“In my judgment I am of the view that the evidence adduced by [the respondent’s] expert witnesses of a haematologist Dr Altheia Jones-Lecointe and an anaesthetist Dr Phyllis Pitt-Miller properly demonstrates that the [second appellant] failed to determine if the deceased was taking aspirin before performing the TURP, failed to properly treat [the deceased’s] hypovolemic shock and prevent the onset of the condition of DIC and failed to properly monitor and manage his blood transfusions. The experts also satisfactorily demonstrate on a balance of probabilities that [the first appellant] failed to monitor his post operative recovery, failed to have on site and to make suitable arrangements for sufficient blood products appropriate for transfusions for dealing with excessive bleeding and the problems attendant with excessive bleeding. These actions led and materially contributed to [the deceased’s] death caused by DIC. The only expert evidence as to the steps that ought to have been taken to deal with the foreseeable risks and complications arising from post operative bleeding which is acceptable as proper practice by a responsible body of anaesthetists and hospitals (has) come from these experts. Despite the rigorous cross examination, their scientific knowledge was not questioned and they have sufficiently set out a reasonable body of medical opinion which suggests on a balance of probability that there was negligence on the part of both [the first and second appellants] in the pre-operative and post-operative care of [the deceased]. The [respondent] for the reasons set out in this judgment is therefore entitled to judgment. Her damages have been assessed in the sum of$18,034,772.33 .”
“However Gulf View has persisted in its closing submissions to insist that there is no duty of care on Gulf View in relation to their nursing staff. Similarly Counsel for Dr Roopchand took the cue from Queen’s Counsel to assert that his duty was restricted to only that of administering anaesthesia. There is of course no quarrel with Dr Roopchand in his administration of anaesthesia; this is not a ‘death by anaesthesia case’. But these submissions have certainly contradicted their pleadings.”
“As discussed above there is no issue as to the existence of a duty of care. The pleaded duty was admitted by these Defendants and it included critically the monitoring of Mr Tesheira’s blood loss, the containment of his blood loss, the management of the patient in post operative care to safely transfuse large quantities of blood products, and carefully manage same. There simply is no plea by Gulf View that its duty or role was limited to support service or of providing accommodation, operating facilities or nursing care. …. The issues for determination at this trial have been properly identified in advance of this trial, …. The cross examination therefore of the experts to the effect that decisions were made by clinicians and not nursing staff are really irrelevant in that it does not advance the Defendants’ case against the backdrop of its accepted duties of care.”
“ Gulf View 125. Insofar as Gulf View is concerned it has admitted to be under a duty to ensure that Mr Tesheira’s bleeding was carefully monitored, and his transfusion was managed and contained. The evidence demonstrates that there was a breach of the requisite standard of care expected of such an institution adjudged against a body of responsible practice as set out by Dr Pitt-Miller and Dr Jones-Lecointe. Gulf View failed in my view: (a) To make attempts to monitor and contain the post surgical bleeding as indicated earlier in this judgment. The lapse in time while Mr Tesheira was bleeding post operatively is basic carelessness. …. I am satisfied that but for this failure to monitor and contain the post surgical bleeding he would not have developed hypovolemic shock. (b) To maintain appropriate supplies of blood and blood products and clotting agents sufficient to meet the risk of bleeding. The undisputed evidence of Dr Jones-Lecointe is that the preferred fluid to prevent bleeding and to increase the chance of haematosis is fresh whole blood. But this was not administered until 8:00p.m that night. (c) I also accept that the failure to have the appropriate products readily available within half [an] hour exposed Mr Tesheira to the unnecessary risk to hypovolemic shock which later developed to DIC and later fluid overload. But for