited one or other party to apply for pension credit.29. In R(IS) 13/05 the Secretary of State had decided in July 2003 that the claimant was living together, but again had not made any decision on entitlement to benefit. Mr Commissioner Mesher held that the later overpayment recoverability decision was of no effect, as the living together determination by itself was simply a “building block”. It therefore could not satisfy the condition in section 71(5A) of the Social Security Administration Act 1992 that there must be a valid revision or supersession decision, changing an existing award, as a basis for a decision that an overpayment is recoverable. As Mr Commissioner Mesher further explained (at paragraph 13):
“It is not really appropriate to talk in terms of a defect in the decision of 16 July 2003. There was nothing wrong with it as a determination on the question of living together as husband and wife, as one building block as I put it at the end of paragraph 13 of CIS/1720/2004, that might, with other determinations, have built to a decision altering the claimant’s entitlement to income support. It is simply that, if it is contended that the decision altered the claimant’s entitlement to income support in the periods in question or was a revision or supersession within the terms of section 71(5A), it gets nowhere near having that effect. And no process of the correcting or ignoring of defects can alter that conclusion. Using the terminology of R(IB) 2/04, if it is contended that the decision had that effect, it had so little connection to the legal powers to produce that effect that it was not a decision of that kind at all. The decision did not purport to alter the claimant's entitlement to income support at all.” 30. So how do those principles apply on the facts of this case? I am satisfied here that there was a valid outcome decision taken on 12 October 2006. I say that for several reasons. The DWP’s letter to the claimant was clear enough; having relayed the “building block” decision about living together, it continued “This means that from 10/10/1999 we cannot pay you Income Support because your partner is in full time work." It is difficult to read that as anything other than the notification of an outcome decision about her entitlement to benefit for a past period. Certainly the claimant understood it in those terms, and reasonably so, and she promptly challenged it. 31. The terms of the DWP submission to Tribunal 1 do not help the Secretary of State, not least as that document then goes on to conclude that “[the claimant] is not entitled to Income Support because the conditions specified by Section 124 of the Contributions and Benefits Act 1992 are not satisfied”
. Although expressed in the present tense, that statement followed a discussion of the evidence since 1999. 32. Nor am I persuaded by the fact that neither the clerical records nor the archive printout appears to disclose any decision of 12 October 2006 expressly making an outcome decision on the claimant’s entitlement to benefit. Those records are only as comprehensive as the staff are as efficient at inputting the relevant information. In my judgment the absence of such records cannot undermine the clear language of the letter of 12 October 2006. 33. I also note that in any event there appears to be no statutory requirement that a decision on a benefit claim must be committed to writing in order to qualify as a “decision”, although obviously it is good administrative practice to do so. Certainly there is no such requirement in section 8 of the Social Security Act 1998, which governs decisions by the Secretary of State. Nor is there any such requirement in the Social Security (Claims and Payments) Regulations 1987 (SI 1987/1968). The 1987 Regulations do, of course, require that any person with a right of appeal under the 1998 Act or the regulations “shall ... be given written notice of the decision against which the appeal lies” (regulation 28(1)(b)). However, the wording is significant – what the claimant must be sent is “written notice of the decision”, not that the decision itself must be recorded in writing.