DM v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (II) [2010] UKUT 207 (AAC)

UKUT-AAC
DM v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (II)
[2010] UKUT 207 (AAC) · 2010-06-24
[14]“In avoiding both, the Court of Appeal took the view I have followed above that interpretation should be by looking at the prescription as a whole, rather than by isolating individual words within it. The question to be decided is therefore whether what the claimant actually did in his work came within the proper meaning of the words of category (c) for prescribed disease A11.”30. With those principles in mind, I now return to the prescription test for PD A14 and the context of this particular appeal. The period before January 1, 1986: paragraph (a) of prescribed disease A14 Introduction31. The statutory test in paragraph (a) of prescribed disease A14 requires one to ask first whether the claimant’s occupation involved “work underground in a coal mine for a period of, or periods which amount in aggregate to, at least 10 years… before 1st January 1986 as a coal miner”.32. The tribunal in the present case did not deal with this point in any great detail. This is presumably because the tribunal’s conclusion that the post-January 1, 1986 employment “did not count” meant that it took the view that there was little point in addressing the earlier period in any detail, as the period concerned was less than six years. The tribunal simply noted the capacities in which the claimant had been employed. Its failure to make a clear finding of fact on the issue is nonetheless an error of law.33. The drafting of the prescription test for the period before January 1, 1986 is relatively wide. Essentially the test is whether the claimant was in “work underground in a coal mine… as a coal miner”. There is no need, therefore, for the claimant to have been working either at the coal face or in a particular role underground. The pre-January 1, 1986 test involves three separate questions. First, was the claimant a coal miner? Secondly, was he involved in “work underground in a coal mine”? Third, how long was he in such work? Was he a coal miner?34. As to the first question, social security legislation does not define the term “coal miner”. The authorities analysed above show that one must focus on what the claimant actually did, and not what his job was labelled. Beyond that, it is ultimately a question of fact as to whether a particular individual was a “coal miner”. However, it is important to bear in mind Mr Commissioner Magnus’s observation in R(I) 3/78 that the way in which a workforce is “designated, classified or graded by reference to function, training or skills” is not determinative (see paragraph 22 above). The very breadth of the term “coal miner” also indicates that an unduly restrictive construction should be avoided. On that basis, the new tribunal may have little difficulty in concluding that the claimant’s pre-January 1, 1986 occupation was as a “coal miner”, although it is entirely a matter for them to decide.35. More than a century ago the term “miner” was defined in the context of the Cornish tin mining industry (by section 2 of the Stannaries Act 1887) so as to include “all artizans, labourers, and other persons working in and about a mine, except the purser, secretary, agent, or manager”. Although that legislation has now been repealed by the Statute Law (Repeals) Act 1998, in my view it gives, at least by analogy, a flavour of the meaning of the term “coal miner”. So a tribunal might well reasonably form the view that a “coal miner” was anyone working in or about a coal mine, in a skilled, semi-skilled or unskilled “blue collar” capacity, but not, for example, a “white collar” colliery manager, mining engineer or mining surveyor.36. I stress that the guidance in the previous paragraph is designed to give a flavour of what is meant by the term “coal miner”. It does not replace the statutory language. Indeed, it is probably neither possible nor wise to attempt to devise a comprehensive or exhaustive definition of “coal miner” sufficient to determine the issue in any given case. It is a question ultimately for tribunals to decide as an issue of fact. As the Court of Appeal observed in a rather different context, “Although this may be close to adopting the elephant test of knowing one when you see one, it is almost inevitable in this field” ( Lucasfilm Ltd & Ors v Ainsworth & Anor [2009] EWCA Civ 1328 , at paragraph 77). Was he working underground in a coal mine?37. As to the second question, the 1985 Regulations unsurprisingly define a “coal mine” as “any mine where one of the objects of the mining operations is the getting of coal”, but also include a compendious definition of the generic term “mine” itself, which includes shafts and both level and inclined planes within mines (see regulation 1(2)). However, while the statutory definition of “mine” also includes certain operations above ground, the particular test for PD A14 expressly requires “work underground in a coal mine” (emphasis added). Several other prescribed diseases also refer to “work underground”: for example PD D10 and PD D12.38. This point was considered in detail by the Commissioner in R(I) 37/59, where it was held that a man working below ground level in a crushing plant, more than a mile from the coal mine itself, was not working “underground in a mine”:
