"11.In relation to count 1 it is alleged that the defendants sought to induce the Department to make grossly inflated payments for the antibiotics. They held secret meetings to exchange confidential information on pricing and sales in order to devise and implement the scheme to control prices and manipulate supply. There were alleged to have been some fifteen meetings, the true purpose of which was disguised under the pretext that they were connected with packaging. False minutes were created retrospectively. The defendants pre-determined allocations of the supply of antibiotics between themselves. They increased the prices in concert on five separate occasions. They disseminated false reasons for stock shortages and price increases in accordance with a script. They lied when questioned by the Department about price increases across the market. They falsely asserted that the generic market was competitive and identified a number of bogus reasons for the price increases. They paid competitor companies with the capacity to supply antibiotics to stay out of the market and concealed the purpose of the payments. They withheld stock and policed agreed prices and market allocations by auditing each other and imposing penalties on those undertakings which exceeded the agreed allocation. They published price lists with a 2% variation of the agreed prices to disguise the fact that they were the product of collusion. Prosecution witnesses say that some of the conspirators acknowledged that they were behaving dishonestly and ran the risk of imprisonment. 12. In short, the allegation is that the defendants entered into agreements dishonestly to fix and maintain the price of the drugs and manipulate their supply. They thereby agreed dishonestly to prejudice the economic rights or interests of the Department by inducing them to pay a higher price than would have otherwise been set by the drug tariff. They dishonestly induced the Department to believe that the drug tariff had been calculated by reference to the operation of a competitive market."
"The prosecution case is that the corporate defendants well knew the basis upon which the Department of Health funded the provision of pharmaceutical drugs under the NHS. Its method of reaching a fair price was formulated upon the continued existence of open competition between manufacturers and suppliers. Taking advantage of that knowledge the defendants acted as though they were engaged in open competition when in fact they were not. They had secretly agreed to undermine open competition in order to fix prices and by that means to extract from the Department of Health vast sums of money from which they knew it would not otherwise have parted."
"22.We do not accept that such a distinction can be made. The allegations in the instant case of what Mr Pannick QC described as positive deception are no more than that the defendants took steps to maintain the deception which the secrecy of the agreement was designed to achieve. There seems to us to be no satisfactory point at which a boundary can be drawn between such secrecy and cases of positive deception. In the instant appeal the secrecy of the agreement was essential to the purpose of the agreement, deception of the Department. To maintain secrecy it may well have been necessary to provide false information but, as Auld LJ remarked in Norris (paragraph 66) the distinction is merely one of degree."
"The common law recognised that an agreement in restraint of trade might be unreasonable in the public interest, and in such cases the agreement would be held to be void and unenforceable. But unless there were aggravating features such as fraud, misrepresentation, violence, intimidation or inducement of a breach of contract, such agreements were not actionable or indictable."
"In cases where aggravating elements, notably misrepresentation and deception, have been found, defendants have been successfully prosecuted for conspiracy to defraud. Thus in R v De Berenger (1814) 3 M&S 67 the defendants were successfully prosecuted for conspiring by false rumours to raise the price of the public funds, causing loss to those who bought during this temporary rise. In R v Lewis (1869) 11 Cox CC 404 the defendants were convicted of conspiring to obtain money by divers false pretences and deceptive practices. In Scott v Brown, Doering, McNab & Co[1892] 2 QB 724 , a civil case, the plaintiff was found to have created a false market in shares by false and fictitious acts."