[34]These comments, of course, are without prejudice to the well -established principle that an official decision which is not properly communicated to the party concerned is, at the very least, for the time being ineffective. In R(I) 14/74 Mr Commissioner Lazarus held that "In my view it is not possible to make an effective decision without communicating it to the person whose rights are dealt with in it. Writing the words of an intended decision on a piece of paper and placing the piece of paper in a file is not a complete decision-making process" (at paragraph 14(a)). In R ( Anufrijeva) v Secretary of State for the Home Department and another [2003] UKHL 36 , the House of Lords (Lord Bingham of Cornhill dissenting) rejected the argument that a non-communicated decision was nonetheless effective for the purpose of terminating the claimant's income support award , although the majority of their Lordships were not unanimous in explaining the precise scope of that principle (see further GB v CMEC [2009] UKUT 189 (AAC) ).35. Moreover, Judge Powell, sitting as a Deputy Social Security Commissioner in Northern Ireland, has held in decision C10/07-08(IS) that “there are clear and well established lines of authority in both the courts and the decisions of Commissioners that the failure to notify a decision, such as a social security decision made by the Department, to the person or persons concerned, does not necessarily render that decision void, invalid or unenforceable for all purposes. The failure to do so will render the decision inchoate – which in this context means without full effect, of only partial effect or requiring further action to perfect” (at paragraph 22).36. The precise ambit of the Anufrijeva principle is perhaps uncertain. As Judge Mesher observed in SD v Newcastle City Council [2010] UKUT 306 (AAC) (at paragraph 12):
“I think it best not to speculate about how the Anufrijeva principle might operate in other circumstances. I have no doubt that the central importance given in that case to whether a person is in a position to challenge through legal process a decision that would affect his or her rights is reinforced in the case of a social security decision that purports to take away entitlement for a past period, especially where benefit has been paid for that period.” 37. In the present case, of course, the decision had been communicated; the claimant was left in no doubt that the Secretary of State had decided that she was not entitled to income support for the past period as from October 1999. This affected her rights and she duly appealed. 38. In summary, therefore, in a case such as this the formal position is that the decision maker should (i) review the evidence relating to “living together” and make appropriate findings of fact; (ii) make a “building block” determination about that issue; (iii) review the evidence about income support entitlement and make appropriate findings of fact; (iv) make an outcome decision on that issue; and (v) send a written notice of that appealable outcome decision to the claimant. It may well be that DWP procedures require there to be a written record of each stage of this process. 39. In this context, however, one must be realistic about the way in which DWP local offices operate and the pressures that its staff work under. In the present case we have on file a written record of stages (i) and (ii) of this sequence together with stage (v). The absence of a written record of stages (iii) and (iv) does not mean that those stages (and the supersession process that they represent) did not take place. On the contrary, it may well be that the decision maker in question did not actually commit stages (iii) and (iv) to writing in the form of an office note. However, in my judgment it is highly probable that the decision maker made the entitlement decision, having reviewed the evidence, and then simply took a shortcut. In other words, she took the pragmatic view that there was no need for her to make any further record of the fact that she had made a supersession decision on entitlement. Rather, it was sufficient simply to leave a copy on file of the letter to the claimant, which expressed the outcome decision in plain English. That letter expressly referred to the fact that Mr S was in full-time work (a fact which was irrelevant to stages (i) and (ii) but highly pertinent to stages (iii) and (iv)) as the reason why “we cannot pay you Income Support” (in other words, you have had no entitlement since October 1999). 40. For completeness, before leaving this point I should deal with an issue raised by the District Tribunal Judge in his purported grant of permission to appeal. He accepted (contrary to my conclusion above) that the Secretary of State was probably right to argue now that there had never been a proper outcome decision. He then went on to ask “Has the Commissioner, in CIS/573/2008, perfected the decision that the Secretary of State now submits is fatally flawed in such a way that I could safely proceed to make the decision that I did?” 41. The short answer to that now hypothetical question is No. A decision is either an outcome decision (and so subject to appeal) or it is not. As Mr Commissioner Mesher held in R(IS) 13/05 (see paragraph 29 above) “no process of the correcting or ignoring of defects can alter that conclusion.”