the receipt of timely transfusions of the correct blood that is packed red cells within half [an] hour, or cryoprecipitate and fresh frozen plasma Mr Tesheira would not have developed hypovolemic shock or that it would have progressed to DIC or it would have progressed further to fluid overload. (d) Gulf View committed a cardinal sin in haematology by pumping O positive blood into Mr Tesheira. The appropriate products were not available. This was not only carelessness but simply dangerous. It is very likely that this was a direct causative link to his fluid overload as O positive blood [had] no recuperative value for Mr Tesheira in his condition of DIC. This resulted in the destruction of the red blood cells in his blood. The standard of care fell woefully short of what was required by the normal competent specialist exercising the skill in undertaking that task. The basic steps according to the normal competent specialist exercising the requisite skill in that undertaking [were] suitably explained by Dr Pitt-Miller. These steps were not followed. The level of testing was inadequate and incapable of assisting those treating Mr Tesheira as to the clotting ability of his blood. Dr Roopchand 126. Dr Roopchand clearly admitted his duty of care to Mr Tesheira as discussed earlier. Indeed from his role with Dr Goetz in aborting the first TURP and in assisting Dr Goetz when Mr Tesheira experienced hypovolemic shock his duties extended beyond merely administering anaesthesia. The evidence demonstrates that Dr Roopchand was in breach of the Bolam gold standard of care. 127. Dr Roopchand: (a) Failed to take any steps to arrest or control his bleeding post TURP. Mr Tesheira was bleeding continuously from 1:10p.m and bled heavily and excessively from 2:50p.m (at least as recorded by the reporting nurse) to 3:30pm. In a full 40 minutes of heavy bleeding nothing was done. … Dr Jones-Lecointe’s evidence is quite clear that this failure to act was a serious breach to deliver the standard of care expected of him and exposed Mr Tesheira to an unnecessary risk. Dr Roopchand and Gulf View failed to carry out PT/PTT tests or make proper pre-assessment of the use of aspirin which relates directly to the management of blood loss. (b) Failed to act quickly to transfuse the relevant blood products. The question that still remains unanswered by Dr Roopchand or Gulf View is where was the whole blood or plasma or packed red cells and plasma? …. It is more probable that the suitable products were simply not on site at Gulf View. (c) Failed to ensure that prior to the TURP procedure there were adequate supplies of packed red cells or whole blood to treat hypovolemic shock or fresh frozen plasma and cryoprecipitate to treat DIC. …Again this is indicative that Gulf View was simply not ready for this and Dr Roopchand had failed to prepare adequately for the TURP. (d) Failed to manage properly the transfusion of blood and administering excessive amounts of blood and blood products. From Dr Roopchand’s very own records at almost half an hour intervals from 4:30p.m Mr Tesheira was being continuously transfused with the wrong blood. Instead of fresh whole blood he was administered 5 units of whole blood. Instead of receiving fresh frozen plasma and cryoprecipitate when he developed DIC he received this three hours later. Instead of the right type of blood he is administered three units of O positive. This according to Dr Jones-Lecointe completely destroys his A red cells. (e) Failed to properly monitor and record Mr Tesheira’s fluid output or ensure adequate proper or sufficient monitoring to monitor his status during the transfusion of blood and other fluids. There was a risk of fluid overload or TURP syndrome coming out of the TURP procedure. However it was double the risk when the 19 units of fluid and blood products cumulatively were transfused haphazardly. This according to the evidence of Dr Pitt-Miller would lead to fluid overload. There was according to both Dr Pitt-Miller and Dr Jones-Lecointe inadequate monitoring during these procedures. The experts repeatedly called for the temperature and pulse recordings and the use of an oximeter. 128. But for these failures or omissions and actions by Gulf View and Dr Roopchand, Mr Tesheira would not have gone into hypovolemic shock, he would not have developed DIC, he would not have developed TURP syndrome and died of irreversible shock and DIC.”
