"2 It is hereby agreed and declared between the Vendor and the Purchasers that all easements quasi-easements or rights in the nature of easements as now existing between the property hereby conveyed and the adjoining property of the Vendor known as Walford House aforesaid shall continue for the benefit of the respective properties.
"3 The Vendor herby covenants for himself and his successors in title owner or occupiers for the time being of the property known as Walford House aforesaid to maintain to the reasonable satisfaction of the Purchasers and their successors in title such part of the roof of Walford House aforesaid as lies above the property conveyed in wind and water tight condition."
"It is said, that the covenant being one which does not run with the land, this Court cannot enforce it; but the question is, not whether the covenant runs with the land, but whether a party shall be permitted to use the land in a manner inconsistent with the contract entered into by his vendor, and with notice of which he purchased."
"if an equity is attached to the property by the owner, no one purchasing with notice of that equity can stand in a different situation from the party from whom he purchased."
"I think that when a contract is entered into for the benefit of contiguous landowners, and one is bound by it and the other entitled to the benefit of it, the covenant binds him for ever, and also runs with the land. But it is equally clear that he is bound by taking the land with notice of the covenant."
"decided that an assignee taking land subject to a certain class of covenants is bound by such covenants if he has notice of them, and that the class of covenants comprehended within the rule is that covenants restricting the mode of using the land only will be enforced. It may be also, but it is not necessary to decide here, that all covenants also which impose such a burden on the land as can be enforced against the land would be enforced ... It is said that if we decide for the defendants we shall have to overrule Cooke v. Chilcott, 3 Ch. D. 694. If that case was decided on the equitable doctrine of notice, I think we ought to overrule it."
"Let us consider the examples in which a court of equity has enforced covenants affecting land. We find that they have been invariably enforced if they have been restrictive, and that with the exception of the covenants in Cooke v. Chilcott 3 Ch. D. 694, only restrictive covenants have been enforced."
"lays down the real principle that an equity attaches to the owner of the land . . . The covenant to repair can only be enforced by making the owner put his hand into his pocket, and there is nothing which would justify us in going that length."
"With regard to the argument founded on Tulk v. Moxhay, 2 Ph. 774 that case was very much considered by the Court of Appeal in Haywood v . The Brunswick Permanent Benefit Building Society, 8 Q.B.D. 403, and the court there decided that they would not extend the doctrine of Tulk v. Moxhay to affirmative covenants, compelling a man to lay out money or do any other act of what I may call an active character, but that it was to be confined to restrictive covenants. Of course that authority would be binding upon us if we did not agree to it, but I most cordially accede to it. I think that we ought not to extend the doctrine of Tulk v. Moxhay in the way suggested here. The doctrine of that case . . . appears to me to be either an extension in equity of the doctrine of Spencer's case to another line of cases, or else an extension in equity of the doctrine of negative easements . . . The covenant in Tulk v. Moxhay was affirmative in its terms, but was held by the court to imply a negative. Where there is a negative covenant expressed or implied, ... the court interferes on one or other of the above grounds. This is an equitable doctrine, establishing an exception to the rules of common law which did not treat such a covenant as running with the land, and it does not matter whether it proceeds on analogy to a covenant running with the land or on analogy to an easement. The purchaser took the estate subject to the equitable burden, with the qualification that if he acquired the legal estate for value without notice he was freed from the burden."
"to a degree which was thought dangerous, considerable pains were taken by the court to point out the limits of that doctrine . . . The conclusion arrived at ... was that Tulk v. Moxhay, when properly understood, did not apply to any but restrictive covenants."
"Undoubtedly, where there is a restrictive covenant, the burden and benefit of which do not run at law, courts of equity restrain anyone who takes the property with notice of that covenant from using it in a way inconsistent with the covenant. But here the covenant which is attempted to be insisted upon on this appeal is a covenant to lay out money in doing certain work upon this land; and, that being so ... that is not a covenant which a court of equity will enforce: it will not enforce a covenant not running at law when it is sought to enforce that covenant in such a way as to require the successors in title of the covenantor, to spend money, and in that way to undertake a burden upon themselves. The covenantor must not use the property for a purpose inconsistent with the use for which it was originally granted; but in my opinion a court of equity does not and ought not to enforce a covenant binding only in equity in such a way as to require the successors of the covenantor himself, they having entered into no covenant, to expend sums of money in accordance with what the original covenantor bound himself to do."
"Covenants restricting the enjoyment of land, except of course as between the contracting parties and those privy to the contract, are not enforceable by anything in the nature of action or suit founded on contract. Such actions and suits alike depend on privity of contract, and no possession of the land coupled with notice of the covenants can avail to create such privity: Cox v. Bishop (1857) 8 De G.M. & G. 815. But if the covenant be negative, so as to restrict the mode of use and enjoyment of the land, then there is called into existence an equity attached to the property of such a nature that it is annexed to and runs with it in equity: Tulk v. Moxhay, 2 Ph. 774. This equity, although created by covenant or contract, cannot be sued on as such, but stands on the same footing with and is completely analogous to an equitable charge on real estate created by some predecessor in title of the present owner of the land charged. . . . effect is given to the negative covenant by means of the land itself. But the land cannot spend money on improving itself, and there is no personal liability on the owner of the land for the time being, because there is no contract on which he can be sued in contract."
"(1) A covenant relating to any land of a covenantor or capable of being bound by him, shall, unless a contrary intention is expressed, be deemed to be made by the covenantor on behalf of himself, his successors in title and the persons deriving title under him or them, and, subject as aforesaid, shall have effect as if such successors and other persons were expressed."
"a covenant to perform positive acts ... is not one the burden of which runs with the land so as to bind the successors in title of the covenantor: see Austerberry v. Oldham Corporation."
"Section 79, in my view, involves quite different considerations and I do not think that it provides a helpful analogy."