So again it is a binary choice: either Tribunal 1 and Mrs Commissioner Jupp both had jurisdiction or they did not. If Tribunal 1 had no jurisdiction, then Mrs Commissioner Jupp had no magic wand to perfect a fatally flawed decision. However, for the reasons set out above, they both had jurisdiction. The question then is whether the findings of Tribunal 1 in any way were in any way binding on Tribunal 2. Was Tribunal 2 was in any way bound by the findings of Tribunal 1? The Secretary of State’s submission 42. The Secretary of State’s representative now argues that Tribunal 2 was in effect bound by the findings of Tribunal 1 on the facts relating to the living together issue. He is so bold as to argue that Tribunal 2 “was not entitled to come to a different view of the facts”. The Secretary of State’s supporting arguments 43. The Secretary of State’s representative relies on just one authority for this proposition, CIS/4423/2006. In that case the DWP had issued an entitlement decision on 16 February 2006 to the effect that the claimant had been overpaid income support for a past period because his partner’s earnings had not been taken into account. The claimant did not appeal that decision. On 24 February 2006 the Secretary of State made a further outcome decision to the effect that, as a result, there had been an overpayment in excess of £15,000 which was recoverable from the claimant because of his failure to disclose the material fact that his wife had part-time earnings. The claimant unsuccessfully appealed that second decision to a tribunal. 44. Mr Commissioner May QC (as he then was), setting aside the tribunal’s decision but substituting a decision to the same effect, agreed with the Secretary of State’s representative that the tribunal had erred by assuming jurisdiction over the entitlement decision of 16 February 2006 even though no appeal had been lodged against that decision. The Commissioner continued (at paragraph 10):[10]“As the claimant saw fit not to appeal against the decision of 16 February 2006, there is ... a final decision which amended his entitlement to income support from 24 October 2001. That decision sets out clearly the basis upon which entitlement had been amended and also provides the basis upon which the calculation of the amended entitlement would fall to be made. I do not accept that the merits of an entitlement decision following supersession, which is not appealed, can be challenged in an appeal against an overpayment decision following thereon. 45. In a further passage relied on by the Secretary of State’s representative in the present case, Mr Commissioner May added that:[16]“The argument in the third ground of appeal was one that related to the substance of entitlement, namely whether the claimant and his wife had separate households. That was an issue which, if it was to be raised, should have been done by an appeal against the decision of 16 February 2006. As it was a final decision, it was not possible to go behind the substance of it in an appeal on an overpayment decision. The claimant's representative simply cannot leave the decision of the decision maker on entitlement unchallenged and then seek to challenge it within the context of an appeal against the overpayment decision. ” The Upper Tribunal’s conclusions on this issue46. I am not persuaded that CIS/4423/2006 is relevant to the present appeal for two reasons. First, there is, of course, a material distinction between the circumstances in the present case and those in CIS/4423/2006 – in the present case the claimant had appealed both the entitlement decision and the later overpayment recoverability decision, albeit with different results. In CIS/4423/2006 the claimant had only appealed the latter decision.47. Secondly, and with respect, there is a more fundamental problem with the passages in CIS/4423/2006 on which the Secretary of State relies, or at least with the proposition that he seeks to advance on that basis. Section 17(1) of the Social Security Act 1998 certainly provides that “any decision made in accordance with the foregoing provisions of this Chapter shall be final”. So in the present case the entitlement decision confirmed by Tribunal 1, and in respect of which Mrs Commissioner Jupp later refused permission to appeal, was undoubtedly final.48. However, section 17(2) of the 1998 Act then provides that:
“(2) If and to the extent that regulations so provide, any finding of fact or other determination embodied in or necessary to such a decision, or on which such a decision is based, shall be conclusive for the purposes of— (a) further such decisions; (b) decisions made under the Child Support Act; and (c) decisions made under the Vaccine Damage Payments Act.” 49. Some limited provision has been made under section 17(2) (see for example regulation 10 of the Social Security and Child Support (Decisions and Appeals) Regulations 1999 (SI 1999/991)). However, the general principle remains as before, namely that while decisions are final (see section 17(1)) a person or tribunal making a subsequent decision is entitled to rely on an earlier finding of fact but is not bound to do so. 50. In an ideal world, of course, the same tribunal should perhaps normally hear both the entitlement and the overpayment recoverability decisions at the same time. However, if for whatever reason the issues become separated, it is entirely feasible that the tribunal hearing the appeal against the overpayment recoverability decision may reach a different conclusion on the underlying facts at issue in the entitlement decision to the tribunal which heard that earlier appeal. There is a well-established line of Commissioners’ decisions supporting this analysis: see e.g. CIS/1263/1997, CIS/1330/2002 (at paragraphs 15-19), CDLA/2328/2006 (at paragraph 30) and CA/2650/2006 (at paragraphs 16-19). Indeed, Mr Commissioner May QC, whilst not referring to CIS/4423/2006, has since accepted, albeit “with considerable reluctance”, a submission made on behalf of the Secretary of State in a later case that “while, in relation to the determination of fact in relation to whether the claimant and the named man were living together as man and wife, was final and conclusive for the purposes of entitlement, it was not so in relation to the issue of the disclosure of a material fact for the purposes of the overpayment decision made under section 71(5A) of the Social Security Administration Act 1992” (see CIS/3512/2007 at paragraph 8). 51. I do not share Mr Commissioner May QC’s view that it is “absurd that the same issue of fact should be capable of being determined by two separate tribunals in a manner which is contradictory” (CIS/3512/2007 at paragraph 8). One reason is that, as a matter of principle, decisions of one First-tier Tribunal are not binding precedents for another tribunal at the same level, and certainly not as regards issues of fact. Another reason is that although the two tribunals may have to determine the same factual issues, they may not be doing so on the same evidence. For example, in the present case Tribunal 1 did not hear from Mr S, whereas Tribunal 2 did. In addition, the claimant at Tribunal 1 had denied that Mr S lived with her but had refused to give his address on the basis that this would have betrayed a confidence. Tribunal I found her explanation to be implausible; on the other hand, Mr S was at Tribunal 2 and gave evidence on oath about where he was actually living at various times which that tribunal accepted. 52. In conclusion, an entitlement decision necessarily establishes that there has been an overpayment, because it proves that the amount paid during a particular period was more than the claimant was entitled to. But it does not establish that the overpayment is recoverable. That requires a misrepresentation or failure to disclose a material fact. To decide whether that has occurred, the tribunal dealing with the overpayment recoverability decision must first establish what the true facts were. Inevitably this involves consideration of the same matters as were considered in the entitlement decision. However, when making findings of fact, the effect of section 17(2) of the 1992 Act is that the decision maker or tribunal dealing with the overpayment recoverability decision cannot be bound by the findings in relation to those facts made in the course of dealing with the entitlement decision. It follows that the District Tribunal Judge who constituted Tribunal 2 did not err in law on this point. He correctly directed himself that he was not bound by the findings of fact made by Tribunal 1. That leaves the final question, namely whether Tribunal 2’s reasons were adequate. Were the reasons given by Tribunal 2 adequate? The Secretary of State’s submission 53. The Secretary of State’s original grounds of appeal were confined to this issue. The Secretary of State argued as follows: “[Tribunal 1] provided a very comprehensive statement of its reasons for its decision. This was sufficient for the Commissioner to refuse leave to appeal without any further submissions from either the Secretary of State or the claimant. Although [Tribunal 2] has found, in connection with the overpayment, that the claimant was not living together as husband and wife with [Mr S], which it has the right to do it has not, I submit, provided an equally thorough explanation as to how or why it differs in its conclusions on the ‘living together’ determination from [Tribunal 2] or the Commissioner.”
