“That seems to me to be misconceived. Refusal of sanction would cause no loss. It is common ground that when the transaction closed the bargain was a good one. It is illegitimate to describe as ‘loss’ a profit that might have been obtained had the relevant asset been disposed of at some different time. … Similarly misconceived is the complaint that unless the Trade Confirmation is set aside Farnum will obtain a ‘windfall’. If the Trade Confirmation were set aside the windfall would be made by Fairfield, while Farnum would lose the benefit of an arms length bargain.”
“I do not consider that it is right for this Court, which confirmed and approved the transaction, to lend its sanction to efforts which necessarily involve breaching such a solemn obligation”. (iii) When Bannister J originally approved the Trade Confirmation, he expected that, subject to the approval of the US Bankruptcy Court, it would be performed timeously. That approval was ultimately obtained in January 2013 and one appeal had failed. Over two and a half years after the contract was made, the court was being asked to sanction a period of indeterminate further delay. Two US judges had rejected the Liquidator’s case under Section 363 and “enough is enough”. (iv) In reliance on the principle enunciated in Ex parte James (1874) LR 9 Ch App 609 regarding the conduct to be expected of liquidators as officers of the court, he said: “The only object of the step he wishes the Court now to sanction is to defeat accrued rights in order to obtain a windfall. When parties deal with a Court appointed liquidator, they are dealing, in a sense, with the Court. I think that they are entitled to expect that the Court will not facilitate moves by its officer designed to frustrate proper bargains which it has formally approved.”
“In my judgment efforts to cause the contract to become aborted are a breach of that implied covenant”