"When I get home Ruby, Winston and my old man did home. I went in my bedroom and tek up some kerosene I had in a plastic jug and I throw de kerosene oil pun de bed and light it wid some matches. I left de jug in my bedroom and run out through de door nearest to my bedroom. When I left de fire did burning in my bed and I see Winston and my old man gine to out it. I then went down to Belleplaine Police Station and tell the Police that I was in some trouble because I light the house."
"Mr Foreman and Members, you will remember that at this stage the Prosecution sought to produce the statement as evidence in this trial and Counsel for the Defence objected to the admission of the statement on the ground that it was not a voluntary statement. I investigated the circumstances surrounding the making of the statement, and I ruled that the statement was made by the Accused Trevor Foster and that it was a voluntary statement and was therefore admissible in law. Accordingly, it was admitted in evidence. However, despite the fact that I have admitted the statement in evidence, it is for you, the Members of the Jury, to say what weight, if any, you attach to this statement, having regard to all the circumstances in which the statement was taken. Its probative value, that is, how much reliance you can place on it is for you to determine, having regard to all the circumstances. The mere fact that a statement is ruled admissible by the Judge does not necessarily mean that you should accept it, it is still your duty to look at it and see what weight, if any, you should attach to it, since admissibility and weight are two different things. Admissibility is a matter of law for the Judge, weight is a matter for the Jury. It is therefore the Jury's responsibility to find the truth of what took place. If you accept that it was really the statement of the Accused, then you would consider the weight and probative value to attach to it by paying careful attention and due consideration to all the circumstances surrounding the making of the statement. The matter rests with you as a question of fact, whether or not the statement was made by the Accused."
"Malice can be proved in different ways, depending on the circumstances. Malice can be proved by establishing an intention to kill or an intention to cause really serious bodily harm. Malice can also be proved by establishing that the killing occurred in the course of, or in the furtherance of the commission of a felony. The law in this regard is that where a person does a felonious act which is unlawful and dangerous, and the act is likely to injure another, and that act causes the death of another, even inadvertently, the person doing the act is guilty of murder. To set fire to a dwellinghouse with another person in it is a felony. Indeed Section 3 of the Malicious Injury to Property Act, Chapter 140 of the Laws of Barbados provides that: 'Any person who unlawfully and maliciously sets fire to any dwellinghouse, any person being therein shall be guilty of felony.' Where the word maliciously is used in a statutory definition of a crime, malice must be taken as requiring either, one, an actual intention to do the particular kind of harm that is in fact done or two, recklessness as to whether such harm should occur or not. That is to say, the Accused must have foreseen that the particular kind of harm might be done, that is, that the house might burn down with the persons in it and yet gone on to take the risk of it."
"If in your final determination of all the evidence before you, bearing in mind that the Accused has nothing to prove, and that it is the duty of the Prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, you are satisfied that Ruby Grecia met her death as a result of accidental fire, or you are left in a state of doubt as to whether or not the fire started accidentally, then you will return a verdict of not guilty. If on the other hand you do not accept that the fire occurred accidentally, and you are not in any doubt about that on the evidence, then, if you are satisfied on the totality of the evidence and feel sure that the Accused deliberately and intentionally, that is, not accidentally set fire to the dwellinghouse at Cambridge, St Joseph, knowing other persons were inside, and that the death of Ruby Grecia resulted from the setting of the house on fire, then you will find the Accused guilty of murder as charged."
"On 27/12/91 about 7.00pm I was at home in the dining room my mother was in her bedroom. I saw the accused come and stand up at the side door of our house. The accused had a white salt meat bucket in his hand. He also had a green cigarette lighter. I saw the accused take the bucket he threw gasoline across the table cloth and he lit the table cloth with the lighter. I smell the gasoline when he threw it on the table cloth. The table cloth caught fire – the house started to burn."
"Yesterday Friday I went at my girlfriend mother house to talk to she. I had to arm myself because sometime when I go there de family does come at me with forks and knives and things like that. So I get some gasoline and went by de door and stop by de table. I call for my girlfriend Cerlene and de mother come out from de bedroom with a knife and then de rest gather round like they want to attack. I then throw de gasoline all bout de house wild and light it. I get catch first and I run."
"I saw the door of a bedroom open and I saw the face of Cerlene's mother which was facing me. She and I were face to face. Within a split second, before I could think or reverse, Cerlene's mother took up a knife from a barrel which was in the left hand corner of the bedroom. She came towards me at full force. I could not reverse. It was too late, so I pulled up the container with the gas with my right hand to block the knife and the container which had on a cover which was loose. The gasoline spilt out all over the place where I was standing. The cigarette which I had in my mouth, fell on the left side on to the table cloth. I reached down to take it up but it was too late. When I reached for it, the flames came off the table and I was caught on fire on my left side. The fire then spread fast from my left side to my right side. I dropped the container which had the gasoline, ran outside with my clothes on fire."