The Secretary of State’s supporting arguments 54. In a later submission, the Secretary of State’s representative argued that as Tribunal 1 had discharged its duty so thoroughly, “it was incumbent on any subsequent tribunal seeking to overturn the earlier tribunal’s findings to present reasons why that earlier tribunal’s findings are no longer valid.” He argued further that Tribunal 2 had “completely ignored” Tribunal 1’s findings and Tribunal 2’s reasoning was “sadly lacking in argument”. 55. I make two initial observations on the original ground of appeal set out at paragraph 53 above. First, at that stage the Secretary of State had acknowledged that Tribunal 2 was not bound by the findings of Tribunal 2. That position was only changed later in the course of these proceedings. Secondly, in refusing permission to appeal from Tribunal 1, Mrs Commissioner Jupp had not expressed any view on the underlying substantive merits of the question of whether or not the claimant and Mr S were living together. Inevitably, and properly, she confined herself to issues of law, concluding that “the tribunal was entitled to make the decision it did make”. There was, she emphasised, “no arguable case that the tribunal’s decision was wrong in law”. The Upper Tribunal’s conclusions on this issue 56. The main point, however, is this. Tribunal 2 was not under any obligation to provide “an equally thorough explanation” to that provided by Tribunal 1. As I put it in DC v London Borough of Ealing [2010] UKUT 10 (AAC) at paragraph 62, “Tribunal decisions are not to be graded in the way that an undergraduate essay might be. Rather, in terms of the adequacy of their reasons, there is a simple ‘pass/fail’ binary choice.” So Tribunal 2’s decision might have been more fully expressed; for example, it might have been better to have had a clear and explicit finding of fact that the claimant and Mr S had not been members of the same household at any material time, although that finding was implicit in the terms of the Decision Notice. However, that is not the point. Tribunal 2 was duty bound to produce a decision that was legally effective. In particular, it had to make appropriate findings of fact and give adequate reasons for its decision. The legal test for adequacy of reasons is well established and need not be rehearsed in detail here. Suffice it to say that the purpose of a tribunal’s reasons “remains what it has always been, which is to tell the parties in broad terms why they lose or, as the case may be, win” ( per Donaldson LJ in UCATT v Brain [1981] IRLR 225). 57. Looked at in that light, the decision of Tribunal 2 clearly told the parties in broad terms why they won or lost. The District Tribunal Judge admitted it was a borderline decision. He certainly did not “completely ignore” Tribunal 1’s findings; he took them into account but took a different view of the claimant’s credibility. In that context it is important to remember that the burden of proof was on the Secretary of State to make out his case. Moreover, reading the Record of Proceedings, the Decision Notice and the Statement of Reasons together, as one must, it is plain why Tribunal 2 reached a different decision to Tribunal 1. Tribunal 2 accepted the account as provided by the claimant and Mr S as to the nature of their relationship and their respective living arrangements, whereas Tribunal 1 (which had only heard from the claimant) had not. Tribunal 2 also had before it Mr S's interview under caution, which had been conducted after the first tribunal hearing. The District Tribunal Judge expressly incorporated as his findings of fact the evidence provided by the claimant and Mr S. Although their account at times “stretched credulity”, the second tribunal was satisfied that they were both telling the truth. To that extent the District Tribunal Judge may well have been right in stating “It is not possible to state my reasons for making the decision that I did more plainly than I have.” 58. For example, one of the unusual aspects of the claimant’s case which “stretched credulity” concerned the circumstances surrounding the registrations (and re-registrations) of the births of the older two of her four children (the younger two had no father registered). The older two children were both originally registered by the claimant alone. In May 1999, however, the claimant and Mr S re-registered the details of both children identifying Mr S as the father of both children. The DWP, unsurprisingly, relied on this as a factor showing that they were living together as husband and wife. 59. The claimant’s case, on the other hand, was that she had been having problems with an abusive former partner called Michael and that Mr S had agreed to be named as the children’s father as a means of protecting both her and the children. Indeed, Tribunal 1 found as a fact that Mr S was not the father of either of the older children, observing that he would have been 13 or 14 at the time of the oldest child’s birth. However, Tribunal 1 certainly regarded this episode as fatally undermining the claimant’s reliability as a witness as to the truth. The tribunal judge on that occasion found that “She has admitted to lying to the Registrar of Births she says in an attempt to protect her children form a violent relationship when common sense would dictate that other remedies including police involvement would have afforded far greater protection.” 