“14. ‘Underground’ is a word of somewhat indefinite meaning, in ordinary usage. The primary dictionary definition meaning is ‘below the surface of the ground’; but this definition is itself ambiguous. In one sense a man who works in the basement of a building might be said to work ‘underground’; and so perhaps (although more doubtfully) might a man who works in an excavation. But, as the word is used in the regulation, its meaning is controlled by its context. The context is “in a mine”. ‘Underground in a mine’ normally connotes, in my opinion, what is colloquially referred to as ‘down the pit’…”
How long was he working underground in a coal mine? 39. As to the third question, the period or period concerned, when taken with any relevant post-January 1, 1986 employment, must “ amount in aggregate to, at least 10 years”. Resolving this issue may pose some practical problems for tribunals, depending on the quality of the information which is available to them about a claimant’s employment history. These problems may be more acute where the individual has worked at several different pits and/or his work underground has been interspersed with jobs either above ground at the colliery or outside the coal industry. The Commissioners’ decisions in R(I) 3/78 and R(I) 2/79, discussed above, provide helpful guidance in computing periods of work in scheduled occupations. 40. Finally, I also observe that the focus “on what the claimant actually did” may present some difficult questions in borderline cases (in relation to whether the 10 year rule is satisfied), especially where the claimant was involved in any of the industrial disputes which have taken place in the coal industry in the past. It is arguable that two or three weeks on strike in any given year should not make any difference to the prescription test, just as two or three weeks’ holiday would not affect the overall position. However, as is well known, the 1984/85 stoppage lasted for almost a year in some pits. It would be very difficult to say that a claimant who was out on strike for a substantial period was involved in “work underground in a coal mine” during that time. That issue may or may not arise in the present case. If it becomes relevant, however, regard should be had by analogy to the view expressed by the Tribunal of Commissioners in R(I) 2/79 (at paragraph 20), namely that continuous absences from work of 3 calendar months or more should normally be excluded from the computation of the 20-year qualifying period for occupational deafness cases. The Secretary of State’s submissions on the pre-January 1, 1986 test 41. Mr Kendall, for the Secretary of State, cites extensively from the 2008 IIAC report, and in particular from paragraphs 2 and 51-56 of the report. This, he argues, shows that IIAC had in mind that the prescription should cover those exposed to the risk of osteoarthritis because of “kneeling and squatting whilst under load” and that this further qualifying test applied to both the pre- and post-January 1, 1986 occupations. For the period before January 1, 1986, his submission is as follows:
“The Secretary of State takes the view that a broad definition should be applied provided that the work was underground and that it involved the person in question kneeling and squatting whilst under load for prolonged periods of each day.” 42. As to the first part of this submission, and for the reasons explained above, I am entirely satisfied that a broad definition should be applied to the occupation of “coal miner”, provided, of course, that the work was underground. That approach is also consistent with the position taken by IIAC in their report. 43. As to the second part of the Secretary of State’s submission, it is much less clear that there is any separate and additional requirement to show that the claimant’s occupation “involved the person in question kneeling and squatting whilst under load for prolonged periods of each day”, as Mr Kendall submits. 44. The IIAC report explains how, between the 1940s and 1960s, “miners would normally have spent most of their working careers at the pit face, in jobs that involved kneeling and squatting whilst bearing heavy loads for a large proportion of each day” (paragraph 54). Gradually, however, with increasing mechanisation, “less time was spent by fewer workers in kneeling and squatting under load, although certain tasks still required heavy manual effort while kneeling or squatting” (paragraph 54). The justification for the distinction between pre- and post-January 1, 1986 employments was put by IIAC in the following terms: “55. Kneeling and squatting under load remained a significant feature of work for most underground miners until the mid-1980s, after which the majority of miners would not have spent prolonged parts of their working day kneeling and squatting.” 45. As indicated above (at paragraph 7), the Upper Tribunal may have regard to relevant IIAC reports as an aid to construction. However, as Mr Commissioner Goodman observed in R(I) 4/99 (at paragraph 9), if the legislation “is clear and unambiguous then the material in the Advisory Council’s Report cannot be used to qualify or alter its meaning. If, however, that wording is unclear or ambiguous the Council’s Report may be used to clarify it.” 46. Although ambiguity may lie in the eye of the beholder, I have to say that I do not regard the prescribed occupation within paragraph (a) of “Work underground in a coal mine … before 1st January 1986 as a coal miner” for the requisite period as being unclear or ambiguous at all. A tribunal can use its good sense to find the facts as appropriate. Applying the “elephant test” (see paragraph 36 above), I am confident that tribunals can be trusted to recognise a pre-January 1, 1986 coal miner when they meet one. 47. Accordingly, in my view the second limb of the Secretary of State’s submission seeks to introduce an unwarranted gloss on the statutory language. As Mr Commissioner Goodman also pointed out in R(I) 4/99, “it must be borne in mind that the claimant is entitled to any benefit which the law gives him in the shape of the actual wording of [the relevant paragraph] of Schedule 1 to the Prescribed Diseases Regulations”
