"1. The appellant is a citizen of Jamaica born on18 December 1958 . She arrived in the United Kingdom on15 September 2002 , as a visitor and claimed asylum on 5 December, 2002. She claimed that she feared persecution and ill-treatment from a group of men who wanted to rape her daughter and who were not happy with her relationship with her boyfriend. A gun man came into her house on2 November 1999 , and after not finding her daughter in the house, he shot her son and killed him and the appellant was shot in the eye. She became unconscious and was in a coma until January 2000. The appellant also claimed that her other son was shot by police and killed on20 December 2001 . 2. The respondent refused her claim and she appealed to an Immigration Judge [Mr I T Sanderson] who heard the appeal on 20 May, 2004. He dismissed it in his determination promulgated on20 July 2004 . He found that there was a sufficiency of protection available to the appellant from the authorities. He also found that the option of internal relocation was open to the appellant. 3. Mr Allison made submissions on behalf of the appellant. He submitted that there was a material error of law on the part of the Immigration Judge. He referred to paragraph 23 of the determination where the Immigration Judge had stated that the appellant's fear was not subjectively well-founded and that there was a sufficiency of protection. He submitted that relevant objective evidence was placed before the Immigration Judge which clearly indicated that there was no sufficiency of protection. He referred to various documents in the appellant's bundle that was placed before the Immigration Judge [sic] , in particular the Amnesty International report, on page 94 of the bundle, where it was stated that there was no general sufficiency of protection for victims of criminal violence in Jamaica. He also referred to paragraph 7.6 of the judgment of the Court of Appeal in the case of McPherson (page 82 of the appellant's bundle) where the report of Professor Le Frank was referred to by their Lordships and which stated that the police were quite unable to provide adequate protection for any one. Mr Allison submitted that the Immigration Judge had made a material error of law in overlooking to consider the objective that was placed before him. 4. Mr Allison submitted that the Immigration Judge had also made an error in his consideration of the internal flight options. He did not apply his mind to the general inefficiency of protection in his consideration of the internal flight option. 5. Mr Johnson made submissions on behalf of the respondent and invited us to find that the determination was sustainable. The grounds of appeal were a simple disagreement with the findings made by the Immigration Judge. The Immigration Judge considered the existence of the Jamaican Constabulary Force and made his findings. He took all the evidence into account in finding that the police were able to provide a sufficiency of protection. He also submitted the internal flight option was probably considered by the Immigration Judge. The findings made by the Immigration Judge were open to him and he invited us to find that there was no error of law. 6. We considered the submissions made by both representatives and examined the determination. We found that there was a material error of law on the part of the Immigration Judge. Objective material was placed before him which clearly indicated that there was no sufficiency of protection. It is clear from the findings of the Immigration Judge that he did not engage with the objective materials. He found in paragraph 23 that there was a sufficiency of protection but did not comment on the objective material presented to him which clearly indicated otherwise. We find that that was a material error of law. 7. Connected with the error relating to sufficiency of protection, the Immigration Judge also made an error as regards the internal flight option. His consideration of the internal flight option was inadequate and therefore a further error of law. We are satisfied that there is a material error of law on the part of the Immigration Judge. 8. We could not complete the consideration today since the appeal would have to be heard afresh when the appellant would want to give oral evidence and factual findings would have to be made. 9. The matter is adjourned and kept at Field House Hearing Centre where further reconsideration will resume in due course. There will be a complete rehearing of the appeal when both parties will be able to argue all aspects of their respective cases. 10. The matter is placed before the country guidance group to consider whether this case, which we have linked with another file where an error of law was found today, should be listed for country guidance. 11. We gave a direction at the hearing that both parties serve on each other and on the Tribunal at least 14 days before the resumed hearing any documentary evidence to be relied upon, including any witness statements and skeleton arguments. 12. We reminded both parties that further directions may follow. 13. The list office should liaise with the appellant's representatives to enquire whether oral expert evidence is to be called since it was not made clear at the hearing before us. 14. An interpreter will not be required. 15. The list office should refer to the country group to find out how much time should be allocated to these two cases which may be heard together."