60. The claimant repeated her account of this episode to Tribunal 2. She was reported as saying “she [had] deceived the authorities about the birth to protect self from [the true] father. He could not trace where the children were. He did not know where she was either... Same father for all children, she does not know where he is now... Her son puts down his father at school as Mr S because he wanted it to be known that he had a father as he was being bullied”. In incorporating that evidence, Tribunal 2 expressly accepted what was recorded as encapsulating its findings of fact. That was an approach that was open to it in all the circumstances. 61. Some might argue that the scepticism shown by Tribunal 1 as to the claimant’s account of this matter failed to recognise the realities of living in an abusive relationship and coping with domestic violence and displayed an unduly sanguine view of the effectiveness of police intervention. However, that was an approach that was open to Tribunal 1 on the evidence before it. Equally, Tribunal 2 was perfectly entitled to take a different approach to that evidence and to attach both credence to it and not to regard the claimant’s admitted deception of the Registrar of Births as undermining her evidence as a whole. It is, of course, well established that a person’s evidence must be considered in its entirety, and the fact that he or she has lied on occasion does not necessarily mean all their testimony is unreliable (see EPI Environmental Technologies Inc v Symphony Plastic Technologies plc [2005] 1 WLR 3456 ).[62]The bottom line, therefore, is that Tribunal 2 believed the claimant (and Mr S) whereas Tribunal 1 did not. This is a classic jury question for the tribunal of fact (the First-tier Tribunal). It is axiomatic that it is not for the Upper Tribunal to interfere with the findings of fact made by Tribunal 1 or by Tribunal 2. Indeed, in a case involving allegations of domestic violence in the context of a child support claim, the Court of Appeal has cautioned a Social Security Commissioner (now an Upper Tribunal Judge) from attempting “to reanalyse evidence (which he had not heard) from a perspective that he preferred” ( Secretary of State for Work & Pensions v Roach [2006] EWCA Civ 1746 , at paragraph 37).[63]The case law on the principles governing the extent to which reasons may need to be given for findings of credibility was discussed in CIS/4022/2007 (at paragraphs 33-51). The conclusion of that analysis was as follows: “52. In my assessment the fundamental principles to be derived from these cases and to be applied by tribunals where credibility is in issue may be summarised as follows:(1) there is no formal requirement that a claimant's evidence be corroborated – but, although it is not a prerequisite, corroborative evidence may well reinforce the claimant's evidence;(2) equally, there is no obligation on a tribunal simply to accept a claimant's evidence as credible;(3) the decision on credibility is a decision for the tribunal in the exercise of its judgment, weighing and taking into account all relevant considerations (e.g. the person's reliability, the internal consistency of their account, its consistency with other evidence, its inherent plausibility, etc, whilst bearing in mind that the bare-faced liar may appear wholly consistent and the truthful witness's account may have gaps and discrepancies, not least due to forgetfulness or mental health problems);(4) subject to the requirements of natural justice, there is no obligation on a tribunal to put a finding as to credibility to a party for comment before reaching a decision;(5) having arrived at its decision, there is no universal obligation on tribunals to explain assessments of credibility in every instance;(6) there is, however, an obligation on a tribunal to give adequate reasons for its decision, which may, depending on the circumstances, include a brief explanation as to why a particular piece of evidence has not been accepted. As the Northern Ireland Tribunal of Commissioners explained in R 3/01(IB)(T), ultimately ‘the only rule is that the reasons for the decision must make the decision comprehensible to a reasonable person reading it’.” 64. The issue in CIS/4022/2007 concerned the adequacy of the tribunal’s reasons for a negative credibility finding. In Basildon District Council v AM [2009] UKUT 113 (AAC) I suggested (at paragraph 18) that the legal principles were the same in respect of a positive credibility finding. Whether or not that is right in theory, in practice it may be that the application of those same principles may often result in a requirement for less extensive reasons where the credibility finding is positive. Bearing in mind that “the only rule is that the reasons for the decision must make the decision comprehensible to a reasonable person reading it”, could the District Tribunal Judge in Tribunal 2 really say much more than that he believed the account provided by the claimant and Mr S – the essence of which was that although they were friends of longstanding they were not, and had not been, living together in the same household at the same address – and on that basis he had to allow the appeal? In my judgment his fact-finding and reasoning, while perhaps not optimal, was certainly adequate. Conclusion 65. For the reasons explained above, the decision of the tribunal does not involve a material error of law. The Upper Tribunal therefore dismisses the Secretary of State’s appeal against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal dated 28 May 2009 (Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007, section 11). Signed on the original Nicholas Wikeley on 29 November 2010 Judge of the Upper Tribunal

Cited in 8 later judgments