(emphasis in original). The Schedule does not limit relevant pre-January 1, 1986 employment to “Work underground in a coal mine … before 1st January 1986 as a coal miner providing it involved the person in question kneeling and squatting whilst under load for prolonged periods of each day”. Nor is the prescribed occupation qualified in some way as PD A6, another knee condition, is, namely being confined to any occupation involving “manual labour causing severe or prolonged external friction or pressure at or about the knee”. 48. The relevant passages from the IIAC report that Mr Kendall refers to are undoubtedly instructive in understanding the Council’s reasoning in arriving at the conclusion that the epidemiological evidence about the incidence of osteoarthritis in the knee in miners is such as to justify its prescription within the test laid down by section 108(2) of the Social Security Benefits and Contributions Act 1992. They cannot, however, be used to undermine the clear and unambiguous statutory language of the amending regulations in respect of the occupational test for PD A14 for periods before January 1, 1986. The statutory presumption 49. I would add, however, that in respect of certain prescribed diseases there is a statutory presumption that a disease is due to the nature of employment (see regulation 4 of the 1985 Regulations). In principle, that presumption applies to PD A14, as the condition is not listed amongst the exclusions in regulation 4(1). However, the statutory presumption applies only where the claimant was employed in the scheduled occupation on the date of onset of the disease or at any time in the previous month. Sometimes there may be medical evidence of that – for example, where a coal miner had more than 10 years’ underground work before January 1, 1986 and before that date, whilst still employed by the NCB, was moved to lighter duties because of difficulties with kneeling. If the presumption applies, then the burden would be on the Secretary of State to show, on the balance of probabilities, that the disease was not due to the nature of the prescribed occupation (see Commissioners’ decisions R(I) 38/52 and R(I) 4/91, at paragraph 17(5)). 50. However, the time requirement in regulation 4(1) will not be met in many cases of PD A14, given the typical latency of the condition. Without the benefit of the presumption in regulation 4, the onus of proof will then be on the claimant to show that, on the balance of probabilities, his osteoarthritis of the knee has been caused by his occupation as a coal miner. That causation requirement is laid down by section 108(1) of the Social Security Contributions and Benefits Act 1992, which stipulates that the prescribed disease or injury must be “due to the nature of that employment” (see R(I) 3/04, at paragraph 16). It is not part of the diagnosis question itself. 51. This distinction has important consequences for the decision making process. For example, assume that a coal miner with more than 10 years’ underground work prior to January 1, 1986 has osteoarthritis of the knees, but also assume further that in his particular case the evidence points strongly to the conclusions that (i) in fact his work underground actually involved relatively little “ kneeling and squatting whilst under load for prolonged periods of each day”; and (ii) his osteoarthritis is actually constitutional in origin. In such a case the correct approach for a tribunal is to find that the claimant has PD A14, because he meets the prescription test, but that he is not entitled to industrial disablement benefit because the disease was not due to the nature of his employment, giving reasons as appropriate. The period after January 1, 1986: paragraph (b) of prescribed disease A14 52. The test for the period after January 1, 1986 in paragraph (b) of prescribed disease A14 is undoubtedly more prescriptive than that applying before that date. It is not sufficient that the claimant was a coal miner working underground. After that date, he must have fallen into one of the five groups set out in the Schedule, namely a (i) face worker working on a non-mechanised coal face; (ii) development worker; (iii) face-salvage worker; (iv) conveyor belt cleaner; or (v) conveyor belt attendant. The term “non-mechanised coal face”, which only applies to occupation (i), is defined as meaning “a coal face without either powered roof supports or a power loader machine which simultaneously cuts and loads the coal or without both.” 53. As indicated above, in the present case the tribunal essentially decided that because the claimant was an electrician, and because the job title “electrician” does not appear in any of the post-January 1, 1986 occupations, then therefore none of his post-January 1, 1986 employment could count as he had not worked in a prescribed occupation. That approach involved an error of law, as the tribunal focussed on the label attached to the claimant’s job, and not on the work that he actually did. 54. Mr Kendall’s submission on behalf of the Secretary of State is that the same test of working underground and of kneeling and squatting whilst under load should be applied after January 1, 1986 to the specific occupations