"It is clear that any civilised system of law is bound to provide remedies for cases of what has been called unjust enrichment or unjust benefit, that is to prevent a man from retaining the money of or some benefit derived from another which it is against conscience that he should keep."
"all contracts or agreements, whether by parole or in writing, by way of gaming or wagering, shall be null and void; and that no suit shall be brought or maintained in any court of law or equity for recovering any sum of money or valuable thing alleged to be won upon any wager, or which
"So, in the case of money stolen, the true owner cannot recover it, after it has been paid away fairly and honestly upon a valuable and bona fide consideration: but before money has passed in currency, an action may be brought for the money itself."
"Here the plaintiff sues for his identified property, which has come to the hands of the defendants iniquitously and illegally in breach of the Act of Parliament. Therefore they have no right to retain it; and consequently the plaintiff is well entitled to recover."
"why should not a man say, you and I have agreed so and so, but the agreement is good for nothing; I cannot bind you, and you cannot bind me, therefore I desire, before the event happens, that you will pay me back my money:"
"It is said that an action for money had and received is not maintainable in this case. But an action for money had and received is maintainable whenever the money of one man has, without consideration, got into the pocket of another. Here the money of the plaintiffs has got into the pocket of the defendant; and the question is whether this has been without any consideration. The consideration was the supposed right of the defendant to dispose of the goods as partnership property, which was the inducement to the plaintiffs to give this bill, under which they have been obliged to pay the money. The defendant had no such right; therefore the absence of any consideration entitles the plaintiffs to maintain this action, and still more so where the money has got into the defendant's pocket through the medium of a fraud."
"operates against the person who is able to exercise the influence (in this case it was the father) and in my judgment, it would operate against every volunteer who claimed under him, and also against every person who claimed under him with notice of the equity thereby created or with notice of the circumstances from which the court infers the equity."
" ... I am bound now to hold . . . that where people embark in a perfectly lawful game and contest of skill, not trusting to fortune but to skill, to ascertain the comparative eminence of the two persons, the sums which they deposit to make a joint award are to be considered by the law as sums deposited by way of wagering, the contract is null and void, and the winner cannot recover the fund."
"Where money has been stolen, it is trust money in the hands of the thief, and he cannot divest it of that character. If he pays it over to another person, then it may be followed into that other person's hands. If, of course, that other person shows that it has come to him bona fide for valuable consideration, and without notice, it then may lose its character as trust money and cannot be recovered. But if it is handed over merely as a gift, it does not matter whether there is notice or not."
"To accept either of the two contentions with which I have been so far dealing would be to assent to the proposition that a thief who has stolen money, and who from fear of detection hands that money to a beggar who happens to pass, gives a title to the money to the beggar as against the true owner - a proposition which is obviously impossible of acceptance."
"as the money paid into the bank can be identified as the product of the original money, the plaintiffs have the common law right to claim it, and can sue for money had and received."
"the chips were not money or money's-worth; they were mere counters or symbols used for the convenience of all concerned in the gaming. As tokens, the chips indicated that the holder had lodged cash with the club or, when a cheque had been used, had been given credit by the club, to the extent indicated by the tokens. It is as though the customer had been given a series of receipts in respect of the money handed over by him prior to beginning to play. The money was to go to the winners, or be returned to the customer if not spent on gaming. When the customer played at the table he was playing with the money he had brought with him to the casino, just as much as if he had used the banknotes themselves rather than the chips for which he had exchanged the banknotes preparatory to the start of play. I do not believe that this internal, preliminary, preparatory step, of issuing chips for cash, adopted for considerations of practical convenience, can have the effect in law that the club gave valuable consideration for the money it received, when the position in law under the statute is that if money rather than tokens had been used at the table, the club would not have given valuable consideration. I find such a conclusion repugnant to common sense."
"This is a liberal action in the nature of a bill in equity; and if, under the circumstances of the case, it appears that the defendant cannot in conscience retain what is the subject matter of it, the plaintiff may well support this action . . . the plaintiff does not sue as standing in the place of Wood his clerk: for the money and notes which Wood paid to the defendants, are the identical notes and money of the plaintiff. Where money or notes are paid bona fide, and upon a valuable consideration, they never
"People do not game in order to win chips; they game in order to win money. The chips are not money or money's worth; they are mere counters or symbols used for the convenience of all concerned in the gaming."
"It is important to distinguish between what was Richardson's authority in relation on the one hand to the A.N.Z. bank and on the other to Mann. No question arises in these proceedings between Mann and the A.N.Z. bank. It is clear that Mann could not as between himself and the bank question Richardson's authority to draw cheques on the trust account. The position as between Mann and Richardson was different. Richardson had no authority, express or implied, from Mann either to draw cheques on the trust account or to obtain bank cheques in exchange for them except for the proper purposes of the partnership. If he exceeded those purposes, his act was unauthorised and open to challenge by Mann. It is in these circumstances that the question must be asked whether, as the judge held, the bank cheques were throughout the property of Mann. It is irrelevant to this question what was the relation between Richardson and Ward and whether the latter gave any consideration for the bank cheques that he received and at what stage Mann learned of the fraud that had been practised upon him. The proposition upon which the respondent founds his claim is simple enough: Richardson was his partner and in that capacity was able to draw upon the trust account and so to obtain from the bank its promissory notes: therefore the notes were the property of the partnership and belonged to Mann, and Richardson could not give a better title to a third party than he himself had."
"This is a direct decision that, if the acts of McClintock were unauthorised in the relevant sense of that word, the bank cheques did not when issued become the property of the plaintiffs. It appears to their Lordships that the majority of the full court in McClintock's case erred in regarding as decisive the fact that as between the plaintiffs and the bank McClintock was authorised to obtain bank cheques, whereas the relevant question was whether McClintock was as between the plaintiffs and himself authorised to obtain the particular cheques that were converted. Upon the verdict of the jury that he was not so authorised, they should have come to the opposite conclusion. In the same way in the present case the judge, having found that Richardson obtained the bank cheques in question in fraud of Mann and without his authority, should have gone on to hold that they did not become the property of Mann. Whether they became his by his subsequent ratification of the acts of Richardson is another question, which their Lordships will examine just as it was examined in McClintock's case. Upon what has been called the main question they observe that they could not hold that the respondent acquired a property in the bank cheques without directly contradicting a decision which has in 40 years been the subject of no adverse comment. And they would add that it appears to be in accordance with principle. They agree with the analysis of the transaction which was submitted by counsel for the appellant. In effect