"Nevertheless, in spite of these obvious signs of the building having been violated by unauthorised persons, no one saw fit to report the matter to the police or to attempt to bring it to the attention of the defenders or their representatives."
"bearing in mind that [Littlewoods] had no control over the children and teenagers, was it reasonably foreseeable by [Littlewoods] that, by failing to keep the cinema lockfast and to inspect it regularly during the last half of June and the first few days of July 1976, children and young persons would not only enter it, but start a fire?"
"In the absence of any evidence about the lighting of fires, it would have been difficult to say that it was 'very likely' that children and young persons breaking into these premises would start a fire, but in the present instance there is evidence that on two occasions shortly before5 July 1976 witnesses saw signs of someone having tried to start a fire. ... I accept that there is a very narrow dividing line in the circumstances of this case between bare foreseeability and reasonable foreseeability, but having applied my mind to that problem I have reached the conclusion that the lighting of a fire in the premises by children or teenagers was in the circumstances reasonably foreseeable."
"[It] should I think be regarded as a statement of principle. It is not to be treated as if it were a statutory definition. It will require qualification in new circumstances. But I think that the time has come when we can and should say that it ought to apply unless there is some justification or valid explanation for its exclusion."
"These cases show that, where human action forms one of the links between the original wrongdoing of the defendant and the loss suffered by the plaintiff, that action must at least have been something very likely to happen if it is not to be regarded as novus actus interveniens breaking the chain of causation. I do not think that a mere foreseeable possibility is or should be sufficient, for then the intervening human action can more properly be regarded as a new cause than as a consequence of the original wrongdoing. But if the intervening action was likely to happen I do not think that it can matter whether that action was innocent or tortious or criminal. Unfortunately, tortious or criminal action by a third party is often the 'very kind of thing'
"As to negligence, the two men [who were carrying the urn] were not their [i.e. the defenders'] servants. They were not responsible for their acts. That the men should be negligent in so simple an operation was not likely to happen. It was a mere possibility, not a reasonable probability. The men, if negligent, were, no doubt, responsible for their own negligence, but from the standpoint of the appellants the risk of negligence was a mere unlikely accident which no responsible person in [the manageress's] position could naturally be expected to foresee."
"In my opinion, the appellants can only be fixed with liability if it can be shown that there materialised a risk that ought to have been within the appellants' reasonable contemplation."
"The crucial question in this matter appears to me to be whether [the manageress] ought as a reasonable woman to have had in contemplation that, unless some further precautions were taken, such an unfortunate occurrence as that which in fact took place might well be expected."
"it seems to me that it would be entirely in accordance with principle to hold that in such circumstances there was a general duty on owners or occupiers of property, particularly property of the tenement type, where they chose to leave it vacant for any material length of time, to take reasonable care to see that it was proof against the kind of vandalism which was calculated to affect adjoining property."
"I confess that I find it inconceivable that the reasonable man wielding his pick in the road in 1973 could be said reasonably to foresee that his puncturing of a water main would fill the plaintiffs' house with uninvited guests in 1974."
"But, apart from vicarious responsibility, one man may be responsible to another for the harm done to the latter by a third person; he may be responsible on the ground that the act of the third person could not have taken place but for his own fault or breach of duty. There is more than one description of duty the breach of which may produce this consequence. For instance, it may be a duty of care in reference to things involving special danger. It may even be a duty of care with reference to the control of actions or conduct of the third person. It is, however, exceptional to find in the law a duty to control another's actions to prevent harm to strangers. The general rule is that one man is under no duty of controlling another man to prevent his doing damage to a third. There are, however, special relations which are the source of a duty of this nature."
"It is of course true that in the present case the plaintiffs do not allege that the defendants should have controlled the thieves who broke into their storeroom. But they do allege that the defendants should have exercised reasonable care to prevent them gaining access through their own premises; and in my judgment the statement of principle by Dixon J . is equally apposite in such a case. I know of no case where it has been held, in the absence of a special relationship, that the defendant was liable in negligence for having failed to prevent a third party from wrongfully causing damage to the plaintiff."