listed under paragraph (b) of PD A14. I have explained at paragraphs 43-48 above why I do not accept that this further test applies in the context of employment before January 1, 1986. The position after that date is not quite so straightforward. Rather than using the broad-brush occupation of “coal miner”, the regulations governing the later period adopt a much narrower approach to defining the relevant occupations. In particular, five particular roles are identified, rather than a general reference to working underground as a coal miner. The starting point, however, must be the same as before, namely that the tribunal must look at what the person was actually doing. To that extent I do not accept the gloss that Mr Kendall seeks to place on the statutory wording of the prescription test by imposing a further requirement as to kneeling and squatting whilst under load. 55. In this context it is appropriate to consult the IIAC report to understand the basis for the distinction between the general and the particular occupational tests. IIAC, having established the mid-1980s as the relevant cut-off point, given the impact of increased mechanisation on mining processes (see paragraph 44 above), had this to say about the incidence of kneeling and squatting under load experienced by different categories of miners after that time:
“56. However, such exposures are likely to have persisted for faceworkers and face salvage workers in certain non-mechanised mines until a much later period; and other categories of miner, such as development workers and conveyor belt cleaners and attendants, would have incurred such exposures through activities such as installing track, pipework and conveyor belts, carrying heavy arched supports, and cleaning coal spillages by shovel in circumstances of restricted access.” 56. IIAC does not cite any of the epidemiological evidence in support of its decision to identify these particular groups of coal miners. This was presumably because the scientific studies involved were insufficiently fine-grained to support such distinctions. For example, the study by G McMillan and L Nichols entitled “Osteoarthritis and meniscus disorders of the knee as occupational diseases of miners”, itself reviewing earlier studies, refers to coal miners as a general group and concludes that kneeling and/or squatting, especially when lifting, is casually associated with an increased risk of osteoarthritis of the knee ( Occupational and Environmental Medicine 2005; 62: 567-575). That being so, one can only assume that IIAC was satisfied by other evidence it received as to the types of actual work undertaken that these particular categories of coal miner remained at risk after January 1, 1986. 57. As noted at paragraph 9 above, there appears to be a difference between the IIAC recommendation and the implementing regulations. It is plain from the passage cited above that IIAC drew a distinction between “ faceworkers and face salvage workers in certain non-mechanised mines” on the one hand and “other categories of miner, such as development workers and conveyor belt cleaners and attendants” on the other. Their actual recommendation did not refer to face-salvage workers, but the extract above strongly suggests that they regarded that group as subsumed within the general category of face workers in non-mechanised mines. 58. However, be that as it may, the new tribunal must apply the regulations as they find them (see paragraph 47 above). For whatever reason, face-salvage workers have been separated out in the list of prescribed occupations. The result is that any face-salvage worker is covered by the prescription test for the later period, whether working on a mechanised or non-mechanised coal face. Face workers, however, only qualify after January 1, 1986 if they worked on a non-mechanised coal face, as that term is defined. 59. In this context I must note that the claimant in his further submissions on the appeal, made the following further point: “In my opinion my duties were just as arduous after 1-1-86 as they were before. In fact the more mechanised operations became, the more involvement we as electricians had, i.e. carrying heavy pieces of equipment etc whilst crawling along the face. This is just as traumatic on the knees as shovelling while kneeling.” 60. That may well be so, and of course circumstances may have varied from coalfield to coalfield and indeed from pit to pit within the same coalfield. However, the regulations plainly exclude face workers after January 1, 1986 who worked on mechanised coal faces. 61. The new tribunal will have to consider whether the claimant worked in any of the post-January 1, 1986 occupations. As explained above, the new tribunal cannot rely on the job title stated in the claimant’s contract of employment. The new tribunal also cannot simply rely on the claimant’s pay grade or the label that may appeared on the pay-slip in his wage packet. The focus, as has been explained, must be on what the claimant actually did. This must ultimately be a question of fact for the tribunal. 