"I, […] , make this statement as follows: The names of the three "brothers" were "
"Families against state terrorism (FAST). I presently lead this organisation and need to be regularly in contact with social services agencies that can provide victim support and counselling, as well as care and protection for children and young persons. Membership is drawn mainly from those whose children police have killed or those (including minors) whose rights have been infringed by agents of the state. This organisation provides support for bereaved families and lobbies for systems to hold police to account or for breaches of peoples human rights. FAST maintains close links with low income communities where the police killings and abuses usually take place. The organisation has built a reputation for pursuing justice on behalf of people outside circles of power, affluence, and influence. FAST has campaigned most notably on behalf of the families of the Braeton 7 - seven young men killed by police in 2001." 34. This, with respect, shows some bias on her part. Mr Ouseley produced a copy of inter-press service agency news report entitled Jamaica: police acquittals revives spectre of impunity written by Dionne Jackson Miller which refers to Ms Sobers being on the local human rights groups and being against state terrorism and said that she had mixed feelings about the outcome of a trial. It quoted here as saying "
"Asylum claims ... 4) Sufficiency of state protection, whether from state agents or non-state actors, means a willingness and ability on the part of the receiving state to provide through its legal system a reasonable level of protection from ill-treatment of which the claimant for asylum has a well-founded fear; Osman , Horvath , Dhima . 5) The effectiveness of the system provided is to be judged normally by its systemic ability to deter and/or to prevent the form of persecution of which there is a risk, not just punishment of it after the event; Horvath , Banomova , McPherson and Kinuthia . 6) Notwithstanding systemic sufficiency of state protection in the receiving state, a claimant may still have a well-founded fear of persecution if he can show that the authorities know or ought to know circumstances particular to his case giving rise to his fear, but are unlikely to provide the additional protection his particular circumstances reasonably require; Osman . Article 3 claims ... 10) The threshold of risk required to engage Article 3 depends on the circumstances of each case, including the magnitude of the risk, the nature and severity of the ill-treatment risked, and whether the risk emanates from a state agency or non-state actor; Horvath . 11) In most, but not necessarily all, cases of ill-treatment which, but for state protection, would engage Article 3, a risk of such ill-treatment will be more readily established in state agency cases than in non-state actor cases – there is a spectrum of circumstances giving rise to such risks spanning the two categories, ranging from breach of a duty by the state of a negative duty not to inflict Article 3 ill-treatment to a breach of a duty to take positive protective action against such ill-treatment by non-state actors; Svazas . 12) An assessment of the threshold of risk applicable in the circumstances to engage Article 3 necessarily involves an assessment of the sufficiency of state protection to meet the threat of which there is such a risk – one cannot be considered without the other whether or not the exercise is regarded as 'holistic' or to be conducted in two stages: Dhima , Krepel , Svazas . 13) Sufficiency of state protection is not necessarily a guarantee of protection from Article 3 ill-treatment any more than it is a guarantee of protection from an otherwise well-founded fear of persecution in asylum cases – nor, if and to the extent that there is any difference, is it eradication or removal of risk of exposure to Article 3 ill-treatment; Dhima , McPherson , Krepel . 14) Where the risk falls to be judged by the sufficiency of state protection, that sufficiency is judged, not according to whether it would eradicate the real risk of the relevant harm, but according to whether it is a reasonable provision in the circumstances; Osman . 15) Notwithstanding such systemic sufficiency of state protection in the receiving state, a claimant may still be able to establish an Article 3 claim if he can show that the authorities there know or ought to know particular circumstances likely to expose him to risk of Article 3 ill-treatment; Osman . 16) The approach is the same whether the receiving country is or is not a party to the ECHR, but in determining whether it would be contrary to Article 3 to remove a person to that country, our courts should decide the factual issue as to risk as if ECHR standards apply there – and the same applies to the certification process under Section 115(1) and/or (2) of the 2002 Act."
" I am absolutely for anybody defending himself or herself, but I am not convinced that this is what was occurring in this case, although I acknowledge the jury's right, and the decision they came to… but I am very concerned by the message that it is sending."
"…..as a general rule, he would not argue that the authorities would provide a Jamaican homosexual with a sufficiency of protection."