"Before a verdict of guilty can be returned in this case on this Indictment, the Prosecution must make you feel sure that the Accused Cedric Williams killed Cynthia Martin and that the killing was unlawful and that the killing was accompanied by malice. Malice can be proved in different ways depending on the circumstances. Malice can be proved by establishing an intention to kill or an intention to cause really serious bodily harm. Malice can also be proved by establishing that the killing occurred in the course of or in the furtherance of the commission of a felony. The law in this regard is that where a person does a felonious act which is unlawful and dangerous and the act is likely to injure another and that act causes the death of another, even inadvertently, the person doing the act is guilty of murder. To set fire to a dwellinghouse with another person in it is a felony, because section 3 of the Malicious Injury to Property Act, Chapter 140 of the Laws of Barbados contains the following provisions. 'Any person who unlawfully and maliciously sets fire to any dwellinghouse with any person being therein shall be guilty of a felony.' Where the word maliciously is used in the statutory definition of a crime, malice must be taken as requiring, either (i), an actual intention to do the particular kind of harm that was in fact done, or (ii), recklessness as to whether such harm should occur or not. That is to say, the Accused must have foreseen that the particular kind of harm might have been done, that is, that the house might burn down with the person or persons in it and yet went on to take the risk of that event coming to pass."
"… if you felt that he didn't go there to burn down the house, he didn't go there to kill anybody or to cause grievous bodily harm to anybody, but if you think that he went there to look for his girlfriend and he carried along a bucket of petrol instead of carrying some flowers or sweets, some chocolate or icecream, if you believe that, but whilst there through his recklessness, a fire started, then you will have to find him not guilty of murder, but guilty of manslaughter."
"The decision on the admissibility of a confession after a voire dire is the sole responsibility of the judge. There is no logical reason why the jury should know about the decision of the judge. It is irrelevant to the consideration by the jury of the issues whether the confession was made and, if so, whether it is true. There is also no practical reason why the jury need to be informed of the judge's decision. This is underlined by the fact that in modern English practice the judge's decision after a voire dire is never revealed to the jury. Moreover, if the judge reveals his decision to the jury, the risk of unfair prejudice to a defendant is created. That risk will often be greater than in the case of a no case submission. That is so because in the typical case, of which the present is a paradigm, the decision of the judge on the voluntariness of the confession may convey to the jury that the judge believed the police witnesses and disbelieved the defendant. It is true, of course, that in a summing up a judge may for the assistance of the jury make tentative observations which could reflect adversely on the veracity of a defendant. Provided that the judge does so in a fair and balanced way that is unobjectionable. But that situation does not bear comparison with the judge informing the jury of his decision on the voluntariness of a statement. That will typically involve a concluded view on the credibility of the police and the defendant. The reason why it is wrong for a judge to reveal his decision to a jury is not because it would amount to a withdrawal of an issue from the jury and it does not amount to a misdirection. The vice is that the knowledge by the jury that the judge has believed the police and disbelieved the defendant creates the potentiality of prejudice. A jury of laymen, or some of them, might be forgiven for saying: 'Well the judge did not believe the defendant, why should we believe him?' At the very least it creates the risk that the jury, or some of them, may be diverted from grappling properly and independently with a defendant's allegations of oppression so far as it is relevant to their decision. And such an avoidable risk of prejudice cannot be tolerated in regard to a procedure designed to protect a defendant. In these circumstances, and relying particularly on the irrelevance of the judge's decision to the task of the jury taken together with the potentiality of prejudice created by informing the jury of the judge's decision, their Lordships hold that the jury ought not to be informed of a judge's decision on a voire dire held to determine the admissibility of a confession. Any contrary practice in The Bahamas or elsewhere in the Caribbean ought to be discontinued."
"Any person who unlawfully and maliciously sets fire to any building, other than those specified in sections 2 to 5, shall be guilty of felony …"
" … in any statutory definition of a crime, 'malice' must, as we have already seen, be taken – not in its vague common law sense as 'wickedness' in general, but – as requiring an actual intention to do the particular kind of harm that in fact was done … For it is essential to arson that the incendiary either should have intended the building to take fire, or, at least, should have recognised the probability of its taking fire and have been reckless as to whether or not it did so."
"I think that, instead of saying that any act done with intent to commit a felony and which causes death amounts to murder, it would be reasonable to say that any act known to be dangerous to life, and likely in itself to cause death done for the purpose of committing a felony which caused death, should be murder."