62. In practice a tribunal may well find it hard to accept that an electrician could ever fall within the terms of paragraphs (b)(iv) and (v), namely a conveyor belt cleaner or attendant. To be fair, the claimant in this case has never suggested as much. However, it is possible that an electrician might be, for example, a “face worker working on a non-mechanised coal face”, a “development worker” or a “face-salvage worker” within paragraphs (b)(i) to (iii). It all depends on the facts, and in particular what those occupations involved and what the claimant himself actually did. 63. The new tribunal will therefore have to make findings of fact as to whether the occupations specified in paragraphs (b)(i) to (iii) are relatively narrowly defined occupations or whether, as the claimant argues in his grounds of appeal, they are broad umbrella terms which describe a number of separate categories of worker. If the former, it may be unlikely that they encompass someone who is an electrician by training. If the latter, it is possible that an electrician might be included. 64. I note that the CES reply described the claimant as an “underground and coalface electrician” (see paragraph 10 above). If the tribunal conclude that the occupation of “face worker” is a broad enough term to include someone who is a qualified electrician, then of course that occupation will only count if the claimant was a “face worker working on a non-mechanised coal face”, which seems unlikely given what is known so far in the present case. Of course, the “non-mechanised coal face” rider does not apply to the occupations of “development worker” and “face-salvage worker”
. It is conceivable, of course, that the claimant might have worked in one or more of the qualifying occupations in paragraph (b) and also in a non-qualifying occupation during his employment. If that is the case, the tribunal will need to make careful findings of fact as to the length and proportion of time involved in each occupation to see whether the 10 year test is met. The decisions of the Commissioners in R(I) 3/78 and R(I) 2/79 provide helpful guidance in such cases. 65. In the last resort, however, the tribunal must be satisfied in relation to the post-January 1, 1986 period that the claimant actually worked in one of the listed occupations, not that he worked in conditions similar to or indeed even identical to those experienced by the listed occupations. The previous tribunal was right to allude to that important distinction (see paragraph 13 above). Summary 66. The general guidance above on the application of the prescription test for diseases prescribed under the Schedule to the 1985 Regulations may be summarised as follows: (1) In interpreting the occupational requirements for a prescribed disease, “it would be wrong to give to those words too narrow a definition when one considers the purpose of the statute, which was to provide compensation for those who suffered the prescribed disease as result of their occupation” ( Secretary of State for Social Security v Davis [2001] EWCA Civ 105 at paragraph 23 per Rix L.J.); (2) Just as the statutory language should not be “artificially narrowed”, so too it should not be “artificially widened” (CI/207/2004); (3) The focus must always be on what the claimant actually did, not what his job was labelled ( Janicki v Secretary of State for Social Security , also reported as R(I) 1/01, and CI/2668/2002); (4) Courts and tribunals may have regard to relevant Industrial Injuries Advisory Council reports as an aid to construction where legislation has been enacted to implement a recommendation in the report (R(I) 15/75, Davis, Janicki and Secretary of State for Work and Pensions v CS (II) [2010] UKUT 198 (AAC) ). 67. In addition, the more specific guidance set out above on the application of the prescription test for PD A14 may be summarised as follows: (1) In considering a claimant’s employment before January 1, 1986 under paragraph (a), three questions may need to be addressed: (i) was he a coal miner ? (ii) was he working underground in a coal mine? (iii) how long was he so working? (2) In considering a claimant’s employment on or after January 1, 1986 under paragraph (b), careful findings of fact will need to be made about the actual work carried out to establish whether it falls within one or more of any of the following occupational categories, namely a (i) face worker (but only if working on a non-mechanised coal face); (ii) development worker; (iii) face-salvage worker; (iv) conveyor belt cleaner; or (v) conveyor belt attendant; (3) The claimant’s formal job title and pay grade are not conclusive as to the issue of categorisation; furthermore “ the fact that the workforce employed in the business is designated, classified or graded by reference to function, training or skills … does not of itself justify a conclusion that each separate designation, classification or grading involves a separate occupation” (R(I) 3/78); (4) Contrary to the Secretary of State’s submission, there is no separate requirement in relation to periods either before or after January 1, 1986 to the effect that the claimant’s occupation must have “involved the person in question kneeling and squatting whilst under load for prolonged periods of each day”; (5) Tribunals may need to consider whether or not the statutory presumption in regulation 4 of the 1985 Regulations as to causation applies in any given case; (6) In deciding whether a claimant has worked for an aggregate of 10 years or more in a relevant coal mining occupation or occupations, tribunals may need to consider whether there have been any lengthy periods of absence from work, e.g. due to strike action. Conclusion 68. This appeal succeeds for the reasons set out above. The case is sent back to a new First-tier Tribunal for rehearing. The fact that this appeal to the Upper Tribunal has succeeded should not be taken as any indication as to the likely outcome of the rehearing, which is entirely a matter for the new tribunal. Signed on the original Nicholas Wikeley on 24 June 2010 Judge of the Upper Tribunal

Cited in 1 later judgment