"The judge's finding is, in my judgment, determinative of this appeal. Summarizing his judgment, he said:
"I am unable to accept that any material ground of distinction exists between the two cases. In P. Perl (Exporters) Ltd, v. Camden London Borough Council [1984] Q.B. 342, as in the instant case, the plaintiff sought to make the defendant occupier liable in negligence for the wrongdoing of a third party. In his judgment Robert Goff
"All of these endorse the development which their Lordships find in the decisions, towards a measured duty of care by occupiers to remove or reduce hazards to their neighbours. So far it has been possible to consider the existence of a duty, in general terms. But the matter cannot be left there without some definition of the scope of his duty. How far does it go? What is the standard of the effort required? What is the position as regards expenditure? It is not enough to say merely that these must be 'reasonable,' since what is reasonable to one man may be very unreasonable, and indeed ruinous, to another: the law must take account of the fact that the occupier on whom the duty is cast has, ex hypothesi, had this hazard thrust upon him through no seeking or fault of his own. His interest, and his resources, whether physical or material, may be of a very modest character either in relation to the magnitude of the hazard, or as compared with those of his threatened neighbour. A rule which required of him in such unsought circumstances in his neighbour's interest a physical effort of which he is not capable, or an excessive expenditure of money, would be unenforceable or unjust. One may say in general terms that the existence of a duty must be based upon knowledge of the hazard, ability to foresee the consequences of not checking or removing it, and the ability to abate it. And in many cases, as, for example, in Scrutton L.J.'s hypothetical case of stamping out a fire, or the present case, where the hazard could have been removed with little effort and no expenditure, no problem arises. But other cases may not be so simple. In such situations the standard ought to be to require of the occupier what it is reasonable to expect of him in his individual circumstances. Thus, less must be expected of the infirm than of the able-bodied: the owner of a small property where a hazard arises which threatens a neighbour with substantial interests should not have to do so much as one with larger interests of his own at stake and greater resources to protect them: if the small owner does what he can and promptly calls on his neighbour to provide additional resources, he may be held to have done his duty: he should not be liable unless it is clearly proved that he could, and reasonably in his individual circumstances should, have done more."
"a breach of duty has taken place if they show the appellants guilty of a failure to take reasonable care to prevent the accident. One may phrase it as 'reasonable care ' or 'ordinary care' or 'proper care' - all these phrases are to be found in decisions of authority - but the fact remains that, unless there has been something which a reasonable man would blame as falling beneath the standard of conduct that he would set for himself and require of his neighbour, there has been no breach of legal duty."
"The law might acknowledge a general principle that, whenever the harmful conduct of another is reasonably foreseeable, it is our duty to take precautions against it . . . . But, up to now, no legal system has gone so far as this."
"The very parable of the good Samaritan (Luke 10, v. 30) which was evoked by Lord Atkin in Donoghue v. Stevenson[1932] AC 562 illustrates, in the conduct of the priest and of the Levite who passed by on the other side, an omission which was likely to have as its reasonable and probable consequence damage to the health of the victim of the thieves, but for which the priest and Levite would have incurred no civil liability in English law."
"In general . . . even though A is in fault, he is not responsible for injury to C which B, a stranger to him, deliberately chooses to do."
"There was nothing about the building, so far as we know from the evidence, to suggest that it could easily be set alight."
"It is, in my opinion, significant that no witness who spoke about the increasing use of the cinema by intruding children and the witnesses included the minister of St. Paul's Church, the session clerk and the beadle, and also Mr. Maloco reported to the police or the defenders what they had observed. If it had crossed their minds that it was likely that the children would set fire to the building and put neighbouring properties at risk, it is inconceivable that they would not have taken immediate steps, by reporting to the police and the defenders, to bring the use of the premises by children to an end. My experience of life, which I am entitled to bring to bear as a juryman would, has not taught me that empty buildings, to which vandals gain access, are likely to be set on fire by them ..."
"a general duty on owners or occupiers of property ... to take reasonable care to see that it [is] proof against the kind of vandalism which was calculated to affect adjoining property,"