“293. In the circumstances while the judge may have at times misstated the cause of death I cannot say that in determining that the negligence of the appellants cumulatively resulted in the deceased’s death the judge was plainly wrong. The negligence of the appellants in failing to carry out PT and PTT tests just prior to the performance of the TURP procedure increased the risk of the deceased succumbing to excessive bleeding after the TURP procedure. The absence of the test meant that the appellants were unable to properly assess the already existing risk of heavy bleeding and either postpone the procedure or properly prepare for it by ensuring that the blood and blood products needed to treat the bleeding were readily available. 294. By failing to have the appropriate blood available for transfusion into the deceased within a half an hour of being requested at 3.30pm and transfusing O+ blood into the deceased when his blood group was A+ the deceased’s heavy bleeding was allowed to progress into hypovolemic shock and then DIC. In the course of treating the DIC, the failure of the appellants to properly monitor the deceased’s status during the transfusions of blood and blood products led to excessive fluids being transfused into the deceased and caused his death as a result of fluid overload. Had the appellants treated the deceased’s excessive bleeding properly and in a timely manner the deceased would not have succumbed to the excessive bleeding to such an extent as to require such massive transfusions of blood and blood products which resulted in his fluid overload and ultimately his death. Insofar as the judge determined that but for the negligence of the appellants the deceased would not have died therefore it cannot be said that the judge was plainly wrong. On the evidence before him there was sufficient evidence for him to conclude that on a balance of probabilities the death of the deceased was caused by the negligence of the appellants.”
“23. Further, the Defendants were under a duty in performing the TURP procedure on the deceased, to ensure that during and after the performance of the procedure (a) any bleeding of the deceased was carefully monitored and/or properlycontained and/or otherwise so managed as to protect the deceased from excessive bleeding; (b) there were sufficient materials, equipment, and personnel as to facilitate the safe transfusion of large quantities of blood and blood products to the deceased; and (c) such transfusions as may have been necessary were carefully managed and carried out using such equipment, tests and practices as would minimise the risk of, or prevent, the deceased experiencing fluid overload or other deleterious effects from same”
“The non-delegable duty of care is a special duty to ensure that reasonable care is taken for the safety of those to whom it is owed. It is not vicarious; it is a personal duty, breach of which requires fault. It is an onerous duty in that if a defendant owing the duty to a claimant does not take reasonable care to avoid a foreseeable risk of injury which eventuates causing damage to a claimant, then liability cannot be avoided by the defendant engaging another to carry out the defendant’s responsibilities”
“At all material times the First Second and Third Defendants were under a duty in performing the TURP procedure to ensure that during and after the performance of the procedure any bleeding of the deceased was carefully monitored and/or properly contained and/or otherwise so managed as to protect the deceased from excessive bleeding, that there were sufficient materials, equipment and personnel to facilitate the safe transfusion of large quantities of blood and blood products to the deceased and that such transfusions as may have been necessary were carefully managed and carried out using such equipment, tests and practises as would minimise the risk of or prevent the deceased from experiencing fluid overload or other deleterious effects from same.”
“The following matters pleaded in the [respondent’s] Amended Statement of Claim are … admitted in the Amended Defence”
“Both defendants were under a duty to ensure that during and after the performance of the procedure: (a) Any bleeding of the deceased was carefully monitored, properly contained, and managed so as to protect the deceased from excessive bleeding; (b) There were sufficient materials, equipment, and personnel as to facilitate the safe transfusion of large quantities of blood and blood products to the deceased; and (c) Such transfusions as may have been necessary were carefully managed and carried out using such equipment, tests and practices as would minimise the risk of, or prevent, the deceased experiencing fluid overload or other deleterious effects from same.”
“ … the transfusion of O positive Whole Blood to the Deceased who had A positive blood, was a serious error on the part of the Medical Centre as such a transfusion may: (a) itself cause DIC; and (b) result in the destruction of the Deceased’s red blood cells by antibodies present in the O positive whole blood transfused to the Deceased. Such a transfusion is reserved for desperate emergencies where the patient’s haemoglobin level is so low as to be life threatening and where there is no A positive whole blood/packed red cells available. However according to the CBC test results issued at 4:20pm on the13th April 2010 the Deceased’s haemoglobin level although low, was acceptable, and certainly was not life threatening. There are no other CBC test results amongst the Deceased’s Records which showed his haemoglobin level to be so low as to be life threatening. In those circumstances there was no justification for taking the extreme and dangerous step of transfusing him with O positive whole blood. If there was no A positive blood product available then the Medical Team should have waited until same became available while repeating the CBC test to ensure the Deceased’s haemoglobin did not dip to dangerously low levels.”
“34. During the period 3:30pm. to 10:00pm. (6.5 hours) the Deceased received by way of transfusions 3 units of haemaccel, 3 litres of Lactated Ringers, 11 units of whole blood, 2 units of FFP, and 3 units of Cryoprecipitate…. This represents a massive transfusion amounting to more than twice the average volume of fluid in the human body. 35. There is a significant risk of causing fluid overload … when transfusing a large volume of fluid to a patient if the transfusion process is not carefully monitored and managed. Fluid overload in this context refers to a condition where there is too much fluid in the blood, that is to say more than the heart can effectively cope with, as a result of the infusion of too much fluid or the infusion of fluid too fast. A fit person can usually deal with excessive fluid administration up to a point. However, compensation for fluid overload is difficult or impossible for those patients with cardiac impairment. If left unaddressed and/ or unchecked, fluid overload may lead to heart failure. 36. Given the fact that the deceased had ‘early coronary disease’ with a 40 to 50% stenosis in the right coronary artery, there was a significant risk of him developing fluid overload in the event that the post-operative transfusion of fluid was not monitored and managed carefully. The risk of [the deceased] developing fluid overload was further increased by the risk of him developing what is commonly known as ‘TURP syndrome’. There is a 2% incidence of this syndrome which is associated with congestive heart failure, pulmonary oedema, hypotension, and acute hyponatraemia as its main manifestations. It results from the absorption of large amounts of irrigant used during the TURP procedure resulting in amongst other things fluid … overload. 37. Given the risk of the deceased developing fluid overload as a result of TURP syndrome, the large amount of fluids which were required to be administered to the deceased post-operatively, and the fact that the deceased had been diagnosed with ‘early coronary disease’, [the surgeon and/or the second appellant] ought to have taken certain basic steps to prevent and detect fluid overload in the deceased both peri-operatively and post-operatively, and in particular, during the period the deceased was being transfused with large volumes of fluids as treatment for shock. These steps include:- (i) a regular and meticulous assessment of the amount of fluid administered to the deceased and the amount of fluid drained from the deceased; (ii) the insertion of a central venous pressure line - this is a device used amongst other things to determine whether there is too much or too little fluid in the body; (iii) intra-arterial line to monitor accurately changes in blood pressure and indirectly cardiac output and to provide for the monitoring of blood gasses. Blood gasses show the efficiency of oxygenation and the acid/base of the circulating blood; (iv) the use of a pulse oximeter to measure oxygen levels in the deceased blood – a reduction in oxygen levels in the blood is a symptom of fluid overload; (v) monitoring of the deceased for jugular venous distention – an indication of fluid overload; (vi) auscultation of the chest (i.e. listening to lungs) for crepitations (i.e. crackling, rattling or clicking noises) another indication possible fluid overload; (vii) listening to the heart for a third heart sound; (viii) arterial blood gas tests; (ix) Chest x-rays 38. There is nothing in the deceased records that indicate that any of these steps were taken by the [first appellant] save that it is recorded in [the second appellant’s] notes that at 10:00pm that 2 pulse oximeters were used to monitor the patient”
“such fluid overload was the direct cause of his death.”
“On the evidence before [the judge] there was sufficient evidence for him to conclude that on a balance of probabilities the death of the deceased was caused by the negligence of the appellants.”